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Abstract
This thesis undertakes a detailed examination of the development theory and practice of
the World Bank and, in particular, its shift from the Washington Consensus to the socalled post-Washington Consensus. It does this utilising a Gramscian framework, which
means that the Bank is situated as constituent part of the larger hegemonic project of the
post-World War Two era. Thus, the first part of the thesis explores the origins, history
and development theory of the Bank in the context of the prevailing ideas and political
power.

While the Bank’s move away from the Washington Consensus from the early to mid1990s has been explored by a number of academics, this thesis is the first attempt to
systematically outline the contents of the post-Washington Consensus development
model. These contents are utilised in the second part of the thesis to structure a detailed
analysis of the Bank’s lending practices in two countries, Vietnam and Indonesia. The
case studies enable the development of some empirically-based conclusions regarding
the extent to which the rhetoric of the post-Washington Consensus has been
incorporated into the Bank’s lending practices. They also facilitate some tentative
conclusions about the role of the post-Washington Consensus and its relationship to US
hegemony.

1

Part I:

The World Bank, its History, Structure and
Operations
Chapter One
Introduction

Thesis Approach and Description

This project attempts to analyse the extent and nature of the shift of the World Bank
from the so-called Washington Consensus to the post-Washington Consensus (PWC). It
does so by evaluating the shift in the Bank’s underlying development discourse, as
embodied in its statements, reports and operational guidelines from its origins through
to recent events. It then goes a step further by examining actual lending practices in two
case studies, Vietnam and Indonesia. These detailed studies enable more empiricallybased conclusions about the extent to which the shift in rhetoric to the PWC has been
incorporated into lending practices, thus providing insights into its lending discourse
more generally. In line with the project’s Gramscian inspiration, the analysis of the form
and content of the Bank’s modus operandi is undertaken with the aim of challenging
mainstream development discourse and more broadly the dominant global financial
hegemony, which the Bank both reflects and propagates.

This project sits at the intersection of Development Studies and International Political
Economy (IPE). IPE evolved from studies of International Relations (IR) as a result of
major events in the 1970s in the arena of so-called ‘low’ politics. The impact of a turnaround in the US’s trade account, the abrogation of the Bretton Woods’ agreement by
President Nixon in 1971 and the 1973 Organization of Petroleum Exporting Nations
(OPEC) oil shock forced (some) IR scholars to abandon the distinction between
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economics and politics or to reconceptualise their relationship. 1 Apart from an interest
in ‘new’ issues of low politics and a resultant incorporation of neoclassical behavioural
models, mainstream IPE scholarship, has as Stephen Krasner readily acknowledged
generally “…accept[ed] the basic analytic assumptions of structural realist
approaches.” 2 These basic analytic assumptions include positivist epistemology, a
pessimistic view of human nature, a belief in the state as the main actor in international
relations and the proposition that states are focused on obtaining and maintaining
power. 3

This project is informed by a critical IPE approach. This approach was pioneered by
scholars such as Susan George whose untiring focus on the marginalised, hungry and
poor has been an inspiration, as has her work both as an academic and campaigner
against the World Bank. Robert Wade has challenged orthodox explanations of
development in relation to the role of the state through his detailed empirical work on
East Asia. He provided an insider’s understanding of the Bank’s operations and
ideology and insights into the development discourse more broadly. It is from Robert
Cox though, that my theoretical and political position has gained particular clarity, as it
was he who introduced the work of Antonio Gramsci to IPE. And it is from Gramsci’s
approach to the analysis of the creation of specific forms of hegemony by the dominant
social forces and Cox’s attempt to apply it in the international sphere, that this analysis
of the World Bank draws its inspiration.

Gramsci’s work is, of course, the subject of many interpretive debates and it is beyond
the scope of this thesis to engage fully in these or in a comprehensive account of his
1

Craig N. Murphy and Roger Tooze, "Introduction," in Craig N. Murphy and Roger Tooze (eds.), The
New International Political Economy (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991), p. 3.
2
Stephen Krasner, "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables," in
Stephen Krasner (ed.), International Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), pp. 1-2. See also
Stephen Gill, Power and Resistance in the New World Order (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), pp.
15-40, Craig N. Murphy and Roger Tooze, "Getting Beyond The "Common Sense" Of the IPE
Orthodoxy," in Craig N. Murphy and Roger Tooze (eds.), The New International Political Economy
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991) and Murphy and Tooze, "Introduction."
3
The last two themes are derived from the work of Morgenthau, see Hans J Morgenthau, Politics among
Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972). An excellent overview
of the impact of positivism on both International Relations and IPE is available in, Jim George,
Discourses of Global Politics: A Critical (Re)Introduction to International Relations (Boulder, Co.:
Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc, 1994). For a critique of the outcomes of positivism on the discipline see
John A. Vasquez, The Power of Power Politics: A Critique (London: Frances Pinter, 1983), John A.
Vasquez, The Power of Power Politics: From Classical Realism to Neotraditionalism (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1998).
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work. To be clear, I must acknowledge that my interpretation and reading of Gramsci is
framed by the critical IPE literature and its ambition to supersede positivist IR
scholarship. There are critics of the critical IPE reading of Gramsci, however, they tend
to downplay the importance in both Gramsci and current critical IPE literature of
engaging with, and providing an alternative to, the thinkers of his time. 4 Thus the
purpose of understanding Gramsci here is not to articulate a universal Gramscian
framework, rather it is to explore concepts and ideas that are useful for understanding
and analysing the forms and operations of IPE today. 5

Why the World Bank?

Since the 1980s, the Bank has been at the centre of a new neoliberal global intellectual
hegemony in development theory and practice. The Bank assumed this role because as
an international organisation it had credibility and a veil of independence, yet at the
same time it had demonstrated its usefulness in promoting US interests over a number
of decades. 6 US support for the Bank was also part of its attack on the United Nations
(UN) development agencies, which had historically pursued a more radical development
agenda. 7 The UN agenda saw development as not merely catch up by developing
economies but transformation of global economic and political structures, requiring
some sacrifices from the West. Whereas, despite its dedication and rededication to
poverty eradication on a number of occasions since the 1970s, the Bank remains a
conservative and mainstream lender whose theory and practices support the current
world US neoliberal hegemony.

4

A recent well known critique of the reading of Gramsci in IPE is by Randall D. Germain and Michael
Kenny, "Engaging Gramsci: International Relations Theory and the New Gramscians," Review of
International Studies, Vol. 24, (1998).
5
This is articulated in the responses to Germain and Kenny by Adam David Morton, "Historicizing
Gramsci: Situating Ideas in and Beyond Their Context," Review of International Political Economy, Vol.
10, No. 1 (2003), Mark Rupert, "(Re-)Engaging Gramsci: A Response to Germain and Kenny," Review of
International Studies, Vol. 24, (1998).
6
On the Bank’s usefulness to American interests, see the leaked details from a US Treasury report in,
Walden Bello, Dark Victory : The United States, Structural Adjustment, and Global Poverty (London:
Pluto, 1994), pp. 32-34.
7
Branislav Gosovic, "Global Intellectual Hegemony and the International Development Agenda,"
International Social Science Journal, Vol. 52, No. 166 (2000), p. 454.
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The World Bank is the largest and most powerful global development agency. In 2007,
it added its 185th member and had offices in over 100 countries. Its development
lending arms – the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and
the International Development Agency (IDA) – have cumulatively lent USD $590.2
billion to the end of the 2006 financial year. 8 In the 2004 financial year, the last year of
the case studies in this thesis — it committed $20.1 billion in new loans and it disbursed
just over $17 billion in loans and $3.28 billion from trust funds. 9 Co-financing of its
loans by other bi- or multilateral development agencies further expands its influence.
The Bank’s $20.3 billion was equivalent to 7.3 per cent of Foreign Direct Investment
(FDI) flows to developing countries in 2004, which amounted to $275 billion. 10
However, over 46 per cent of FDI flows to developing countries went to just five
recipients: China, Hong Kong, Mexico, Brazil and Singapore. If you deduct these flows,
FDI to developing countries was $128.7 billion and Bank assistance equalled 15.6 per
cent of their total value. Bank disbursements to its 47 African borrowers in 2004 were
equivalent to 26.8 per cent of the value of FDI flows to these countries. 11

The relative significance of the Bank’s lending operations in purely financial terms has
ebbed and flowed over the years, 12 but it remains at the forefront of investment
decisions guiding the priorities of private investors. The Doing Business series of
flagship publications, which started in 2004, have been “most influential” and only

8

All currency references are to US dollars unless specified otherwise. Data source: World Bank, The
World Bank Annual Report 2006 (Washington: World Bank, 2006).
9
World Bank, The World Bank Annual Report 2004, Volume 1 Year in Review (Washington: World
Bank, 2004), pp. i and 112. The value of trust funds in 2004 was $8.6 billion.
10
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report 2006: FDI from
Developing and Transition Economies: Implications for Development (Geneva: United Nations, 2006),
p. 300.
11
World Bank, Annual Report 2004, p. 29 and United Nations Conference on Trade and Development,
World Investment Report 2006, pp. 299-300.
12
After declining between 2000 and 2003, FDI started an upward trend in 2004, United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report 2006, p. 4. Even in this context of
increasing FDI flows, Bank assistance remains significant despite another of the recurrent crises in the
Bank about the relevance of its lending program when facing competition from FDI. The concerns can be
seen in a number of testimonies to the recent House Committee on Financial Services, "The Role and
Effectiveness of the World Bank in Combating Global Poverty" (Washington: 22 May, 2007), available
from: http://www.house.gov/apps/list/hearing/financialsvcs_dem/ht052207.shtml, accessed: May 2007.
The current crises may be more significant than previous ones but the fact that these crises about the
relevance of Bank lending have reoccurred, suggests the need for a degree of scepticism about their
importance. Further, the recent growth in FDI flows has been concentrated in “a few specific industries,
rather than being broad-based sectorally. Specifically, in 2005, oil and gas, utilities (telecommunications,
energies), banking and real estate were the leading industries.” United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development, World Investment Report 2006, p. 7.
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added to the Bank’s relevance to the private sector. 13 This capacity to impact on private
capital markets may be of greater consequence than the dollars the Bank lends.
Moreover, the authoritativeness of the Bank’s analysis and model of development have
only increased over the last two decades. This is because as well as offering loans and
grants, the Bank provides technical assistance and advice; mobilises economic survey
missions; undertakes sectoral surveys; and organises consultative groups of major
donors to review the progress of particular countries development programs and
policies.

The Bank is the largest development research organisation in the world and probably
the largest development training organisations in the world. Through the World Bank
Institute, it trains around 47,000 people per year. The main targets of its training
programs are developing country government officials and its own staff, though in more
recent years the Institute has broadened its reach to include staff from NonGovernmental Organisations (NGOs), journalists, academics and other development
specialists; they even train parliamentarians, secondary school teachers and children. 14
The Bank’s research capacity is many times larger than any university research
department. According to Nicholas Stern and Francisco Ferreira, by the early 1990s it
had several hundred people working full-time on research and many more who spend
part of their time on research activities. 15 It is not only the main source of research for
its own staff, but for other development agencies and multilateral banks and for the
World Trade Organization, which initially had only limited research capacity. It is very
influential in academic debate, particularly in the field of development economics. 16
The Bank has a larger research and analytical capacity than many of the developing

13

Abhijit Banerjee, et al., "An Evaluation of World Bank Research, 1998-2005" (World Bank, September
24 2006), available from: http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/0,,contentMDK:
21165468~pagePK:64165401~piPK:64165026~theSitePK:469372,00.html, accessed: May 2007, p.49.
14
Prior to 1999, the staff training function was separated from the then Economic Development Institute,
where government officials were trained.
15
Nicholas Stern and Francisco Ferreira, "The World Bank As "Intellectual Actor"," in Devesh Kapur,
John P. Lewis and Richard Webb (eds.), The World Bank Its First Half Century, Volume 2: Perspectives
(Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1997), p. 593. There are around 95 researchers in the
Development Research Group but the Bank’s formal definition of its research activities is very narrow
and excludes most of its analytical and advisory services — its research budget is only eleven per cent the
analytical and advisory services budget, Abhijit Banerjee, et al., "An Evaluation of World Bank Research,
1998-2005," pp. 24-7
16
Robin Broad, "Research, Knowledge, and the Art of 'Paradigm Maintenance': The World Bank's
Development Economics Vice-Presidency (DEC)," Review of International Political Economy, Vol. 13,
No. 3 (2006), pp. 395-396.
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countries it lends to. In 1996, it set about intensifying its research strengths through the
Knowledge Bank initiative, which includes a massive web presence. The Bank uses its
research selectively to promote a particular view of development. This was highlighted
in a recent Bank-commissioned review of its research by a group of prominent
economists. 17 The review highlighted the way that the Bank promoted and extensively
used research by David Dollar and Aart Kray on the relationship between growth,
openness and poverty reduction, which essentially argues that countries (across time
and space) that are open to trade and have ‘sound’ policy settings have achieved better
poverty reduction. 18 The review by prominent economists found that:
…much of this line of research appears to have such deep flaws that,
at present, the results cannot be regarded as remotely reliable… The
problem is that in major policy speeches and publications, it [the
Bank] proselytised the new work without appropriate caveats on its
reliability… Nor has it corrected itself to this day. 19

What is the World Bank?

What we now refer to as the World Bank Group, started with one institution — the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), which was established
through the Bretton Woods agreements of 1944. The World Bank became a group in
1956 with the formation of the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and was further
expanded with the creation of: the International Development Association (IDA) in
1960; the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) in
1966; and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) in 1988. 20 However,
as the World Bank Group itself states, the term ‘World Bank’ refers only to the IBRD

17

Abhijit Banerjee, et al., "An Evaluation of World Bank Research, 1998-2005."
There were a number of papers in the series of research but the most widely cited is David Dollar and
Aart Kray, "Growth Is Good for the Poor," Journal of Economic Growth, Vol. 7, No. 3 (2002).
19
Abhijit Banerjee, et al., "An Evaluation of World Bank Research, 1998-2005," p. 53.
20
The IFC invests in private enterprises via loans and guarantees and provides risk management and
advisory services. MIGA was established to guarantee foreign investors against losses from noncommercial risks such as expropriation, currency inconvertibility and transfer restrictions or war and civil
disturbances. ICSID’s role is conciliation and arbitration of investment disputes.
18
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and the IDA — the Bank’s two development lending arms, which are the focus of this
thesis. 21

The IBRD and IDA were each established with their own Articles of Agreement but
they operate as a single entity— they share the same staff, headquarters and president.
A country must be a member of IBRD to be a member of IDA, as it must be a member
of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to be a member of the IBRD. The Board of
Governors and Executive Directors of the IBRD are ex officio those of the IDA, so long
as the members of each are also members of the IDA. The 24 Executive Directors of the
IBRD comprise five appointees from the countries with the five largest shareholdings
and 19 Directors elected by the remaining Governors. This means that the largest
shareholders in the IBRD automatically have Directors in the IDA, regardless of their
level of subscription. In both organisations, voting is based on the number of shares or
the level of subscription. 22 In the case of appointed Directors, they are able to cast the
number of votes held by the member who appointed them and, in the case of elected
Directors, the number of votes that were cast for them in their election.

The Bank is a “specialized agency” of the United Nations (UN), as per Articles 57 and
63 of the UN Charter. Article 63 of the Charter gives the Economic and Social Council
(ECOSOC) primary responsibility for coordinating specialised agencies. However, even
under the highly decentralised and “…somewhat vague co-ordinating authority” 23 of
ECOSOC, the Bretton Woods institutions are “…rather ‘special’ specialized
agencies.” 24 This relationship is discussed further in Chapter Two, which examines the
establishment of the IBRD.

The principal difference between the IDA and IBRD is that IDA provides zero interest
loans (called credits) to the poorest of countries, defined in 2007 as those with a per
capita income of less than $1,025, whereas the IBRD provides loans to middle income

21

World Bank Group Website, ‘About Us’ available from: http://www.worldbank.org, accessed: March
2003. All references in this thesis to the World Bank or the Bank thus refer to the IBRD and IDA only.
22
The voting structure for the IBRD is outlined in Chapter One and for the IDA in Chapter Two.
23
Paul Taylor, "Managing the Economic and Social Activities of the United Nations System: Developing
the Role of ECOSOC," in Paul Taylor and A.J.R Groom (eds.), The United Nations at the Millennium:
The Principal Organs (London and New York: Continuum, 2000), p. 102.
24
Edward S. Mason and Robert E. Asher, The World Bank since Bretton Woods (Washington, D.C.: The
Brookings Institution, 1973), p. 58.

INTRODUCTION

8

and credit-worthy poorer countries at current market rates. IDA loans generally are over
longer terms (now 20, 35 or 40 years), have a ten years grace period but do attract threequarters of a per cent annual service charge. IBRD loans are shorter terms (generally a
maximum of 25 years), have only a five or seven year grace period and attract marketbased interest rates, though at the bottom end of the market rate given the Bank’s ‘triple
A’ credit rating. The IBRD raises most of its funds from international financial markets,
while the IDA requires regular replenishments from governments in developed
countries plus it receives profits transferred from the IBRD. In the ten years to 2004,
IBRD lending averaged 67 per cent of total new commitments, through the range varied
from 55 to 75 per cent. 25

Understanding Hegemony

Hegemony was used by Gramsci to describe “…a relation, not of domination by means
of force, but of consent by means of political and ideological leadership. It is the
organisation of consent.” 26 Gramsci was predominately interested in how the working
classes can organise consent and thus hegemony within a country, however, he also
analysed the nature and form of bourgeois hegemony. Anderson claimed that it was this
later use of “…the concept of hegemony for a differential analysis of the structure of
bourgeois power in the West” that “was a new and decisive step.” 27 This later usage of
hegemony is also where he conceptualised its unique combination of coercion and
consent. 28

Hegemony operates in society across both the economic structure and the
superstructural levels of civil society and political society. 29 According to Anderson and
others, there are discrepancies in Gramsci’s work in the formulation and inter-relations
of these levels. He identified three different conceptions of economy, state, civil society:
25
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the first involves a distinct dichotomy between civil society and the state with
hegemony located in civil society and domination located in the state. 30 This conception
is seen in the oft-quoted section from Gramsci:
[w]hat we can do, for the moment, is to fix two major superstructural
‘levels’: the one that can be called ‘civil society’, that is the ensemble
of organisms commonly called ‘private’, and that of ‘political society’
or ‘the State’. These two levels correspond on the one hand to the
function of ‘hegemony’ that the dominant group exercises through
society and on the other hand to that of ‘direct domination’ or
command exercised through the State and ‘juridical’ government. 31
The second conception is more of a balance between state and civil society with
hegemony as a combination of coercion and consent operating in both spheres. 32 The
third formulation, suggests a civil society / state nexus. Anderson understood this
formulation as the state encompassing political and civil society. He was suspicious of
this blurring of the boundaries, suggesting that it inhibits the development of a
“…scientific theory of the total articulation of capitalist social formations.” 33 Randall
Germain and Michael Kenny, however, argued it is most appropriate to acknowledge
the presence of both positions — or the possibility of finding them — in Gramsci. 34
Alternatively, it can be argued that it is precisely the rejection of dichotomous modes of
analysis in this third formulation that is most reflective of Gramsci’s historicist
approach and thus, provides a more sophisticated understanding of state / civil society
relations whilst maintaining a distinction between them.

For Gramsci, hegemony is organised through leadership, alliances and networks in a
context of continuous ideological and political struggle. Consent can be obtained by
combining the interests of various social forces around particular populist causes such
as struggles for democracy; or it can be obtained through compromise and persuasion.
As Gramsci said:

30

Anderson, "The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci," p. 26. Anderson derives this usage from Gramsci’s
discussion of the differences in state and civil society relations between East and West.
31
Antonio Gramsci, Prison Notebooks Trans. Joesph A. Buttigieg (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1996), p. 138.
32
Anderson, "The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci," p. 31.
33
Ibid, p. 35.
34
Germain and Kenny, "Engaging Gramsci," pp. 13-14.

INTRODUCTION

10

[o]bviously, the fact of hegemony presupposes that the interests and
tendencies of those groups over whom hegemony is exercised have
been taken into account and that a certain equilibrium is established. It
presupposes, in other words, that the hegemonic group should make
sacrifices of an economic-corporate kind; these sacrifices, however,
cannot touch the essential… the decisive core of economic activity. 35
Here we have also the idea that each hegemonic system is organised around a set of
core ideas that cannot be challenged without overturning the hegemony, which,
following Richard Howson, are termed here “hegemonic principles.” 36 The ideological
and political struggles of hegemonic groups are designed to change the theoretical,
social and also cultural framework of social forces in order that they support their
hegemony.

Ideology, the framing of knowledge, is one of the key terrains on which hegemonic
struggles are fought. In a historically organic form, Gramsci argued that ideology
organises human thought and action and it structures the practical and moral framework. 37 Equally though social organisation (especially work) frames ideology,
producing a frequently reductionist ‘common sense.’ Ultimately, as Simon pointed out:
Gramsci considers that an ideology is not to be judged by its truth or
falsity but by its efficacy in binding together a bloc of diverse social
elements, and in acting as cement or as an agent of social unification.38
In liberal democratic societies ideological dominance is achieved via legitimation and
validation and this involves a genuine engagement with non-hegemonic discourse,
bounded by hegemonic principles such as the private ownership of property and the use
of markets to generally manage the production and distribution of goods and services.
In other words, ideology is never mere manipulation or brainwashing.

Ideology is a difficult terrain for counter-hegemonic struggles because of “…the
tendency of public discourse to make some forms of experience readily available to

35
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consciousness while ignoring or suppressing others.” 39 The working classes, in
particular, tend towards passive submission to an inherited, “…uncritical and largely
unconscious” common sense. 40 Equally though, Gramsci pointed out that the
constructed nature of common sense makes it a fertile ground for resistance. There are
tensions in the discussions of ideology in the Prison Notebooks that T.J. Jackson Lears
explained as remnants of the concept of false consciousness in Gramsci’s work and
which, he suggested, tend to obscure ‘subjective’ needs (family, community, religion,
etc) that are not underpinned by class. Thus, a Gramscian approach can be reproached
for ignoring the fact that “…most radical anticapitalist protests have been rooted not in
Marxist universalism but in local traditions undermined by industrialization.” 41

The efficacy of ideology is partly the product of specific agents, ‘organic intellectuals’,
who enunciate, organise and reform its components. As Gramsci put it, every social
force “…creates one or more strata of intellectuals who give it homogeneity and an
awareness of its own function not only in the economic but also in the political and
social fields.” 42 These intellectuals are the organisers of the superstructure:
[t]he intellectuals are the dominant group’s ‘deputies’ exercising the
subaltern functions of social hegemony and political government.
These comprise: 1. The ‘spontaneous’ consensus given by the great
masses of the population to the general direction imposed on social
life by the dominant fundamental group; this consent is ‘historically’
caused by the prestige (and consequent confidence) which the
dominant group enjoys because of its position and function in the
world of production. 2. The apparatus of State coercive power which
‘legally’ enforces discipline on those groups who do not ‘consent’ for
the whole of society in anticipation of moments of crisis of command
and direction when spontaneous consent has failed. 43
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Gramsci’s belief in the power of organic intellectuals to transform the working class is
somewhat difficult to understand in today’s social and political circumstances, at the
same time there is little doubt that intellectual production has played a significant role in
the ascent of neoliberalism, which is a crucial element of the current international
hegemony. Gramsci’s discussion and analysis of ideology is a useful antidote to
mainstream IPE, which generally remains silent on this issue.

If dominant forces are successful, meaning that they predominate for a long duration,
Gramsci labelled this ensemble of interests as an ‘historic bloc.’ 44 Historic blocs are not
always hegemonic. The concept of historic blocs is important because it is linked to the
economic base, through the decision-making framework, thus historic blocs craft the
production and distribution of goods and services. Equally, the concept enables analyses
to go beyond the traditional Marxist focus on class, promoting an analysis of social
forces that is not limited to ownership of the means of production. Analysis can
incorporate issues of culture, populism, religion, theory and ideology. 45 For a critical
IPE approach, historic blocs provide a concrete means to overcome mainstream closure
on the content of the state by adding analysis of economic, social and cultural relations
to structural realist assumptions about the basis of international relations. Viewing states
as historically contingent and constructed historic blocs involving economic, political,
social and cultural influences, produces a very different understanding of global
processes.

Historic blocs are not static — social forces are constantly shifting, influenced by
counter-hegemonic movements as well as shifting groupings within the dominant social
forces. Gramsci highlighted two types of change in his analysis, one is short-term and
non-structural, whilst the other is significant, structural and often long lasting. Structural
change generally results in re-shaping all elements of the historic bloc — institutions,
alliances and ideology. 46 Gramsci did not dismiss either form of change because: “…a
social form ‘always’ has a marginal possibility for further development and
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organisational improvement.” 47 However, he had a particular interest in the response of
dominant social forces to significant changes in socio-economic systems and concluded
that they normally employ a strategy of ‘passive revolution’ or ‘revolution from above.’
Passive revolution is a way that dominant social groups manage social change to ensure
their dominance is maintained and, at the same time, the possibility of oppositional
change is minimised or indeed, excluded. 48 The primary form of this strategy is
utilisation of the institutions of the state to achieve structural changes in the economy to
shape a new historic bloc. 49 This analysis is very relevant to understanding the role of an
international institution like the World Bank.

Gramsci saw that the advance to socialism required labour and other emancipatory
movements to combine to build counter-hegemony. This requires a prolonged strategy
of moral and ideological reform, which Gramsci labelled ‘war of position’ to distinguish
it from the ‘war of movement’ of the Russian Revolution where power was seized
through a frontal attack on the state. This later strategy, he suggested, was not suitable
for liberal capitalist societies with complex state—civil society formations, which can
easily overcome direct attacks. It is, however, a difficult strategy as there is a constant
danger that acceptance of incremental gains within the existing hegemony will capture a
movement and negate its long-term revolutionary potential.

Hegemony, for Gramsci, was not just an organising concept it also has epistemological
value. 50 While noting the debates around his epistemological (ontological and
methodological) position, this work is informed by an understanding of Gramsci as a
historicist. As Adam Morton and Andrea Bieler contended, this demanded research:
“…based on critical reflection which involved acknowledging the role played by
existing forms of thought and their relation to the actual world which produced them
and in which they were received.” 51 This project then, takes practical inspiration from
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Gramsci. 52 That is, whilst engaging with the significance of theoretical and
philosophical debates around hegemony, it uses them to undertake a detailed and
concrete analysis of the day-to-day operations of the World Bank, the aim of which is to
contribute to the political struggle against the operations of the Bank and other
international institutions whose existence, in the final analysis, does little to improve the
lives of millions in the developing world. However, this approach does not reduce all
development efforts to a capitalist conspiracy or claim that organisations like the World
Bank always operate consistently. Rather, it paints a complex picture of ideologies,
social formations and relations of production that generate compromise, conflict and
change.

Hegemony and World Order

There remains, however, a problem in the theoretical approach for this project;
hegemony for Gramsci, is organised and analysed at the national level — understanding
the specific social, historical and cultural organisation within a country is seen as
essential to an emancipatory project. 53 Indeed, Gramsci wrote at a time when nationstates dominated Europe and North America but in other parts of the globe colonial
relations intersected with local traditions and structures in diverse ways. That is, it was
not yet certain that the international system would, to a large extent, be structured by
nation-states. However, Gramsci was aware that social forces were driving the creation
of nation-states and regional and international levels of action. In one of his key notes,
“Analysis of Situations. Relations of Force” he stated that “…international relations
intertwine with these internal relations of nation-states, creating new, unique and
historically concrete combinations.” 54 The acknowledgement in Gramsci’s work of the
existence of an international or global level of action extends to the possibility of
“combinations of States in hegemonic systems.” 55 The “Analysis of Situations” note
asks the question: “Do international relations precede or follow (logically) fundamental

Historical Materialism and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp.
17-20.
52
Morton, "On Gramsci," pp. 5-6.
53
Simon, Gramsci's Political Thought, p. 35.
54
Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, p. 182. That this is a key note is also the position of
Howson, Challenging Hegemonic Masculinity, p. 13.
55
Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, p. 176.

INTRODUCTION

15

social relations?” The answer: “There can be no doubt that they follow… However,
international relations react both passively and actively on political relations.” 56 In his
notes on economic trends and developments, Gramsci noted that “…the world is a unit,
whether we like it or not…” 57 This world is made up of states, which are structurally
differentiated — there are “hegemonic states” and “subaltern states” and the history of
the latter needs to be understood at least partly in relation to the history of the former. 58
Moreover, in a discussion on international trade and tariff barriers, he pointed out that
states have made “…various attempts at organising the world market and establishing
the most favourable position in it…” 59 Here too, is the idea that domestic hegemonic
social forces can exert their influence internationally.

Other examples in his work of analysis of the simultaneous operation of social forces in
national and international arenas include his critique of the Comintern, the impact of
Fordism on Europe and his writing on the structure and organisation of the Catholic
Church. 60 Susan George and Fabrizio Sabelli’s 1994 book on the World Bank drew
significantly on Gramsci’s analysis of the organisation and moral/intellectual project of
the Catholic Church. 61

From Gramsci’s somewhat sketchy comments on the international realm, Cox attempted
to construct an explicit Gramscian analysis of hegemony at the international level or, as
Cox called it, the level of world orders. He has done this in an age where the world is
more interconnected than ever through a whole series of international institutions. Cox’s
schema involved analysis of hegemonic and non-hegemonic forces in three interrelated
spheres of historically current activity, namely social forces, states and world orders.
Relations of production fundamentally shape social forces and this, for him, was the
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starting point for analysing hegemony. 62 His focus on production has led to critiques
from Gramscian inspired scholars and others, of an overemphasis on economic relations
at the expense of ideology, culture, etc. While the critique does have some substance,
Cox noted that for him production:
…is to be understood in the broadest sense. It is not confined to the
production of physical goods used or consumed. It covers the
production and reproduction of knowledge and of the social relations,
morals and institutions that are prerequisites to the production of
physical goods. 63
Understanding the social relations of production, which are not restricted to the
boundaries of states, facilitates analysis of dominant groups both across states and
world orders.

In contrast to much mainstream IPE theory, Cox does not accept the unity of the state.
Forms of state need to be explained via the analysis of state and civil society (social
forces) connections. 64 They can be influenced by the structure of the world order and
can influence the structure. Cox utilised the Gramscian idea of an historic bloc to
analyse the development of forms of states and their underlying dominant social forces
as well as their movements towards hegemony. And following Gramsci too, the purpose
of this was always a practical one — only through such mediations can an
understanding of the potentials for resistance and transformation be developed. 65

In the final sphere of world orders, Cox retained (as in Gramsci) the national sphere as
the foundation of the hegemonic historic blocs. He proposed that a “…world hegemony
is thus in it beginnings an outward expansion of the internal (national) hegemony
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established by a dominant social class.” 66 However, a national hegemony can form the
basis of a world order if the hegemony is universalist and the national state can ensure
its development and protection. As Bieler and Morton explained:
[h]egemony can therefore operate at two levels: by constructing an
historical bloc and establishing social cohesion within a form of state
as well as by expanding a mode of production internationally and
projecting hegemony through the level of world order. 67
As important as the internationalisation of production, is the internationalisation of the
state. Cox perceived the current hegemony as an outwards expansion of the dominant
American historic bloc and he labels this: pax americana. The legitimating ideology of
pax americana is neoliberalism. Reconciliation of the world economy and domestic
pressures under it involves practices of policy harmonisation, varied roles for key state
agencies and active international institutions.68 Cox also identified a range of ways in
which hegemony is expressed by international organisations as both the products of the
hegemonic world order and institutions that facilitate the expansion of the rules of that
order, in this case neoliberalism. Institutions function to legitimate rules, engage social
forces in developing countries in an order and they serve to “absorb counter-hegemonic
ideas.” 69 To Cox’s schema highlighting international order, I would add that hegemony
can have regional dimensions and that regional structures and relations can mediate the
impact of national and international historic blocs.

Randall Germain and Michael Kenny (1998) questioned the accuracy of Cox’s (and
other critical IPE scholars’) reading of Gramsci. But, as Morton argued, this critique
represents a kind of “austere historicism,” which suggests that the ideas of writers in the
past are not relevant to analysis today. 70 Further, as Morton demonstrated, austere
historicism is not consistent with Gramsci’s theoretical or political project, which was a
transformative one. 71 Thus the purpose of understanding Gramsci in critical IPE is not
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to articulate a universal Gramscian framework, rather it is to explore concepts and ideas
that are useful for understanding and analysing the forms and operations of IPE today.

The historian Giovanni Arrighi explained world hegemony somewhat differently from
Cox, as “…the power of a state to exercise governmental functions over a system of
sovereign states.” However, his analysis of the shift from the previous period of
hegemony, which he called ‘Free-Trade Imperialism’ to the current period of US
hegemony, also highlights the importance of institutions and rules and norms. Arrighi
argued that in:
…comparison with Free-Trade Imperialism, the institutions of US
hegemony have considerably restricted the rights and powers of
sovereign states. The principles, norms, and rules to which states must
submit have increased in number and have become tighter, while a
growing number of supranational organisations have acquired
autonomous power to overrule the interstate system. 72
The strength of this system is demonstrated by that fact that it is very difficult to operate
outside of the network of institutions, norms and transnational corporations, except at
enormous cost. 73 With the increasing incorporation of the former Soviet Union and
communist states into the global economy, this argument is more salient today than
when it was written over a decade ago.

While taking the work of Cox as my starting point, I hope through this case study of the
World Bank in Vietnam and Indonesia to more effectively incorporate Gramsci’s
framework and example by building a deeper understanding of the relationship between
pax americana and the World Bank. Thus, this interrogation considers that the Bank
should be studied as an institution that serves the interests of the dominant hegemony,
pax americana, by promoting its dominant ideology — neoliberalism. It is important to
make the proviso that hegemony is both historically contingent and never complete —
there are always challenges, complexities and counter-hegemonies. This study of the
Bank explores not just how and where the Bank has successfully legitimised rules or
72
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supported particular social forces and ideologies but also where it has not been
successful, that is where the gaps or tensions have surfaced.

One particular complexity is that the World Bank is an international bureaucracy and
Gramsci noted that bureaucracies are subject not just to the will of competing states but
have their own dynamics that results in the development of their own interests and
logics. 74 International institutions also operate differently in different locations, they
utilise what Gramsci called democratic centralism to allow adaptation to different local
social, political and economic realities. 75 This adaptive capacity is central to the survival
of the organisation and the social forces they represent. Studying what can be modified
and, more pertinently, what can never be challenged regardless of location sheds much
light on the nature of neoliberal ideology. A Gramscian framework also directs attention
to how World Bank policies and programs are best understood in the coercion/consent
dialectic and whether the post-Washington Consensus has seen a significant shift in this
balance. The framework points to questions about whether the post-Washington
Consensus represents structural and fundamental transformation or whether it involves
utilising the state to shape the current historic bloc.

Chapter Outline

The theoretical assumptions used in this thesis suggest that an analysis of the World
Bank should start by examining it as part of the larger hegemonic struggle of the postSecond World War period. This is essential background for any project attempting to
deconstruct the Bank’s current practice. Further, as Gramsci suggested it is important to
examine how organisations and ideas, “…adjust to different historical epochs and
different countries” thus the thesis starts with a history of the Bank. 76 Chapter Two
explores the origins of the Bank, that is the postwar economic planning culminating in
the Bretton Woods conference in 1944. In line with the Gramscian approach, the
foundations of the Bank are explained with reference to two major changes of the era —
74
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first, the major shift in power that took place in the first half of the Twentieth Century,
which resulted in the decline of British hegemony and the rise of pax americana.
Second, the ‘revolution’ in economic theory influenced by the economist John Maynard
Keynes that led to changed ideas about the role of the state in the economy and civil
society that changed the ideological terrain of the post-Second World War period. In
this light, the Bank’s Articles of Agreement developed at Bretton Woods are analysed
as not simply the product of debates between the British and Americans, rather, and
more

profoundly,

as

reflections

of

the

postwar

compromise

between

classical/neoclassical commitments to free trade and markets and the Keynesian
commitments to planning and welfare. Ben Fine has labelled the outcome of this
compromise: the Keynesian, welfare, modernisation model of development. 77

Chapter Three explores the evolution of the World Bank from the first meeting of its
Executive Directors at Savannah in 1946 through to the introduction of structural
adjustment lending at the end of the reign of long-term Bank President Robert Strange
McNamara in 1981. The Bank started out as a small, hard-nosed and conservative
lender to only a handful of mostly medium income countries. It simply ignored the
welfare component of the ‘Keynesian, welfare, modernisation model’ and focused
largely on infrastructure. Its growth in the 1950s and 1960s was hampered by the
ambivalent attitude of the then US administrations; nevertheless the Bank’s size and
development agenda gradually expanded. Just after McNamara took over as Bank
president, the Nixon Administration set out to reorganise US hegemony by restructuring
the international monetary system and placing the US dollar and US private capital at its
centre. 78 This plan provided a boost to the World Bank as expanding its lending was a
way of encouraging private US banks in the same direction. 79 This shot in the arm,
combined with McNamara’s obsession with size and expansion, made the Bank by the
end of the 1970s, the leading international development agency. McNamara’s term
ended as neoliberalism swept the West, thus the chapter explores the theoretical
development of neoliberalism and its first impact on the Bank — structural adjustment
lending.
77
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Chapter Four explores how the Bank’s commitment to a set of core principles known as
the Washington Consensus was consolidated. The Washington Consensus centres on
commitment

to

macroeconomic

stability,

outward

orientation

and

domestic

liberalisation. In the 1980s, Washington Consensus policies are implemented fairly
simplistically and often with high social costs to the poor in developing countries. This
made the policies unpopular and too difficult to implement. Even the Reagan
Administration realised that the Bank’s efforts were frequently counter-productive and
they replaced the strict neoliberal Alden W. Clausen with the more politically astute
Barber B. Conable in 1986. However, the supremacy of the Washington Consensus in
the Bank was not really challenged until the early 1990s. In fact, the Bank’s shift away
from it is most strongly associated Clinton Administration appointee, James D.
Wolfensohn. The Bank’s post-Washington Consensus is the political product of the
slightly more state-friendly international atmosphere with a ‘liberal’ government in
power in the US. Theoretically, it reflects the increasing prominence of New
Institutional Economics as a challenge to some components of neoclassicism. It also
reflects the incorporation of aspects of the critique of the World Bank’s development
model from NGOs, in particular regarding its weak focus on poverty reduction and a
lack of local participation in framing development agendas. The chapter identifies the
key differences between the Washington Consensus and the PWC that are more fully
explored in the case studies.

Part Two of the thesis commences with a brief description of the rationale for selection
of the case study countries — Vietnam and Indonesia — and the methodology used in
examining Bank lending practices. The periods selected for the case studies are 1993 to
1997 to examine Washington Consensus lending and 2000 to 2004 to examine postWashington Consensus lending.

The case studies follow a similar structure starting with an overview of political, social
and economic developments in each country focusing on the post-1990 period as an
essential context for the analysis of Bank lending. They then explore the history of
provision of development assistance to each country and the specific role of the World
Bank within them. The Bank’s key planning documents for each country are analysed to
identify change between and within the case study periods. Then an analysis of Bank
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lending to each country in each case study period is undertaken. The analysis is
organised using the Bank’s sectors of lending, for example, water supply and sanitation
or agriculture, forestry and fishing. The thesis conclusion provides the opportunity to
contrast the experiences in each case study using the key differences between the
Washington Consensus and post-Washington Consensus outlined in Chapter Four.

23

Chapter Two
Creating a World Bank
Most histories of the World Bank focus on the relative contributions (and power) of the
United States and Great Britain at the Bretton Woods Conference and/or their two
principal negotiators, John Maynard Keynes and Harry Dexter White. 1 This chapter
analyses the Bretton Woods’ negotiations in the context of the broader social, political,
economic and theoretical developments of the Second World War era. In Gramscian
terms, it explores shift from British to American hegemony through analysis of their
associated historic blocs. The Articles of Agreement of both the IBRD and IMF,
finalised at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire in July 1944, are revealed as the product of
the change in global hegemony and the shift in thinking about international economic
management. This latter shift was the outcome of a range of challenges including the
Great Depression, the seeming success of Russian economic planning, the New Deal
and the ‘revolution’ in liberal economic thought known as Keynesianism.

The chapter commences with a brief exploration of the shifts in the historic blocs that
led to the end of British international hegemony and the rise of pax americana. It also
explores in some detail the economic ideas connected to these hegemonic forces, as
they are the basis of the ideas about development implicit in the IBRD’s Articles of
Agreement. They also underpin the early operations of the Bank. Finally, it explores the
IBRD’s Articles of Agreement and the debates that took place in finalising them in
order to shed light on the hegemonic principles underlying the Bank’s role and mission.

1
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Mason and Asher, World Bank since Bretton Woods and Robert W. Oliver, Early Plans for a World Bank
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The Changing International Order from the First World War

Where to commence analysing the hegemonic shift that took place in the first half of the
twentieth century is a fraught question. Giovanni Arrighi, using a Marxist model of
capital accumulation, traces the origins of the rise of the United States and the decline
of Great Britain to the mid-nineteenth century, linked by the rise of the German state. 2
However, the First World War is a useful starting point for this discussion as it sealed
the fate of the British Empire and fundamentally reordered the debtor/creditor relationship between Great Britain and the United States — the two key players in the
establishment of the Bretton Woods institutions. The First World War also saw the
‘birth’ of Russian and international communism and the war’s settlement initiated the
Great Depression. Both communism and the Great Depression were central to the
changing view of the role of the state that led to new ideas and practices in economic
planning at an international level. The liberation movements in the former colonial
dependencies are also touched upon, because they are part of the overall global shifts
central to the argument of the thesis.

If the First World War disrupted Britain’s hegemonic position in the international
economy, the Second largely ended it. 3 During the First World War, Britain’s imports
increased at an unprecedented rate — mainly armaments and basic goods, primarily
from the US. This reduced the large US foreign debt, which had been mostly owed to
Britain, and reduced Britain’s foreign investments by one quarter. Britain’s losses were
compounded by the Russian revolution followed by its abrogation of war debts, many
of which were owed to British investors. Britain as well as other European industrial
countries lost traditional export markets, including those centred on colonial empires as
most of the colonies became increasingly self-sufficient during the war. 4 Finally and
importantly, Britain lost its capacity to organise the international monetary system in its
own interests. On the positive side, at the end of the war Britain still had significant
(though reduced) gold reserves, considerable claims on foreign incomes, German war
reparations and an extensive and profitable colonial empire, which the war in fact
2

Giovanni Arrighi, The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power, and the Origins of Our Times (London:
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3
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4
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expanded. 5 By the end of the First World War, the US had purchased many British
owned assets in the US and had accumulated large war credits. It had increased its
invisible earnings, becoming a net creditor and developed a large trading surplus
leading to a significant net current account surplus. 6 From the First World War, the US
integrated itself into the world economy and assumed an unprecedented dominance; one
upshot of this was that the US dollar became a major international reserve currency.
Russia suffered enormous losses during the First World War and economic and social
chaos continued during and after the revolution through to 1921. Thereafter, economic
growth rapidly took off, in part, because the chaos destroyed much production and
growth started from such a low base. 7

The inter-war years saw the re-establishment of the gold standard and a fixed exchange
rates system, which, by the mid to late 1920s, included US and most European
countries. European efforts at creating an international financial system were rebutted
by the US government, which was not yet hegemonic and thus did not have the
institutional capability or the interest to organise it. 8 The fixed exchange rate system
made adjustments to shocks difficult. The tendency to overvalue exchange rates and
deflationary monetary policy resulted in frequent balance of payments crises. 9 Even
during the years of relative prosperity, 1925 – 1929, the whole system was ultimately
reliant on large capital flows from the US, especially to Germany, which used these
flows for reparation payments and investment. In the 1920s, US productivity grew
significantly faster than in debtor countries, making it very difficult for them to service,
let alone repay, their debts. Dependence on the US dollar increased and the US acquired
foreign assets at an unparalleled rate. 10 When the flow of US dollars slowed in 1928 and
further in 1929, the effects across the entire West were extensive and severe.

5
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With the drying-up of short-term capital flows, most governments put in place a range
of protectionist measures to stabilise their currencies. 11 They turned inwards looking for
solutions, leading to a structural collapse in world trade and finance. The scale of the
disaster was extraordinary: in Europe from 1929 to 1932/3 industrial output fell by 27
per cent, in the US it fell by 45 per cent. 12 Unemployment was on “…an unimagined
and unprecedented scale,” in 1932-33 unemployment in Britain was 22-23 per cent and
in most of Europe it exceeded 24 per cent reaching a staggering 44 per cent in
Germany. 13 In the US, unemployment was around 27 per cent and, as in much of
Europe, it remained high (over 20 per cent) for the rest of the 1930s. 14 The full scale of
the Great Depression is beyond the scope of this work but there were two important
outcomes. First, the Depression persuaded policy-makers that the unprecedented rate of
unemployment could produce social and political chaos or indeed revolution. The
growth in organised labour in the West and the Russian Revolution were further proof
of this possibility. Second, it provided concrete evidence of the inadequacies of ‘free
markets’ in achieving optimal economic and social outcomes, let alone maintaining
political stability.

Commitment to planning was strengthened by the example of Russian communism
from the late 1920s — workers and policy-makers looking to Russia saw an economy
unaffected by the Depression. Rapid industrialisation took place under the Five Year
Plans, industrial production tripled between 1929 and 1940 and there was no
unemployment, though the social and personal costs of Stalinism were immense. The
economic achievements “…impressed foreign observers of all ideologies...” 15 Equally,
Nazi Germany utilised strong state planning models to eliminate unemployment by the
end of the 1930s. Thus, as Hobsbawm notes, “…‘Plan’ and ‘Planning’ became buzzwords in politics.” 16
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Politicians, intellectuals, policy-makers and citizens in the US and other Western liberal
capitalist countries had overwhelming evidence that ‘free markets’ did not necessarily
achieve full employment and that state planning could work. 17 The case for government
planning (utilising the knowledge of experts) and an expanded role for the state,
solidified when economic theory caught up with practice via ‘Keynesianism’, which
developed from John Maynard Keynes’s, General Theory (1936). 18 The economic
theory is discussed in some detail in the following section. However, the point here is
that there was a profound change in the approach of liberal capitalist states to the role of
government intervention in the economy — there was a new openness to the idea of
economic planning and of state participation in the economy. This receptiveness to
national economic planning at a state level also influenced thinking about the
possibilities for economic cooperation at an international level — a development that
eventually resulted in the establishment of the World Bank. Keynesianism thus
underpinned the Bank’s development theory and practice for decades.

The Great Depression was also a “…landmark in the history of anti-imperialism and
Third World liberation movements.” 19 Although Britain had already been dealing with
independence movements in some of its colonies, especially those with large expatriate
populations, it was really only with the large-scale economic dislocation of the
Depression that these movements became widespread. 20 The effects of the Depression
were even more profound in many of the dependent economies than in the Western
liberal states because given their fixed exchange rate regimes and their reliance on
exports of primary products, their terms of trade deteriorated dramatically.21 Some
industrialisation did take place in settler colonies during the First World War and again
17
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during the protectionist era of the Depression, nevertheless, most colonies remained or,
were reduced to, overwhelmingly agrarian and rural societies. The severe impacts
radicalised many local elites, who had previously supported and had been implicated in
colonial rule. The independence movements already underway in Egypt and India
expanded and, by the mid-1930s, there were powerful movements organising in French
North Africa and Indochina and in Dutch controlled Indonesia. 22

In the US, the commitment to planning was taken up in the mid-1930s with the New
Deal policies of the Roosevelt administration. However, these policies were only
partially implemented and “…were insufficient to stimulate the economy and take
advantage of this underutilized productive capacity.” 23 Further, in 1937 when the US
finally seemed to be undergoing a slow recovery from Depression, Department of
Treasury economists (the “men of sound judgement” as John Kenneth Galbraith
ironically labelled them) successfully convinced the Roosevelt administration to follow
classical economic prescriptions — spending was cut and taxes increased in order to
bring the Federal budget into balance. 24 This led to a new slump and a renewed increase
in unemployment. The 1937 recession made Keynesianism respectable in Washington.
However, as Galbraith argues, policy actions continued to be “half-hearted” and in 1939
unemployment was still at 17 per cent, until “[t]he war then brought the Keynesian
remedy with a rush.” 25

The shift in hegemony that was heralded by the First World War was solidified by the
Second. The Keynesian “rush” provided by the Second World War unleashed a massive
expansion in US productive capacity:
[i]ts standard of living was higher than any other country's, but so was
its per capita productivity. Among the Great Powers, the United States
was the only country which became richer — in fact, much richer —
rather than poorer because of the war. 26
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US gold reserves at the end of the war were around two thirds of the world’s total. It
had half of the world’s manufacturing production and a third of all production; it was
also the world's greatest exporter. 27 For the first time, the US had a net current account
surplus that was significantly larger than its trade surplus. It had near complete control
over international liquidity and world financial power became centralised in the city of
New York. 28

Along with enabling the US to become the hegemonic economic power in the postwar
world, the Second World War changed its internal political alliances (as Gramsci would
say, its historic bloc), by the blow it dealt to the isolationist element in the US Congress.
It was clear that US security was no longer inviolable. As Arrighi puts it: “US political
isolationism had reached the point of diminishing returns.” 29 Many policy-makers felt
that the failure of the US to take a leadership role in the interwar period had encouraged
the turn to protectionism that they identified as the prime cause of the war. Further, they
considered that the level of mal-distribution of income across the (liberal capitalist)
globe would hurt US foreign trade and investment. As Franz Schurmann highlights,
Roosevelt administration foreign policy was fundamentally an extension of the New
Deal philosophy:
[t]he essence of the New Deal was the notion that big government
must spend liberally to achieve security and progress. Thus, postwar
security would require liberal outlays by the United States in order to
overcome the chaos created by the war.... Aid to ... poor nations would
have the same effect as social welfare programs within the United
States — it would give them the security to overcome chaos and
prevent them from turning into violent revolutionaries. Meanwhile,
they would be drawn inextricably into the revived world market
system. 30
The debates and discussions in the US Administration and Congress are returned to
below, when postwar planning and the ratification of the Bretton Woods agreements are
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discussed. Initially the chapter explores the ideological terrain of the period especially
the shift in economic thinking that took place prior to and during the Second World
War. Starting with a brief description of neoclassical economics, to which Keynes was
reacting, this analysis aims to locate Keynesianism as the theoretical justification for the
Keynesian, welfare, modernisation model of nation-state development. 31

Changing Economic Theory: Neoclassical Economics and
Keynesianism

Economics was well established as a discipline by the inter-war period. Neoclassical
economics largely superseded classical economics in the 1870s and had developed a set
of central assumptions, concepts and theories, which formed the basis of its teachings. 32
However, many of the underlying assumptions of neoclassical economics still bore the
direct impact of classicism. When John Bates Clark identified the key postulates of
neoclassical economics as:
…private property, individual freedom, a limitation of government
activity to those fields which Adam Smith had laid down as proper to
it, the mobility of capital and labour according to the stimulus of
varying remuneration, and, finally the desire of the individual to
satisfy certain objective wants 33
he could equally have been summarising the key postulates of classical economics.
However, neoclassical economics was clearly a break from classicism, starting with its
more individualistic approach to society, through to its consequent emphasis on
consumption, demand and utility (of conglomerations of individuals), which replaced
classical economics’ emphasises on production, supply and costs. 34

The operational form of the new individualism was a psychological and subjective
approach to value, ‘utility,’ which replaced the classical Labour Theory of Value. The
utility approach, in both its hedonistic and more common utilitarian version posited that
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value is determined by a subjective estimate of utility, tied to quantity. The focus on
utility went hand-in-hand with the so-called ‘marginal revolution,’ which focused
economics on measuring small changes in economic quantities. The research agenda
was formed by Gossen’s Law on diminishing returns and the theory of marginal utility,
which provides a measure of the “…alteration in the subjective conditions which would
be occasioned by either the disappearance or the addition of some object.” 35 Thus the
focus was on deriving optimal utility by examining marginal increases in consumption.

The other main element of the neoclassical research agenda was its focus on
equilibrium, at the level of individual and markets and at the aggregate social level.
With the neoclassical basis in individualism, general equilibrium is simply the sum of
individual equilibriums, thus the key question for economists was: is there theoretically
a price configuration for commodities at which supply equals demand? And if “…there
is such a theoretical price configuration, can general equilibrium be obtained... and
would the general equilibrium state be stable?” 36 One of the first neoclassical
economists to deal with this issue was Léon Walras (1834 – 1910). Walras’s solution
built on the work of Jean-Baptiste Say, in particular, Say’s Law, which posits that
supply creates its own demand, and therefore there is no oversupply or undersupply of
commodities. Examining general equilibrium, Walras theorises that every demand, or
desire to purchase something at a particular price, involves giving up money in order to
do so; thus when consumers realise demand they supply someone with money of equal
value. Every realised demand is also, effectively, a supply. At the aggregate level,
therefore, the aggregate of all demand equals the aggregate of all supply at the general
equilibrium price. This is the point of general equilibrium. 37 Walras demonstrated that a
general equilibrium price theoretically exists, however, the problem of demonstrating
whether general equilibrium can be attained in the real world remained. 38 Walrus’s
model posited that it could occur via an auctioneer who, taking bids on commodities,
could adjust prices so that supply equals demand. General equilibrium models rely on
the following assumptions: individuals are price takers implying perfectly competitive
35
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commodity markets; all firms make the same ‘normal’ rate of profits implying perfectly
competitive factor markets; and there is freedom of entry.

This brief introduction to neoclassical economics highlighted the key neoclassical ideas
necessary to understanding both the Keynesian critique of general equilibrium and the
work of later neoclassical economist who became such powerful voices in development
economics and practice. As James Meade and others have pointed out, the ‘Keynesian
revolution’ needs to be seen as a two headed animal — “…first, the theoretical
revolution in economic analysis; and, second, the practical revolution in governmental
policies.” 39 In terms of economic analysis, Keynes’s magnum opus was The General
Theory, it provided both an extensive critique of neoclassical economics and developed
an alternative framework for analysing liberal capitalist economic relations. 40 Keynes
was interested in macroeconomic analysis, however, neoclassical economics at this
stage was mainly focused on microeconomic analysis. 41 Thus his critique of classical
macro-economics was based on assumptions he deduced from its microeconomics,
starting with an analysis of the labour market and determinants of output that propound
a supposed natural tendency towards full employment (and the associated level of fullemployment output). 42 Keynes accepted the neoclassical views on the operation of
markets but suggested that certain premises of its theories about output and employment
were wrong. 43 He agreed with the neoclassical proposition that increases in aggregate
demand would lead to price rises relative to money wages but charged that workers with
increasing job opportunities would not resist an associated fall in real wages. 44 He
disagreed with the neoclassical view on the supply of labour, namely that labour is
39
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focused on the acquisition of commodities and is not subject to the ‘money illusion.’ He
suggested rather, that workers do not necessarily withdraw their labour when the price
of wage-goods increased and that they could not establish real wages through their
money wage agreements. 45

On Say's Law that supply creates its own demand, Keynes argued that it is not
necessarily the case that incomes from production are spent at rates that result in market
clearing and that various agents in the economy have differing and incompatible
interests. 46 Next, he examined the neoclassical theory of interest that complements
Say’s Law. This posits that income not used for consumption is saved at an interest rate
that, in the short-run, is at the level at which the demand for capital equals the supply of
loanable funds. In the long run though, interest rates are determined by the preference
for current consumption over future goods. 47 Keynes demonstrated that the interest rate
does not, in fact, provide a simple connection between the decisions of savers and
investors as they have differing interests. 48 Overall, as James Love points out:
[t]he importance of Keynes's comments on the classical theory is that
once the nexus between savings and investment is broken, Say's Law
no longer serves to avoid the possibilities of ‘overproduction’ and the
possibility is admitted of having unemployment due to a deficiency of
effective aggregate demand. 49

The neoclassical quantity theory of money holds that money is exogenous to the
economy — it is a medium of exchange and has no features that make its acquisition
valuable per se, therefore people only hold the amount of liquid money required for
transactions. Keynes and other Cambridge economists had earlier challenged this theory
by demonstrating that cash holdings fluctuate with people’s confidence in the
economy. 50 In The General Theory, Keynes added a further dimension to the properties
of money via an analysis of speculation driven by the profit motive. The main
determinants of the amount of speculative liquidity held are the actual interest rate, the
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degree of uncertainty about future interest rates and the extent to which expectations
parallel actual interest rates.51 From this, Keynes concluded that money and monetary
policy does impact on the rate of interest and the level of aggregate demand in the
economy.

Building on this critique, Keynes developed an alternative framework whose key
concept was effective demand — this is defined as the point at which aggregate demand
and aggregate supply intersect and, as such, represents the point at which entrepreneurs’
expectations of profits are maximised at an equilibrium rate of employment. 52 The
aggregate supply function is determined by firms’ short-term expectations plus input
costs, which produces a derived demand for labour. Aggregate demand is a function of
employment derived from its relationship to expenditure and income. The key outcome
of this formulation is that the level of employment, particularly in the short-term, is
dependent on the level of aggregate demand:
Moreover, since decisions on spending and on employment and
production level are taken by different groups with different
motivations, the level of employment resulting from the interaction of
the aggregate demand and supply functions is not automatically a
position of full employment. 53

Putting aggregate demand at the centre of his framework led Keynes to an extensive
analysis of the forces determining demand, indeed, a large part of The General Theory
examined factors influencing consumption and investment spending. Three key factors
were identified. First, the propensity to consume — for Keynes, real income was the
main influence on consumption. Short-term consumption was presented as largely a
stable, increasing function of real income with the proviso that people do not spend all
of any increase in real income, instead they save an increasingly greater portion. 54 This
is Keynes’s famous Multiplier Theory, which in J.R. Hicks’s statistical formulation
became very influential in the teaching of economics. Second, consumption and
investment spending were influenced by the marginal efficiency of capital theory. This
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was a function of expectations and confidence, investment and the fact that information
on the likely yields and the marginal efficiency of assets does not determine interest
rates. 55 The new development here was the key role that business confidence plays in
determining the level of aggregate demand. The third influence on consumption and
investment spending was interest rates — here Keynes’ theory was built around the
relationship between the preference for liquidity and nominal cash holdings, which
introduced money as a factor in determining output and employment. 56 Supplementing
his critique of the neoclassical theory of money, Keynes’s Liquidity Preference Theory
held that people choose to hold liquid assets in preference to capital assets as they are
safer or when they believe the current price of capital assets is too high. 57 The
preference for holding cash, combined with the argument that it is difficult to lower
interest rates beyond a certain point, meant if people saved more,
… this wouldn’t necessarily mean lower interest rates and a resulting
increase in investment. Instead, the total demand for goods might fall,
along with employment and also investment, until savings were
brought back into line with investment by the pressure of hardship
which reduced savings in favour of consumption. The economy would
find its equilibrium not at full employment but with an unspecified
amount of unemployment. 58

The General Theory contrasted to neoclassical economics of the time because it
functioned as a theoretical tool to understand economic and social problems. 59 This
gave it great contemporary resonance. It provided not only a comprehensive critique of
neoclassical economics and an alternative, but also one which remained broadly within
the liberal capitalist tradition — Keynesianism maintains the neoclassical and classical
commitment to markets and private property. Keynes’s critique was written with the
purpose of saving liberal capitalism (and economics as a discipline) and making it
function more effectively not replacing it. 60 This rationale gives Keynesianism its
capacity for diverse theoretical and policy-oriented interpretations that range from
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relatively conservative market-oriented one to interventionist and welfare-statist
positions. As we shall see, in the World Bank’s Articles of Agreement this tension is
resolved in favour of a more conservative market-oriented approach.

Keynesianism and the later growth of development economics, helped consolidate the
nation-state as the way to organise society and it gave the state a central role in
development. 61 It both coincided with and contributed to, changes in civil and political
debates in most capitalist societies regarding the appropriate role and reach of the state.
This was the revolution in practical governmental policy that Meade and others argued
was “…of much greater importance and significance for the welfare of mankind” than
the revolution in macroeconomics. 62 Writing in 1975 when the ‘revolution’ seemed
permanent, Meade was confident that Western governments were still committed to
demand management to maintain near full employment. Where demand was
insufficient, governments were not afraid to implement policies and programs to
stimulate investment, government expenditure and/or exports, or to discourage
leakages. When demand was excessive, the appropriate government response was to
restrain investment and government expenditure and/or to encourage savings and
maintain taxation levels. 63

These became the core components of the Keynesian,

welfare, modernisation model.

Concurrently with Keynes’s contribution, major advances in the statistical
sophistication of national income accounting measures occurred. Pioneering work
started in the 1920s, however the theoretical developments of Keynesianism provided a
significant stimulus to statistical methods. By the time of the war, statisticians had
developed time series data using a Keynesian scheme of income/consumption and
savings/investment. 64 By the mid-1940s, “…a very large measure of agreement on the
general techniques to be employed in this field was quickly reached and virtual
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unanimity as to the purpose for which these statistics are designed.” 65 The purpose was
to measure goods and services available for national consumption or wealth creation
and development of social accounts for use in “both diagnosis and prescription in
economic policy.” 66 As we shall see later, the World Bank utilised these agreed
techniques and purposes from early on and, via various training programs, became a key
disseminator of them across the developing world. Indeed, statistical representations of
economic concepts remain their primary instrument for assessing the life quality of
people in developing countries.

Early Post-war Economic Planning

(Non-communist) Post-war political and economic planning was dominated by the
administrations in the US and Great Britain and by the compromises they made to
organise an international system to meet their interests. Given US global production and
military hegemony, it was not surprisingly the US which, on the whole, set the agenda
for economic planning even providing drafts plans to which Great Britain and the other
allies responded. Later, it hosted the key international conferences that created the postwar international structure — Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, July 1944; Dumbarton
Oaks Conference, Washington State, from August 1944; and San Francisco Conference,
April 1945. The Dumbarton Oaks Conference established “…the basic principles that
would underlie and infuse the future United Nations Charter” and the San Francisco
Conference developed the UN Charter in a mere two months. 67 However, it is notable
that the first conference on post-war planning was concerned with the international
economic order — Bretton Woods. The story of economic planning leading up to and
during Bretton Woods provides the context to understand the character and nature of the
institutions thus created.

Given US pre-war isolationism, it could be seen as remarkable that the Administration,
in particular the State Department, began economic and political planning as early as
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the autumn of 1939 — prior to becoming directly involved in World War II. 68 Peter
Gowan explained this phenomena as the product of a US project “…to penetrate
existing capitalist states and reorganize their internal arrangements to suit US
purposes...” 69 However, a Gramscian approach suggests that hegemony requires more
than coercion, which may be why the focus of postwar economic negotiations in the US
shifted from the State Department to Treasury: in contrast to the State Department’s
sometimes aggressive tactics to push a controversial trade agenda, Treasury shared a
growing consensus with the British and others regarding the need for organisation of a
postwar monetary system. 70

The State Department and other parts of US political and civil society remained
dominated by a laissez-faire philosophy that opposed government action and thought
that the (supposedly) efficient allocation of world resources should be left to the
international economic ‘market.’ 71 The laissez-faire approach was reinforced by the US
political structure, which tended to subordinate international considerations to domestic
ones; but it was these elements of the historic blocs that reasserted themselves shortly
after the war. 72 Fred Block labels this group as “business internationalists” and notes
their key representatives in the State Department were Cordell Hull, Dean Acheson and
William Clayton. 73 In contrast, the Treasury Department and other sections of political/
civil society were influenced by the inter-war ‘lessons’ and the Depression and as a
result were committed to early, detailed planning for the postwar world, US
involvement in postwar international institutions and adequate planning for post-war
economic management. 74 Block calls this group national economic planners; they were
represented in Treasury Department by Henry Morgenthau and Harry Dexter White. 75
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The Treasury view predominated during the later war years partly because of its
capacity to cooperate with the British. 76 But Treasury plans required Congressional
approval and the Bretton Woods institutions were significantly shaped by the trade-offs
made in negotiating approval from a Congress dominated by those committed to
laissez-faire. 77 Nevertheless, the degree of autonomy given the US (and British)
technical experts to develop plans and negotiate was remarkable. 78 So, it was Harry
Dexter White from the US Treasury who drafted the Suggested Plan for a United and
Associated National Stabilization Fund and a Bank for Reconstruction and
Development of the United and Associated Nations in 1941. By 1943, White had:
…abandoned the ambitious design of the international bank … and
the fund became the major focus of his attention. When the plan for
the fund was published in mid-1943 it was without a design for the
bank. When the bank proposal was finally made public it had been
stripped of the trappings of an international central bank, for the bank
had been reduced to a more traditional international lending agency. 79
The British only really commenced detailed post-war planning in 1943. 80 Keynes’ plan
for an International Clearing Union, produced largely as a response to the White plans,
allowed expansion to add a body for postwar relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction, in
other words an equivalent of the Bank, if it was not provided for elsewhere. 81 However,
no specific plans were drafted. White’s plans became the basis for negotiations but it
was strongly Keynesian even if it was significantly less expansionary than Keynes’
plan.
76
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During the course of these negotiations the Bank came to be known as the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development. This chapter turns to examine the key
features of the IBRD’s Articles of Agreements, incorporating an exploration of the key
debates prior to, and at, Bretton Woods. It attempts to show the flavour of the debates
between the US and Great Britain and between US policy makers, whilst highlighting
the broader influences of the Keynesian, welfare, modernisation model.

Key Features of the IBRD’s Articles of Agreement

Purposes
The purposes of the Bank are:
(i) To assist in the reconstruction and development of territories of
members by facilitating the investment of capital for productive
purposes, including the restoration of economies destroyed or
disrupted by war… and the encouragement of the development of
productive facilities and resources in less developed countries.
(ii) To promote private foreign investment by means of guarantees or
participations in loans and other investments made by private
investors; and when private capital is not available on reasonable
terms, to supplement private investment…
(iii) To promote the long-range balanced growth of international
trade and the maintenance of equilibrium in balances of payments by
encouraging international investment for the development of the
productive resources of members, thereby assisting in raising
productivity, the standard of living and conditions of labor in their
territories.

(iv) To arrange the loans… so that the more useful and urgent
projects, large and small alike, will be dealt with first.
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(v) To conduct its operations with due regard to the effect of
international investment on business conditions in the territories of
members…. 82
It is clear from the Purposes that the Bank was an institution designed to operate within,
and indeed support the expansion of a liberal capitalist international order and one
clearly structured around nation-states. Three themes in the Purposes stand out: the
relative commitment to reconstruction versus development; the emphasis placed on
private investment and private markets for capital; and the Keynesian commitments to
planning and labour conditions.

From White’s early drafts to the discussions at Bretton Woods, there is little doubt that
reconstruction rather than development was at the forefront of the planners’ minds.
White’s April 1942 draft did not mention development per se, rather the main objective
of the Bank was: “…to provide capital for relief and reconstruction and otherwise
facilitate a smooth postwar transition.” 83 Victor Urquidi, a member of the Mexican
delegation to the Bretton Woods conference, confirmed that in the April 1942 draft,
“…‘development’ of the less developed nations was not to be one of the primary
purposes of the Bank as outlined by White, though some recognition was give to the
role of private direct investment.” 84 Urquidi argued that the Mexican delegation was
responsible for furthering the interests of economic development at Bretton Woods,
highlighting the amendment the Mexican delegation submitted to Article III, Section
1(a) on Use of Resources. The amendment added to the clause that Bank’s resources
were “exclusively for benefit of members,” the statement “with equitable consideration
to projects for development and projects for reconstruction alike.” 85 However, the
following Section, 1(b), gives “special regard” to the costs of reconstruction and thus, to
an extent, negates the focus on development.

The priority given to reconstruction was also evident in the way US bureaucrats used it
to ‘sell’ the Bank to Congress. They indicated to Congress that the alternative to support
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for the Bank would be a loan to the British. 86 Further, as Edward Mason and Robert
Asher, in the Bank’s first official history, pointed out, the members with the most shares
were largely concerned about issues of reconstruction and that was reflected in the early
loans of the Bank. 87 While the creation of the Bank can be seen as a remarkable step in
international cooperation, it is clear that the Western liberal states at the core of its
establishment were concerned with furthering their interests rather than with broadscale international ‘development.’

Clause (ii) of the Purposes on promoting private foreign investment is not simply
neoclassical theory and practice as it points to the system’s hegemonic principles —
markets and private investment. This clause focused the Bank on guaranteeing private
investments rather than loans, a notable shift from White’s 1942 draft, which placed
equal emphasis on the Bank making loans out of its own capital. 88 According to Robert
Oliver, the increased emphasis on guaranteeing private loans was one of the major
contributions of the Europeans — the British and Dutch in particular. Mason and Asher
confirmed that it: “…was all but the universal expectation of the founders of the Bank
that its primary function would be to guarantee private investments.” 89 In reality, direct
lending has been the major focus of the Bank. This clause on private investment also
highlights the “…appeal to economics rather than ethics” palpable in the Bretton Woods
negotiations. As the Bank’s second official history by Devesh Kapur, John Lewis and
Richard Webb, pointed out, this pragmatism “…has colored the Bank’s development
efforts” ever since. 90

With regard to the influence of Keynesianism in the Bank’s Articles of Agreement, it is
plausible that without the innovations proposed by Keynes and his colleagues in
economic theory and practice, White’s proposals for international bodies to regulate
international economic relations would not have been conceived. 91 The connection to
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Keynesianism is visible in the Bank’s underlying premise that the (liberal capitalist)
international economy would not, left to its own devices, provide the capital required
for reconstruction and development at a level that achieves near full employment. As
discussed above, this was precisely what The General Theory argued theoretically and
what the Great Depression had so potently demonstrated. Clause (iii) of the Purposes
promoting “…the long-range balanced growth of international trade and the
maintenance of equilibrium in balances of payments” potently combines classical
commitments to free trade with Keynesian concerns of growth and adjustment. 92 The
belief in the capacity of government planning and management by experts demonstrated
in the Purposes also reflects Keynesian influence. The (limited) commitment to countercyclical investment on both a country and world scale in clause (v) is a clearly
Keynesian remedy, however, this is an area where, perhaps unfortunately, the Bank has
never dared to subsequently tread.

Bank Membership and Capitalisation
Membership of the Bank is only open to countries that are members of the IMF. The
final size and structure of capitalisation, as outlined Article II, largely followed the
model in the White plan. The initial capital stock of the Bank was $10 billion, made up
of 100,000 shares worth $100,000 each. Increases in the capital stock must be agreed to
by 75 per cent of the IBRD’s total voting power. As of 30 June 2002, it had 1,570,895
shares and a total capital stock of $189,505 million. 93

The British were successful in influencing the amount of subscribed capital that was
paid in to the Bank. White’s 1942 draft specified 50 per cent be paid in initially,
whereas the final agreement was only 20 per cent; the remaining 80 per cent can only be
called in to meet losses. 94 Richard Gardner posited that the conservative British position
was because they themselves neither expected to use the Bank to obtain a loan, nor to be
able to make a large contribution for lending to others, thus giving them limited
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influence. 95 Of the 20 per cent paid-in subscription, only two per cent must be paid in
gold or US dollars and the remaining 18 per cent in the member’s currency. Given that,
during the early years of Bank operations, the US dollar was the only convertible
currency, the Bank’s early loanable funds were in effect limited to the US contribution
plus the contribution of other members in US dollars or gold. 96 The small initial capital
stock and even smaller paid-in component made the Bank reliant on financial markets
for capital, which profoundly shaped its subsequent operations.

Lending Capacity and Conditions
White’s early plan for the Bank included provisions for issuing its own international
bank notes, which he assumed would be ‘as good as gold.’ This would have made its
lending capacity many times the paid-in capital. 97 However, despite White’s protests
and the initial support of the US delegation, the Bank emerged from the Bretton Woods
negotiations with a conservative lending capacity — as per Article III, Section 3 the
Bank can only lend or guarantee amounts equal to a maximum of 100 per cent of its
capital subscriptions, reserves and surpluses. Given Bank reliance on borrowed funds
(which initially meant the New York capital market), this may have been a necessary
strategy to gain investment support during an unstable period, however, it has
significantly constrained the Bank ever since. The conservative debt-to-lending ratio
reinforced the idea of a “businesslike Bank” that came out of Bretton Woods. 98

White considered that the Bank’s below market interest rates would result in a high
demand for its funds and thus his 1942 draft included “…several provisions to ensure
that the Bank’s loans would be productively employed and would be repaid.” 99 Many of
these provisions are in the Bank’s Articles. Article III, Section 4 on conditions requires,
amongst other things, that: (i) member governments guarantee loan repayments; (ii)
loan funds must not be able to be borrowed on the market in the prevailing conditions;
(iii) a “competent committee” (i.e. experts) study each proposal and submit a written
report of recommendation; (iv) the Bank should, using a prudent assessment (that is,
examination of national accounts), be confident of the capacity of the borrower to repay
95
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the funds; and (v) “Loans made or guaranteed by the Bank shall, except in special
circumstances, be for the purpose of specific projects of reconstruction and
development.” The overall impression is of a cautious lending program, centred on
market strictures and ‘disciplined’ by (Western) experts.

Interestingly, Section 5 of Article III specifies that loans are to be untied, in other words
they can be spent in the territory of any Bank member. Since 1951, this commitment has
been linked to requirements in loan agreements for international competitive bidding
where possible. 100 More recently, the establishment of Trust Funds under the Bank’s
auspices has give donor countries a way around this clause. This section also contains
anti-corruption measures, specifying that loans must be used “only for the purposes for
which the loan was granted” with due regard to “economy and efficiency and without
regard to political or other non-economic influences or considerations.”

Operations
Article IV returns to the issue of the source and types of Bank lending touched on in the
Purposes. As noted earlier, at Bretton Woods there was a shift in “…the emphasis of
Bank operations away from lending its own paid-in subscriptions and toward the
lending of borrowed funds or the guaranteeing of private loans.” 101 This not only
reflected the British influence to limit paid-in amounts but also anchored the Bank to
Western capitalist financial markets. Section 3, Article IV specifies that Bank loans are
generally denominated in the currencies of members, “other than the member in whose
territories the project is located” and only in “exceptional circumstances” cover the
local currency components of loans. Exceptional circumstances has been the subject of
differing interpretations by the Bank over the years — the interpretation has become
increasingly liberal and the tendency to allow funding for local currency components of
projects has grown. Section 4 gives the Bank “complete discretion” over the terms and
conditions of loans and guarantees. 102 Combined with the requirements under Article
III, Section 4, the Bank is given extraordinary capacity to set conditions on loan
agreements —a major concern of this thesis.
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Section 10 of Article IV says the Bank shall:
[n]ot interfere in the political affairs of any member; nor shall they be
influenced in their decisions by the political character of the member
or members concerned. Only economic considerations shall be
relevant to their decisions, and these considerations shall be weighed
impartially in order to achieve the purpose stated in Article I.
It is clear that the distinction made between politics and economics is an artificial and
theoretical one and the Bank over its history has made decisions that show how blurred
this line frequently becomes. For example, for most of its history, the Bank did not
make loans to public enterprises engaged in the manufacturing sector arguing that such
enterprises were not likely to be efficiently managed — is this an economic or political
judgement? 103

Organisation and Management
Little time was spent at Bretton Woods on the Bank’s organisational structure — Article
V is “…nearly an exact copy of the Fund’s Articles XII and XIII.” 104 The Article covers
the issues of voting rights, management structure and office location. The agreement on
voting rights points to the ‘realist’ heart at the centre of what has, at times, been
portrayed as a somewhat ‘idealist’ attempt to create international organisations to
manage postwar international economic relations at Bretton Woods. Voting rights are
linked to the amount of shares held — each member has 250 votes plus one additional
vote for each share of stock held. The largest shareholders — the countries that provide
the main guarantee behind the Bank’s bond issues and loans on money markets — are
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Research (OECD) countries. Indeed, there
is little incentive for developing countries to have large subscriptions to the Bank
because subscriptions are independent of borrowing rights, in contrast to the Fund,
where subscriptions are linked to drawing rights. 105

The voting formula, derived from White’s 1942 draft for the Bank, was completed with
only minor changes. White initially proposed each member only receive 50 votes plus
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one additional vote for each share of stock held. 106 The increase to 250 basic votes was
a compromise to ideals of equal representation over the power-based formula. However,
as capital increases have occurred there has been no matching increase in the basic
votes; thus the value of these has significantly declined. 107

White also proposed that no one country should have more that 25 per cent of the total
votes. This formula came from his belief that subscriptions should be linked to national
incomes and assessment that the American Congress could only be induced to a
subscription of around $2.5 billion. If, as he assumed, the US subscription was to be 25
per cent, this gave a figure for total capitalisation of $10 billion. The 25 per cent was
important as it gave the US an effective veto on most key decisions, as these would, in
his draft, require a four-fifths majority vote. 108 The final voting formula for Bank
decisions (other than amendment of the Articles, see below) was fifty per cent of the
vote’s cast, thus somewhat reducing direct US influence. However, with the Soviet
Union’s refusal to ratify the Bretton Woods agreement, the US initially had 35.07 per
cent of votes and the US and European countries combined controlled 74 per cent of
votes. 109 Despite the influx of new members in the 1960s, by June 1971 the US and
Europeans still held 61 per cent of the vote. As of March 2007, the US controlled 16.84
per cent of the votes and the combined voting power of Western Europe, North
America, Japan, Australia and New Zealand was over 56 per cent. 110

A Board of Governors, consisting of representatives appointed from each member
country, oversees the Bank. The Board’s responsibilities include: admitting or
suspending members; increasing or decreasing the capital stock; and adjudicating
appeals on interpretations of the Articles made by the Executive Directors. Nominally,
most of the formal power in decision-making lies with the Executive Directors who are
responsible for the “…conduct of the general operations of the Bank.” In reality the
President and senior management control the Bank. Directors are elected for a two-year
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terms and are paid by the Bank, not by member governments. There were originally
twelve Executive Directors but that was expanded to 24 through a series of increases,
the last in 1995. 111 Five Executive Directors are appointed directly by those member
countries with the largest number of shares (US, Japan, Germany, UK, France) and the
remainder are elected by the Board of Governors. Smaller states generally pool their
votes in relatively stable groups with the job of Executive Director often passed around
members of a group.

Directors are able to cast the same number of votes at meetings that they received at
their election. These groups have often resulted from historical or colonial relationships
or from geographic factors. There are a number of groups with one member (generally a
developed country) who dominates the group. 112 At Bretton Woods, the British and US
disagreed about the role of the Executive Directors. Keynes and the British felt that the
Directors should see themselves as international civil servants. This was not what the
US had in mind; they wanted and achieved “…close governmental control” of their
representative. 113 But this is not the case for group-elected Directors, who can be voted
in by a group comprising more than 20 states, yet there are no rules about whose interest
they are there to represent. 114 Theoretically, the Executive Directors select the President
of the Bank, however, an informal agreement between the US and Europeans means the
US selects the head of the Bank and the Europeans the head of the IMF (see following
chapter for details). The President is the chief of operating staff of the Bank and
controls its ordinary business “under the direction of the Executive Directors.”

Article VIII specifies the requirements for amendments to the Articles — most
amendments require three-fifths of the members with 85 per cent of the voting power.
This was increased from 80 per cent in 1989, leaving the US (16.41 per cent of voting
power) with an ongoing veto on amendments. One hundred per cent of members are
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required for amendments that modify: the right to withdraw from the Bank; rights to
subscribe to increases in the authorised capital stock; and limitations on liability.

The British compromised on the location of the principal offices of the Bank (and
Fund), which were to “be located in the territory of the member holding the greatest
number of shares.” 115 Undoubtedly the Bank’s location in the US has had a profound
influence on the Bretton Woods twin. The controversy surrounding their precise
location continued at the first meeting of the Bank and Fund in Savannah, a matter
discussed in Chapter Three.

Selling the Bretton Woods Agreements to Congress

President Roosevelt did not forward the Articles of Agreement of the Bank and Fund to
Congress until January 1945. Beforehand, there was both a major publicity campaign to
gain support for the institutions and the formation of an opposition, which although not
broadly based, created some difficulties for the US Administration. 116 The opposition
was largely focused on the operations of the Fund, however, contrary to the commonly
held position that the Bank “…escaped practically unscathed”, the debate had a
significant impact on the Bank. 117 Without going into the detail of the discussion about
the Fund, there was an attack on the (supposed) relative lack of control by the US,
particularly in relation to the Fund’s provision of liquidity. This resulted in the
Administration tightening its national control over the Fund and Bank by subordinating
American Executive Directors to a National Advisory Council and increasing the
commitment to conditionality. 118 These issues were further played out in Savannah.

The US Administration claimed, to rebut criticism, that the Bank and Fund could deal
with postwar transition and reconstruction problems. They argued that if the institutions
were not ratified, special reconstruction aid for Britain would be imperative. 119 As
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Garner notes, the enthusiastic atmosphere of the time also contributed to the tendency
“…to claim all good things for the Bank and Fund.” 120 At the end of the day the ideas
behind the Bretton Woods agreement played enough of a politically integrating role to
ensure their passage through the US Congress, as well as garnering to achieve broader
international support. As John Ikenberry notes, the Bretton Woods Agreements:
“…allowed political leaders and social groups across the political spectrum to envisage
a postwar economic order in which multiple and previously competing objectives could
be met simultaneously.” 121 It was, in Gramscian terms, a change in the intellectual
terrain that helped shape changing national historic blocs and, in a time of crisis and
hope, facilitated a change to the underpinnings of international (but US led) capitalist
hegemony.

The Soviet Union did not take part in the ceremony in Washington to deposit the
ratifications for the Bretton Woods twins on 27 December 1945. Documents released
from the Russian foreign ministry in the mid-1990s show that, until shortly before this
ceremony, Soviet officials were in fact preparing to join the institutions. 122 It seems that
the Soviet Union postponed its decision, in part, to improve its leverage on the US for
greater postwar financial assistance, but growing Cold War tensions resulted in an end
to discussions about US loans. 123

The death of Roosevelt in April 1945, had already tipped the scales of power in
Washington. Even as the Bretton Woods Agreements were passed, the State Department
was reasserting its control over US foreign policy. 124 The State Department, dominated
by business internationalists, opposed the Bretton Woods agreements and pursued an
alternative strategy, based on the Key Currency Plan of John Williams which meant
“…offering Britain a substantial loan in exchange for British cooperation in restoring an
open world economy.” 125 The resurgent nationalism, the “…tense and critical
atmosphere” of the loan negotiations with the British, where the US tended to coercive
120
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tactics and the developing Cold War tensions, provided the backdrop to the meeting at
Savannah. 126

Conclusion

Following its Gramscian framework, this chapter covered ideological, theoretical and
political territory in explaining the origins of the IBRD. It explored the transfer of
international hegemony from the British to the US, which originated from a structural
crisis linked to the Depression and war. It was equally associated with the development
and implementation of new ideas about the international organisation and management
of capitalism. Nevertheless, the establishment of the Bretton Woods institutions was
dependent on a small window of opportunity for change that was quickly closed by
shifts in the US historic blocs and by rising Cold War tension.

Considering the role of White and Keynes, this chapter placed the Bretton Woods
negotiations in the context of the broader hegemonic developments of the Second
World War era. In particular, it examined the increasing acceptability of government
planning provoked by the Depression and the impact of Russian communism, which
was given theoretical expression in Keynesian economic theory. In practice this became
the Keynesian, welfare, modernisation model, which provided the intellectual and
practical backdrop for the founding of the World Bank at Bretton Woods. This
contextualisation allows for a different interpretation of the Bank’s Articles of
Agreement highlighting its ongoing classical/neoclassical commitment to free trade
overlaid with Keynesian commitments to state investment and planning. It positions
White and Keynes as fundamentally committed to the same project, the Keynesian,
welfare, modernisation one. Their differences in approach are attributed to
commitments to the perceived needs of their respective countries and governments,
rather than a reflection of fundamental ideological differences.

The chapter stressed the importance of analysing the Articles and the debates between
Keynes and White, as here the hegemonic principles underlying the system are most
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visible. For example, White’s voting system linked to countries’ capital subscriptions to
the Bank, was designed to give the US a dominant role and it was approved at Bretton
Woods with only minor modification. Analysis of the Keynes/White debates also gives
an insight into the tensions within this hegemony, for example Keynes wanted the Bank
to have a more international focus that he believed would be friendlier to British
capitalism. He attempted unsuccessfully to achieve this in his challenges over the role
of Executive Directors and location of Bank offices. Thus the changing structures of
global economic, financial and military power coincided with a theoretical and
institutional realignment. The Bank’s origins and purpose reflect these major
transformations.

53

Chapter Three
From Savannah to Structural Adjustment
This chapter reviews the Bank’s growth from a small, relatively conservative lender,
which had difficulty finding a president, to the leading international development
agency. As President throughout the 1950s, Eugene R. Black oversaw the slow growth
of a hard-nosed banking organisation that lent to a handful of mostly medium income
countries. It was a Bank focused on infrastructure project, in particular power and
transportation. The 1960s was a decade of two halves for the Bank, the first half saw a
notable expansion not just of the organisation but of its mission through the creation of
the IDA in 1961. The presidency of George D. Woods from 1963-1968 saw further
expansion in the Bank’s mission. Despite this expansion, the second half of the 1960s
was a difficult time for the Bank both fiscally and politically as the problems of the US
economy limited its budget and as US foreign policy turned inward and became more
conservative, slowing the Bank’s expansion. Nevertheless, the expansionary vision of
Woods set the tone for the presidency of one of the Bank’s most well known presidents,
Robert Strange McNamara, as it was Woods who lobbied for McNamara’s selection.

McNamara’s tenure had two distinct phases: 1968-1973 and 1974-1981. During the first
phase, the key development was the rapid growth in the Bank’s lending portfolio. The
second phase was marked by McNamara and the Bank’s ‘discovery’ of poverty and a
strategy to address it — integrated rural and later urban development programs.
McNamara’s tenure ended as neoliberalism became the intellectual force behind pax
americana. In the Bank, neoliberalism made its first appearance with the introduction of
structural adjustment lending. It was the Black and Woods’ presidencies that established
much of the Bank’s organisational and operational structure, but it was the McNamara
reign that transformed the Bank from a reflection of pax americana to an institution that
was a key force in establishing and reproducing that hegemony.
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The Inaugural Meeting of Bank and Fund at Savannah

The Inaugural Meeting of Board of Governors of the IMF and World Bank took place
from 8 March 1946, in Savannah, Georgia. Keynes, again leading the British
delegation, was determined to ensure the organisations were both internationalist and
expansionary. However, as noted in the previous chapter, the atmosphere in Washington
had changed and US political views had shifted again, this time towards a preference
for coercive tactics in pursuit of its national interests. The US delegation opposed
Keynes’ lobbying to appoint White as the first managing director of the Fund. The
delegation, led by the relatively conservative Fred Vinson, Secretary of the Treasury,
wanted the Bretton Woods twins subject to relatively close (i.e. US) government
control. Vinson did not have a good relationship with White and, one month prior to
Savannah, had been given a FBI report by President Truman naming White as a
probable Soviet spy. 1 To block White, the US delegation persuasively argued it was
necessary for the Bank to be headed by an American in order to gain the confidence of
Wall Street and that it would be unseemly for an American to be head of both the Bank
and Fund, therefore a European should be head of the Fund. 2 This led to informal
agreement that the US selects the head of the Bank and the Europeans the Fund. This
agreement continues to this day.

To ensure the internationalism of the institutions, Keynes — having agreed at Bretton
Woods that they be located in the US — wanted to see them in New York near to the
UN rather than in Washington, where they would be more directly subject to pressures
from the US Administration.3 Vinson stepped in again and had the US President instruct
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the delegation that no compromise on location was acceptable. 4 As Gardner highlights,
this “…decision was an important victory for the idea of close [US] national control of
the Bretton Woods institutions. It was to have a profound effect on their future
development.” 5 With a view to insulation from the US Administration, Keynes wanted
the executive directors to be part-time positions paid at medium levels. The US insisted
on full-time executive directors with high salaries by contemporary international
standards. Thus, the US view of close control by national governments prevailed at all
levels, indeed, the decisions at Savannah strengthened US government control. 6

The First Meeting of Executive Directors of the IMF and World Bank took place in
Washington on 7 May 1946 but there was no president. The US had difficulty in finding
a suitable candidate prepared to assume the role. 7 They needed a person with high level
experience, contacts and standing — preferably in the banking sector as the Bank would
be reliant on finance markets (Wall Street in particular). However, the US finance
industry was suspicious of international schemes, given the experience of the Great
Depression, and indeed suspicious of the IBRD proposal. Only on 4 June, was Mr.
Eugene Meyer (previously editor and publisher of The Washington Post) elected as the
first President. The Bank formally opened for business on 25 June 1946. 8

Early Bank Operations: 1946 -1949

There was relatively little lending activity from 1946 to the end of 1948 and that which
did occur was primarily for postwar reconstruction projects. The Bank started to
develop a business-oriented, technocratic model for lending. This model had its origins
in the Bank’s Purposes but was reinforced by new appointments to the Bank (mostly
bankers and technical experts) and its difficulty in raising capital. These factors and the
priority given to infrastructure projects shaped the Bank’s ‘character’ for over a decade.
4
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Without having raised capital or committed any loan funds, Meyer resigned as President
— he spent only six months in the job. His resignation is generally attributed to
frustrations with the Bank structure, which gave the Executive Directors a large degree
of formal control and the President, responsibility without authority. 9 The US
Administration had difficulties finding a replacement; John J. McCloy was asked twice
and was only convinced to take up the position after he gained a commitment that the
Executive Directors would interfere less with day-to-day operations. 10 This was an
important development as it pushed the Bank towards a hierarchical structure with
strong central control by a single individual — a model that continues to this very day.
This structure also reinforced US influence over the Bank with an American President,
selected by the current US administration and the Bank being close to the US both
physically and politically.

McCloy started work in March 1947 bringing with him Robert L. Garner as VicePresident and Eugene R. Black as US Executive Director. These appointments started
another tradition in the Bank — a preference for senior management with commercial
backgrounds. McCloy was a Wall Street lawyer who, as was common at the time, had
had administration experience as Assistant Secretary of War (1941-1945). Garner had
been a banker and vice president of the General Foods Corporation. Black had been a
vice president of the Chase National Bank of New York. 11 It is not surprising that the
“…faith of the new trio in private investment as a panacea for the economic ills of the
world was almost boundless.” 12 Thus none of the senior management of the Bank had
development backgrounds, yet another tradition that continues to this day. Not
surprisingly, when the Bank was being established, this situation was the norm. As early
Bank staff member, Davidson Sommers (Legal Department, later a vice president)
explains:
…when the Bank started, people in the West didn’t know much about
the developing world except as colonies. They didn’t know much
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about development lending, didn’t know much about development
economics. 13

Another factor that shaped the Bank’s operations was the initial difficulty it had in
raising capital. The Great Depression led to a high degree of suspicion amongst
Americans about international bonds. Investors, big and small alike, had become
involved in international speculation in bond markets often with limited knowledge of
the countries they were investing in. They discovered, at significant cost, that many of
the bonds were not worth the paper they were printed on. Nevertheless, at the end of the
Second World War, the US was the only country with surplus funds to purchase bonds.
In fact, many individual US states still had bans on the sale of foreign bonds and some
actually “…imposed new bans specifically aimed at the World Bank.” 14 The difficulty
in raising capital contributed to the Bank’s early cautiousness in offering loans and its
close scrutiny of proposals to ensure they were sound, and appeared to be so to Wall
Street investors.

In April 1947, the first of the Bank’s early reconstruction loans was finalised. The loan
to France was followed by three further reconstruction loans to Western European
countries — the Netherlands, Denmark and Luxembourg. However, the IBRD was nowhere near large enough to meet Europe’s need for finance. Thus, when the Lend-Lease
arrangements ended, Britain could only meet its foreign exchange requirements for a
matter of weeks. The Anglo-American Loan of December 1945 was meant to solve its
transition problems but when the British made sterling convertible in July 1947, as per
the loan conditions, its reserves were quickly exhausted. 15 Even before the sterling
crisis, George Marshall, Secretary of the State Department, made a speech at Harvard
University acknowledging the scale of the transition problem, which resulted in a
massive US balance of payments support program for Europe between 1948 and 1952. 16
By late 1948, the Bank had committed just $497 million in loans, whereas the Marshall
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Plan disbursed over $12.7 billion in three years. 17 But the Marshall Plan was not just
“magnificent philanthropy” it was also “…the price to the United States of building a
ring of containment to Soviet territorial ambition.” 18 Equally, it was the price of
building an economic sphere that was sympathetic to US needs, it was in a number of
ways the price of hegemony.

Although the IBRD continued to lend to developed countries, reconstruction lending
essentially ended with the loan to Luxembourg in August 1947. McCloy understood
that once the Marshall Plan was operational, IBRD reconstruction aid would be
redundant. 19 As William Ascher points out, the Plan may have ended much of the flow
of funds to Europe but it did not change the Bank’s underlying rationale of facilitating,
predominately US, private capital investment to the world. 20 Indeed, the growing Cold
War gave a new urgency to that mission. It was now a question of where to focus loan
funds and the search for a new target took some time. With its only loan during 1948, a
development loan to Chile, the Bank started out in its new market — developing
countries. 21 In January 1949, President Truman’s famous four points speech not only
underlined the growing Cold War threat, but gave legitimacy to the Bank’s focus on
developing countries through its hastily added final point, which Gilbert Rist argues
“…inaugurated the ‘development age.’” 22 It is worth quoting from the speech because
not only was it part of the inspiration for the formation of the IDA, 23 but the similarities
with what was to become the Bank’s development model are striking.
Fourth, we must embark on a bold new program for making the
benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for
the improvement and growth of the underdeveloped areas….
The United States is pre-eminent among nations in the development of
industrial and scientific techniques. The material resources which we
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can afford to use for assistance of other peoples is limited. But our
imponderable resources in technical knowledge are constantly
growing and are inexhaustible.
I believe that we should make available to peace-loving peoples the
benefits of our store of technical knowledge…
And, in cooperation with other nations, we should foster capital
investment in areas needing development.
The old imperialism – exploitation for foreign profit – has no place in
our plans. What we envisage is a program of development based on
the concepts of democratic fair trading. 24

The Bank itself commenced research to determine what its “productive purposes” were
and which types of key investments would not receive financing from private sources as
stipulated in the Articles of Agreement. In contrast to the Bretton Woods agreements,
which were largely composed by technical experts, the Bank’s purposes were developed
by practitioners resulting in a more pragmatically informed approach. The Bank’s
senior managers considered that light manufacturing and export industries in developing
countries should be funded from private sources, so they were excluded from
consideration. Further, McCloy, Garner and Black were ideologically opposed to
investment in state-run enterprises, other than utilities. The consensus that dominated
Bank lending for over a decade was reached fairly quickly, namely that public utilities,
especially electricity, transport and communications were the key prerequisites for
achieving economic growth via private investment. 25 Despite being designed by
practitioners, the impact of the ‘Keynesian, welfare, modernisation consensus’ remained
visible, though the disappearance of the welfare component — the most controversial
element for business internationalists was simply dropped.26 So, the consensus extended
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to avoiding public investment in welfare-related areas such as sanitation, education, and
health care as their contribution to economic growth was “…less measurable and direct
than that of power plants.” 27 In determining which public utilities to fund, Urquidi, an
early Bank staffer, notes the “…Bank's ‘bottom line’ in judging a project was the ‘times
earned column’ on a spreadsheet…” 28 This is a clear example of the privileged status of
newly available economic data and national accounting. However, it is equally
important to note that the Bank’s public focus on individual projects could be
misleading — it was just as interested in a lender’s overall creditworthiness and thus in
its overall economic policy priorities and settings. 29

By 1949, Bank assessment of loans had turned into a program that involved the Bank
essentially managing the development of loans proposals and providing technical
assistance to that end. Here is the Keynesian, modernisation model’s emphasis on
(Western) ‘experts.’ The Bank’s assessments covered development, assessment and
supervision of projects and the planning and management of economies utilising data on
monetary, fiscal and balance of payments positions to determine policy. The model of
the ‘fly-in, fly-out’ Western expert became the norm. The economist, Albert
Hirschman, described how, to assist planning in Columbia, the Bank expected him to
formulate within a few weeks:
…some ambitious economic development plan that would spell out
investment, domestic savings, growth and foreign aid targets for the
Columbian economy over the next few years. All of this was alleged
to be quite simple for experts mastering the new programming
techniques: apparently there now existed adequate knowledge, even
without close study of local surroundings, of the likely range of
savings and capital-output ratios, and those estimates, joined to the
country’s latest national income and balance of payments accounts,
would yield all the figures needed… 30
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This level of confidence in both the newly available economic data and the methods of
econometric analysis are quite remarkable. Although data on government revenue and
expenditure and on national trade had been collected for a long time and attempts to
estimate national income were made in the 1860s, it was not until the Second World
War that the first attempts were made in the West to produce reliable national
accounts. 31 The quality of data collection in many developing countries was
questionable to say the least and the decisions about the composition of national
accounts impacted on economists’ understanding of the situation in these countries. In
particular, the decision not to include household production in national accounts
discounted its importance in the economy and its role in balancing activity during
economic downturns. 32 It particularly skews comparisons against economies with
significant peasant or subsistence economies. The new programming models in which
the Bank expressed so much faith were also in their early stages of construction and
tended to (and still do) stress parsimony. 33 This faith in numbers remains a feature of the
Bank’s lending and analytical activities.

Along with providing experts, the Bank assisted developing countries to build local
autonomous planning agencies. 34 Staff in such agencies were trained by the Bank and
had close intellectual relationships with Bank staff. They were often central to
organising and managing Bank-funded projects but more importantly, promoted Bank
favoured macro- and micro-economic policies and influenced components of domestic
historic blocs.
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The Bank took its role in loan supervision to greater depths than mainstream banks
(partly in order to win the trust of finance markets) and the loan to Chile already
included most of the key conditions that still characterise Bank lending. These include:
…close scrutiny and discussion of proposals; conditionality related to
monetary, fiscal, and balance of payments policies that would bear on
a country’s capacity to repay; supervision of these funds; and a
negative pledge. 35
The principal condition on the loan to Chile was that it settled with owners of prewar
bonds, on which the government had earlier defaulted. Settlement of outstanding debt
became (and remains) a core condition for access to Bank funds.

In 1948, the Bank had commenced a research program, producing and publishing
estimates of incomes in various countries. 36 From these humble beginnings the Bank
became the largest development research organisation in the world (see Chapter Four).
Already by the end of the 1940s, and despite limited lending activity, most of the
elements that dominated the Bank’s management of lending through the 1950s and
beyond were in place: strong centralised bureaucratic structure; a conservative approach
to lending that resulted in strong loan conditionality; a strong focus on infrastructure;
and a belief in technocratic expertise to provide solutions to development problems.

The 1950s

Lending really got going after January 1949 and grew steadily during the presidency of
Eugene Black, which commenced on 1 July 1949. Ultimately though, lending remained
at rather modest levels throughout the 1950s: from 1949 until April 1961 (when the
IDA was founded) the Bank made 280 loans in 56 countries, to the value of $5.1
billion. 37 Up until 1957 annual commitments averaged only $307 million per annum;
though they jumped to $600-700 million per annum in 1958-60 due primarily to
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increased assistance to India as it confronted a balance of payments crisis. 38 World Bank
lending remained dwarfed by US bilateral assistance, which averaged more than $1.8
billion per annum in the early 1950s. The focus on financing public utilities and
infrastructure remained: power and transport accounted for over half of lending in the
1950s and over 78 per cent of loans to developing countries. 39 Dams were also a major
activity, they are included under various Bank sector classifications but made up a
quarter of lending during Black’s tenure. 40 Some 43 per cent of Bank loans in this
period went to countries with already high levels of income (e.g. Japan and Australia)
and a further ten per cent went to loans for colonial development — for projects that
were largely designed to meet the raw materials needs of Europe. 41

During the 1950s, the strength of the influence of Western, and in particular US, foreign
policy concerns and priorities on the Bank became discernible. Anti-communism was
more than a little visible in the Bank. President McCloy publicly and repeatedly stated
that the Bank would “create markets for U.S. trade… [and] stop Communism.” 42 In
1948, a loan to communist Poland was not submitted to the Board because it may have
been approved even with the US voting against it. 43 Loans to encourage anticommunism were made to India (from 1949), Ethiopia and Nicaragua (from 1951) to
cite just a couple of examples. As Kapur, Lewis and Webb state:
…political priorities were common knowledge and inevitably exerted
an influence on lending decision. In any case, the meeting of minds
was helped along by routine meeting with State Department officials,
in which the Bank was often urged by State to ‘support’ specific
countries. 44
There are a few instances where the Bank has supported left-wing regimes (Tanzania
and Romania for example), just as there are a few instances where the Bank has made
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loans despite the objections of its largest donors (e.g. 1978 to the Socialist Republic of
Vietnam), but these were notable exceptions. They were made, it seems, to demonstrate
the Bank’s notional independence, which even the US government has acknowledged is
necessary for a Bank promoting capitalism sympathetic to pax americana. 45

The Bank’s development model firmed during this period but, as the Bank expanded, its
need to influence potential lenders grew and a more sophisticated and academic
approach was required. One of the consequences of this was the establishment of its
own training institute and ‘think tank’ in 1956, the Economic Development Institute.
Three features stand out about the Bank’s development model during this time: it was
never systematically described in Bank documentation; 46 it selected elements from
academic discourse to fit its ideas; and its model was quite different from that of UN
development agencies and bilateral donors who focused more on basic needs. Whilst it
may have been a small player amongst UN agencies in its early years, it was and
remains the organisation with access to sufficient resources to implement its
development agenda. 47

So how did the Bank’s development model fit with the blossoming field of development
economics during the 1950s? One of the most significant academic propositions put
forward in the 1950s was the Prebisch-Singer thesis. This was derived from work
published separately by Raúl Prebisch and Hans Singer on first-third world trade in
1950, which reached similar conclusions. Their work challenged the neoclassical theory
of comparative advantage first formulated by David Ricardo but refined by Eli
Heckscher and Bertil Olin in the 1930s. Ricardo’s version of comparative advantage
found that trade would provide benefits to countries with differences in labour
productivity. The Heckscher-Olin model based gains on different factor endowments
(land, labour, capital) in different countries but assumed constant access to
technology. 48 Its implication is that countries should specialise in products in which
they have relatively abundant factor endowments.
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The Prebisch-Singer model directly challenged the idea that countries should
concentrate on exports based on their relative factor endowments. They found that over
time, the terms of trade for primary commodities actually declined. This decline was the
consequence of capital concentration and higher profit margins from industrialisation
not occurring to the same extent in competitive primary product markets as with
manufactured goods. 49 Declining terms of trade for primary commodities would further
exacerbate the propensity of prices in industrialised countries to rise more quickly those
than in less industrialised countries. This trend would be strengthened by differences in
the income elasticity of demand, in other words by consumer’s tendency to increase
demand for manufactured goods as their incomes rise. The implication is that trade
between industrialised nations and those dependent on primary products — generally
developing nations — involves unequal exchange. 50

The Prebisch-Singer thesis concluded that, over the long-term, developing countries
would have to export ever increasing quantities of primary commodities just to maintain
their levels of imports from the industrialised world. Furthermore, to increase their
imports, developing countries would have to increase exports even further. As John
Rapley notes, the consequences were that developing countries needed to “…alter the
structure of the economy's production otherwise they would sink deeper into poverty.” 51

The Prebisch-Singer thesis was a key impetus in the development of Dependency
Theory, which set out to explain the empirical failure of ‘trickle down’ growth in Latin
America. 52 Dependency Theory went beyond the Prebisch-Singer thesis and posited that
the world trading system, in concert with section of the indigenous bourgeois, acted to
shift wealth from traditional to the modern sectors. This occurs both within a
developing society (the periphery) and between it and an already industrialised (the
centre) one, contributing to a process of underdevelopment. In other words, wealth, via
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exploitation, moves from the underdeveloped periphery to the developed core and,
importantly, the core is responsible for the process of creating underdevelopment and
impoverishment of the periphery. 53

The Prebisch-Singer thesis and Dependency Theory were quite influential in many
developing countries. In practice, the main policy proposals that derived from them
were promotion of state-led development and import substitution industrialisation (ISI).
State-led development led to policy proposals ranging from promotion of autarky to the
more common proposition that the state has a key role in the distribution of investment
and mediation of inequality. 54 ISI is a way of promoting industrialisation by restricting
imports of manufactured goods using tariff or non-tariff barriers as protection for local
industries. State-led development and ISI became developmental doctrine in much of
Latin America, India, parts of Africa and it was influential in East Asia too. Its
outcomes were not always as planned. Where it was one part of an overall development
program and used strategically (e.g. East Asia) it showed promise but in many countries
it became associated with inefficiency and corruption. 55

Many mainstream economists believe the Prebisch-Singer thesis would not occur under
free market conditions. Alternatively they argued, as per Paul Rosenstein-Rodan, that a
“big push” in infrastructure investment and careful development planning would
combat declining terms of trade. 56 The World Bank’s evolving development paradigm
drew significantly on this idea, but it was equally informed by Modernization Theory,
which was more in line with its founding fathers’ ideas regarding development.
Evolving from the behaviouralist turn in mostly US social science, Modernization
Theory aimed to duplicate the conditions that had promoted development in the
industrialised world in developing countries. As Mark Berger notes, it had “….an
emphasis on Fordist pay and production arrangements, Taylorist forms of labor
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organization, and a ‘paternalistic and protective’, but modernizing state.” 57 Its main
conclusions about the reasons for underdevelopment were a shortage of capital (thus the
prescription to increase savings) 58 and an inappropriate value system (prescription:
education in capitalist values). At the end of the day, Modernization Theorists saw that
underdevelopment was an initial phase and that developing countries would ‘catch up’
with some assistance from the West, which was under this prescription assumed to be
relatively benign. 59 It complemented the Bank’s ideas about the necessity of ‘trickle
down’ growth, with industrialisation starting in specific sectors and, thanks to
comparative advantage, spreading across the economy. 60 In the Bank’s version, light
industry was the key sector and borrowing governments were encouraged to promote
this sector, rather than heavy industry, which was promoted by UN bodies, some
academic analysis and, of course, many developing country governments. 61 The Bank’s
role was to provide the infrastructure necessary for ‘take off’ whilst social welfare
would be dealt with in due course, as a result of development. It need not form a
specific part of the lending program. For Berger, Modernization Theory like much
subsequent development economics:
…conflated capitalist development with national development and
turn nation-states that flowed from complex and contested histories
into unproblematic units to be developed and modernized, equating
the governments of those nations with the nations themselves. This is
directly linked to the way in which development economics and the
idea of national development rested on an elitist and technocratic
approach that conceived of development as a technical problem
outside of history and politics. 62

The Bank’s paradigm was not inconsistent with some aspects of the work of
development economists of the period from different sides of the fence and this
contributed to its legitimacy. For example, the structuralist work of Prebisch
emphasised the need for large-scale industrialisation, though apart from infrastructure,
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the Bank saw that this should be achieved through the market. 63 The classically shaped
work of W. Arthur Lewis was also influential. Lewis saw that the rural sector was
inefficient and that labour would have to be transferred to more productive industrial
uses to achieve development. 64 Lewis’ recasting of poverty as an employment problem
facilitated debate amongst classically trained economists on addressing poverty and
influenced the Bank’s understanding of development during the McNamara years. 65 Yet
its approach remained at odds with many bilateral donors, in particular the US, whose
aid program had a strong focus on winning the ‘hearts and minds’ of third world
peasants and thus funded social programs in health, water supply and education. 66

The main change to the Bank’s development thinking during the 1950s was in regard to
the absorptive capacity of developing countries. Initially, Bank management firmly
believed that absorptive capacity was very limited and that developing countries must
raise the local currency requirements for projects domestically. 67 By the mid-1950s, it
saw much higher needs in developing countries. By the end of the 1950s, the Bank
faced the problem of net negative transfers in some countries, that is, where borrowers
pay more money back to it (typically in interest) than it disburses in new loans. 68 It
became clear to some at the Bank that, given a limited number of borrowers, continued
lending may create a debt crisis: it would need to close its door once it had lent a certain
amount or to continue to lend at a higher level. Thus, it was not coincidental that the
Bank’s revised understanding of absorptive capacity fitted with the reality of its need to
continually increase lending to maintain fund flows and to avoid being dwarfed by
large, predominately bilateral, capital flows.

The IBRD’s lending jumped in the late 1950s and, not surprisingly, its sectors of
lending expanded too: education, industry and agriculture were the main beneficiaries.
The 1973 official history of the Bank applauded this expansion and was quite critical of
the Bank’s early conservatism regarding countries’ debt service capacity, though this
was almost a decade before the first debt crisis. Despite the expansion in agenda and
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lending, the outlook for the IBRD by the end of the 1950s was not great – its developed
country borrowers were becoming too ‘developed’ to meet the criteria in the Bank’s
Articles of Agreement that countries should not be able to access commercial credit.
Further, many of the big borrowers were already facing problems with their levels of
debt according to the Bank’s existing conservative debt servicing ratios and leastdeveloped countries were not considered creditworthy enough to access IBRD funds. 69
Thus, the establishment of the IDA in 1960, which expanded the Bank’s lending
capacity, was a godsend to the Bank, yet one with a sting in the tail — the IDA’s need
for regular replenishments by its big donors gave those donors new capacity to
influence the Bank. 70

The IDA and the 1960s

Bank President Black welcomed the establishment of the IDA despite his reservations
about its potential impact on the IBRD’s standing in financial markets. Further, Black
acknowledged that the IDA was in part the product of Cold War politics increasingly
being played out in developing countries. 71 The IDA was a multilateral channel for soft
loans to promote anti-communism but also part of a second wave of building
development institutions that occurred between 1958 and 1962. 72 Developing countries
had called for a new large development fund under UN control (called the Special
United Nations Fund for Economic Development). A World Bank controlled-fund was,
for the Eisenhower Administration, preferable to a UN agency because the Bank’s
weighted voting structure gives significant control to the US and West, whereas UN
agencies (the Security Council aside) have a one country one vote system and by the
end of the 1950s the UN was numerically dominated by developing countries. The US
also preferred the Bank’s business-like approach to development compared to the
operations of other agencies. 73 Moreover, the US initially envisioned the IDA as a way
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to deal with its excess holdings of non-convertible currencies, though at the end of the
day this was not the case. 74

The IDA was created under separate Articles of Agreement rather than by amendment
of the IBRD Articles. This was due to Black’s concerns to protect the IBRD’s standing
in financial markets but it also served to prevent attempts to revise the IBRD’s
Articles. 75 The IDA’s Articles are largely a duplication of the IBRD’s, with three
exceptions, first, they specify which countries are developed (Part I) and which are
developing (Part II) and link contributions to this status. This division was a way of
rationing access to IDA resources, which were likely to be over-subscribed. The
Articles of Agreement refer to balance of payments constraints on overseas borrowing
as the condition for access to IDA funds but relative poverty, as measured by per capita
income, became the main criteria for access. 76 Second, the voting structure is marginally
more favourable to developing countries — in March 2007, Part I countries controlled
62.77 per cent of the IBRD’s votes while they controlled only 58.44 per cent of the
IDA’s votes. 77 Third, despite misgivings of the Bank’s senior management, the Articles
allow the financing of social projects. 78 This was not only the product of the demands of
developing country members — the US and other developed countries saw social
expenditures as essential to combating communism. The focus remained on project
financing to the chagrin of some members. However, the definition of a ‘specific
project’ was enlarged to include sectoral efforts. In this way, the IDA paved the way for
greater program lending. 79

The first IDA credit — as they are called to distinguish them from IBRD loans — was
in a social sector, a water supply project in Jordan. This project was actually made to
support a pro-Western regime in the Middle East and in an implicit acknowledgement
of this, Bank management wished to ensure that it did not set a precedent for future IDA
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lending. 80 The Bank’s expansion into social areas proceeded slowly in the 1960s. It was
constrained by the initial IDA capitalisation of only $1 billion (of which only around
$750 million was in useable funds). Generating enough quality proposals was always a
problem for the IBRD whereas IDA resources, given their concessional nature, were
and continue to be oversubscribed. Their allocation is an ongoing issue of Board and
public debate. Interestingly, 60 per cent of IDA commitments from its formation until
June 1971 went to India and Pakistan and overall one third of Bank Group lending in
1960s went to them. 81

In 1962, new Bank lending commitments jumped to over $1 billion per annum for the
first time and they exceeded this level for the rest of the decade with two exceptions. 82
This was the product of increased Bank membership – it jumped from 68 in 1961 to 110
in 1969 83 – as well as a combination of new IDA resources and a gradual expansion in
IBRD loans. Lending to developed countries from the IBRD slowly declined throughout
the 1960s, by 1968-69 it accounted only for seven per cent of new commitments,
however, the last loan to a developed country (Greece) was not until 1979. 84

Much of the expansion during the 1960s was due to George D. Woods who became
president in January 1963. Another ex-banker, Woods was familiar with the Bank as he
had been on a number of missions in the decade or so prior to his appointment. 85 He
came into the role with the Bank in a unique situation of increased resources from the
IDA and significant retained earnings from IBRD loans yet limited investment
opportunities for IBRD resources. His first major role as president was to make a
recommendation to the Board on how to deal with the excess IBRD reserves. As Kapur,
Lewis and Webb note, rather:
…than passively accept the curtailment of lending opportunities and
deal with the Bank’s embarrassment of riches by cutting interest
charges, paying dividends, or building up liquid reserves, Woods
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recommended an aggressive and costly plan to create investment
opportunities through new types of lending and new clients. Wood’s
agenda implied riskier lending, a larger staff, more hands-on
development assistance, and in general, a relative increase in the
Bank’s nonfinancial role. 86
This expanded agenda was not actually focused on poverty alleviation but it allowed
lending in what had previously been regarded as ‘soft’ sectors, such as water supply,
agriculture, health and education. The case for lending in these sectors was a business
one – they were now seen as profitable investments, a case which was assisted by
developments in calculating economic rates of return in these areas. The expanded loan
agenda did not start to show effects until the late 1960s — agriculture went from two
per cent of lending in the 1950s to 11 per cent across the 1960s, but water, education
and health expenditures remained minimal. 87

Despite facing notable resistance from a number of Board members, Woods did see
some of his agenda implemented. His success was most visible in the growth of the
organisation: “...the number of employees, level of administrative spending, and, most
notably, the size of the professional staff all grew explosively.” 88 Indeed, it is notable
that professional staff and the administrative budget both grew at higher percentage rate
than during the McNamara reign, with which Bank growth is most closely associated.
However, lending did grow more rapidly under McNamara. Many of the new
professional staff were economists, who Wood’s saw as ‘agents of change.’ Yet they
were not as interested in expanding the Bank’s approach as he had hoped. At the end of
the day, the increase in the number of economists relative to the number of technical
specialists significantly contributed to greater overall intervention in borrowing
countries’ general economic policy settings. 89 They increased the Bank’s research
output too – of particular note is a 14 volume attack on the Indian approach to economic
development (in particular, ISI) published in the mid-1960s. 90
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Wood’s expansionary plans were slowed dramatically by the middle of the decade. The
US balance of payments difficulties, which began in 1960 but were serious by 1965, led
the Treasury to deny the Bank access to US markets in 1966. This limited IBRD loan
funding in 1967-68. At the same time, US foreign policy once again became more
conservative and inward looking; a general negativity regarding the outcomes of aid
prevailed. This atmosphere, combined with bad relations between Woods and the then
US Secretary of Treasury, contributed to a lengthy three-year negotiation for the second
IDA replenishment. It did not take place until 1968, which constrained IDA
disbursements. By mid-decade too, debt problems were clearly visible in many of the
Bank’s borrowers, though this did not greatly impact on the Bank’s lending. As
Catherine Caufield explains, on debt restructuring:
…the Bank felt that this was a task for other lenders not itself, and it
should be achieved not by cutting back on lending, but by
rescheduling existing loans… Between 1957 and 1969, international
creditors, often with the Bank acting as mediator, carried out twentyone reschedulings… 91

Woods’ final legacy was his choice of Robert McNamara as a successor and his attempt
to influence his directions, in particular focusing him on poverty alleviation. Woods’
concern about poverty was apparent in the diversification and expansion of Bank
projects, most notably in agriculture. However, Bank staff were more focused on
increasing output rather than on poverty alleviation. 92

The McNamara Years: 1968 — 1981

Much has been written about the McNamara years at the Bank, both supporters and
critics alike see him as having a missionary zeal, as the man who introduced a poverty
focus to the Bank and as the real founder of the modern Bank. McNamara did talk about
issues of poverty from the start of his presidency, though for most of what can be
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regarded as its first phase, 1968-1973, there was little action to specifically address
poverty other than increases in lending volume. In the second phase, 1974-1981
McNamara ‘found’ integrated rural development and to a lesser extent urban
development schemes as a way to transfer rhetoric into action. Ultimately, his increase
in the size of the organisation contributed most to putting the Bank at the forefront of
international development and thus making it a core player in the reproduction of pax
americana.

With hindsight, it is possible to be a little more dispassionate about McNamara’s role in
the Bank’s growth into a hegemonic development institution. It was Woods who played
the pivotal role in the Bank shift toward social issues and in broadening its lending
agenda. McNamara was as much a reflection of the trends and beliefs of his generation
as the iconic figure he became. As an example, take McNamara’s challenge, early in his
presidency, to one of the Bank’s core tenets — that growth would ‘trickle down.’ This
was important because the distinction between growth and poverty reduction was
central to the focus by McNamara and the Bank on poverty. In the academic debate on
development, Modernization Theory, which was intimately associated with ‘trickle
down’ growth, was already under attack by the 1950s and outdated by the early 1970s. 93
Part of its downfall was thanks to Dependency Theory — as Björn Hettne noted, the
most important impact of dependency critiques was “the undermining of the idea of
progress as a more or less automatic and linear process.” 94 Even in classical economics,
Lewis’s casting of poverty as an ‘employment problem,’ enabled economists to analyse
poverty because it was transformed from an issue of politics into one of price
distortions. So the “proxy notion of an ‘employment problem’ thus became a bridge
from orthodoxy to interventionism in development policy, much as cyclical
unemployment had legitimized Keynesian fiscal policy.” 95 Thus, by the time of
McNamara’s presidency, the assumption that growth would trickle down was no longer
universally held and there was a strong focus on poverty in both mainstream and radical
economics.
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Kapur, Lewis and Webb claimed that the “…sudden upgrading of poverty alleviation
under McNamara was an exceptionally personal decision.” 96 Yet this downplays
Woods’ influence on the direction of the Bank and on McNamara regarding the
importance of poverty reduction, noted in their earlier chapter. It has also been
convincingly argued that McNamara’s concern for poverty and meeting people’s basic
needs grew, at least initially, largely derived from his concern about the spread of
communism. 97 Further, McNamara was raised in a generation in which welfare was an
accepted part of social compromise (even in its limited US form) and he entered
government as a member of the Kennedy team promising a Great Society. In this sense,
McNamara was simply re-inserting welfare into the ‘Keynesian, welfare, modernisation
model’ that existed at the Bank’s origins. The focus on McNamara also ignores the
growing international concern regarding poverty which resulted in the formation of the
IDA; the new academic interest in poverty; popular worries about poverty; and the
focus on basic needs in the American aid program from the 1950s. This focus operated
during the campaign in Vietnam (even if it was more concerned with winning the
‘hearts and minds’ of peasants than with their well being), which of course McNamara
had directed as Secretary of Defence.

McNamara was obsessed with statistics, measurement, size and scientific management
and in this field he was a pioneer. 98 He was one of the first generation trained at the
Harvard Business School in control accounting. 99 During the war, McNamara was part
of a team from Harvard that were seconded to run the Statistical Control Unit for the US
Air Force and teach them the benefits of new control and management techniques. 100
After the war, he went to the Ford Motor Company as part of a team recruited from
Statistical Control to help turn the ailing company around. Here, he led the replacement
of the traditional ‘Fordist’ culture with centralised management practices and statistical
96
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control of inputs and production. 101 These were techniques that swept across American
industry and in the longer term had seriously detrimental effects on the quality of
American manufacturing. 102

Coming to the Bank from the Department of Defense, McNamara’s reliance on
managerialism and data in his leadership of the Bank was probably reinforced by the
reality that he “was notably uninformed about the developing world…” 103 Much of his
focus on data came down to an interest in scale and from his earliest days in the Bank,
McNamara was determined to increase the size of the Bank. As Deborah Shapley,
McNamara’s biographer notes, “McNamara knew he wanted a big Bank before he knew
for certain what to do with it.” 104

After 1969, the Bank also received encouragement to expand lending from the Nixon
Administration. According to Gowan, the Administration saw that increasing World
Bank lending would encourage private US banks to follow — enlarging the role of
private American financial operators was central to its strategy to maintain US
hegemony through centralising the role of the US and the US dollar in the international
financial system. 105 This strategy was operationalised with the abrogation of the Bretton
Woods agreements in 1971/73, which made the US dollar the international currency
through removing the discipline and alternative of the gold standard. 106 It also made the
US the only country in the world that: could change the relative value of its currency
without great domestic cost; could direct international interest rates via its domestic
policy; and faced only a limited balance of payments constraint. 107 Gowan concludes
that the post-1971 international financial arrangements more effectively promoted pax
americana than the Bretton Woods arrangements did. 108
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It is not surprising that the most significant outcome of McNamara’s presidency was the
expansion of lending. In the first phase of McNamara’s presidency, there was a 131 per
cent increase in new loan commitments; they averaged over $2.8 billion per annum. 109
During the second phase of his presidency, lending averaged over $9.9 billion per
annum. 110 Sometimes pressures to lend mitigated policy influence but size increased the
Bank’s influence and extended it into new areas of government action, particularly
social areas.

The number of staff continued on the growth trajectory started under Woods. More than
one thousand new staff were appointed in the first three years and this growth
transformed the Bank more and more into a large bureaucracy. 111 The vast majority of
the new (professional) staff had an economics or finance background. 112 At the end of
the day, the Bank often had more and better trained professional economists working
for it than developing countries — size does matter. Further, McNamara “…truly
grasped the overall importance of broader economic research for the bank…” 113 During
his tenure, research became one of the Bank’s vice-presidencies and the research that
was carried out was increasingly neoclassical and neoliberal. This research became the
basis of the policy conditionality in the Bank’s structural adjustment lending. 114

McNamara believed that to be a leader in the development industry the way projects are
administered actually matters, thus he gave much attention to administrative reform in
the first phase of his presidency. Country Program Papers were introduced in 1968,
which as Rich pointed out, represent an extraordinary “…vision of global central
planning” based on belief in Bank technocrats. 115 In 1970, McNamara added the
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Operations Evaluation Unit, which would for the first time evaluate the outcomes of
Bank projects. 116 Overall, though the pressure to lend outweighed administrative
concerns, the:
…rush to meet targets reached a point of near absurdity toward the
end of the Bank's fiscal year… During McNamara's tenure, 40 percent
of all IBRD loans were pushed through in the last two months of the
fiscal year, a pattern that continues to this day. 117
As Caufield noted, staff members themselves “…often complained that the pressure to
lend resulted in poorly prepared and poorly executed projects.” 118 Yet, as George and
Sabelli noted, equally interesting was the point that it was Bank staffers designing all
aspects of projects. 119 Despite populist calls for greater participation and an enhanced
role for civil society, these disappeared from the Bank during the McNamara years.

The second phase of McNamara presidency began with a speech at a World Bank / IMF
conference in Nairobi in 1973. Here, McNamara introduced a focus on integrated rural
development. This was not McNamara’s first idea on how to focus the Bank on poverty
— over the years, McNamara gave speeches about a range of other issues: population,
unemployment, environment, land reform, public health, the environment and even
income distribution. 120 But for the most, “rhetoric outran implementation” 121 and they
did not translate into projects. Whereas agriculture, which had already increased in
importance during McNamara’s first phase, jumped from 20 per cent of overall IBRD/
IDA new lending approvals in 1969-1973 to 29 per cent in 1974-1982. In contrast,
despite the many statements and speeches, the education, water supply and sanitation
sectors remained at around five per cent of new approvals in both periods, health was
one per cent and the new sector of population and nutrition was a mere two per cent of
lending in the second period. 122 However, McNamara’s broad interests did directly
influence the Bank’s “vastly expanded” research programs. 123
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McNamara’s basic needs approach at first gained little popularity outside the Bank.
Developing countries were more focused on the creation of a New International
Economic Order (NIEO). 124 However, as Rist argued, the developed countries would
not accept the idea of non-interference in domestic policies that NIEO promoted; 125
whereas the basic needs approach justified intervention in developing countries on the
basis of solidarity with the poor. It eventually received approval from many developing
country governments and also from the Third World Forum (an independent
international association of intellectuals from the Third World) and the International
Labour Organization. The basic needs approach improved the Bank’s legitimacy as a
development agency and its relations with NGOs. 126

Why the delay in initiating projects that fitted McNamara’s focus on poverty?
McNamara, despite his concern with poverty, did not contest the Bank’s disdain
regarding social welfare approaches to poverty. Economic productivity and growth was
still the priority. 127 To quote McNamara, the Bank would put its:
…primary emphasis not on the redistribution of income and wealth —
as necessary as they may be in many of our member countries — but
rather on increasing the productivity of the poor, thereby providing for
a more equitable sharing of the benefits of growth. 128
Integrated rural development was the first area that McNamara hit upon that offered the
possibility of both direct growth in the productivity and in the income of the poorest and
that, at the same time, fulfilled the Bank’s project model. It was also potentially
replicable on a grander scale. 129 At another level, as Walden Bello pointed out, rural
development projects offered potential as a political solution to rural volatility: they
aimed to de-link smallholder farmers from tenant farmers and the landless and link
them instead to national markets, giving them a stake in the system. 130 Yet the Bank was
not overly successful in its focus on smallholders because, even at the end of
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McNamara’s term when agriculture accounted for one third of new approvals, most
Bank projects still targeted richer farmers and employed capital-intensive models and
cash cropping. 131 Furthermore, the overall outcomes of both traditional agriculture
projects and the smallholder-focused integrated rural development projects were less
than a roaring success even on the Bank’s own terms. 132 It is difficult not to agree with
Caufield’s conclusion that the Bank may have chosen to highlight its activities with the
poor but it actually “…acted consciously, out of a conviction that the best way to create
new wealth is to invest in the wealthy, not the poor.” 133

One area where McNamara did challenge a Bank hegemonic principle was in lending to
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) that were not operating public utilities. 134 Historically,
Bank doctrine was that outside of natural monopolies (as most public infrastructure was
then regarded), markets were efficient, natural and largely self-adjusting and should be
left to determine production. McNamara, probably drawing from his experience at Ford,
held the view that control of enterprises was more important than ownership. Further,
he saw that markets were sometimes failing to ensure production of key inputs
(especially agricultural inputs).135 He was, therefore, not as hostile to SOEs as the Bank
had been. His position was never widely held in the Bank but it was a likely reason for
the not insignificant funding that went to development finance companies and from
thence to SOEs. Given that this position challenged a Bank hegemonic principle, it is
not surprising that this more sympathetic view to mixed economies barely survived
McNamara’s tenure — a Bank commissioned report on development in sub-Saharan
Africa put an end to it in 1981 because of a supposed lack of efficiency regardless of
control. 136 This is a very telling point about Bank doctrine — that an organisation born
out of Keynesianism could only fleetingly and partially accept mixed economic
structures. Not surprisingly, the issue has never made a comeback in Bank debates.

On debt, McNamara was even more liberal than his predecessor but given the influence
of Keynesianism on the Bank, this did not challenge hegemonic principles. McNamara
131
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was even more determined than Woods not to have the Bank engaged in debt
rescheduling. 137 It was not that he thought that debt was not an issue for the Bank, rather
he believed that developing countries needed additional capital in order to improve
productivity and growth and in this way improve their capacity to meet loan repayments
in the long-term. 138 McNamara thought that the World Bank needed to lend more to
make up for what he saw as developing countries’ inadequate access to finance and he
took it upon himself to encourage commercial banks to increase lending. Of course,
debt levels in some developing countries were already problematically high by 1973
(due in part to Eurodollar loans). After 1973, balance of payment problems for non-oil
exporting nations were severe and the subsequent petrodollar phenomenon significantly
contributed to the build up of debt in developing countries. McNamara’s response was
not to curb lending but to argue that loan funds should be used to fund exports, which
would enable debt servicing. 139

McNamara stepped down before 1982, when the debt crisis really became public but the
increased lending and attitudes of the Bank during his reign must be acknowledged as a
contributing factor. During McNamara’s presidency, in the context of an international
system that lacked a way to prevent instability, the Bank’s only response to debt was to
‘bail out’ developing countries in crisis. 140 The growth in private lending and the oil
crisis reduced Bank influence in some countries but for the more numerous losers
during the oil crisis, leverage increased. The crisis also served to sharpen the Bank’s
focus — publicly social objectives were relegated to second place behind economic
stabilisation, prior to neoliberal hegemony demanding it. 141 In the medium-term, debt
problems actually enhanced the Bank’s capacity to impose conditionality due to the
amounts owed to it and its role as a lender of last resort.

It is not possible to finish with the McNamara presidency without noting that it was he
who formally introduced structural adjustment loans (SALs) to the Bank in 1980, in
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what George and Sabelli called his “parting gift” to the Bank. 142 Actually, it seems that
the idea of conditional structural adjustment lending belonged to Ernest Stern, the then
Vice President Operations. In May 1979, he wrote McNamara a memorandum that
proposed a:
…conditioned program [of] loans in support of macroeconomic
policies to selected, mostly middle-income countries… His advocacy
was cautious… SAL, said Stern, would give the Bank an
uncomfortably high political profile. 143
For McNamara it seems SALs were a way to get quick disbursing loans out to lenders
— which he considered an even more urgent task since the second oil crisis. McNamara
was actually only ensuring that the Bank played its new US designated role of ‘bailing
out’ states — SALs offered a more efficient way of doing this. A proposal was
presented to the World Bank Board in February 1980 and they approved it a couple of
months later, after assuring themselves there would be proper coordination with the
IMF.

Whether or not McNamara and Ernst recognised it, SALs reflected the new politicoeconomic climate that was spreading across the West and that came to prominence in
the Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan administrations in the UK and US
respectively, followed a couple of years later by Helmut Kohl in Germany.
Underpinning this new neoliberal hegemony was the intellectual work of a group of
neoclassically trained, neoliberal economists led by Friedrich von Hayek and Milton
Friedman who had been working on a critique of Keynesianism and to develop their
own diagnoses of the developed and developing world’s problems. This chapter
concludes with an exploration of their analysis and how they came to be the dominant
approach to economic analysis by the mid-1980s.
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Neoliberal Economic Theory

Neoliberals take as given the neoclassical assumption that individuals are rational and
maximise their utility or benefits. From “this assumption it follows that the most
productive economy will be one in which individuals are allowed the greatest freedom
to engage in activities or enter into contracts as they choose, and to reap the full benefits
of their labours.” 144 Friedman added to neoclassical economics a focus on demand,
consumption, utility and a preference for monetary policy (in particular control of the
money supply and interest rates) to address economic cycles over fiscal policy (Keynes’
preferred mechanism). This fondness for monetary policy had the added benefit of
minimising state intervention in the economy. 145 Rational expectations theory, which
models how people forecast future events, expanded the neoclassical case against the
state with the argument that people could increasingly foresee the direction of
government policies and would adjust their behaviour, thus undermining government
attempts to change policy. 146

The neoliberal diagnosis of the developing countries’ problems began in the 1940s with
the work of P.T. Bauer whose empirical work supposedly demonstrated that the rational
actor assumption held true for developing countries.147 In particular, he was concerned
to show that smallholders do respond ‘rationally’ to local incentive structures as
opposed to the view that their actions were the product of (natural) conservatism and/or
local cultural and social practices. T.W. Schultz, building on Bauer’s work, argued that
smallholders do not make capital improvements on their land because of government
policies that distort prices and take too much of their profit in order to fund industrial
development. By the mid-1960s there was a rash of literature from neoliberal
economists on the negative impact of many countries’ incentive and price structures and
on the way that state protectionism or overvaluation of the exchange rate negatively
impacts the overall ‘welfare’ of the economy. 148
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It was not until the 1970s that neoliberalism became mainstream amongst development
specialists. A 1970 OECD study was central to its mainstreaming. The study examined
the experience of seven developing countries in the postwar period and concluded that
ISI was overall negative predominately because it did not follow countries’ ‘natural’
comparative advantage but also because of limited bureaucratic capacity to effectively
direct ISI. 149 It found that ISI increased income inequality and recommended instead
that states follow export-oriented industrialisation (EOI). Further reports followed and
while the initial report was relatively cautious in its conclusions, “[s]tronger — some
might say dogmatic — expressions of neoclassical thought were to follow, as critics
gained in confidence and grew convinced that their findings had thoroughly discredited
the old statist development schools.” 150

The critiques came together in a 1983 trade study by the National Bureau of Economic
Research (NBER) that set up a simplistic dichotomy between ISI and EOI, the latter of
which was supposedly practiced fully by the successful East Asian tigers. In countries
following ISI, the NBER study said that government interventions in markets for capital
and labour distorted the relative prices of each making capital relatively cheap and
labour more expensive leading to the elimination of many traditional labour intensive
industries but creating few jobs. 151 The proposed solution to the problems was, not
surprisingly, reduced government intervention across the whole gamut of the economy.
The report also totally rejected Prebisch-Singer type arguments regarding the structural
problems of trade between developing and industrialising countries and reformulated
the benefits of trade based on comparative advantage to make it again attractive. The
NBER analysis, along with most neoliberal influenced studies, essentially ignored the
role of the state in the development of the East Asian tigers. 152 Nevertheless, this
problematic neoliberal reading of East Asian development became central to the case
for the adoption of Washington Consensus policies in developing countries and it did so
in a way “naturalized” the existence of nation-states and liberal capitalism. 153
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In the 1970s, a further string was added to the neoliberal bow through New Political
Economy (NPE). It was pioneered by Anne Krueger who applied the rational utility
maximisation thesis to politics via a study of the effect of quotas on firms. 154 Quotas
create economic rents so, Kruger argued, plant managers will augment their access to
these rents by increasing the capacity of a plant, regardless of current idle capacity.
They do so to make windfall profits via on-selling of goods purchased under the quota
system rather than through growth in production. Kruger’s posited that this would result
in a decrease in overall plant productivity because of increased overheads. Moreover,
the quota system would supposedly expand corruption in industry and government.
Kruger’s study resonated with fellow neoliberals because it supposedly demonstrated
that efficiency losses from trade protection were higher than empirical studies had to
that point indicated, thus it made the rather weak neoclassical argument in favour of
trade liberalisation stronger. 155

Robert Bates published an influential study in 1981, which built on the neoliberal
analysis of urban bias in developing countries’ government policy using the NPE
framework. 156 This bias supposedly resulted in an inequitable price structure for rural
production. Bates explained the bias by the disproportionate influence of urban
industrialists allied with the urban working class on government policy in developing
countries. Given the neoliberal faith in comparative advantage, Bates regarded this as
counter-productive for development. As Rapley pointed out, Bates’ work was very
influential in the World Bank and soon after it was published “‘getting the prices right’
became a guiding concern for the World Bank in Africa.” 157

NPE significantly contributes to “a profoundly cynical view of the state in developing
countries.” 158 The proposition that individuals are only motivated by self-interest is, as
John Toye pointed out, an assumption “breathtaking in its scope and pretension,” which
feeds into pessimism to the point of determinism regarding the capacity of states in
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developing countries to implement ‘sound’ policies. 159 This bias contributes to its
ultimate inability to undertake historically grounded socio-political analysis of statemarket-civil society relations despites its pretensions as ‘political’ economy.
Paradoxically, the general acceptance of the negative view of the state was assisted by
strands of neo-Marxist analysis that were equally suspicious of it. 160

In summary, the neoliberal analysis of the problems in developing countries comprised
three interrelated ideas or hegemonic principles, that: the public sector was overextended; there had been too much emphasis on physical capital formation often at the
expense of human capital formation; and the third world had developed too many
market-distorting economic controls. 161 Why did this analysis become so widely
accepted? Similar to the link between the Depression and Keynesianism, the rise of
neoliberal economics coincided with the economic crises of the 1970s for which it
purportedly had an explanation and a solution. There was: “…widespread doubt and
anxiety about the wisdom of government activity in many developing countries...” and
“…some truth” in the neoliberal analysis. 162 In contrast to the spread of Keynesianism,
well-funded think-tanks, World Bank researchers and many in the press set out to
disseminate neoliberal views. 163 More than anything though, it was the election of the
Reagan Administration in the US that legitimated neoliberal economics. The
Administration used neoliberal prescriptions to reshape the US historic bloc and a pax
americana again engaged in reshaping the international scene to its requirements. Of
course, not all developing countries had to be pushed; neoliberal regimes came to
dominate the historic bloc in many developing countries, though of course not all of
them by democratic means.
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Conclusion

This chapter demonstrated how the Bank during its formative years largely reflected the
dominant politics of the time. The Keynesian, modernisation, welfare model that
prevailed in the postwar years provided the impetus for its creation and the logic of its
operation. During the 1950s, the Bank grew slowly; it largely lent for infrastructure
projects to the more creditworthy developing countries. The establishment of the IDA in
1961 made the Bank into a development agency and its lending volume and agenda
expanded, though still relatively slowly. During McNamara’s presidency the Bank grew
more quickly and late in his term, the Bank size and standing gave it the capacity to
help shape pax americana. This meant it was now a useful and growing force in the
global neoliberal reconfiguration of pax americana. 164

With neoliberal economics sweeping across the world and governments espousing
neoliberalism in power in the US and UK, the long-term presidency of Robert
McNamara came to a close. McNamara had left a mixed legacy, he had on the one hand
maintained the Bank’s post-war development tradition based on the priority of
economic growth but emphasising that growth derived from an “…overlapping
combination of Keynesianism, welfarism, and modernisation.” 165 In line with this, he
expanded the Bank’s agenda and operations and introduced at least the rhetoric of
poverty reduction. On the other hand, he left a now hegemonic Bank dominated by
neoclassically trained economists, committed to parsimonious economic modelling and
management using economic data. And he left them with a new tool, SALs, which
strengthened the Bank’s leverage and proved particularly powerful in promoting
neoliberal policies in developing countries.
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Chapter Four
From Washington to Post-Washington Consensus
This chapter takes up the story of the rise of neoliberalism in the Bank from 1981. It
examines how neoliberalism becomes a set of hegemonic economic principles shared
between the Bank, the IMF and the US government. John Williamson labelled these
commitments and policies the ‘Washington Consensus’ in 1990 and they centre on
commitment

to

macroeconomic

stability,

outward

orientation

and

domestic

liberalisation. 1 So, the term Washington Consensus indicates the way neoliberalism
translated to the policies and programs of the Bank and distinguishes this from the
broader theoretical and political movement of neoliberalism outlined in the previous
chapter.

Washington Consensus prescriptions dominated Bank lending and rhetoric remarkably
quickly and were uncontested until the early 1990s. However, a more substantial move
away from the Washington Consensus only occurred in mid-1990s as the Bank
promoted its ‘human face’ under the new president, James Wolfensohn. Over time, the
Bank’s new rhetoric formed an identifiable approach to development, which has been
labelled the post-Washington Consensus (PWC) to indicate both its continuities and
discontinuities with the Washington Consensus. To date, scholars have not outlined the
development and components of the PWC systematically. This chapter attempts to do
precisely this and to identify the elements that distinguish the PWC from the
Washington Consensus.

The Washington Consensus in Full Swing

The Reagan Administration appointed A. W. Clausen as Bank President in mid-1981, at
one level a return to the Bank’s traditional embrace of ex-bankers but more than that, he
was: “…a representative of renewed capitalist doctrine concerning the limits of
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government and the virtues of flexible, self-adjusting markets.” 2 He was influenced by
neo-classical economics and the associated New Political Economy, which, as outlined
in the previous chapter, were increasingly dominating development theory and policy.
His presidency was the death knell for the Bank focus on poverty, though its
commitment was already on the wane prior to his arrival. 3

Clausen made major changes to the Bank’s research department by replacing
McNamara confidants with economists focused on a new research agenda centred on
unquestioned faith in ‘free markets.’ 4 Anne Krueger, a NPE pioneer, was appointed as
the Bank’s Chief Economist. 5 However, staff changes were not sweeping, so the speed
at which the new doctrines permeated the Bank is a little surprising. The foundations for
a shift must have already been in place — and some are identifiable. Of the hundreds of
economists hired during the McNamara reign most were neo-classically trained. A 1991
survey of staff in the Bank’s Policy, Research and External Affairs branch showed 55
per cent of staff had higher degrees in economics or finance and 80 per cent of staff
were trained in a handful of British and US institutions. 6 Stern and Ferreira noted that
training in these institutions tends to be “uniform” and, it should be added,
neoclassical. 7 Kapur, Lewis and Webb pointed out that the Washington Consensus
suited the operational departments for whom poverty lending had been administratively
complex and often not overly successful. 8 Ngaire Woods makes a similar point about
institutional factors — the Washington Consensus provided staff in the IMF and World
Bank with a template and:
[t]he template is necessary because it guides staff working in countries
all over the world, permitting them to act with the full backing of their
institution and to put agreements in place with a minimum of time and
resources. Put another way, staff have no incentive to venture beyond
what the institution, as a whole, will take responsibility for. The result
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is conformity, which is entrenched by the hierarchical way in which
each institution is organized. 9
But management also adopted coercive techniques to ensure Washington Consensus
prescriptions were adopted and promoted. For example, Bank ‘editing’ of reports
became much tighter; Krueger’s Economic Research Staff did not analyse poverty; and
its research program was exclusively centred on showing economic liberalisation was
good policy. 10 By the mid-1980s the Bank and its research economists were “…seen to
be leading the charge of the neoclassical resurgence.” 11

So what where the policy prescriptions of the Washington Consensus? They certainly
did not utilise all the ideas of neoliberal economics because, as Woods argued, the IMF
and Bank have tended to ignore “economic theories or policy prescriptions which would
require greater resources or a different expertise.” 12 Michel Chossudovsky has provided
a useful summary of the key policies of the Washington Consensus, which were carried
out in two phases: first, short-term macroeconomic stabilisation carried out quickly via
‘big bang’ reforms; and second, long-term structural change via a range of detailed
microeconomic reforms. 13 A brief outline of these policies follows.

Washington Consensus Policies Phase One: Economic Stabilisation
This phase of short-term macroeconomic stabilisation is designed to control balance of
payments and budgetary deficits. Implemented predominately by the IMF, key policies
prescriptions include:
i.

Budgetary austerity to control deficits — this demands dramatic cuts in
recurrent expenditure, in particular through cuts to public sector employment,
social sector programs and often investment programs as well.

9

Woods, The Globalizers, p. 63.
Caufield, Masters of Illusion, pp. 144-145, Kapur, Lewis and Webb, World Bank, p. 339. Indeed, there
was little toleration for alternative views in the Bank from the late 1970s on and this stance hardened in
the 1980s, Stern and Ferreira, "The World Bank As "Intellectual Actor"," p. 598.
11
Ibid, p. 539.
12
Woods, The Globalizers, p. 63.
13
The following section is based on Michel Chossudovsky, The Globalisation of Poverty: Impacts of IMF
and World Bank Reforms (London: Zed Books, 1997), pp. 55-67. See also Kapur, Lewis and Webb,
World Bank, pp. 513-518 and Toussaint, Your Money or Your Life!, pp. 141-150. For good evaluations of
the Washington Consensus policies see inter alia Rapley, Understanding Development, pp. 66-93 and
Toye, Dilemmas of Development.
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Currency devaluation, often an end to currency controls or, at minimum,
multiple exchange rate policies. Interestingly, the Bank tended to promote
devaluation more than the IMF as it did not share the Fund’s level of concern
regarding inflation. 14

iii.

Price liberalisation —often referred to as ‘getting prices right’, meaning ending
subsidies and price controls. This generally affects areas such as staple foods
and their production, whilst at the same time prices for energy, petroleum and
other public utilities are set at or higher than world market prices. This is the socalled ‘dollarisation’ of domestic prices.

Washington Consensus Phase Two Policies: Structural Reform
The IMF and World Bank implement microeconomic reform policies jointly. Key
aspects are:
i.

Trade liberalisation — reduction and elimination of tariffs and quotas and
encouragement of an export focus.

ii.

Privatisation of state owned enterprises and utilities, often linked to a program
of microeconomic reform in various sectors (e.g. power, water supply and
sanitation, mining, health and education).

iii.

Tax reform — promoted the introduction of value-added taxes that increase the
tax burden on lower and middle classes and tax breaks for targeted investment.

iv.

Land “reform” — a misnomer as this essentially referred to ensuring the security
and stability of private land ownership.

v.

Banking deregulation — this involved detailed changed to legislation,
privatisation of state-owned banks and the setting up of independent central
banks. The package of changes ultimately reduced central bank control over
interest rates in favour of international markets.

vi.

Liberalisation of capital movements, that is the removal of foreign exchange
controls.

vii.

A focus on poverty alleviation and social safety nets was added in the late
1980s, the focus was on cutting overall social expenditure and selectively
‘servicing’ the poorest (a supposedly low cost, efficient approach).

14

Kapur, Lewis and Webb, World Bank, p. 514.
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Good governance — in the 1980s, this essentially meant the holding of
multiparty elections but, in the post-Washington consensus era, it has taken on a
life of its own.

Implementing the Washington Consensus
The debt crisis provided the Bank (and Fund) with greater capacity to impose
Washington Consensus policies on cash-strapped developing countries. 15 The debt
problem had been building for a number of years but it took the Mexican default of
August 1982 and the others that followed shortly thereafter for the Bank and Fund to
publicly acknowledge the extent of indebtedness and crisis. The Washington Consensus
policies to address the debt crisis acted explicitly to reinforce pax americana. By
promoting currency devaluation, outward orientation and financial liberalisation:
[t]hus did US rentiers get their debts paid, US industry got cheaper
imports of the inputs needed for production, US companies could buy
up assets including privatised utilities in the country concerned, and
the capital account would be liberalised so that local stock markets
could be played. 16

The main mechanism for promoting Washington Consensus policies was conditionality
on Structural Adjustment Loans. From the middle of the 1980s, the new Sectoral
Adjustment Loans (SECALs) also became popular in the Bank. Their narrower
(sectoral) focus made them more effective in facilitating the Washington Consensus’s
second phase micro-economic reforms than SALs. And these reforms were the Bank’s
responsibility in the division of labour between it and the IMF. 17 SALs and SECALs
also received significant and public critical attention, yet Bank investment loans
remained the dominant form of lending and were, in fact, as important a vehicle in
pursuing the Washington Consensus agenda. For example, privatisation of utilities was
generally pursued through investment loans.
15

This is in contrast to how the oil shocks, via the recycling of petrodollars and the creation of new donor
countries, undermined the Bank’s influence especially over middle income countries, see ibid, p. 475.
16
Gowan, The Global Gamble, pp. 42 and 56-47.
17
The Bank had, virtually since its inception, included macroeconomic policy concerns in its project
loans to countries. However, its real influence was often limited and its interests in policy conditionality
actually declined in the 1950s in favour of a focus on projects before increasing again from the mid-1960s
and substantially from the mid-1970s. On the development of policy linked lending see, Kapur, Lewis and
Webb, World Bank, Chapters Nine and Ten and Mason and Asher, World Bank since Bretton Woods,
Chapter Six.
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SALs and SECALS disburse quickly and can be used for balance of payments
difficulties or for meeting debt repayments (an area that had previously been the domain
of the IMF). For those countries willing to accept adjustment loans (or with few other
options), the Bank’s influence was significantly expanded and deepened. 18 In 1981,
SALs were around six per cent of Bank lending, by 1987-90 adjustment lending (SALs
and SECALs) accounted for almost 30 per cent of lending. In 1991-93, it dropped to 20
per cent of Bank lending. 19 The number of conditions on adjustment lending increased
from an average of 34 in 1980-82 to 56 in 1987-90. 20 At the same time as adjustment
lending was increasing, overall Bank lending increased. Average annual Bank
commitments grew from $5.3 billion in the period 1970-79 to $15.69 billion in 198089. 21 This reinforced increased Bank leverage over borrowing countries.

The Reagan Administration had a quite turbulent relationship with the Bank. They were
ideologically antagonistic to it yet they had appointed Clausen whose strong neoliberal
views they applauded and a 1982 report they commissioned from the US Treasury on
the Bank concluded that the Bank had been “…most effective in furthering our [US]
global economic and financial objectives, and thereby also serving our long-term
political/ strategic objectives.” 22 Nevertheless, in 1984, they decided to cut their IDA
replenishment for 1985-87 by 35 per cent on the previous one. According to Bello, the
Reagan Administration felt this cut would ‘encourage’ the Bank to change the eligibility
for restricted IDA funding from a basis of need to one of rewarding those progressing
economic restructuring. 23 Despite this hardline approach, they decided to replace
Clausen when his five-year term expired. His dogmatic neoliberal approach provoked
such strong criticism from both NGOs and borrowers that the Bank’s capacity to play a
role in promoting pax americana was reduced. 24 Amongst NGOs, environmental
campaigners were particularly vocal and their capacity to document Bank projects doing
significant environmental harm proved quite damaging to the Bank.
18

Bello, Dark Victory, p. 27. It must be noted that non-compliance with conditions is relatively common
and the Bank has not often punished it.
19
Kapur, Lewis and Webb, World Bank, pp. 517-521. In the 1970s, program lending (the forerunner of
SALs) averaged 6 per cent of Bank commitments, Kapur, Lewis and Webb, World Bank, p. 487.
20
Kapur, Lewis and Webb, World Bank, p. 521.
21
Ibid, p. 6. The increase in real terms was equally substantial.
22
Cited in Bello, Kinley and Elinson, Development Debacle, p. 33.
23
Bello, Dark Victory.
24
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Clausen was replaced in July 1986 with veteran Republican Congressman Barber B.
Conable. His agenda was largely set by the Reagan Administration who followed their
IDA funding cut with a vote against the Bank’s 1987 budget, arguing that the Bank’s
bureaucracy was bloated and needed a change of direction. Clausen formed a committee
to oversee a Bank reorganisation. It reported back that:
[f]irst, effective macroeconomic management and a sound policy
environment have come to be, and will remain, at the heart of the
development challenge… Second, successful economic development
increasingly depends on being able to deal with the interdependence
of problems and on the effective integration of macroeconomic and
sectoral issues.” 25
As George and Sabelli point out, the first point reaffirms the centrality of structural
adjustment and the second point states that structural adjustment needs to occur in all
sectors. In order that all of the Bank’s projects line up with adjustment programs, the
report recommended reorganisation of the Bank around country programs and
abandonment of some of the old cross-sectoral departments such as water or energy.26
The report also repeatedly emphasised regaining and retaining “intellectual leadership”
and thus concluded that there were not enough economists in Bank. 27 The
reorganisation resulted in a ten per cent reduction in staff numbers achieved by a spill of
all positions. Staff selection was from the top down, which “fostered a rampant
cronyism in the Bank.” 28 This was a coercive project to shift the Bank’s intellectual
terrain and operations towards the Washington Consensus.

Despite the strictures put on Conable’s presidency, he did re-dedicate the Bank to the
fight against poverty in 1987 and the second half of the decade saw some shift back
towards lending in social sectors. However, the reasons for social sector engagement
were new, as even the Bank’s official history acknowledges:
[b]y engaging in social sector projects, the Bank found that, instead of
simply pressing for blanket spending cuts, it was in a position to
25

Cited in George and Sabelli, Faith and Credit, p. 126, emphasis in original.
Ibid.
27
Ibid, p. 127.
28
Caufield, Masters of Illusion, p. 179. Further, the “…reduction in staff was short-lived: Within four
years of the reorganization, the workforce was back up to six thousand,” ibid, p. 180.
26
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discuss with and persuade sector officials of the importance of finding
alternative ways to finance, allocate, and deliver those services. Social
projects thus became a friendlier and more constructive way to lead
borrowers by the hand towards austerity…” 29
Moreover, expanding the social agenda allowed the Bank to respond to growing public
pressure and critique without actually changing doctrine. 30

During Conable’s tenure the debt crisis, which was a catalyst for the implementation of
Washington Consensus policies, worsened — Third World debt rose from $785 billion
in 1982 to $1.3 trillion in 1992. The composition also changed, with a larger portion
owed to the international financial institutions than private sources. 31 This change in
composition was partly due to an initiative on debt from US Treasury Secretary James
Baker III in 1985. The Baker Plan did not involve debt relief, rather it pushed the IMF,
the World Bank and private banks to provide additional resources to debtor countries
and combined this with a requirement for enhanced structural adjustment measures. 32 In
other words, it was a continuation, by using coercive tactics, of the Nixon
Administration’s plan to ensure that US private financial operators dominated the
international market. 33

The 1989 Brady Plan also enhanced the Bank’s role in debt relief. This plan, proposed
by Baker’s replacement Nicholas Brady, did involve some debt forgiveness. Under it,
the US issued new bonds (called Brady Bonds) to be purchased by debtor countries
using a combination of resources from the IMF, the World Bank, private banks and
domestic resources. The Brady bonds were issued either with a discount to the original
value of the loan or with a discount on the interest rates. Participation in the Plan was
also conditional on further structural adjustment measures. 34 In the end, only twelve
countries participated in the first round of the scheme because an interest rate reduction
eased the pressure on many indebted countries. 35 Nevertheless, the Brady Plan
29
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Ibid, p. 369.
31
Bello, Dark Victory, p. 69.
32
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Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 28, No. 3 (1986) and Woods, The Globalizers, pp. 49-50.
33
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reinforced the Bank’s role in adjustment and significantly enhanced its ongoing role in
debt management. 36 At the same time, it expanded the Bank’s links and reliance on the
US Treasury and improved US support — in other words it was a less coercively-based
approach to shoring up the Bank’s role in pax americana. 37

A strong neoliberal World Bank provided the US with an alternative to the UN. It
helped facilitate its multi-pronged attack on the UN system, which involved weakening
the overall UN system by pressure, budgetary constraints and mandate changes. In the
development agencies it pushed to change the development agenda and re-focus
agencies on issues of traditional concern to the North; it even pressured agencies such
as the United Nations Conference on Trade, Aid and Development (UNCTAD) to wind
up having “…outlived their purpose” or others such as the United Nations Development
Program (UNDP) to conform to the World Bank model. 38 According to Branislav
Gosovic, this program was successful in removing sources of intellectual and policy
challenge to the North-controlled hegemonic institutions and agenda, leaving the World
Bank, by the time of the Asian Financial Crisis, the “last man standing.” 39

Lewis T. Preston took over the Bank in late 1991, he was another ex-banker and was
more committed to the core Washington Consensus agenda than Conable had been. 40
Soon after his arrival, controversy around the Bank exploded. In December 1991, a
memo from Lawrence H. Summers, Chief Economist and Vice-President for
Development, was leaked. The memo commented on the 1992 edition of the Bank’s
Global Economic Prospects report and the controversial comments were on section
dealing with ‘dirty industries.’ In it Summers asked: “[j]ust between you and me,
shouldn’t the World Bank be encouraging more migration of the dirty industries to the
LDCs [less developed countries]?”

41

He gave three reasons: lost earnings from

“morbidity and mortality” are less in developing countries; the air quality in LDCs is
“underpolluted”; and those with most money are more choosey about their air quality
36

George and Sabelli, Faith and Credit, p. 22.
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articles, which was discussed in Chapter Two.
38
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and can afford to be so. 42 Summers, despite being nominally a Democrat, clearly held
very neoclassical and rigid views on economics. In a speech on 10 November 1991 in
Bangkok, he asked:
[w]hat can the West do to drive this process of reform [in Russia]
forward? Number one: it can spread the truth. The laws of economics,
it’s often forgotten, are like the laws of engineering. There’s only one
set of laws and they work everywhere. One of the things I’ve learned
in my short time at the World Bank is that whenever anybody says,
‘But economics works differently here’, they’re about to say
something dumb. 43

One of Preston’s first initiatives was to ask Willi Wapenhans, a Bank Vice President
close to retirement, to report on the overall outcomes of the Bank’s lending. The
Wapenhans Report released in 1992 (and leaked in draft form) painted a fairly bleak
picture of Bank operations. It concluded that the percentage of Bank projects that
suffered from major implementation problems (seen in the Bank’s own terms) increased
from 11 in the early 1980s to 37.5 of projects completed in 1991. 44 Projects in the
sectors of water supply and sanitation and agriculture performed worst. Surprisingly,
...the inquiry discovered that the longer it took Bank staff to prepare
projects, the less successful they tended to be. This particular finding
also reflected a lack of borrowers’ commitment to projects, mostly
dreamed up by Bank staff with little input from the countries
concerned. 45
The report was also one of the first to publicly acknowledge the problem of corruption
in Bank projects; it stated that “…the evidence of gross non-compliance is
overwhelming.” 46 The Wapenhans Report was a fairly damning indictment of the
Bank’s implementation of Washington Consensus policies; nevertheless, in 1993 the
Bank was still declaring structural adjustment a success. 47
42
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There is little doubt that country and policy variations increased in the late 1980s and
early 1990s. Thus in 1997, Gustav Ranis argued that the Consensus is “…more subtle
and differentiated today than many critics have asserted,” however he conceded that:
…the kernel of truth remains: the Bank is inhabited by a large number
of highly talented professionals, largely economists, who have shown
little willingness to dissent or deviate from what the in-house
conventional wisdom is seen to be at any point in time; and analyses
of government failure continue to have a much easier time than
analyses of market failure. 48

Structural adjustment did not improve economic outcomes in most developing
countries, indeed, the 1980s were labelled the ‘lost decade.’ Many suffered from zero or
even negative economic growth, the number of people living in absolute poverty
actually increased in a number of regions and the income disparity both within
developing countries and between the developing and developed ‘worlds’ had widened.
There were exceptions of course — the East Asian ‘tigers’ stand out precisely because
they had not followed the Bank’s development paradigm. The Bank would not
acknowledge this. Indeed, from 1983 the Bank’s research department under Krueger
funded a series of studies to strengthen the neoclassical interpretation of East Asian
growth started by Ian Little and the OECD and NBER sponsored studies outlined in
Chapter Three. 49 The high costs of Washington Consensus policies meant that despite
its partial success in transforming domestic historic blocs in developing countries, the
overall social costs of its policies were too high and thus the changes it achieved in
economic policy were “piecemeal.”

50

In a number of cases policy changes were

reversed after short periods.

conditions was too time consuming; and this type of lending may have been encouraging dependency
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By the early 1990s there was a growing body of work demonstrating the empirical and
qualitative failures of the Washington Consensus approach. 51 This, combined with the
growing public critique of the Bank, encouraged a slow process of policy change.
Finally, there was the decision of the Clinton Administration to “…radicalise the
programmes of various multilateral organisations in order to commit them to the radical
opening of national economies.” 52 These are the foundations of the post-Washington
Consensus.

The Post-Washington Consensus

Similar to the link between the Bank’s Washington Consensus and the theoretical (and
political) rise of neoliberalism and the New Political Economy from the 1970s, the
PWC is linked theoretically to the development of New Institutional Economics (NIE)
and politically to the decline of hardline neoliberal regimes in the West and the
increasing voice of NGOs in the development debate. New Institutional Economics
expanded economists’ views of what constitutes market failures — to problems of
externalities, increasing returns to scale and monopolies it added issues of information
failures and transaction costs. 53 The inclusions of these new dimensions led to a picture
of markets with extensive imperfections as opposed to the neoliberal view of perfectly
working markets. 54 As North stated:
…new institutional economics is an attempt to incorporate a theory of
institutions into economics. However, in contrast to the many earlier
attempts to overturn or replace neo-classical theory, the new
institutional economics builds on, modifies and extends neo-classical
theory to permit it to come to grips and deal with an entire range of
issues heretofore beyond its ken. 55
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52
Gowan, The Global Gamble, p. 84.
53
The discussion here of new institutional economics is limited to those aspects that appear to have most
impacted the World Bank. It has a broader research agenda including interest in: property rights, public
choice, quantitative economic history and cognition.
54
Fine, Social Capital Versus Social Theory, pp. 4-5.
55
Douglass C. North, "The New Institutional Economics and Third World Development," in John
Harriss, Janet Hunter and Colin M. Lewis (eds.), The New Institutional Economics and Third World
Development (London: Routledge, 1998), p. 17.

FROM WASHINGTON TO POST-WASHINGTON CONSENSUS

100

New Institutional Economics does not question neoclassical economics’ methodological
individualism or the utility maximisation assumption, however, it does reject its
conception of instrumental rationality in favour of bounded rationality, that is the idea
that human rationality is constrained by factors such as: “…emotional affect, limited
cognitive ability and imperfect information.” 56 This creates space to explain the
existence of social structures and institutions by individuals who create these, “…within
and between market and non-market forms of organisation,” and it allows institutions
and non-market (i.e. social) factors a key role in mitigating market failure and thus
improving the efficient functioning of markets.57

As Fine pointed out, the shift of the World Bank towards NIE was not simply the result
of the weight of theoretical critique against the Washington Consensus, nor the
analytical or theoretical superiority of the new ‘paradigm.’ It was connected, first, to the
Bank’s relations with the IMF, in particular the need for differentiation after the
convergence of both policy prescriptions and lending instruments in the 1980s. It also
reflected the need to justify the extension of conditionality beyond economic policy into
issues of governance, to which one should add, provided the Bank with a new raison
d’être for lending and thus for its very existence. The PWC was marketed as a response
to calls for local ‘ownership’ of development programs while at the same time
facilitating compliance with the broadened agenda. Finally, the PWC reflected the
growing influence of Japan — an influential Washington Consensus sceptic — as a
donor. 58 The Bank’s level of engagement with NIE is also reflected in the limited
impact it seems to have had on the Bank’s own research operations, which remain
dominated by Washington Consensus concerns.59
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In tracing the shift to the post-Washington Consensus in the Bank, a key question is
how far from the Washington Consensus does NIE and associated Bank reforms take
the Bank? Before addressing this question directly, it is necessary to explore whether
the developments in the Bank from the mid-1990s represent a genuine engagement with
new institutional economics and the NGO critique of Bank operations or whether they
are better understood as a co-option of their language and concerns in order to continue
the project of the Washington consensus.

It is not easy to identify when the shift to the post-Washington Consensus took place, it
was not a radical shift but the culmination of incremental changes over a decade. There
have been attempts to summarise the Bank’s PWC, as there is of the Washington
Consensus. Though there were some earlier signs of the shift, the 1993 Bank report, The
East Asian Miracle, is a key marker of change. 60 Produced at the behest of the Japanese
government, it “…concedes for the first time in a major Bank publication the fact of
extensive government intervention in most of East Asia.” 61 However, the report only
acknowledged the role of the state in promoting development through direct
redistribution measures (in particular, primary and secondary education) and deliberate
distortions of the incentive structures to promote exports. 62 In other words, it ignored
issues such as the political systems in these countries including the relations between
business and government, historical factors, (such as land reform or the Cold War and
its effect on foreign aid and FDI) and the role of the state manipulating price structures
(not just for exports). Primacy is given in the report to the role of macroeconomic
fundamentals in achieving growth, thus Wade concluded “…the Bank emerges with its
traditional paradigm unscathed.” 63 Nevertheless, the theory and practice of the East
Asian ‘developmental state’ was one of the most significant threats to the Bank’s
neoliberal orthodoxy; it challenged, in particular, the Bank’s beliefs about ‘getting the
prices right.’ 64
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Following the demise of the Soviet Union, the claims of the ‘victory’ of democracy and
capitalism — most famously expressed in Francis Fukuyama’s declaration of ‘the end
of history’ — shored up the neoliberal project. In the Bank, the challenges posed by the
25 new members that joined the Bank between 1990 and 1994 hindered the shift away
from the Washington Consensus. Most were ex-communist states and their addition as
borrowers undoubtedly affected the budget and focus of the Bank. A new geographical
region (Europe and Central Asia – ECA) was created and these countries did not want
to be seen as developing countries — they were transition economies, whose need was
“…restructuring rather than development.” 65 This view also coincidently served pax
americana because it justified the implementation of Washington Consensus policies in
these countries. 66 So their arrival pushed the Bank’s focus toward its middle-income
clientele for whom the case for structural adjustment seemed clearer. In 1994, the Bank
even changed its purpose from “alleviating poverty” to “helping borrowers reduce
poverty and raise living standards.” 67

There is little doubt that the shift to the post-Washington consensus is most closely
associated with, and took place under, President James D. Wolfensohn. The nexus
between theory and political events again came to the fore, as it was the Clinton
Administration in the US who appointed Wolfensohn. 68 The argument here is not that
the Clinton Administration represented a dramatic break with US foreign and economic
policy rather that it had more belief than the previous Republican administrations in the
“…centrality of state-political action in economic affairs.” 69 But the role of the state in
this new formulation was little changed — it was a pro-capitalist state that opened
“…borders to US goods, capital and services.” 70 The belief in state action extended to a
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commitment to multilateral institutions: the aim was still to further US interests but
through some allegiance to global rule-based governance. Wolfensohn, with his
somewhat unconventional background and broad range of interests, fitted the
Administration’s vision for the Bank.

During his presidency, 1995-2005, Wolfensohn was central to a range of reforms and
programs, including the Highly Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) initiative (1996),
Knowledge Bank (1996) and the Strategic Compact (April 1997). 71 Mark Berger and
Mark Beeson suggested that The State in a Changing World: World Development
Report 1997 (WDR 1997) was the key marker of the Bank’s “…reinvention of
liberalism.” 72 The Report maintained the neoclassical commitments to markets but, in
line with developments in political economy, recognised the importance of state
intervention in “…in defining the structure of market-mediated economic relations.” 73
Paul Cammack argued that this new “…active and pro-capitalist state” was essential to
the reproduction of capitalism and thus in line with the Bank’s neoliberal Washington
Consensus project. 74 Cammack’s argument highlights the Marxist view of the role of
the state as core to the reproduction of social relations. In the Gramscian formulation,
each historic bloc is the product of complex economic and social forces, but the control
by a dominant group of the apparatus of the state gives it the capacity to construct the
historic bloc in particular ways. It is core to constructing hegemony.

How did this change in the role of the state impact on the Bank’s operations? Veronica
Wodsak pointed out,
[a]cknowledging the importance of a functioning state for the
development process meant a reorientation of the Bank’s efforts from
project based lending towards policy-based lending which is clearly
reflected in the Bank’s budget during the late nineties. Adjustment
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lending more than tripled from below $5 billion in 1997 to $15.3
billion in 1999 and ‘institution building and governance’ became the
‘dominant themes.’ 75
From 2000 to 2005, policy-based or adjustment lending returned to average levels of
just over thirty per cent of new Bank commitments ($5-6 billion per annum) but
governance remained a dominant theme in lending. 76 Whether through adjustment
lending or governance programs, the World Bank’s renewed engagement with the state
ultimately increased its capacity to promote or undermine specific elements of a state’s
historic bloc.

The Asian Financial Crisis followed publication of the WDR 1997 and gave added
substance to the critique of the Washington Consensus. However, the international
financial institutions and some neoliberal economists tried to present the Crisis as
evidence of the failure of the East Asian ‘developmental state’ models — Asia was now
the home of ‘crony capitalism.’ 77 But their mishandling of the Crisis limited the impact
of their reading of the it. The brunt of criticism at the response of the international
financial institutions to the Crisis was directed at the IMF, but the Bank too received its
share of critical attention, in particular its ‘one size fits all’ development prescriptions.
Wolfensohn renewed his public relations offensive for the Bank, going as far as
critically commenting on the social dislocation resulting from IMF adjustment. He also
allowed the recently appointed Chief Economist, Joseph Stiglitz to speak critically
about the IMF’s approach to financial liberalisation, in particular capital account
liberalisation in countries without mature regulatory systems. 78 Stiglitz was as an
academic involved in developing NIE and his critique clearly derives from it. Doubt
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regarding the efficacy of capital account liberalisation in developing countries is a
position that has gained currency amongst mainstream economics commentators. 79

The Bank’s reform process continued in 1998 with a report entitled Assessing Aid:
What Works, What Doesn’t, and Why. The report was based on an empirical analysis
that utilises a general equilibrium growth model, in other words, the preferred
methodology of neoliberal economics not NIE. It was focused on the debate about the
link between aid and economic growth and maintained neoliberal assumptions about the
relationship between economic growth and poverty reduction. Its key conclusion was
that aid only helps to increase growth in countries utilising ‘sound’ economic policies
and good governance. 80 Given the failures of conditionality in achieving ‘sound’
macroeconomic management in recipient countries, the report proposed ‘selectivity’ in
aid contributions, meaning assessing current economic policies and institutional
performance and developing targets around these themes to determine eligibility for aid.
This process was meant to counter problems of limited local ownership of reform
programs, which was seen as a key reason for the failure of conditionality. Niels
Hermes and Robert Lensink demonstrated that the report’s criteria for selecting good
management are ill-defined and primarily refer to indicators of macroeconomic stability
associated with the Washington Consensus. 81 Ironically, a number of the report’s
proposals, such as reduction in government expenditures, may inhibit the development
of good governance by limiting development of a strong public sector. 82

In 1999, the Bank launched the Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF) and
later in the year, the associated Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) process. The
CDF is a process designed to improve poverty focus, country ownership and donor
harmonisation. It relies heavily conceptually and practically on the PRSP process,
which is where the concrete strategies and plans are developed through participating
countries planning to reduce poverty. The WDR 1999/2000, produced by Stiglitz
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appointee Ravi Kanbur, claimed that the CDF goes beyond the Bank’s traditional focus
on economic growth to include social goals. 83 The CDF, the Bank claims, emphasises:
…the interdependence of all elements of development — social,
structural, human, governance, environmental, economic, and
financial. It advocates: a holistic long-term strategy; the country in the
lead, both ‘owning’ and directing the development agenda, with the
Bank and other partners each defining their support in their respective
business plans; stronger partnerships among governments, donors,
civil society, the private sector, and other development stakeholders in
implementing the country strategy; and a transparent focus on
development results to ensure better practical success in reducing
poverty. 84
The CDF is sold as a tool (or compass) in contrast to a “blueprint” approach. Yet there
is a Sourcebook for the connected PRSP process – here is the Keynesian commitment to
planning that produced the Bank, reorganised for the neoliberal age. The Sourcebook
states the key requirements of a PRSP are that the country prepares it and that it focuses
“…on faster and broad-based economic growth, which requires macroeconomic
stability.” 85 The ongoing commitment to the macroeconomic prescriptions of the
Washington Consensus including commitment to international integration, is one of the
biggest blind spots of the process.

Doug Porter and David Craig see PRSPs as the “…high water mark” of the PWC, or
what they call ‘inclusive’ liberalism whose purpose is to embed, legitimate and secure
neo-liberal reform. 86 At their best, PRSPs can be effective in identifying local needs and
problems and utilising liberal values to promote “positive freedoms.” But:
…more commonly this convergence works in more conservative
ways, within constrained, almost phoney forms of the social,
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propagating juridical rules and programmes of security and safety,
while merely talking up participation and community. 87
Porter and Craig also point out that PRSPs effectively move conditions to being
prerequisites for accessing assistance from the international financial institutions.88

Country PRSPs are reviewed jointly by Bank and IMF staff against set guidelines to
determine if they provide “…a sound basis on which to proceed with assistance and
debt relief.” 89 Until 2005, PRSP required approved from the Bank board, which as even
the Bank’s Operation Evaluation Department acknowledges, undermined country
ownership. 90 It is still the case that the Bank’s Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) is not
necessarily in line with a country’s PRSP as the CAS is “…specifically to account to”
the Bank’s shareholders. 91 Looked at in this way, the CDF does seem more like a
blueprint than a mere tool. As Cammack states the CDF:
…is precisely what it says it is — a blueprint for a complete set of
social and governmental relations and institutions... it is actually a
means of shaping social and structural policies so that they reinforce
and extend macroeconomic discipline, and subordinating them to
imperatives of capitalist accumulation. 92

The CDF does have a strong focus on wide participation in the planning, design and
implementation of projects. Participants are meant to include various multilateral and
bilateral agencies, all levels of government within a country, civil society and the
private sector. Indeed, the strong language on participation in the CDF highlights the
extent to which the Bank incorporated participation as a core component of the PWC, as
a response to the NGO critique of the Bank in this area. Incorporating this particular
critique was undoubtedly a core part of the Bank’s public relations push, which was
relatively successful at least until the departure of Wolfensohn.
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There has been a broad range of experiences in operationalising participation but, in
practice, the Bank tended to focus on improving relations with other donors and has not
integrated

participation

into

“mainstream

practice”

especially

in

project

implementation. 93 Participation in projects remains a privilege rather than a right. 94
Cammack argued that participation rhetoric needs to be understood as a deliberate
strategy “…to induce people to experience tightly controlled and carefully delimited
forms of market-supporting activity as empowerment.” 95 Actually, as Ilan Kapoor
pointed out, participation performs several functions:
…in one fell swoop: participation becomes a disciplinary mechanism
for the World Bank/IMF to hold the poorest Third World states ‘to
account’… and, in turn for these states to keep civil society
organisations in check; and participation helps advance neoliberalism,
promoting ‘partnerships’ to co-opt Third World states and (elite)
NGOs into the structural adjustment program. 96

Where participation is part of loan projects it is often connected to a renewed interest in
decentralisation — from 1993 to 1997, 12 per cent of Bank projects involved
decentralisation. 97 Theoretically, decentralisation needs to be seen as part of the PWC
agenda of reordering social and political relations in addition to the Washington
Consensus project of reordering economies. However, in practice, in the hands of Bank
staff, it tends to become a ‘technical problem’ and works to exclude the political nature
of policy-making. As Hadiz explained, the:
…emphasis, in particular, on the political insulation of technocrats is
particularly ironic given the supposition that decentralization leads to
good governance practices involving wider public participation in
democracy. In fact, the general thrust of neo-institutionalist theory
embraces democracy only insofar as technocrats (or technopols) can
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preside over politics unimpeded by the intervention of democratic or
more radical agendas. 98
Further, the act of implementing decentralisation projects immerses the Bank in
relations with locally entrenched elites. In this case, it tends to restrict the Bank’s
capacity to transform local historic blocs; indeed, it generally leaves the Bank
supporting existing elites. In its practical implementation, decentralisation also tends to
be entwined with the Washington Consensus goal of privatisation because decentralised
and unbundled government enterprises are easier to corporatise and privatise. The
tensions Hadiz identifies disappear, however, if the reordered social relations promoted
by democratisation are understood as neoliberal relations not democratic ones.
Moreover, these new relations minimise the role of the state and posit civil society as a
distinct conceptual sphere to that of the state.

In 2000, the Bank finally publicly admitted, in a limited fashion, the negative impact of
the Washington Consensus. A report by Bank economist William Easterly noted that
growth in developing countries between 1980 and 1998 was 0.0 per cent. 99 The WDR
2000/2001 also implicitly acknowledged the failure of Bank policies during this
period. 100

The WDR 2000/2001 is the next logical place to examine the PWC as it demonstrates
the impact of NIE. 101 However, WDRs are not actual Bank policy and, although they
generally reflect Bank thinking, WDR 2000/2001 was somewhat of an exception.
According to Wade, the WDR drafted by Kanbur took NIE and the NGO agenda too
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seriously. 102 The US Treasury and the Bank’s neoliberal economists could not accept
the strong focus on income inequality and empowerment of the poor, or the NIEinfluenced view on the failures in capital markets and the recommendation to create
social safety nets prior to structural adjustment. 103 Kanbur resigned as the report was
being finalised in the hope of preventing the Bank from disassociating itself from the
(already revised and re-written) report. However, his resignation did not prevent a
number of further substantive changes to the text, in particular to the most widely-read
sections - the introduction and conclusion. 104

It was suggested that this episode indicated the end of “…the brief ‘springtime’ at the
Bank in the second half of the 1990s.” 105 Other indications of the end of openness were
Stiglitz’s forced resignation late the previous year (November 1999) and the Bank’s
withdrawal from the Structural Adjustment Participatory Review Initiative (SAPRI), a
civil society driven review of the impacts of structural adjustment on the poor. 106 These
developments indicate precisely the limits of the post-Washington Consensus. It cannot
fully address even NIE and NGO challenges because to do so would require challenging
Washington Consensus hegemonic principles and logic. The PWC cannot do this
because it is ultimately a modification of the Washington Consensus. Indeed, the
evidence suggests that when Washington Consensus hegemonic principles are
challenged the Bank still acts to protect them.

A further component of the post-Washington Consensus was the Bank’s interest in
social capital, which was prominent in the Bank from 1996 to the early 2000s. The
relevance of social capital for development was tested in several sites, Indonesia being
one. Its prominence was indicated by the development of a dedicated website, which
has since been downgraded. 107 The Bank defined social capital as:
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…the institutions, relationships, and norms that shape the quality and
quantity of a society's social interactions. Increasing evidence shows
that social cohesion is critical for societies to prosper economically
and for development to be sustainable. Social capital is not just the
sum of the institutions which underpin a society – it is the glue that
holds them together. 108
The Bank's approach to, and definition of, social capital derived from its adaptation of
NIE. The Bank’s goal remained economic growth and for a while social capital was
seen as the missing link needed to achieve this. As is clear from the definition, it is an
all-encompassing phenomenon; there can be ‘bad’ as well as ‘good’ social capital. As
Fine argued, “...social capital fills out everything that is not already taken care of in
terms of standard economic analysis. In principle, it could be anything.” 109 Further, he
pointed out that social capital’s appeal was that, on the one hand it allowed “…the
formal results of the new economics to be expressed in non-economic terms” and, on
the other hand, it allowed economics to appear interdisciplinary. 110

Although social capital was introduced to the Bank by social scientists hoping to
challenge the hegemony of neoliberal economics, development economists rather than
social scientists “won” the debate in the group set up to develop the Bank’s social
capital strategy. 111 According to Anthony Bebbington et.al., the discussion and use of
social capital bifurcated into an econometrically based one amongst economists and a
more social theory based one amongst operation staff. 112 The critics of the Bank’s
discussion of social capital tend to focus on the published work, which was mostly by
economists. The discussion here looks at these critiques but the thesis case studies
subsequently explore critically their practical use by operations staff.
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Social capital studies tend to find that there are many issues (variables) that need to be
taken into account in analysis. However, in the development of theoretical models for
social capital, the Bank’s economists found that inclusion of more than a few variables
resulted in the models being:
…too complicated to be useful. It becomes a matter of focusing upon
a few factors that are privileged by being chosen as the key to
promoting development. 113
Fine’s analysis of the statistical methods that have been used to determine impact of
social capital variables in the Bank, suggested they are (mathematically) inadequate. 114
His critique was far reaching as it took issue with what he saw as the general problem of
economic reductionism inherent in both neoliberal and new institutional economic
approaches, issues which are beyond the scope of this project. 115 The key point here is
that social capital research did expand the opportunities for non-economists but their
opportunities ended at “…borders of the economy and the state,” whereas economists
were able to utilise social capital “…to address issues from which they have previously
been excluded…” 116 By 2005-6, social capital was out of favour in the Bank and even
those social scientists who introduced it, seem to find that its capacity to shift the
Bank’s analysis and position on social issues was perhaps always limited. 117

In August 2004, the Bank renamed Structural Adjustment Lending: Development
Policy Lending. It also revised the relevant Operational Policy / Bank Procedures
statement (OP/BP 8.60). 118 The policy review was presented as the culmination of
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lessons learned about adjustment lending from practice and reviews over the past
decade. It was also meant to reflect changes in policy and practice in this period. The
OP/BP does not fundamentally change the rationale for this kind of lending, it is still
justified as quick or rapidly disbursing policy-based financing to meet “…actual or
anticipated” financing gaps. The new rationale does explicitly include domestic factors
in addition to external factors as possible causes of gaps. Three key themes are visible
in the revised OP/BP, these are: increased flexibility and simplification; participation;
and reducing costs to borrowers.

In September 2004, the Bank released its yearly Doing Business report: Doing
Business 2005: Removing Obstacles to Growth. 119 The report “…benchmarks regulatory
performance and reforms in 145 nations” in other words, the environment for business
as measured by indicators such as: business commencements, access to credit, and
legislation regarding hiring and firing workers, enforcing contracts, registering property
and protecting investors. 120 The report’s conclusions are not surprising — there are
heavier regulatory burdens on business in developing countries than in developed
ones; 121 the benefits of reform “…appear to be large;” and “…regulation and weak
property rights exclude [sic] the poor — especially women and younger people — from
doing business.” 122 They are certainly an interesting contrast to Ha-Joon Chang’s work
from 2002 looking at the historical role of institutions in the now developed countries. 123
Chang’s analysis suggested that the institutions of today’s developing countries are, in
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general, far ahead of the now developed countries when they were at similar levels of
development. While this is mostly a good thing, he pointed out that good institutions
take time to develop, must be affordable for the country and must be socio-politically
acceptable. 124 Notably, he argued that international standard property rights and
corporate governance are the two areas that are most problematic for developing
countries as they require large investments (large numbers of lawyers and accountants)
for limited returns and as a result reduce the availability of funding for education or
essential infrastructure. 125

Doing Business 2005 shows how the Bank is increasingly centralising and unifying the
production of economic and political intelligence on states that was traditionally
produced by firms and banks engaged in international investment. Does this activity
assist private investment which, according to the dedicated website, “…is central to
promoting growth and expanding opportunities for poor people”? 126 Possibly, though
there are certainly more convincing explanations for global investment patterns. And as
Chang also pointed out, investors seem to like China and India in particular, which have
not followed the Bank’s prescription on institutions. 127 What it does do is reinforce the
power of transnational corporations and global finance that has grown so dramatically
since capital markets were liberalised in the 1980s. 128 Equally, it reinforces the Bank’s
own policy prescriptions for economic development.

2004 was probably the year in which the PWC reached its zenith. Moreover, the
replacement of Wolfensohn with Paul Wolfowitz in 2005 heralded the start of another
shift in the Bank’s direction. 2004 is also the final year of the case studies in this thesis,
so this is where the exploration of the PWC concludes. However, it is still necessary to
summarise the key features of the PWC as these are precisely what the case studies
explore.
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Key Features of the Post-Washington Consensus

The key features of the post-Washington consensus are:
i.

A fundamental continuation of the neoliberal approach to monetary and fiscal
policy, however, the approach to financial liberalisation should be more cautious
given concerns about market failure and applicability to local conditions.
Interestingly, support for trade liberalisation remains largely intact in the Bank
despite academic challenges regarding its theoretical and empirical outcomes. 129

ii.

Following from above and the (supposed) abandonment of one-size-fits-all
approaches to development, there should be greater attention to the specific
country situation. This should include better-developed socio-economic analysis
of local conditions as well as consideration of global and regional impacts.

iii.

Recipient government’s should own their development program and projects; in
a strong version this would mean recipient government’s initiate and control
development assistance projects, a weak version is indicated by reference to
proxies for commitment such as counterpart funding and expressions of support.

iv.

A reduction in the Washington Consensus hostility to the state, allowing an
expansion of its role to compliment, rather than compete with markets. There
remains signification variation in the view of the state’s role —a weak form only
promotes a state that provides a good policy environment for business, in other
words an active, pro-capitalist state. 130 A further step would allow more space
for state institutions to engage with market imperfections (information and
transaction costs). A strong version, which indicates a genuine engagement with
the state as actor, would require an analysis of actors and interests in the society
and the distribution of power and resources between them as well as analysis of
who wins and looses from policy proposals. 131

v.

Increased concern with market failure to complement existing focus on
government failure — this would be indicative of a stronger version of the postWashington Consensus. Practical indications of implementation include analysis
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“aggressive thrust” with which the Bank marketed the research of David Dollar and Aart Kray’s work
supposedly demonstrating the better economic performance of trade liberalisers, “suggests how important
maintaining this tenet is to Washington Consensus proponents.” Ibid.
130
Ibid, pp. 140-141 and Paul Cammack, "Attacking the Poor," New Left Review, Vol. 13, (2002), p. 5.
131
Wodsak, "World Bank Reform — a Critical Investigation," p. 44.

FROM WASHINGTON TO POST-WASHINGTON CONSENSUS

116

of markets prior to promotion of privatisation. A related issue is increased
attention to the sequencing of reform programs, in particular the development of
adequate regulatory frameworks relevant to local conditions prior to
liberalisation.
vi.

A greater concern for the social costs of adjustment and poverty in general.

vii.

A seeming genuine appreciation of local knowledge and practices tempered by a
concern about coherence and coordination. 132 This may be presented as
expanded participation in the planning, design and implementation of activities.
Participation needs to be considered both in terms of the type of participants
involved (bilateral and multilateral organisation, levels of government, levels of
civil society and the private sector) and the extent and nature of the participatory
process. A related concern is analysis of social capital —this likely extends to
economists analysing social factors but not social scientists in the Bank
analysing the economy and state.

viii.

Increased attention to decentralisation as a policy prescription for supposedly
increasing participation, ensuring local needs are met and improving
governance.

ix.

A slightly broader approach to health and education.

x.

A revitalised concern with corruption.

The PWC continues the Washington Consensus concern with corruption but on the
basis of quite different assumptions — the Washington Consensus focus on corruption
derived from the New Political Economy’s cynical and almost malevolent view of states
in the Third World. 133 It sees politicians as driven by only self-interest, which is meant
to explain both their failure to adopt the right (neoliberal) policies and problems of
corruption. 134 Whereas NIE understands corruption as the result of government and
market failures. This expands the possibilities for dealing with corruption beyond the
Washington Consensus mantra of smaller government. Further, it makes corruption a
less dangerous area for the Bank as it transforms it from a political to an economic
issue. Equally the focus on property rights and institutions (which comprise legal
systems, conventions and norms and their enforcement) is rejuvenated as these are
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essential to minimising transaction and information costs and thus to economic growth,
they are a prerequisite to ‘getting the prices right’. 135 Moreover, its analysis of the
incorporation of conventions and norms in institutions suggests that simply transferring
Western systems to the developing world is unlikely, on its own, to improve
performance.

One final area that needs to be explored in a study of the Bank’s lending practices is its
project model and procurement practices. As noted in Chapter Two, the Bank is at the
centre of project identification, development and appraisal. The commitment to country
ownership of development programs suggests that a shift in this approach is necessary.
Regarding the management of projects once approved, it has always been the case that
all activities funded by the Bank must be tendered out. That is, the Bank will not
directly fund governments to run any project components, even for example a road
safety campaign component of a road rehabilitation project. Government agencies have
been able to tender for projects against the private sector, though the Bank has clamped
down on this too in the last five years. It is fair to say that the Bank’s project model
was, from the outset, hostile to government and directed at expanding the space for
private markets. Procurement must be undertaken to Bank standards through one of
three methods: International Competitive Bidding (ICB), National Competitive Bidding
(NCB) and local shopping. ICB has been the dominant form of Bank procurement. ICB
does allow a margin of preference (generally 15 per cent) for local suppliers.
Nevertheless, historically North American or European firms have won the majority of
contracts, though over the last couple of decades the trend has been to work with
national partners or through local offices of an international firm. 136 ICB needs to be
seen as a way of ensuring national economies are internationally integrated. It has been
another hegemonic principle in the Bank. Thus the case studies also examine whether
there has been any challenge to Bank project development and procurement methods.

Overall, there is limited evidence that the Bank has moved beyond its traditional
concern with economic growth within a market capitalist framework. Indeed, it is clear
that the concern with social issues ultimately rests on their impact on “economic
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development or the functioning of markets.” 137 However, it is equally clear that there
has been a level of change, influenced in part by NIE and in part by NGO critiques.
However, in the same way that most engaged with the NIE do not want to replace
neoliberalism, but rather to supplement it, the PWC is best understood as an expansion
and revision of the Washington Consensus. Thus the term post-Washington Consensus
is appropriate, highlighting its intellectual, political and practical origins in what Paul
Cammack has described as the Bank’s:
…constant commitment to the systematic transformation of social
relations and institutions in the developing world, in order to
generalize and facilitate capitalist accumulation on a global scale,
and build specifically capitalist hegemony through the promotion of
participation and ownership. 138
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Part II:
The World Bank in Vietnam and Indonesia
Introduction: Case Study Selection

Part II of this thesis comprises two case studies of how the PWC has translated into
Bank lending. This section introduces the case studies and outlines the methodology
used in the selection of case study countries. The case studies examine the Bank’s
overall relationship with the borrower but pay particular attention to Bank lending. This
is a timely exercise because surprisingly, in the last decade or so — apart from the odd
controversial dam project or the like — Bank lending has received limited critical focus.
Further, investment lending receives even less than adjustment lending. Attention has in
the main been focused on the Bank’s development discourse. This focus is undoubtedly
warranted and had been facilitated by the Bank’s increasing disclosure of documents
from 1993. The new disclosure policy, though, also applies to loans thus making
analysis of the Bank’s lending significantly easier. However, there is now sometimes so
much information available that it is difficult to analyse it.

Bank lending is more than just a way of maintaining the relationship with a country in
order to influence its policy directions, as has on occasion been suggested. 1 Rather, as is
shown in the case studies, the Bank’s lending program involves the pursuit of an often
long-term agenda. Moreover, the form and nature of Bank lending — project lending,
design and implementation according to Bank standards and procedures and
international tendering — binds borrowing countries to market procedures and
enmeshes them with international capitalism.

In terms of the timeframes studied, the Washington Consensus dominated the Bank
from the early 1980s to the mid to late 1990s. Ideally, a case study of Bank lending in
this period would have covered a period in the late 1980s to early 1990s. However, in

1
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1993 the Bank relaxed its official disclosure rules for projects approved after that date. 2
The new rules provide for disclosure of: Country Assistance Strategies, Staff Appraisal
Reports (later renamed Project Appraisal Documents) and (some) Implementation
Completion Reports. These reports form the basis of the analysis undertaken below.
Given this change, the first case study period starts in 1993. It was considered that five
year’s analysis of new project approvals would provide a fairly comprehensive
overview of Bank lending and trends, so the first case study period runs from 1993 to
1997. For the post-Washington Consensus period, the latest period possible was chosen
to allow its influence to have filtered through the Bank’s pipeline of projects — the
period studied is 2000 to 2004.

In order to select the case study countries, a range of data was collected on eight
developing countries across four regions with active Bank portfolios. In South-east
Asia, Indonesia and Vietnam were explored, in South Asia, Pakistan and Bangladesh, in
South America, Peru and Brazil and in Africa, Nigeria and Uganda. Given the focus of
the project on changing lending practices, two factors were considered crucial for case
study countries, first a fair sized portfolio with the Bank (approximately $1 billion in
gross disbursements over a five year period) so that there are a range of loans to
compare in the different periods. Second, borrowers should have at least a ‘mediumsized’ economy so that development policy and lending has not normally been seriously
impacted by a single event such as a large fall in the price of a key export or a natural
disaster. In addition, it was considered important that the countries have a strong
relationship with the Bank and that it’s lending is likely to be of significant economic
consequence. Thus, although it is beyond the scope of the current research project to
determine the impact of Bank lending (indeed this is a virtually impossible task), the
project may in addition be of some use in indicating where Bank programs have been
most influential in case study countries and some of the possible implications of this.

Data collected on each potential case study country included:

2



Eligibility for IBRD and/or IDA;



Total number of Bank projects and the cumulative lending;



Bank Approvals in 2003;

The Bank adopted the more conservative of two proposals developed by a committee convened to study
disclosure policy, Caufield, Masters of Illusion, p. 266.
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Type of loans (investment, adjustment and other non-project);



Gross and net disbursements over the period 1997-2002;



Net Official Development Assistance (ODA) received 1997-2002; 3



Net Bank disbursements as a percentage of net ODA 1997-2002;



ODA as a percentage of Gross National Income (GNI) or Gross National
Product (GDP), 2001;



FDI flows 1997-2002; and



ODA as a percentage of FDI, 1997-2002.

Data was obtained from official World Bank publications and its website, the UNDP
Human Development Index and the OECD Development Assistance Committee
website. 4

The South American countries were quickly excluded as in both cases, whilst Bank
funds are significant in relation to net flows of ODA, ODA as a per cent of GNI overall
is minute (for Peru 0.85 per cent and Brazil 0.07 per cent). In addition, both countries
only have access to IBRD funding and both, as of July 2004, had only environment and
investment loans with the Bank, that is, they had no adjustment loans. In Nigeria, ODA
as a percentage of GNI was also small (0.47 per cent) and, in addition, Bank gross
disbursements were quite low and net disbursements were negative for 1997-2002.
Uganda had the highest ODA as a percentage of GNI of the countries studied by far
(14.28 per cent); the Bank was a significant contributor of funds overall and there was a
good mix of loans. However, Uganda had the smallest population examined and the
high levels of poverty mean the economy is quite small, add to this the high dependence

3
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on primary commodities and the ongoing unrest in the northern border regions and it
was not attractive for a study of changing Bank lending.

For both Pakistan and Bangladesh, ODA is a small but significant contributor to GNI —
3.37 and 2.12 per cent respectively. The level of ODA to Pakistan increased notably
from 2001— a direct result of its role in the so-called ‘war on terror.’ The instability in
Pakistan and ongoing travel warnings essentially ruled it out as a case study country.
World Bank gross disbursements to Bangladesh were over $2 billion for 1997-2002, a
significant amount both in relation to total ODA flows and total FDI flows. However, as
of July 2004, the active Bank portfolio contained only one adjustment loan. It was a
possible case study.

Official Development Assistance as a percentage of GNI in Vietnam was 4.42 per cent,
a comparatively significant level. Between 1997 and 2002 gross Bank disbursements
were over $1.3 billion, a significant amount in relation to both ODA and FDI flows. The
Bank portfolio is made up predominately of investment loans, however, structural
adjustment lending increased from almost nine per cent of lending in 1993-1997 to over
16 per cent in 2000-2004. Although this is well below the Bank’s current average of 33
per cent of loans in structural adjustment, it is a significant level for a country defining
itself as socialist.

In Indonesia, ODA as a percentage of GNP in 2001 was approximately 2.5 per cent,
which is a historically average level. Although a spike in 1998-1999, due the Asian
Financial Crisis, took the percentage to over four. 5 Even 2.5 per cent is a significant
level for such a large economy. Gross Bank disbursements to Indonesia 1997-2002
were over $5.8 billion, although interestingly net disbursements were quite low,
indicating a high repayment burden. This meant that net Bank loans as a percentage of
net ODA were a low 3.7 per cent. However, the significance of the Bank to Indonesia is
clear when the gross Bank disbursements (1997-2002) of over $5.8 billion are
compared to FDI flows during the same period, which were minus $13.3 billion. As of
July 2004, Indonesia had only one active adjustment loan out of a total of forty loans.

5
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Prior to the Asian Financial Crisis, Indonesia had only ever accessed one adjustment
loan, since then it had four bring the total to five out of its total of 317 loans.

There are a range of other reasons why Vietnam and Indonesia stand out as attractive
options for the case studies, including the fact that there has been relatively little study
of Bank activity in these countries. But there is also their accessibility, the interesting
contrast between their forms of government and relationships with the Bank. Bank
lending to Vietnam resumed in 1993, during the period when the Bank was shifting
away from the Washington Consensus. It seems reasonable to assume that the assigned
staff would have fewer preconceptions about the ‘right’ policy actions. It may mean that
new directions in the Bank’s approach to development could be more apparent here.

Indonesia and Vietnam share a region and are now at similar levels of development —
Indonesia’s 2006 Human Development Index ranking was 108 and Vietnam’s was 109. 6
Indonesia’s Gross National Income per capita is still significantly higher than
Vietnam’s (2005: $1280 versus $620) but Vietnam’s life expectancy is higher (2004:
70.3 years versus 67.4 years). 7 Both countries have an adult literacy rate of just over 90
per cent and similar levels of reported income inequality (2002 GINI Index Indonesia
34.3, Vietnam 37.0). 8 Of course, Indonesia has a much larger population than Vietnam,
they are geographically very different and their development and coherence as ‘nationstates’ is quite distinct. 9 They also have interesting and contrasting forms of
government, levels of political stability and approaches to the role of the state in
development. These contrasts should be useful for the study in terms of analysing the
Bank’s changed approach to the role of the state in the economy and specificity to local
conditions in two diverse settings.

The contrast continues with the impact of the Asian Financial Crisis — Indonesia was
hit early and hard by the Crisis and is only just returning to earlier levels of GDP
growth. Whereas the relatively insulated Vietnamese economy was only indirectly

6
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impacted and growth rates quickly returned to the equal the previous high levels.
Indonesia was an early favourite of the World Bank and their relationship through to the
time of the Asian Financial Crisis, was if not always perfect, certainly strong. However,
since then Indonesia has fallen out of favour with the Bank and the level of lending has
decreased. Vietnam in contrast, after decades in the wilderness, has become a Bank
favourite — one of it’s proclaimed ‘success stories.’ Since the Asian Financial Crisis
though, there have been hints of strains in the relationship.

There is one identifiable weakness in the suggested case studies, which is that both
countries have a low proportion of adjustment loans, compared to the Bank’s overall
portfolio. In 2003, adjustment loans accounted for 33 per cent of new lending
commitments and for the period 1997-2003 they averaged 38.2 per cent. However,
adjustment loans appear to be disproportionately concentrated in a few countries. A
brief survey of loans in 30 countries confirmed this with twenty countries (including
India, China and Thailand) having none or only one adjustment loan, whilst a few
countries had a very high proportion of adjustment loans. For example, over 48 per cent
of Turkey’s loan portfolio by value was adjustment lending. 10 Nevertheless, overall the
majority of Bank loans are project loans and relatively less analysis has been done on
this area, in comparison to structural adjustment, which has been the subject of much
study.

Structure of the Case Studies

Each case study comprises two chapters. The first chapter focuses on the general
background starting with some information on the political, economic and social
structures and policies of the country. The country’s dealings with donors are outlined
as are their relationship with the World Bank. The initial chapter also details the link
between the policy framework of the country and the Bank’s program through an
analysis of the Bank’s key country planning documents: the Country Assistance
Strategies and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper.

10

Survey of active portfolios in July 2004, undertaking using the World Bank’s projects database,
available online at World Bank Group Website.
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The second chapter provides a detailed analysis of Bank lending structured by type of
lending: adjustment or investment. Adjustment loans were studied together but analysis
of investment lending was separated into sectors, utilising the Bank’s own sectoral
classifications of activities. Thus loans in say the transportation sector in the first case
study period are compared with loans in the transportation sector in the second case
study period. This generally worked well because, despite the broad nature of the
sectoral classification, Bank projects in both case study periods tend to be similar. For
example, in Vietnam energy and mining sector projects are made up only of activities in
electricity generation, distribution and retailing. It did create some problems in sectors
where Bank lending was small. For example, in Indonesia there is only one loan in each
case study period in the information and communications sector and they are in quite
different areas. This made any comparison impossible but such problems areas made up
only a very small proportion of lending so their exclusion or incorporation into other
sectors is unlikely to have any detrimental impacts on the overall outcomes of the loan
analysis.
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Chapter Five
Vietnam: An Overview
This chapter commences with an overview of the structure of the Vietnamese
government and an outline of key socio-economic developments. It covers the period
since reunification, though the focus is the post-1986 period, as this is when the process
of socio-economic reform or renovation, called Doi Moi, was initiated. Next, donor
activity in Vietnam is highlighted, followed by an outline of the Bank’s relationship
with Vietnam and a detailed analysis of the changes in the Bank’s country strategy for
Vietnam over the two case study periods of 1993 to 2004. This analysis provides the
structure for the analysis of Bank lending in Chapter Six.

It is necessary to introduce a proviso here: the primary and secondary literature on
Vietnam is much more limited than for Indonesia. Further, official Government of
Vietnam (GoV) documents do not always accurately reflect policy. The GoV has been
careful not to publicly challenge the views of international donors but that does not
necessarily mean they share their views. Thus, as Pietro Masina argued, it is safer to
analyse Vietnamese policy through what is implemented than what is sometimes said. 1

The Political and Administrative Structure in Vietnam

The political structure of Vietnam is not easy to describe because the Communist Party
of Vietnam, while not having a clearly defined role in the Constitution and elsewhere,
parallels the formal structure of the state and the administration at every level.2 The
Constitution indicates the importance of the Party rather than its role — it defines
Vietnam as a socialist republic “…of the people, from the people, for the people” and
notes that the Party represents the “…rights and interests of the working class, the

1
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toiling people… [It] is the force leading the state and society.” 3 Membership of the
Party, state administration and business interests overlap; generally the Party decides
key administration appointments. However, a 1995 government reorganisation by the
‘pro-reform’ Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet and his faction (and supported by the IMF
and World Bank) started a process of insulating government administration from the
Party. 4 The Party seems to have largely acquiesced to this reduced role and, since the
late 1990s, it has limited its role to “…orientation and policy-making, rather than direct
participation in management activities.” 5 This enabled the administration to develop
property rights and an increase the importance of the rule of law.

The Constitution provides for a unitary system of government operating at four levels:
national, provincial, district and commune. At the national level, the Constitution
provides for a National Assembly with 450 deputies elected for five-year terms. The
National Assembly elects the President and Prime Minister, each for five-year terms;
the President is the ceremonial Head of State and Commander-in-Chief of the armed
forces. The Prime Minister selects the ministers or heads of the state’s 22 ministries and
26 other agencies and heads the Council of Ministers.

The Prime Minister also selects the leaders of the Provincial People’s Committees,
which administer the 59 provinces and five municipalities. There is a separate
provincial legislative arm, Provincial People’s Councils, but membership of the two
bodies often overlaps. 6 A similar structure operates at the district and commune level.
There is also organisation at the village or ward level. Despite the unitary structure and
strong national control, provincial administrations have increasing autonomy with
respect to budgeting and operations. The degree to which this has been utilised varies
among provinces and depends in part, not surprisingly, on the standing of local leaders. 7

3

The Constitution of Vietnam 1992, cited in Van Arkadie and Mallon, Viet Nam: A Transition Tiger?,
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Cited in Irene Nørlund, Tran Ngoc Ca and Nguyen Dinh Tuyen, "Dealing with the Donors: The Politics
of Vietnam's Comprehensive Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy" (Policy Papers 4/2003, Helsinki:
Institute of Development Studies, University of Helsinki, 2003), p. 53.
6
For an account of how provincial government operates see the interesting study of Ho Chi Minh City by
Martin Gainsborough, Changing Political Economy of Vietnam: The Case of Ho Chi Minh City (London:
Routledge, 2003).
7
Van Arkadie and Mallon, Viet Nam: A Transition Tiger?, p. 61.

VIETNAM

128

Despite being a one-party and unitary state, Vietnam was never as centrally planned or
controlled as other socialist countries. Stein Tønnesson explained this as the result of
necessary compromise between the many layers of the Vietnamese state: social,
political-doctrinal, economic and geographic. For example, an important Viet Minh
legacy is that key social forces remain committed to social justice, which to an
“…extent reduces the capacity of those Vietnamese decision-makers who want to
combine social stability with market-oriented reforms.” 8 Such doctrinal commitments
can cut across regional differences (between the north, centre and south) and combine in
various ways with the diverse but linked class grouping (for example, linking various
groups focused on security concerns or commercial matters) and with Confucian and
Vietnamese cultural traditions. As Adam McCarty concludes, it is appropriate to
describe Vietnam as “…a rather unique form of consensus governance” or a “managed
democracy” that allows mass representation under Party control. 9

The Grassroots Democracy Decree legislated in 1998 is a good example of the
consensus process. The decree was partly a reaction to peasant uprisings especially the
widespread disturbances in 128 villages in Thai Binh Province in 1997-8. The
disturbances appear to have been caused by a combination of the reaction to economic
reform in rural areas, local corruption and governmental unresponsiveness to these
issues. The Decree gave people at the commune level specific rights to participate in
decision-making, petition authorities and oversee local budgets; it was overlain with a
commitment to promote democracy at the commune level. 10

The consensus system, a cautious leadership and the continuing perception that the
Party and State are concerned about the welfare of the general population, means the
Party and State have retained a fair degree of legitimacy in Vietnam. 11 The process of
reform or renovation, called Doi Moi, initiated in 1986 coupled with a willingness to
admit to previous mistakes undoubtedly assisted with the retention of legitimacy.

8

Stein Tønnesson, "The Layered State of Vietnam," in Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard and Susan Young (eds.),
State Capacity in East Asia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 243.
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10
Nørlund, Ca and Tuyen, "Dealing with the Donors", p. 44.
11
McCarty, "Governance Institutions and Incentive Structures in Vietnam," p. 6. See also Gainsborough,
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Gabriel Kolko suggested that Doi Moi was strongly influenced by the IMF — or rather
that IMF staff had strong influence on a few key Vietnamese policy-makers who were
the key architects of the reform. 12 However, McCarty and others disagree and have
pointed to Vietnam’s strong political structure and culture that give it a notable capacity
to resist donor pressure for political reform. McCarty explained that:
…the traditional role played by programme aid in supporting reform
has been of limited relevance in Vietnam… examination of the
political economy of Vietnamese reform further supports the idea that
policy dialogue has been of limited relevance… The policy making
process in Vietnam is diffuse and does not follow the formal
structures that a political scientist may map out. The system is one of
consultation and consensus, with many different bodies being
involved in a single decision… 13
The capacity of Vietnam’s historic bloc to resist the Bank’s hegemony is a reoccurring
theme of this case study.

Socio-economic Changes and Policy in Vietnam since 1986

There is an interesting academic debate about the nature of Doi Moi and the Vietnamese
socio-economic system more generally. It revolves around two central issues: first, the
relative strength or weakness of the Vietnamese state (political society) and its
contribution to the country’s notable economic growth over the past two decades. The
second issue is the level and pace of reform required to ensure continuing economic
growth. Similar to the literature on East Asian development, a rough dividing line can
be made between ‘free market’ (or neo-liberal) and more critical (‘statist’) perspectives.
The former group point to the weakness of the Vietnamese state and concurrently the

12
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need to speed up market-based reforms. 14 Whereas the critical scholars find that the
Government of Vietnam (GoV) has provided relative stability, continuity of political
institutions and decisive economic decision-making and has thus been a key
determinant of Vietnam’s poverty reduction and economic growth performance. 15
Equally, they have highlighted the bearing of regional and international geopolitical and
economic developments on Vietnam’s policy choices. While I do not engage directly
with these debates, I take more from the critical position than the neoliberal one.

Following formal reunification in 1976, economic growth was low and unable to keep
pace with population growth. The demands of rehabilitation and reconstruction
competed with security needs as Vietnam was forced to engage militarily with both
Cambodia and China, and thus led to a doubling of the size of the army. The difficulties
were exacerbated by the US-backed UN economic embargo after Vietnam’s
intervention in Cambodia. Domestically, the attempt at collectivisation in the south
generally failed, while in the north, collectivised agriculture performed poorly. The
performance of manufacturing enterprises was highly variable. Already in 1979, a
sporadic process of relaxing constraints on economic activity and decentralising of
decision-making commenced. After initial improvements, poor structures combined
with high levels of military expenditure resulted in further economic deterioration. In
1986, inflation was 500-700 per cent per annum and the budget and trade deficits had
escalated — a situation made worse by the cessation of Communist Bloc and Chinese
aid in the following years. 16 On an expenditure basis, over 70 per cent of the population

14
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was living in poverty and some areas were on the verge of famine. 17 Most
commentators considered that the resultant social unrest, (articulated so forthrightly by
key Party members at the Sixth Party Congress in 1986), was a key impetus to Doi Moi.
In addition, Doi Moi can be seen as a delayed recognition of informal activities already
occurring in trade and exchange, which, in effect, drove formal policy changes.
Dzung The Nguyen described Doi Moi as comprising three main periods. 18 The first
period, “Path Seeking” (1986-1988), was driven by informal activity. A series of microeconomic reforms were undertaken to reduce the limits on private sector activity and
domestic trade. This was followed by increases in official prices for non-essential
consumer goods to bring them closer to market prices. Price reform was undertaken
fairly systematically through to 1992 by which time prices for all but a few
commodities were at market levels. The price reform effectively lifted a significant
burden from the state budget. In 1987, a law allowing private land-use rights was passed
and in 1988 land was re-allocated in an equitable manner to households; this combined
with additional freedoms for farmers (connected to the dismantling of cooperatives) and
new forms of support (e.g. agricultural extension services) was central to significant
improvements in farm productivity from the late 1980s. 19 These improvements were at
the core of the dramatic reductions in poverty. 20

Macroeconomic reform started in 1987 with the first currency devaluation, although a
major devaluation of the Dong did not take place until 1989. This devaluation brought
the Dong close to its market rate and resulted in positive interest rates. 21 The year 1989
was also the start of the second phase of reform, which Nguyen argues was the key

level of investment in human capital and the development of strong rural structures and institutions, ibid,
pp. 51-53.
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transition phase. From 1989 to 1993, reforms systematically moved Vietnam towards a
market-type economy and macroeconomic stabilisation took place. 22 This period saw:


a formal end to the two-tier price system;



increasing formal acknowledgement of the role of the non-state sector in
industrial production, in particular via enactment of laws on companies, private
enterprises and foreign investment;



a gradual reduction in foreign exchange and trade restrictions;



legalisation of foreign direct investment;



legalisation of gold trading;



development of a two-tier banking system; and



legislation on land-rights trading.

Reform of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) got underway during this period too, initially
via mergers and closures. Between 1988 and 1992, the number of such enterprises fell
from 12,000 to 6,000 and the SOE labour force was reduced by one third. In 1992, the
process of ‘equitisation’ was initiated. The GoV describes equitisation as transforming
the ownership of the mode of production. It can take place through one of four methods:
maintaining the existing state capital value and issuing shares to attract capital; selling
part of the existing state capital value of the enterprise; selling part of the enterprise; and
selling the entire state capital value of an enterprise and turning it into a joint stock
company. 23 A 2004 study of the forms of equitisation suggested that it generally
amounts to little more than privatisation. 24

Commentators on both the ‘left’ and ‘right’ have characterised the program of reform as
equivalent to a typical IMF stabilisation package. However, there are at least five
reasons to be cautious with this interpretation and to examine the impact of indigenous
influences on Doi Moi in some detail. First, as Stefan de Vylder pointed out, in Vietnam
microeconomic reforms preceded macroeconomic reform — the reverse of the standard
IMF approach. 25 Second, despite reductions in the SOE sector and tight monetary and
fiscal policy, government expenditure actually increased during the reform period, in
22
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stark contrast to standard IMF prescriptions of reducing government expenditures. 26
Third, the Vietnamese opted for a gradual process of reform, with much ‘learning by
doing’ — it cannot be characterised, regardless of IMF preferences or the picture of
some analysts as a ‘big bang’ approach. 27 The fourth reason is an outcome of the first
three — Vietnam was not able to meet IMF or World Bank requirements to receive
adjustment loans between 1995 and 2001. Finally, the process was more than mere
‘adjustment’ of the economy, it “…revolutionised the entire set of development
concepts and strategies.” 28 And this ‘revolution’ has been as much influenced by
socialism and the model of the East Asian ‘developmental states’ as it has been by
neoliberalism. 29 It is a process in which Vietnam is still engaged.

The positive economic developments — economic growth jumped to 5.1 per cent in
1988 and inflation stabilised — cannot be explained only by the Doi Moi reforms. A
key factor was the end of the war in Cambodia. 30 In 1991, inflation spiked briefly
prompting further macroeconomic stabilisation, consolidation of the SOE sector and
reform of banking. By 1993, growth reached close to 10 per cent and remained at high
levels until mid-decade. Much of the early growth was attributable to the farm sector,
which employed around 70 per cent of the working population. Given the egalitarian
land distribution, growth had a strong impact on poverty; by 1998 the poverty rate had
fallen to around 37 per cent of the population. 31

Prior to 1986, Vietnam was performing better than countries with similar levels of per
capita income assessed by development indicators such as levels of literacy (1980:
males 91 per cent, females 78 per cent), primary schooling (gross enrolments in 1980:
108 per cent of age group) and maternal mortality (200 per 100,000 live births). 32 Thus
the existing social welfare structure underpinned the ongoing reductions in poverty.
Serious problems remained: malnutrition affected 52 per cent of under-five year olds in
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1980-1985; in 1997-2000 it still affected 37 per cent of under-fives, which is high by
regional standards. 33

While Vietnam progressed on most human development indicators between 1986 and
1992, the overall social welfare system — covering health, education and social support
—was largely neglected. Education and health were least neglect but in education,
lower and upper secondary enrolments actually declined until 1995. In health, the
number of beds, medical assistants and nurses declined, accompanied by reduced access
to the formal health care system. 34 The introduction of user-fees meant that by the year
2000, households directly covered approximately 43 per cent of the costs of education
and 35 per cent of public hospital costs. A public hospital visit cost a household from
the poorest population quintile on average around 45 per cent of their annual non-food
expenditure.

35

But from the mid-1990s state allocations to health and education

increased and these combined with the income from user fees to produce noteworthy
quality improvements. 36

Other forms of social welfare such as transfers and poverty reduction programs were
severely neglected. Under the old system, the provision of housing, food, utilities,
health, education, etc was organised around cooperatives, SOEs and the arms of the
state. But cooperatives largely disappeared and SOEs had most social obligations
removed in the transition to market operations. Only after 1992 were steps taken to
adjust social services to the new economy, these are discussed below.

Dzung The Nguyen argued that the third period of Doi Moi, 1994 to 2001, focused on
consolidating reforms. Tight fiscal and monetary policy was maintained and
incremental reforms continued including decentralisation of budget management and a
general focus on public sector management from 1995. 37 Irene Nørland, Tran Ngoc Ca
and Nguyen Dinh Tuyen see the incremental process as the government’s attempt “to

33
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set up rational and harmonious development structures before creating a common
playing field for all economic components.” 38

Since 1994, further steps have been taken to integrate Vietnam into the world economy,
including tariff reductions, removal of various quantitative restrictions and quotas and
further liberalisation of export and import licensing requirements. Some of the steps
were requirements for accession to the World Trade Organization, which occurred in
January 2007. In 2000, business licensing procedures were simplified and a stock
exchange was established in Ho Chi Minh City. The GoV plans to complete planned
equitisation of SOEs by 2010, but the pace has been relatively slow and this deadline
might not be met. SOE equitisation has been a major focus of the Bank and is discussed
in more detail in the section on the Bank’s structural adjustment lending in Chapter Six.

The Asian Financial Crisis reduced GDP growth, though not nearly as heavily or as
long as for regional neighbours such as Thailand and Indonesia. This was in part due to
the continuing controls on foreign investment and exchange, which meant funds were
long-term investment-oriented not short-term and speculative. FDI to Vietnam did
decline in the lead up to the Crisis but this was not, as the World Bank argued, due to
foreign investors concerns about slowing down of reform. Rather, it was due to a
decline in real estate investment and fluctuations in oil and gas investments. 39 The
decline during the Crisis was mostly due to the fact that over 60 per cent of Vietnam’s
FDI came from East Asia, that is from other countries affected by the Crisis.40 The
Crisis also appreciated the value of the Dong, reduced exports and hit government
revenues. In 1998, growth dropped to 5.8 per cent and in 1999 to 4.8 per cent. However,
the government acted to maintain macroeconomic stability by controlling imports,
devaluing the Dong and adopting conservative monetary policy. 41 By 2000 growth had
recovered to 6.8 percent and in 2004, it was 7.7 per cent. Poverty continued to decline
significantly — from 37.4 per cent in 1998 to 28.9 per cent in 2002 and 20 per cent in
2004. However, the gap between the rich and poor in Vietnam is steadily increasing. 42
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From 1992 steps were undertaken to adjust the social services to the new economy. In
1994, social insurance was extended to non-state employees, however, this scheme only
covers employees in formal sector enterprises with more than ten employees. By the
end of the 1990s, it covered only around 11 per cent of the workforce. 43 Combined with
existing veterans’ pension and state obligations, social insurance accounted for 90 per
cent of the three per cent of national expenditure that was directed to social welfare at
this time. Most of the benefits go to upper and upper-middle income groups. 44 The other
key development in social services was the creation of a national program of poverty
reduction assistance. Some of the components of this program were already in existence
but in 1998 nine programs were consolidated into the National Target Program for
Hunger Eradication and Poverty Reduction. Components include:


construction of basic commune infrastructure;



promotion of agricultural and off-farm employment;



credit for the poor;



Health Care Fund for the Poor;



education subsidies for the poor;



extension services;



training for commune leaders;



sedentarization, organised migration and new economic zones; and



assistance for ethnic minority groups. 45

The final component of the social protection system is social assistance, comprising two
funds: a social guarantee fund; and the contingency fund for pre-harvest starvation and
disaster relief. These funds are the main safety net for the bulk of the population yet
they were equal to only 0.1 per cent of GDP in the mid-1990s. They provide benefits
that leave recipients living below the poverty line. 46 Dzung The Nguyen’s analysis of
the overall social welfare system concluded that, despite some improvements,
“Vietnam’s social protection system provides its benefits to those who appear to be
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least in need.” 47 Yet, since Nguyen’s study, poverty reduction expenditures have been
increasing and there was a big drop in poverty between 2002 (28.9 per cent) and 2004
(20 per cent), which seems to indicate that the overhaul of social expenditures is
proving effective. 48

Development Assistance to Vietnam since 1993

Prior to 1993, Vietnam had only limited engagement with non-communist donors.
There were some international advisers present, coordinated through the UNDP, which
had a small program in Vietnam along with UNICEF. The IMF maintained a limited
program but Vietnam defaulted on repayments in the mid-1980s and the US vetoed the
rescheduling of its arrears until 1993 thus preventing any new program. 49 The Bank
made one loan to Vietnam in 1978 but a self-imposed ban stopped further activity until
1993 (see the following section for further detail). In addition, the Swedish International
Development Cooperation Agency and a number of NGOs, such as Oxfam and Save the
Children, had small programs prior to 1993. 50

Non-communist donors re-engaged with Vietnam only after the debt with the former
regime in the south was settled. According to Chossudovsky, Vietnam was only allowed
to rejoin the Bank after a:
…secret agreement reached in Paris in 1993, which in many ways
was tantamount to forcing Vietnam “to compensate Washington” for
the costs of the war, [it] required Hanoi to recognise the debts of the
defunct Saigon regime of General Thieu as a condition for the
granting of fresh credit and the lifting of the US embargo. 51
At one level then, it is surprising how dependent the GoV is now on Western aid. As
Painter pointed out:
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…between 1994 and 1999, annual overseas development assistance
(ODA) averaged 20 per cent of central government expenditure, rising
from 17 per cent in 1997 to 27 per cent in 1999. 52
There are now over twenty countries and organisations providing ODA to Vietnam,
however, over 80 per cent of funding comes from just three sources: Japan, the World
Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Given the sources of ODA, not
surprisingly most is in the form of concessional loans not grants — in 2002, 84.8 per
cent of ODA was in the form of loans requiring repayment. 53 As a consequence,
“[a]bout four-fifths of debt in Vietnam is with multilateral and bilateral donors, on
concessional terms.” 54 In terms of sectors of support, according to OECD Development
Assistance Committee categories, just over 40 per cent of ODA in Vietnam is for
economic infrastructure and services, 17.5 per cent is allocated to programme assistance
and the remainder is divided fairly equally between education, health, production,
multi-sector and other assistance. 55 Japan is overall the largest donor of ODA — in
2002 it disbursed $429 million. On average, 73 to 82 per cent of Japanese ODA has
been loans: 45.5 per cent went to the electricity sector, 32.3 per cent to transportation
and 16.8 per cent to rural and urban infrastructure projects. 56
By the end of 2004, ADB cumulative commitments to Vietnam were $3.15 billion. 57 Its
sector profile was somewhat more diverse than the World Bank or Japanese ODA. The
agriculture and transport sectors led its priorities — each receiving just over 19 per cent
of loans in value terms. The energy sector was also a major focus receiving 12.6 per
cent of flows, while the finance and water sectors each received 10.8 per cent. The
remaining funds were divided between education, multi-sector, law, health, and industry
and trade. There is a significant convergence visible between the three major donors in
the sectors of electricity, transport and water supply and sanitation (on the World Bank,
see the following section). Yet, while the PRSP process has received significant and
critical attention from NGOs, these sectors of assistance have not.
52
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Since the rescheduling of arrears in 1993, the IMF and Vietnam have had a rather
tumultuous relationship. 58 It resumed lending to Vietnam in 1994 and made further
commitments in 1995 and 1996. However, after a falling out in 1997 regarding the
timing of reforms, loan disbursements were withheld and there were no loans until
2001. 59 After 2002, the program was suspended though not formally until April 2004.
This most recent impasse was due to Vietnam failing to meet IMF standards for central
bank accounting and auditing. 60 According to Porter and Craig, use of such standards
has become a standard IMF mechanism for deepening fiscal discipline.61 They are also a
broad “post-conditionality” mechanism similar to that employed in Bank PWC
adjustment lending. 62 The IMF maintains its office in Hanoi and continues a program of
technical advisory work in the financial sector including: banking supervision, stateowned commercial bank equitisation, monetary policy and anti-money laundering
initiatives. 63

The World Bank in Vietnam

With the support of McNamara, the World Bank made its first loan to Vietnam in 1978
— the Dau Tieng Irrigation Project. The loan was made despite the US government’s
disproval and it proved costly to the Bank — a campaign against the loan led by
Congressman C.W. Young led to inaction on an agreed capital increase for the Bank.
Young also called for a cut to the US replenishment of the IDA and inclusion of a
proviso on the legislation for the replenishment to prevent the US funds being used for
loans to Vietnam and a handful of communist states. 64 In late 1979, McNamara signed a
letter to Young stating that the Bank would not again lend to Vietnam, in return Young
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agreed to end his campaign and support the capital increase and Bank replenishment.
The letter was leaked and caused an uproar because it violated the Bank’s rules on
political involvement and on negotiating with member governments only through
specified channels. 65 Nevertheless, the self imposed ban remained in place until 1993.

Between 1993 and 2004, the World Bank committed just over $5.12 billion to Vietnam.
Between 2000 and 2002, it committed significantly less than average at $270 million
per annum, but remained Vietnam’s second largest donor. The Bank’s 2002 Vietnam:
Country Assistance Strategy (Vietnam CAS) indicated that loans would increase in
2003–2006 — its base scenario (“base case”) for loan commitments was an average of
$581 million per annum. In 2003, the base case was met and in 2004, loans moved to
the Bank’s high case scenario with loans totalling over $744 million. So in 2004, the
Bank actually topped Vietnam’s donor list. 66 The Bank’s priority sectors have
historically been: energy and mining (electricity), which between 1993 and 2004
accounted for 22 per cent of the value of Bank commitments, and transport, which was
20 per cent. The three sectors of agriculture, fishing and forestry, law, justice and public
administration and water supply and sanitation each accounted for 13 per cent of the
value of Bank loans.

The Bank also administered $44.6 million in trust funds specifically for Vietnam
between 1993 and 2004. Trust funds have been a key mechanism for extending Bank
influence since their inception in the 1970s. In Vietnam, the Bank’s use of trust funds
indicates how it has sought to be at the front of donor coordination. Its donor
coordination role increased after 1999 when Vietnam agreed to join the pilot
Comprehensive Development Framework process and the associated Poverty Reduction
Strategy Paper process. The Bank also chairs the Consultative Group for Vietnam
(CGV). The combined effects of a shared development agenda and the Bank’s influence
on donors resulted in the CGV making additional aid in 1998 and 1999 conditional on
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Vietnam undertaking World Bank prescribed reform. 67 The Bank’s role in the CGV
gives it influence broadly over the geographical spread and sectors of donor’s ODA.
The Bank also encourages joint funding of its loans, for example, under the 2004
structural adjustment loan, called Poverty Reduction Support Credit III, the Bank lent
$100 million; co-financing by other donors was $73 million. The Bank plays a lead role
in pushing a ‘development’ agenda, which was confirmed in a 2001 study by Irene
Nørlund. However, the response from the GoV and others to the role of the Bank was
generally positive as it was seen as having a “…very open attitude in Vietnam.” 68
Further, the Bank has generally adopted a “…tolerant and longer-term view of the
relationship” with Vietnam, in contrast to “the IMF’s preference for imposing stricter
conditions and timetables.” 69

The Bank has used alliances and networks to further its objectives, most prominently it
aligned itself with the so-called ‘pro-reform’ factions in the party and bureaucracy. At
times, it has linked with private business interests, for example to assist in its campaign
for business licensing reform. The Bank’s vast array of technical advisers employed to
develop reports, designs, legislation and policy recommendation assist in making the
Washington Consensus hegemonic principles ‘common sense.’ The Bank trains
bureaucrats and party cadres in neoliberal principles through particular projects and
specific training programs. It even trains private businesses in Vietnam in how to
operate in a market economy by training them how to tender for Bank-financed
activities.

The World Bank’s Key Planning Documents: the Country Assistance
Strategy and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
There are references to a first CAS, dated September 1994, however despite requests the
documentation remains unavailable. Prior to 1998, the Bank tended to keep its country
programming documents confidential (even from recipient governments). The first
available Vietnam CAS is 1998-2002. However, the first Structural Adjustment Credit
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(SAC I) provided to Vietnam in 1994 does give some indications of earlier Bank
priorities. While available documentation is limited, the brief “Program Information
Document,” was very supportive of the Doi Moi reforms that had taken place. The
reforms were described as the start of a Washington Consensus structural adjustment
package, regardless of whether this is an accurate description. Thus it emphasised:
conservative monetary and fiscal policy combined with price liberalisation to control
the budget deficit and inflation and to ‘get the prices right,’ currency devaluation and
financial sector reforms, reform of SOEs, openness to foreign direct investment, decollectivisation and property rights, as well as limited and highly targeted social
programs. 70 Conditionalities on the loan were focused in the areas of government
budgeting, the program of SOE reform, the legal framework for property rights and
commercial transactions and banking reforms — in other words, core Washington
Consensus concerns.

While SAC I praised ‘ownership’ by the GoV of Doi Moi, the 1998-2002 CAS already
noted differences between the Bank and the GoV on the pace of reform, with the Bank
urging a faster program. 71 This issue frequently reappeared in Bank documentation. It is
not an exaggeration to suggest that it is at the centre of Bank / GoV relations. The
Bank’s overarching focus was on the pace of reform despite the significant inroads
made into SOE reform and cuts in the labour force pre-1993 and the evidence from
other countries that quick privatisation often results in a significant decline in
production with high social costs and a strong likelihood of insider privatisation. Thus it
indicates the limited extent to which the Bank has taken on board NIE concerns about
the pace and timing of reform over the Washington Consensus concerns with
government failure and rapid adjustment.

Yet, the Bank and other donors have supported an increased focus on poverty reduction
in Vietnam. The Poverty Task Force and Poverty Working Group were established in
1999 and involved the government, donors and NGOs. The smaller Poverty Working
Group was the initial vehicle for participatory poverty assessment and living standards
70
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surveys. While this was clearly an innovative process for Vietnam, it was largely driven
by donors, in particular the World Bank. 72

The GoV requested involvement as a pilot CDF/PRSP country because it was a precondition for access to structural adjustment lending. But, in the wake of the Asian
Financial Crisis and the downturn in FDI, producing a PRSP was a signal to both the
donor community and international financiers that Vietnam was continuing its reform
program. 73 The interim-PRSP, released in March 2001, drew on the results of the
Poverty Working Group and in particular, a report it released in December 1999,
Attacking Poverty. However, the interim-PRSP was produced quickly in order to
maintain access to structural adjustment lending and involved little public
participation. 74 In a separate process, the Government’s own key planning documents
were concurrently drafted and debated by political/civil society across the country. The
“Five Year Plan for Socio-economic Development 2001-2005” and “Ten Year SocioEconomic Development Strategy 2001-2010” were approved in April 2001 by the Party
Congress. They did not mention the PRSP process. 75

The Bank and IMF approved the interim-PRSP but their Joint Staff Assessment
identified issues that had to be addressed in the full PRSP including: improving poverty
data and monitoring, sector strategies for addressing poverty, costing and prioritisation
of programs, improving the participatory process and increasing attention to vulnerable
groups. 76 The list of concerns certainly suggests a shift from the Washington Consensus
yet it contrasts with the process whereby, until 2005, the Bank and IMF’s Executive
Directors approved PRSPs.

The GoV had a relatively strong degree of ownership of the full PRSP; indeed their
very renaming of it as the Comprehensive Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy
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(CPRGS) may indicate a desire to distinguish it from Bank processes. 77 Released in
May 2002, it involved significant consultation with various levels of government, some
local NGOs, international NGOs and donors, organised through the Poverty Task Force
(now the lead body for poverty assessments). 78 Yet, the participatory processes were not
country driven, the World Bank “…mobilised an immense effort to facilitate the
process,” following it at every step and ensuring that research could be transformed into
policy. 79

An evaluation of the overall process concluded that to start with it had little impact on
the GoV or the broader community, indeed the document remained “…unknown at the
provincial and communal levels, and even foreign to members of the Vietnamese
development research community.” 80 This obscurity is largely because the CPRGS
process was kept separate from the Government’s existing planning process, which
involves debate across civil and political society (including party cells and mass
organizations) and final approval by the National Assembly. The CPRGS has
progressed to becoming “…a ‘second-track’ policy forum, paralleling government and
party policy.” 81 Despite the Bank and Fund’s preference to have the CPRGS as the main
policy planning mechanism, 82 in future the PRSP plan will be subsumed under the
Government’s Five Year Plan. This should largely address problems such as the fact
that participatory processes have not been mainstreamed.

That the CPRGS is not mainstream is conceded by the Bank, however, a Bank staffer
suggested that:
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…the strength of not being a mainstream document is that is has the
space to discuss sensitive issues that are not normally tackled in a
direct way in the mainstream documents of government. 83
This may have some truth, yet the Bank-organised participatory processes did not
include any discussion of macroeconomic policy settings or structural reform, which
must be one of the most ‘sensitive’ components of any country’s development
program. 84 Failure to include discussion of macroeconomic policy in participatory
processes seems to be a common feature of PRSPs. 85

In summary then, the CPRGS process contained notable elements of Bank and IMF
control, for example the Bank direction of the participatory process and the requirement
that the IMF and Bank Boards approve the final document to gain funding access. 86
However, the GoV took increasing control of the drafting process and the content and
seems to have come to regard it as an action plan for the Five and Ten Year Plans. 87 In
terms of the underlying development theory it largely reflects the PWC conception of
‘growth with equity’ as it prioritises economic growth as the key to poverty reduction.
What is new for Vietnam is the use of poverty language and analysis and here tensions
are visible between neo-liberal self-help ideas and the emphasis on the role of the state
in development and equity. 88

The 2003-2006 Vietnam CAS claimed to be based on the CPRGS and sets out three
broad objectives derived from it:
(i)
83

High growth through a transition to a market economy;

Caroline Turk, "Interview," (Hanoi, Vietnam: Senior Poverty Specialist, Poverty Reduction and
Economic Management, World Bank, 2005). The Joint Bank/IMF CPRGS assessment expresses the lack
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document, World Bank, "Vietnam Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper and Joint IDA-IMF Staff
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(ii) An equitable, socially inclusive, and sustainable pattern of growth;
and
(iii) Adoption of a modern public administration, legal and governance
system. 89
Although these three themes did appear in the CPRGS, the report was not organised
around them and the way they are presented differs subtly but significantly from the
CPRGS. The CPRGS, drawing from overall objectives in the Government’s Five Year
Plan, aimed to:
[b]ring about a significant improvement in the people’s material,
cultural and spiritual life, lay the foundations for the country’s
industrialization and modernization, build a prosperous people, strong
country and a just, equal, democratic and civilized society, and
establish the institutions of a socialist-oriented market economy… 90
The Bank’s version ignored the socialist-orientation of the market economy and
changes the “people’s material, cultural and spiritual life” into an equitable “pattern of
growth.” The Bank’s approach can be read in two main ways, a generous reading
suggests the Bank has made a significant concession to country ownership in supporting
a country operating on other than a market basis. 91 A more critical reading asks why the
Bank would find it so difficult to accept the idea of a socialist-oriented market economy
given the level of redistribution and public ownership in many of its (democratic)
member states. 92 Of course, the situation is made more complex by the lack of a
consensus on the meaning of a ‘socialist-oriented market economy’ within the
government and party in Vietnam.

In terms of public administration and the legal environment, the Bank’s key descriptor
was ‘modern,’ the CPRGS on the other hand referred variously to a fair, level,
transparent and efficient system. 93 ‘Modern’ is clearly a synonym for a Western
capitalist system, which translates in the lending program as assistance in the design of
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key laws consistent with a “market-driven economy” in areas such as land, gas and
electricity. 94

The CAS examination of Vietnam’s historic bloc is revealing: social aspects received
little attention accounting for only one paragraph out of fourteen. The economic
analysis was also brief and made up largely of broad claims and truisms. The focus was
on the need for a faster pace of policy reform connected to building a market economy.
The short section on the medium-term outlook focused on the (presumed) link between
continued policy reform and economic growth. Monetary and fiscal policy analysis was
limited but emphasised prudence and soundness, which fits with the analysis of the
PWC as maintaining the Washington Consensus approach. There was no consideration
of the potential impact of the external environment, which is surprising given that the
Asian Financial Crisis must still have been fresh in people’s minds.

The 2003-2006 CAS contained three scenarios for lending volumes; the outcome was
linked only to the “…pace of progress on the Government’s policy and institutional
agenda.” 95 It was not linked to poverty outcomes or to the potential impact on Vietnam
of regional or global events. There was also no suggestion of alternative scenarios in
case the economy and poverty reduction did not respond to the proposed policy
prescriptions. So, although the Bank needs and wants to be more ‘organic’ in the PWC
period, its structures as a Bank and commitment to the hegemonic principles of pax
americana expressed in the Washington Consensus, ultimately prevented it from
moving beyond superficial interventions and issues.

Yet, there have been substantial reductions in poverty since the PRSP process began,
although until 2000 rate of reduction was slower than in the early 1990s. Can these be
attributed to the PRSP process? Probably not, as the GoV itself, reflecting the demands
of local social forces, made a decision prior to joining the PRSP process to overhaul its
social welfare system and to increase and redirect poverty reduction expenditure as
indicated by the introduction in 1998 of the National Target Program for Hunger
Eradication and Poverty Reduction.
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World Bank, "Vietnam CAS 2003-2006," p. 25.
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Conclusion

Vietnam had a stable and quite ‘strong’ government over the case study periods. It has
managed to maintain quite high levels of growth and poverty reduction during a period
of significant economic transition. Its strength enabled the GoV to work closely with the
World Bank yet still maintain a fair degree of autonomy. In other words, the Bank was
by no means always able to impose its ‘common sense’ on Vietnam. The next chapter
explores this relationship in more detail through an examination of Bank adjustment and
investment lending.
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Chapter Six
World Bank Lending in Vietnam
This chapter commences with an analysis of changes in the overall lending program in
terms of sectoral lending and loan size. It then embarks on a detailed exploration of all
Bank loans to Vietnam in the two case study periods by sector commencing with
structural adjustment lending. Investment loans are analysed by Bank sector, starting
with energy and mining and water, sanitation and flood protection, which are grouped
together because of the common approach in these sectors. Transportation is dealt with
separately; finance lending is combined with the law, justice and public administration
sector, as four out of its five credits were structural adjustment loans. Health and
education are also combined because of the small number of loans in each sector.

A Sectoral Analysis of World Bank Lending to Vietnam

Looking at the two case study periods, 1993-1997 and 2000-2004, this section explores
the evolution of Bank lending in terms of sectoral focus and the size of loans. The
analysis utilises the Bank’s own sector classification system. In 1993-1997,
transportation and energy and mining were clearly the focus of Bank lending (see Table
6.1). Together they accounted for almost half of total new Bank lending commitments.
Transportation comprised mainly projects to rehabilitate highways and ports; the energy
and mining sector in Vietnam is restricted to projects in electricity generation,
distribution and management. Finance, the third largest sector focused predominately on
microcredit and banking reform projects. Health and education received scant attention
in either period. Indeed, despite the focus on poverty reduction in the PWC, the Bank’s
overall levels of lending for education, the environment and health remained fairly
stable across the Bank after 1996 at a level lower than the first half of the 1990s. Social
“…sector lending has only increased marginally following the record low of 2.5% of
Bank lending in 1996.” 1

1
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Table 6.1 World Bank New Loan Approvals to Vietnam by Sector, as a per cent of total
country lending: 1993-97 and 2000-04
Sector

1993-1997
(%)

2000-2004
(%)

Transportation

29

16

Energy

20

23

Finance

16

7

Law, justice and public administration

9

18

Health and other social services

9

1

Agriculture, fishing and forestry

7

11

Water, sanitation and flood protection

6

18

Education

4
6
Data source: World Bank Website, Projects & Operations, Projects Database 2

The 1998-2002 Vietnam CAS indicated that the Bank program would shift its focus
towards poverty, social issues and rural development. There are indications of a shift in
emphasis through such projects as the Northern Mountains Poverty Reduction Project
and some power projects were targeted at rural areas. Yet, looking at Table 6.1 the
negligible expenditure on health and education speaks for itself. Transport and energy
(electricity) are the key sectors in both case study periods, though law, justice and
public administration and water, sanitation and flood protection moved into equal
second place in 2000-04. The increase in the share of Bank commitments in these last
two sectors was suggested by the analysis of the PWC, given its renewed emphasis on
government’s facilitating the provision of infrastructure to enable economic growth; as
well as its focus on property rights and on business and regulatory frameworks to
reduce market and government failures. Overall there was a strong focus on
infrastructure — water, transport and energy accounted for 57 per cent of new
commitments in 2000-04. In an interview, a Bank staff member explained the strong
focus as the inevitable result of Vietnam’s pending graduation from IDA to IBRD
loans:
…the reality is that countries like to borrow IBRD money for
infrastructure, and the Bank has to be able to lend that money
otherwise it is going to run out of money sooner or later.3

2

Vietnam received a small number of grants of under $10 million, mainly under the auspices of the
Global Environment Fund. Given the focus is on loans these were excluded from the case study.
3
Turk, "Interview."
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The Bank has been criticised over many decades for its focus on project quantity rather
than quality and loan size as the key indicator. Ranis argued that the fact that average
Bank loans are still around $100 million indicates the continuing “…trade-off between
the quantity and quality of lending.” 4 Vietnam does not deviate from this model. The
average loan size shifted only slightly in the case study periods, in 1993-1997 it was
$105 million and in 2000-2004, $124 million. The mean moved from $100 million to
$110 million.

Structural Adjustment Lending in Vietnam

Table 6.2 Word Bank Adjustment Lending to Vietnam: 1993-1997 and 2000-2004
Project Name

Year
Approved

Approved
Amount
(USD millions)

Loans 1993-1997
Structural Adjustment Credit

1994

$150.0

Poverty Reduction Support Credit I

2001

$250.0

Poverty Reduction Support Credit II

2003

$100.0

Poverty Reduction Support Credit III

2004

$100.0

Loans 2000-2004

Structural adjustment lending increased from almost nine per cent of the value of new
commitments in 1993-1997 to over 16 per cent in 2000-2004, which is notably less than
the current bank average of 33 per cent of lending. 5 Until 2004, Vietnam only accessed
four adjustment loans: there was one Structural Adjustment Credit (SAC) in the 19931997 period and three — called Poverty Reduction Support Credits (PRSCs) — in the
2000-2004 period.

There is limited information available on the 1994 SAC, however, it supported the
initial program of Doi Moi undertaken by the GoV and emphasised those aspects that fit
within the Washington Consensus — conservative monetary and fiscal policy,
devaluation, price liberalisation, land use rights, foreign trade and investment, etc. The

4

Ranis, "The World Bank near the Turn of the Century," p. 86.
See World Bank, Annual Report 2003, p. 36.

5
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objective of the credit was to assist the transition to a market economy. 6 It included
some discussion of the social costs of adjustments and concluded that the Bank should
focus on a “broader” approach to aiding the vulnerable rather than direct support for
social policy. 7 The meaning of broader support becomes clear when loans in the finance
sector are analysed. Conditionality seemed to be focused on regulation and competition
policy, tax policy and administration and debt management and fiscal sustainability.
Brian Van Arkadie and Raymond Mallon suggested that the SAC was the driving force
behind the 1993 Law on Bankruptcy and the 1995 State Enterprise Law, both of which
were developed with little consultation and have been poorly enforced. 8

The gap in adjustment loans until 2001 paralleled the gap in the IMF program in
Vietnam. The failure to reach a consensus continued throughout the Asian Financial
Crisis, which negatively impacted economic growth and poverty reduction efforts in
Vietnam. This gap and the low level of adjustment lending in general, indicates the
relative strength of the Vietnamese historic bloc — because despite the impact of the
Crisis on the economy and the state budget reliance on donor flows, the GoV rejected
access to quick-disbursing loans in favour of some domestic policy freedom. These
policy decisions outlined in Chapter Five, involved conservative monetary and fiscal
policy but also trade (import) restrictions. They were clearly preferable to the GoV over
the liberalisation and privatisation programs being pushed by the World Bank and IMF.
Equally then the Bank’s position is evidence of its commitment to hegemonic principles
over country ownership of macroeconomic policy settings or over mitigating the
impacts of crisis on the poorest. 9 During this gap, the Bank attempted to implement
aspects of its structural reform program though a combination of sector programs and a
large program of analytical studies (see, in particular, the power sector). 10 As noted

6

World Bank, "Viet Nam - Structural Adjustment Credit I," pp. 1-2.
Ibid, p. 5.
8
Van Arkadie and Mallon, Viet Nam: A Transition Tiger?, p. 131. This experienced indicated “…the
limited role of legislation as an instrument of change, where the laws are neither supported by a
consensus of the concerned parties nor respond to a demand arising from within the society.” Across
Asia, transplanted laws have neither been generally well received nor been successful in boosting
business performance Van Arkadie and Mallon, Viet Nam: A Transition Tiger?, pp. 104-105.
9
World Bank, "Vietnam - Country Assistance Evaluation" (Report No. 23288, Operations Evaluation
Department, November 21 2001), p. 1.
10
Between 1990 and 1999, analytical work accounted for 26 per cent of Bank work in Vietnam on
lending, supervision and analysis. This compares to a Bank-wide average of 18 per cent, ibid, pp. 11-12.
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earlier, the Bank-chaired CGV also pressured Vietnam by offering additional funding,
subject to Vietnam following World Bank reform prescriptions. 11

Despite its title and the analysis of poverty in the report, the policy reforms in PRSC I
do not directly address poverty. 12 PRSC I proposes action in five areas: the private
sector climate; SOE reform; banking reform; trade reform; and public expenditure
management. In other words, these are largely Washington Consensus policies focused
on developing markets and global integration. The connection to poverty requires two
leaps of faith, first that making such reforms will increase economic growth, and second
that economic growth will decrease poverty. In contrast, Van Arkadie and Mallon found
that in Vietnam, “…improvements in enterprise performance have usually preceded
changes in the legal framework.” 13

There is a significant shift from PRSC I to II/III, as the later loans incorporate some of
the issues in Vietnam’s interim-PRSP released between PRSC I and II. 14 From PRSC II
the policy reform agenda was expanded mostly around social issues. New issues
included: health, education, land use and transferability, environmental sustainability,
government planning and legal reform. However, the five sectors from PRSC I that
conform to the Washington Consensus agenda continued to receive the most attention.
Decentralisation and corruption appeared in PRSC II and became more prominent in
PRSC III, these are part of the PWC focus on governance and provide new grounds for
the Bank to propose ‘reforms’ to Vietnam’s legal and regulatory system.

The number and types of conditions also changed — PRSC I for $250 million contained
24 conditions for the two tranches in the five sectors mentioned above. By PRSC II
($100 million), conditions were dropped in favour of “policy actions,” 19 of them. In
addition, PRSC II included a list of 14 “triggers,” which are additional targets to be

11

Masina, Vietnam's Development Strategies, pp. 86.
Porter and Craig, "The Third Way and the Third World," p. 402. See also their analysis of the tenuous
links between the loan objectives and poverty reduction on p.403.
13
Van Arkadie and Mallon, Viet Nam: A Transition Tiger?, pp. 104-105.
14
World Bank, "Program Document for a Proposed Credit to the Socialist Republic of Vietnam for a
Second Poverty Reduction Support Credit" (Report No. P-7584, May 30 2003), World Bank, "Program
Document for a Proposed Credit to the Socialist Republic of Vietnam for a Third Poverty Reduction
Support Credit" (Report No. 28916-VN, May 25 2004), World Bank, "Report and Recommendation on a
Proposed Poverty Reduction Support Credit to the Socialist Republic of Vietnam" (Report No. P-7446VN, April 23 2001).
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achieved, prior to PRSC III being negotiated. By PRSC III ($100 million) only triggers
remained — 15 of them. Conditionality has been a controversial area for the Bank
particularly in relation to structural adjustment loans. 15 The Bank claims that triggers
“…are not conditions,” however the explanation of what they are suggests otherwise:
“[p]rogress on most triggers and no backtracking on any of them leads in principle to
the preparation of the next PRSC operation…” 16 The triggers in PRSC III (for PRSP IV)
included both broad directives and specific actions, for example, Vietnam must draft
new “…Enterprise and Investment Laws in accordance with the Guiding Concepts and
Principles date April 26, 2004.” 17 As Griffin noted, these broad “post-conditionality”
mechanisms often increase the Bank’s “…encroachment into the day-to-day governance
of developing countries.” The Bank’s argument that PRSCs are merely a retrospective
of what the country has done over the last twelve months is not convincing, they need to
be seen as an opportunity for the Bank to influence the government’s agenda or as a
way of continuing conditionality in a more expansive form. 18 The GoV demonstrated its
strength by only negotiating a limited number of structural adjustment loans. Further, it
has not always met SAL conditions, particularly when conditions have conflicted with
the needs of the historic bloc. For example, if equitisation of SOEs or trade
liberalisation measures threatens the interests of powerful groups, they tend not to be
implemented. 19

One of the most controversial aspects of the PRSCs was the requirement for equitisation
of SOEs. From 1992 to 2000, there was pilot equitisation of about 450 firms. PRSC I
required equitisation of more than 450 firms prior to the release of the first tranche of
funding (which was obviously already the case) and adoption of a five-year SOE reform
program covering one-third of SOEs. The second tranche release included five
conditions (of 12) on equitising SOEs: streamlining the equitisation process, completing
equitisation of 200 major and 200 minor SOEs, equitising non-core assets of General
Corporations and modification of a redundancy fund for equitising SOEs. 20 It is

15

In late 2004, SALs were renamed Development Policy lending.
World Bank, "Viet Nam PRSC III," p. 17.
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Ibid, p. 32. The Guiding Concepts and Principles document was formulated under a World Bank grant
attached to PRSC II.
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The retrospective argument is from Turk, "Interview."
19
Masina, Vietnam's Development Strategies, p. 103.
20
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surprising to see the use of single numerical targets in the PWC period. This is, as the
Bank itself has noted, a simplistic and inadequate form of conditionality, which leaves
the Bank with only a pass or fail outcome. Where a target is likely to be missed, it
provides no incentive for getting close to the target and it offers no leeway in case of
unforseen events.

In PRSC II, the Bank shifted from broad numerical targets to a program listing
enterprises and target dates for equitisation. This is an even more coercive (but likely
even less effective) form of conditionality pursuing a Bank hegemonic principle. In
PRSC III, the Bank finally dropped numerical targets for SOE equitisation, though the
section analysing or outlining current government policy supported the government’s
plan to equitise, sell or liquidate around 2,400 SOEs between 2004 and 2006. 21

The Bank/GoV debate on equitisation needs to be understood in the context of the
reform and performance of SOEs during Doi Moi. Significant rationalisation of SOEs
was undertaken prior to the Bank’s engagement in Vietnam. Perhaps for this reason,
despite variable performance of individual SOEs, as a group they outperformed
domestic private enterprises in terms of growth until around 2001. They remain a very
important source of stability and government revenue. 22 Van Arkadie and Mallon found
little evidence to support the idea that SOEs have ‘crowded out’ growth in private
enterprise. 23 Further, the experience of rapid privatisation in Eastern Europe provided
good reasons not to undertake ‘big bang’ privatisation. At least six other factors
influence and/or constrain the GoV position on SOEs:
i.

Equitisation is a sensitive process impacting on multiple interests and involving
many actions including: “…state business interests, state bureaucrats, party
leaders and other state actors.” 24

ii.

Connected to the above, there remain substantial and explicit political
commitments to retaining state ownership of SOEs in strategic parts of the

diagnostic audits of SOEs and a $7.57 million trust fund for the trial restructuring of three General
Corporations.
21
World Bank, "Viet Nam PRSC III," p. 22.
22
Van Arkadie and Mallon, Viet Nam: A Transition Tiger?, pp. 112-113.
23
Ibid.
24
Painter, "Politics of Economic Restructuring in Vietnam," p. 22.
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production chain, as well as for key utilities, some military production and in a
range of other ‘sensitive’ areas of the economy.
iii.

SOEs are central to government revenue generation; it is difficult to replace
them with other sources given that it is difficult for developing countries to
effectively tax private businesses. 25

iv.

Equitisation is administratively and managerially complex and has stretched the
regulatory capacity of the government in Vietnam.

v.

The “…considerable labour retrenchment” involved is politically sensitive. 26

vi.

The government has made some progress on hardening the budget constraint
faced by SOEs (limiting subsidies and preferential access to cheap credit in
particular), thus they are not the drain on government resources they have been
in the past. 27

Combine these factors with the tendency for consensus decision-making in Vietnam and
the GoV approach to SOE reform can be better characterised as: “…successful
management and containment of the conflicting ambitions of” various domestic social
forces, with the aim of improving performance of SOEs and maintaining key state
interests. 28

As seen in the PRSCs, such social, political and economic considerations appear to have
had little impact on Bank enthusiasm for privatising the ownership of enterprises and
the pace of equitisation was a significant source of tension between the Bank and the
Government until at least 2004, when the Bank seemed to slightly relax its attitude —
long after the Bank had supposedly shifted away from simplistic Washington
Consensus programs. 29 The reasons for the Bank’s cooling on the topic are not clear —
it tends to tread carefully in Vietnam to avoid backfire, 30 or it may have felt that proreform voices had gathered enough support to push the reform agenda without the

25

Kolko, Vietnam: Anatomy of a Peace, p. 56. Painter noted that across the 1990s SOEs accounted for 23
per cent of total government revenue in Vietnam, excluding crude oil royalties, Painter, "Politics of
Economic Restructuring in Vietnam," p. 26.
26
World Bank, "Viet Nam PRSC III," p. 37. The World Bank estimated that from 2004-2006, 300,000 to
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27
However, this remains an ongoing concern for the Bank, see Klaus Rohland, "Recurring Themes,"
Vietnam Economic Times (2004), pp.12-13.
28
Painter, "Politics of Economic Restructuring in Vietnam," p. 23.
29
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30
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Bank’s explicit support. Further, World Trade Organization accession, according to one
Bank staffer, covered much of what would have been on the conditionality agenda. 31
Ultimately though, as Martin Painter argued, Vietnam has accepted the resources of
donors and even made public pronouncements on timetables for equitisation but these
co-exist “…with other policy pronouncements that speak of another trajectory
altogether — the entrenchment and strengthening of the state sector.” 32

In terms of the actual process of SOE reform, one of the biggest issues is valuation of
enterprises and land. Early on, to speed the process, the Bank pushed successfully to
have the required independent audit prior to equitisation dropped. A decade later, there
are still concerns that firms are not appropriately valuing assets, in particular land, but
given that the land market remains underdeveloped, this is almost inevitable. 33
Managers have utilised undervaluation in order to gain control over enterprises.34

Workers receive priority access in purchasing shares, so the lack of reliable information
also makes it more difficult for them to make judgements about the value of the
company. Given their limited knowledge of share owning in the first place (the process
ignores the issue of worker education), it is not surprising that one survey indicates that,
at best, 55 per cent of worker’s are taking up shares and only 24 per cent are retaining
them. 35 The point of this is that the Bank’s continuing pressure on the Government to
equitise SOEs quickly, despite its own judgement that “insider privatization” is taking
place, is indicative of its judgement regarding the relative importance of government
versus market failures. 36 Clearly NIE’s ‘lessons’ about market failure and pace and
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sequencing of reform and the experience of equitisation in Vietnam to date are
secondary to the Washington Consensus agenda on privatisation.

The Bank policy for redundant workers also sheds light on the PWC. As part of PRSC I,
the Bank negotiated additional support for redundant workers under a specially
established fund for SOEs. The fund provided more generous assistance than the Labor
Code in the form of lump-sum compensation plus a six-month vocational retraining
voucher. Its purpose was undoubtedly to defuse the growing discontent over
redundancies, which could have threatened the process of equitisation. It is adjustment
welfare and other than the voucher, a passive approach to labour market policy. 37 The
Bank’s review of this program claimed it was a success but an independent review
highlighted a number of problems emerging after redundancy particularly amongst
vulnerable groups. Around 75 per cent of workers made redundant are women:
…middle-aged women are having an extremely difficult time finding
employment. Most are poorly educated, low skilled workers and selfemployment is the only option for them. 59 per cent become small
vendors, wage labourers in household businesses, housemaids,
nannies, or pursue other forms of low paid work in the informal
sector… Since the majority work in the informal sector, the vast
majority (74 percent) do not have social welfare, such as annual leave,
maternity leave, social insurance, or health insurance… their family’s
living standards decline dramatically as a consequence. 38
This survey also found that there are problems in the administration of the fund; more
than half of the retrenched workers had only received half the compensation owed to
them a year after retrenchment. 39

Workers being re-trained confront significant problems with the poor quality of the
vocational training system and its lack of employment relevance— in 2002 only 10.7

investments would impact the pace of new job creation in the private sector, which the Bank counts on to
absorb redundant labour.
37
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per cent of the graduates of Ho Chi Minh City’s vocational institutes found jobs. 40
Vietnam also lacks a developed job matching system. There are a growing number of
private employment agencies. However, there is no government regulation of their
activities and there have been cases of worker’s being swindled. 41 These are both
sequencing of reform issues, which have received virtually no attention from the Bank.

The form and implementation of the redundancy package is indicative of the Bank’s
view of a limited role for the state in social issues. Contrast this to the Bank’s view of
the government’s role in private sector development in Vietnam — in justifying the
inclusion of the number of new private enterprises registered each month as a trigger, it
is argued that “[e]ssentially private sector development is the combined outcome of
policy actions in many areas, from financial sector reform to better governance and
public administration.” 42 This is the PWC with a weak conception of the role of the
state, limited to providing adjustment welfare not redistributive justice and to promoting
business.

Investment Lending in Vietnam

Energy and Mining, and Water, Sanitation and Flood Control
Energy and water and sanitation and flood protection are grouped together for the
analysis as there is a clearly discernible common model to the Bank’s activities,
underpinned by the goal of privatisation. The approach to privatisation is organised
around the dual Bank policies of decentralisation and ‘unbundling.’ Rudolf Nsorwine
Amenga-Etego and Sara Grusky succinctly outlined this model in their study of water
privatisation in Ghana, which I have used and adapted for understanding the
Vietnamese experience. 43 Before outlining this model, how privatisation came to be
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applied to utilities is briefly explored — as it was not an original part of the Washington
Consensus but was added in the early 1990s.

According to Xu Yi-chong, three broad sets of developments in the 1980s combined to
facilitate the application of structural adjustment to utilities by the World Bank. 44 First,
in the 1980s the globe was flush with money due to petrodollars. Financial deregulation
further unlocked large amounts of private capital. This capital needed to be invested in
revenue-generating activities. 45 Second, the change in the global political environment,
connected to the rise of neoliberalism, gradually served to reduce support for state
involvement in all sectors of the economy. Specifically, the Thatcher government’s
privatisation of utilities started the trend and facilitated expansion of private investment
in the sector. Yet, other than new privatisations, the utilities market in developed
countries was largely saturated whilst that in developing countries was constrained by
lack of investment.

Third, in the 1980s economists developed a theory of utilities that combined the “grand
story” of neoliberalism with a view of utilities that changed them into a commodity like
any other that can, and should, be traded in markets. In the economist’s view, utilities
operated in the same way across the globe thus the same model for restructuring their
ownership could be applied everywhere. 46 This narrative about utility privatisation was
generally well received by politicians and bureaucrats in developed and developing
countries as many already were committed to neoliberalism; the story also fitted the
new ‘common sense.’ Further, it offered a ‘solution’ for countries facing difficulty in
meeting the increased demand for utilities because of their severely constrained
resource position. Often the financial position of utilities themselves was poor,
privatisation offered a ‘solution’ here too. 47

For the Bretton Woods twins, privatisation of utilities offered a new project and a new
way of facilitating the shift of American private capital to developing countries. They
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certainly took up the project with gusto and privatisation of utilities quickly became a
hegemonic principle of the Washington Consensus. The Bank developed a model of
utilities privatisation with two core steps. The first step is the separation of profitable
urban components of utilities from unprofitable rural ones — this effectively removes
the capacity to cross-subsidise. The second step is the separation of the different
business components of the utility. In electricity, this means separating generation,
transmission and distribution; private operators are then introduced in each sector
starting with generation. In the water sector, the separation of business components
means unbundling the more profitable water supply sector from the less, or
unprofitable, sewerage sector. In its earliest days, the Bank saw this as a gradual process
with an emphasis on introducing private participation rather than privatisation.
However, no sooner was it adopted than more radical requirements for restructuring and
privatisation became standard. 48

The Bank’s model was expanded by the PWC claim that privatisation based on
decentralisation, by definition, improves community participation. Decentralisation also
has the benefit of reducing central government fiscal expenditures (by transferring
responsibility to regions or municipalities) — a key concern of the Washington
Consensus that remains central to the PWC. 49 Participation is, of course, a supposed key
differentiation of the PWC, although as we shall see in the utilities sector it is reduced
to little more than willingness to pay. Most importantly, however, decentralisation
facilitates unbundling of utilities and, "[b]luntly stated, the unbundling process is one
whereby the profitable and the unprofitable sectors of the production process of a good
or service are separated." 50

Amenga-Etego and Grusky identify five steps though which privatisation was organised
for water supply in Ghana. 51 I have modified their schema to understand the Bank’s
approach to water and electricity privatisation in Vietnam. The steps are:
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Grant funds are provided for international consultants to study and develop
plans for sector. Subsequent grants are provided to ‘assist’ with developing a
legislative framework, industry pricing, etc.

ii.

National utilities are dissolved into geographically-based entities with
responsibility generally devolved to provinces or communes.

iii.

Business components are separated. In electricity generation, transmission and
distribution are separated, in water it is water supply and sanitation.

iv.

Devolved urban utilities are corporatised; in rural areas corporatisation is
trialled.

v.

Private providers are introduced in generation and in water supply.

vi.

Sub-contracting of maintenance, etc to private providers is trialled in all
business components.

vii.

A national regulatory agency and agency/ies to support rural utilities are created.

The final step, which has not yet occurred in Vietnam, is to privatise urban
corporations. The specific approach of the Bank in each sector is outlined below.

The Energy and Mining Sector

Table 6.3 Word Bank Energy Sector Lending to Vietnam: 1993-1997 and 2000-2004
Project Name

Year
Approved

Approved
Amount
(USD millions)

Loans 1993-1997
Power Sector Development and Rehabilitation Project

1995

$165.0

Power Development Project

1996

$180.0

Rural Energy Project

2000

$150

System Efficiency Improvement, Equitization and
Renewables Project

2002

$225

Vietnam Guarantee Project

2004

$75.0

Rural Energy II

2004

$220.0

Loans 2000-2004

The World Bank’s principal goal, since its first loan in the energy and mining sector in
early 1995, has been a fully privatised electricity sector. It pursued this through six
loans and one guarantee in the sector, numerous linked technical assistance grants, trust
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fund operations and conditions in PRSCs. 52 There were two loans during 1993-1997 and
three plus the guarantee during 2000-2004. The Bank’s program in Vietnam is similar
to those pursued in other Asian countries — it started with studies to restructure the
industry followed quickly by the introduction of Independent Power Producers (IPPs) in
the generation side of the industry. 53 The preconditions for the introduction were set by
the 1995 Power Sector Rehabilitation and Expansion Project and associated technical
assistance grants. These funds ‘assisted’ the power sector’s move toward a more
commercial orientation and promoted unbundling of generation, transmission and
distribution functions. Conditions on the loan included the GoV reviewing with the
Bank and implementing the outcomes of studies (funded by the Word Bank and ADB)
on industry structure and legislative requirements, financial management and electricity
tariffs. 54

The introduction of an IPP (called Phu My 2-2) at the Phu My power generation
complex outside Ho Chi Minh City was a condition of the 1996 Power Sector
Development loan. The World Bank’s Staff Appraisal Report hailed this development
as a “…breakthrough in the introduction of private power in Viet Nam.” 55 The loan
included funding for the development of the technical, commercial and legal structure
of the IPP. The associated technical assistance grant aimed to create “…a legal and
regulatory framework for the power sector that would be conducive to private sector
participation.” 56

Moving to 2000-2004, the construction of Phu My 2-2 by foreign investors was assisted
by a USD $75 million guarantee from the World Bank; much of the other capital was
sourced from the ADB and the Japan Bank for International Cooperation. 57 The Bank
52
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guarantee was, in turn, guaranteed by the GoV. Further, the state owned electricity
company, EVN, signed contracts to purchase the power produced by Phu My 2-2 under
a 20 year Power Purchase Agreement. In this way, risk was transferred to the GoV and
EVN who must continue to purchase power at a set price even if technological or other
breakthroughs result in a significant decline in the costs of generation. The project
contracts are all denominated in US dollars meaning that the GoV and EVN assume
most of the exchange rate risk as well. 58 In other words, private investors assumed
minimal risk for the project and were not exposed to competition after the contract was
signed. This leaves one asking why have private companies in the first place.

Phu My 2-2 was constructed by the Meco Energy Company Ltd — a consortium of EdF
International, Sumitomo Corporation and Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO). 59
A quick search on the internet revealed the following information about these
companies: EdF International is a wholly owned subsidiary of Electricite de France, a
French public enterprise. It is the largest nuclear power station operator in France and
has been watched by Greenpeace in relation to concerns regarding its storage of nuclear
waste. EdF has been heavily subsidised by the French government for years, but
according to The Economist, has nevertheless rarely been profitable. Further, they
consider it has “questionable accounting practices” and has made “…imprudent use of
funds set aside for nuclear decommissioning and waste-management.” 60 Sumitomo is
part of the Japanese Sumitomo keiretsu, in 1998 it offered a settlement of USD $150
million to the USA Commodity Futures Trading Commission because of the
Commission’s concerns about its manipulation of copper trading in 1995/96. 61 TEPCO,
another Japanese firm, was shown in October 2002 to have falsified inspection data on
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leak rate during containment tests in its nuclear power station to the Japanese regulatory
agency. It was also shown to have concealed damage in three of its power plants.

The Phu My 2-2 Guarantee is a powerful statement of the Bank’s position on the
relative importance of state and market failures. Further, given that the project was
approved two years before the new National Electricity Law was passed by the National
Assembly, it is also indicative of the lack of concern with the pace and sequencing of
reform when it conflicts with the ongoing privatisation agenda.

Two of the Bank’s three loans during 2000-2004 were in rural electrification (RE).
These aimed to expand access to power in rural areas via grid extensions and alternative
energy sources. The expanded access of rural households to energy could have a
significant impact on living standards. There are however, a couple of catches in the
projects that show the more coercive side of Bank hegemony. Connection to the
national grid — the largest part of the program — was only provided to communes that
demonstrate adequate rates of return from the connection.62 So, poverty reduction in the
project was clearly second place to economic efficiency. The distribution model in the
projects promoted Washington Consensus hegemonic principles. 63 In rural areas, EVN
has not been historically responsible for electricity distribution, it has been undertaken
by a variety of commune and district level enterprises. The RE projects formalised this
system of well over a thousand communal and provincial electricity distributors and
provided them with funds to address technical and managerial deficiencies. One
condition of the RE projects (also a condition of the System Efficiency project) was the
commercialisation and subsequent equitisation of distributors (and the equitisation of
EVN assets as well). 64 These projects show the Bank promoting a fairly radical and fast
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approach to equitisation for rural utilities, suggesting a continued prioritising of
Washington Consensus themes over those of the PWC.

The RE appraisal documents contained little analysis of the technical and financial
viability of small operations across different parts of the country. Indeed, there was little
mention in Bank documentation of problems with either the privatisation process
generally or specifically of electrical utilities across the globe, from California and the
UK to India and Brazil. 65

A theme that runs across all of the loans in both periods was electricity tariffs. The
Bank consistently pursued the GoV to raise tariffs. The Government actually slowed the
pace of increase in 2001 after concerns about the pace of economic growth following
September 11 (and with the Asian Financial Crisis and some civil disturbances still a
recent memory). The Bank responded by changing its performance rating on two loans
from satisfactory to unsatisfactory. This was only lifted after the Bank and GoV agreed
to a Tariff Implementation Plan in May 2002. 66 The number of conditions in relation to
tariffs increased from two in each of the two loans in 1993-1997 to five, four and two in
the three loans in 2000-2004. This suggests that the concern with ‘getting the prices
right’ that was so central to the Washington Consensus continues and that it is not
tempered by analysis of, or concern for, the social and economic impacts of price
adjustments. It demonstrates that the PWC is a modification of the Washington
Consensus and does not challenge its hegemonic principles.

The loans in 2000-04 included additional conditions in the area of resettlement. This
indicates the Bank’s knowledge of, and sensitivity to, policy and implementation
differences with GoV on the issue. Resettled people, particularly those with no ‘legal’
claim on the land they were occupying are often left worse off under GoV resettlement
procedures. Further, cultural and socio-economic sensitivities have not always been
taken into account. For example, people whose livelihood involves street enterprise
have been resettled into high-rise flats where they cannot conduct business and take care
of household responsibilities simultaneously. Although the new housing may have been
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of better quality, many people have left re-developed areas — mostly inner city areas —
and moved further out to resume their occupations. The Bank worked with the GoV on
this issue and in 2004, the GoV revised their policy.

There were two notable new concerns in the loans in the second period of study, namely
decentralisation and participation. Decentralisation was a key policy prescription in all
three loans in the second period. It is a policy that, on the surface, responds to critics of
the one-size-fits-all view of Bank programs and also is assumed to provide more local
participation in decision-making. 67 However, as in Vedi Hadiz’s analysis of
decentralisation in Indonesia, the decentralised structures are not the product of political
or social forces on the ground rather they an issue for supposedly apolitical technicians
who will determine how to efficiently manage and administer electricity enterprises. So,
in Vietnam there was no social analysis of local political and power conditions to
determine where and how grid extension should take place, rather decisions were based
on the estimated economic rate of return.

Participation made a welcome appearance in the three loans in 2000-2004, although its
purposes were limited. In RE projects, communities were consulted to “determine the
need for electrification” in other words to assist in the assessment of the economic rates
of return and to confirm that 60 per cent of the local population were willing to pay for
the service. This supports Paul Cammack’s argument that the Bank’s vision of civil
society participation has been a deliberate strategy “…to induce people to experience
tightly controlled and carefully delimited forms of market-supporting activity as
empowerment.” 68

What was visible in the power sector was the Bank pushing a radical model of
privatisation in both case study periods. The GoV seem to have adopted a more gradual
approach to reform and accepted and adapted those components of utility privatisation
that suited its approach. 69 Thus we saw a gradual introduction of IPPs in generation, a
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slow approach to legislative reform and utilisation of Bank funds to develop the already
decentralised distribution arrangements in rural areas.
Water, Sanitation and Flood Control

Table 6.4 Word Bank Water, Sanitation and Flood Control Sector Lending to Vietnam:
1993-1997 and 2000-2004
Project Name

Year
Approved

Approved
Amount
(USD
millions)

%
International
Competitive
Bidding

Loans 1993-1997
Water Supply Project

1997

$98.61

93.8%

HCMC Environmental Sanitation Project

2001

$166.34

90.8%

Urban Upgrading Project

2004

$222.47

53%

Urban Water Supply Development Project

2004

$112.6

48.55%

Loans 2000-2004

The first loan in the sector was the Water Supply Project for four cities approved in
1997. The project was a response to a 1991 request from the GoV to undertake a water
supply and sanitation project. The Bank’s Staff Appraisal Report argued that it was
separated into two projects, a water supply project to be followed by a sanitation
project, because “…the great number of involved institutions with various financial
objectives would make the project very complex.” 70 However, as outlined earlier,
separation of water supply from sanitation is a strategy the Bank has employed in
numerous countries as a key step in achieving privatisation of the more profitable water
supply business.

Much of the process of unbundling of the sector was already carried out under the
impetus of GoV’s decentralisation program and with assistance from an ADB technical
assistance project. 71 Water Supply Companies (WSCs) were formed under the
responsibility of Provincial People’s Committees. Sewerage is controlled by the
municipal level by Sewerage and Drainage Companies or by Urban Environment
Companies. The Water Supply Project included training and capacity building measures
70
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to make the WSCs “…commercial companies in a market economy” that are
“…attractive for private sector participation.” 72 The largest component of the project
was design and construction and it was here that private sector involvement was firmly
established via the Bank’s requirement for ICB for materials and construction, which in
this project accounted for a high 93.8 per cent of the Bank loan.

Poverty got very little attention in the Water Supply Project, indeed the Bank cited its
global experience as a justification for ignoring it:
[t]he principal lesson is that sector projects should not be used as
vehicles to pursue subsidiary objectives at the expense of the main
objective. Thus tariffs should not be distorted to satisfy poverty
alleviation objectives… 73
This is the kind of argument the Bank made regarding water projects from its first
forays into the sector in the mid-1960s and its residual suspicion of such ‘social’
projects meant that cost recovery or revenue raising was promoted in the sector from the
outset. 74 The project contrasts starkly to the three projects in the second case study
period that all focus heavily on poverty reduction as an objective. However, these
projects maintained the push for privatisation. In the Ho Chi Minh City (HCMC)
Environmental Sanitation Project, amidst technical discussion of wastewater and
drainage components was a plan to divide the maintenance units of the Urban Drainage
Company (UDC) into five self-financing business centres which, by 2002 must have
entered into management contracts with UDC. By 2004, three of the five maintenance
units must have been fully separated from the UDC, with two remaining inside UDC as
a baseline and to provide flexibility in case of emergencies. Operation and maintenance
for new wastewater facilities built under the project must be fully contracted out. 75 Over
ninety per cent of the value of the Bank’s loan was for works contracted via ICB. Of the
remaining $15.3 million, $14.3 million was for consultants.
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The Urban Upgrading Project (2004) stepped out of the mould, it had a poverty focus
and participatory components, though participation still reduced to communities,
“…willingness and ability-to-pay”. 76 All of the activities carried out had to be
contracted out, however, only 52 per cent of the value was subject to ICB procedures.
Forty-five per cent were reserved for NCB and the remainder was consultancy service.

The Urban Water Supply Development Project (2004) returned to the traditional Bank
mould of projects expanding private participation, however, it focused on district
centres. 77 The Bank loan funded components one and two of the project, respectively
entitled the “Competition Route” and “Performance Route.” Under the Competition
Route, contractors were used to design and build water supply facilities in un-serviced
district towns. A separate round of bidding was then planned for contracts to operate the
facilities. Component two, the Competition Route provided funds to existing WSC that
were performing well, defined as meeting criteria on staffing, unaccounted for water
and financial ratios. The funds could be used to subcontract work on construction or
rehabilitation of systems. The only concession to the projects being outside major urban
centres was that slightly over 50 per cent of funds were reserved for NCB. 78

The water tariff was a theme and condition in all of the loans, with the Bank focused on
increasing tariffs to levels that fully cover costs. The Bank’s attitude to tariffs was clear
in this statement on key challenges for the sector, which were:
…reorientation of the enterprise management to providing water and
sanitation services as a business rather than exclusively as a social
obligation, to the gradual replacement of subsidies by user charges,
and to the increased ability of enterprises to make rational business
decisions without unnecessary political control. 79
Tariffs are not a simple issue in water supply. Those not connected to water supply
systems (normally the poor) sometimes pay substantially more absolutely and relatively
for their water than those who are currently connected, who are more likely to be
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wealthy. 80 Thus higher tariffs for piped water can be justified if they fund expansion of
networks. However, high tariffs often result in the poor switching to cheaper water
sources (e.g. groundwater) and increases can cause political disturbances. Moreover,
historical experience is that “…network extension in the water sector has only ever been
achieved through cross-subsidisation implemented through central government.” 81
Water is a very ‘political’ issue because it has implication for poverty, health and the
environment and it is clear that private sector involvement has not, and cannot by itself,
guarantee provision of safe water to the poor. 82 The Bank’s view of water tariffs as
being simply a business decision reflects a weak analysis of actors and interests in
society and a weak version of the PWC.

Transportation
Table 6.5 Word Bank Transportation Sector Lending to Vietnam, 1993-1997 and
2000-2004
Project Name

Year
Approved

Approved
Amount
(USD
millions)

%
International
Competitive
Bidding

Loans 1993-1997
Highway Rehabilitation Project 1

1993

$158.5

N/A*

Rural Transport Project 1

1996

$ 55.0

1%

2 Highway Rehabilitation Project

1997

$195.0

73.9 %

Inland Waterways and Ports

1997

$ 73.0

67.1%

Mekong Transport and Flood Protection Project

2000

$110.00

89.5%

Community Based Rural Infrastructure Project

2001

$102.78

0.7%

nd

Loans 2000-2004

Road Network Improvement Project
2003
$225.26
53.6%
* ICB procurement was used in the project but no figures are included in the available reports on the
project. Presumably levels were similar to 2nd Highway Rehabilitation Project.

Transportation has been one of the largest areas of Bank lending in Vietnam. There
were seven loans, mostly large, over the two case study periods (see table 6.5),
supported by an extensive program of analytical and advisory services. Despite being
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Arthur C. McIntosh, Asian Water Supplies: Reaching the Urban Poor (London: Asian Development
Bank and International Water Association, 2003), pp. 1-2.
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82
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one of the least contentious areas of Bank activity, four issues stood out for attention,
these were: procurement; road standards; involuntary resettlement; and the socioeconomic impact of transport projects and their poverty implications. And indeed, these
issues address the core issue for this thesis — the nature and extent of the Bank’s shift
from the Washington to post-Washington Consensus.

Standard Bank procedures relating to procurement apply to transport loans, thus the
Ministry of Transport cannot carry out work, rather it must be contracted out. The only
area of flexibility relates to whether procurement is open internationally or restricted to
national bidding or shopping. Table 6.5 indicates the percentage of each project that
was subject to ICB. Rural projects, in both periods, show a higher component of nonICB. This may indicate more flexibility from the Bank. 83 However, pragmatically
examined, it is unlikely that international capital would (currently) be interested in
small operations in rural Vietnam. Therefore, from the Bank’s perspective, local capital
and competition is required. Thus, the Bank sought to assist in the establishment of
local private contractors and the project set aside funds for training firms in “…bid
preparation, cost accounting, and contract management.” 84

Given the experience of the Rural Transport Project where ‘too many’ SOEs were
winning contracts, in December 2000 SOEs connected to the Ministry of Transport and
relevant provincial governments were banned from bidding for work. 85 The Bank
explained this decision on the basis of removing potential conflicts of interests.
However, it also effectively excluded many firms with relevant skills and experience
from competing for work. The Bank’s Implementation Completion Report on the 2nd
Highway Rehabilitation Project explicitly connected its program to promoting
equitisation:
…there remain a large number of SOEs to which reform has not been
applied… The equitisation process could have continued through this
project with a programmatic approach that would have created the
83

Note that the Community Based Rural Infrastructure Project’s major classification was transportation
because the bulk of expected sub-projects are in this sector.
84
World Bank, "Staff Appraisal Report: The Socialist Republic of Vietnam Rural Transport Project"
(Report No. 15537-VN, September 24 1996), p. 15.
85
World Bank, "Project Performance Assessment Report Vietnam Highway Rehabilitation Project 1
(Credit 2549-VN), Rural Transport Project 1 (Credit 2929-VN)" (Report No. 28168, March 9 2004),
p. 16.
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right incentives for [Ministry of Transport’s] MOT’s innovation,
supporting successful case models for future application, focusing on
equitisation of profitable enterprises and extending the reform to large
SOEs. 86
The important point is the way the Bank explicitly connected reform of procurement,
equitisation of SOEs and deregulation of the construction industry. 87 In rejecting a
mixed economy model, the Bank aims to systematically transform Vietnam to a neoliberal, mediated yet individual and market-driven form of capitalism.

The Inland Waterways and Port Rehabilitation Project (1997) aimed to establish a
framework for the privatisation of “commercially-viable transport services” in the
Mekong. The Mekong Transport and Flood Protection Project (2000) in the second case
study period continued this goal. According to the Bank, the Vietnam Roads Authority
must:
…gradually disengage from force account operations, and focus on
performance-based long-term contract management and quality
control. The road construction industry will have to develop
correspondingly,

by

first

divesting

state-owned

construction

enterprises… The Government has launched a program to equitize
SOEs with selective targeting and a time frame but so far construction
SOEs have not been given a high priority. 88
The Road Network Improvement Project moved the focus from private participation in
road construction to private participation in road maintenance. Its goal of creating a
“large number” of road maintenance enterprises across Vietnam again required

86

World Bank, "Implementation Completion Report on a Credit to the Socialist Republic of Vietnam for
a Second Highway Rehabilitation Project" (Report No. 29375-VN, June 30 2004), p. 18. Component C of
the project to improve hazardous road sections was cancelled by the Bank as GoV wanted to undertake
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and efficiency gains.
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p. 4, emphasis added.
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encouragement for local capital. Therefore, the level of ICB bidding for the project was
only 53.6 per cent of the value of the Bank’s credit. 89

Road standards have been an issue of some contention in all Bank-funded projects, in
relation to the Highway Rehabilitation Project 1 the problem lay in rehabilitation versus
expansion. Some sections of highway that were rehabilitated by the Bank needed,
shortly after completion, to be expanded and or bypasses needed construction, due to
traffic growth. According to the Bank’s Project Performance Assessment Report, both
the Bank and GoV ignored lessons from other countries in post-conflict or transition
stages that road transport is often an area of pent-up demand. 90

Standards on rural roads have been even more controversial — on the basis of a costbenefit approach, the Bank limited upgrades on many rural roads to spot upgrading and
gravel surfacing. In many cases, however both the community and the relevant local
authority pushed for bituminisation. Key reasons for this were that, as in the case of
highways, upgrading often leads to increased traffic volumes, which increase the impact
of externalities on the many communities living along the roads. The Bank’s Project
Performance Assessment Report recommended that such externalities be taken into
account in analysis. 91 This report, released in 2004, appears not to have impacted on the
Bank’s approach — at an interview in 2005, a Bank officer noted:
I know we’ve been having a big debate internally and with the
government about gravel paving versus rural roads. I think the modus
operandi seems to be we finance a gravel road and then they pave it
later on…” 92
When I asked the officer about the implications of the Bank’s position in terms of
government and local ownership, the response was to cite the issue of costs — the GoV
cannot fund all the infrastructure projects they wish and the Bank needs to work with
them to establish priorities.

89

World Bank, "Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Credit to the Socialist Republic of Vietnam
for a Road Network Improvement Project" (Report No. 27368-VN, November 24 2003), p. 10. Bank
procurement is outlined in pp. 54-60.
90
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There was a problem with lack of compliance by the GoV to the Bank’s involuntary
resettlement guidelines in transport projects. As outlined above, the Bank worked with
the GoV to address this issue and progress is being made. However, it remains a
concern particularly in decentralised transport projects with possibly hundreds of local
authorities responsible for resettlement.

Finally, there is the issue of the connection between transport investment and socioeconomic development generally and, more specifically poverty reduction. World Bank
and other donor activity in transport was predicated on a connection between increased
investment and a range of socio-economic benefits, for example, improved access to
markets, health and education facilities and off-farm income generation possibilities. 93
This analysis resulted in a generally implicit correlation being posited between transport
(and roads in particular) and poverty reduction. Rural Transport I makes the link
explicit in referring to data from a national survey that purportedly “…shows that
people who live near an all-weather road have higher living standards than those who
do not.” 94 There is, however, little analytical work to explain the correlation.

Philip Taylor’s work on the Khmer Krom ethnic minority in the Mekong delta did not
question this correlation per se, rather the reasons for it. His study indicated that road
transport projects have driven the Khmer Krom away from better-located land and that
the primary effects of road infrastructure have been “…to open new opportunities for
those who are already advantageously placed.” 95 The Khmer Krom are primarily rice
farmers who, after initial gains in living standards in the late 1980s and early 1990s,
suffered under the decreasing price of rice. Further, the price of many of their key crop
inputs has increased, as have the costs of health and education often resulting in high
levels of debt. Taylor found that when Khmer Krom landowners were offered
93

The summary of donor activity in Vietnam highlighted that transport, in particular roads, has been a
major area of activity for the big three providers of ODA: Japan, the World Bank and the ADB. Australia
and other bilateral providers of ODA have also funded roads and bridges. Taylor noted that donors
possess “…resounding unanimity as to the beneficial impacts of roads” and this has resulted in “…swift
and spectacular” action. Philip Taylor, "Redressing Disadvantage or Re-Arranging Inequality?
Development Interventions and Local Responses in the Mekong Delta," in Philip Taylor (ed.), Social
Inequality in Vietnam and the Challenges to Reform (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies,
2004), p. 242.
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seemingly good prices for their land (from those with knowledge of forthcoming
projects), they often accepted and either relocated to more remote areas where land was
cheaper or they became (landless) agricultural labourers. 96 The implication is that
people who already have high living standards are able to advance their position by
purchasing land near roads to be upgraded and this can result in impoverishment of
people from lower socio-economic strata.

The Bank appeared to recognise this problems in the Community Based Rural
Infrastructure Project, stating in the lessons learned section that it is necessary to
transparently target the poor “and minimize opportunities for influential people to favor
the non-poor or preferred location.” 97 The project implementation model was more
participatory than earlier project; it involved community capacity building prior to
projects. This change is strong evidence of a PWC model of development. However, a
note of caution is required— the necessity for scale in Bank projects meant the project
did not include a differential analysis of it impacts on minority and other disadvantaged
groups. Further, as outlined in more detail in the section below on loans in agriculture,
fishing and forestry, the Bank has not been overly successful in implementing
participatory projects.

The changes visible in the Community Based Rural Infrastructure project are not
applicable to the two other loans in the second case study period. Overall then, it can be
concluded that the PWC had a minor impact only on rural transportation projects.

Finance and Law, Justice and Public Administration
Table 6.6 Word Bank Finance and Law, Justice and Public Administration Sector
Lending to Vietnam: 1993-1997 and 2000-2004
Project Name

Year
Approved

Approved
Amount

%
Microfinance

(USD
millions)

Loans 1993-1997

96

Ibid, p. 261. It is notable that the Mekong has amongst the fastest growing rates of landlessness in
Vietnam, Taylor, "Redressing Disadvantage or Re-Arranging Inequality?," p. 241.
97
World Bank, "Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Credit to the Socialist Republic of Vietnam
for a Community Based Rural Infrastructure Project" (Report No. 21215-VN, June 4 2001), p. 13.

WORLD BANK LENDING IN VIETNAM

177

Agricultural Rehabilitation Project

1994

$96.0

51

Payment System and Banking System
Modernization Project

1995

$45.65

-

Rural Finance Project I

1995

$122.0

100

Second Rural Finance Project

2002

$200.0

100

Public Financial Management Reform Project

2003

$54.3

0

Loans 2000-2004

Forest Sector Development Project*
2004
$39.5
* Project sector as classified by Bank is agriculture, fishing and forestry. ** See note 99.

51**

Four of the five credits in the law, justice and public administration sector were
structural adjustment loans analysed above. Thus the remaining credit in this sector, the
Public Financial Management Reform Project, is included with finance sector activities.
The Bank classified the Agricultural Rehabilitation Project as a finance project because
51 per cent of the loan value was for a form of microfinance — supervised credits to
private smallholder farm households across ten provinces to provide access to farm
inputs. 98 The non-microfinance aspects of the credit are analysed with agriculture,
fishing and forestry loans. The Forest Sector Development Project, which is classified
by the Bank as 100 per cent agriculture, fishing and forestry, includes a similar
microfinance component for smallholder plantation forests valued at 51 per cent of total
project funds (and a greater portion of World Bank loan funds). 99 Thus the microfinance
component is covered in this section.

These two loans (one in each case study period) with specific agricultural credit
components are somewhat surprising as agricultural credit became unfashionable in the
Bank in the 1980s due to a combination of poor performance and a shift in paradigm
regarding rural credit. 100 The new paradigm, outlined in more detail below, is to
mainstream microfinance services and operate them on commercial lines. This was the

98
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model for both Rural Finance Projects with an addition of targeted funds for the rural
poor (accounting for 9.8 and 14 per cent respectively of the first and second Rural
Finance Projects). 101 The new paradigm was also the reason for the switch from using a
single institution for microfinance (sub-project) loans (the Vietnam Bank for
Agriculture and Rural Development), to using one wholesale bank and multiple,
competing banks and organisations for sub-project loans. Overall, microfinance was the
dominant theme in finance sector loans, comprising three of the four activities and
accounting for 89 per cent of loan funds in the sector.102

Microfinance has been part of the World Bank ‘toolkit’ since the 1980s when a socalled ‘revolution’ took place, shifting “…from the old paradigm of subsidised credit
delivery to the new paradigm of sustainable commercial microfinance.” 103 From this
shift, we can see that microfinance is sympathetic to the Washington Consensus
supporting, in particular, its faith in individualism, entrepreneurship and banking
liberalisation, especially in relation to control over interest rates. By the early 1990s, the
Bank was publicly supporting microfinance as an approach to poverty reduction104 — an
approach that eschews the need for social safety nets as “…a welfare-biased approach to
poverty alleviation that disenfranchises the poor and establishes new dependency
relations.” 105 The Bank’s theory is that empowering the poor requires the appropriate
“enabling environment” thus giving them the opportunity to be entrepreneurial. As
Heloise Weber pointed out, the enabling environment in policy terms becomes in
essence an issue of access to credit, which in a neoliberal context has the effect of
placing financial sector liberalisation as a central issue in poverty reduction. 106 Thus, she
concluded that microfinance is more than merely sympathetic to the Washington
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Consensus, as a poverty reduction strategy its goal is: “…to both advance and legitimize
neoliberal restructuring.” 107

Moreover, the administration of microfinance projects is often presented in ways that
imply a need for financial sector liberalisation. 108 This later implication is evident in
statements

from

the

Bank-sponsored

group

responsible

for

mainstreaming

microfinance, the Consultative Group to Assist the Poorest (CGAP), who state that
necessary financial sector reforms to support microfinance include:
…removal of ceilings on interest rates, removal of competing
subsidized credit schemes, less restrictive banking laws to encourage
new entrants, and prudential regulation and supervision to
accommodate non-bank financial institutions, particularly those
involved in savings mobilization and uncollateralized credit to
individuals through solidarity groups. 109

The strategy of promoting multiple, competing banks for loans was a part of the Bank’s
overall project of reforming finance in Vietnam — the Second Rural Finance Project
justified IDA involvement in the loan because it facilitated restructuring of state-owned
commercial banks, improved banking competition and created “…a framework within
which there can be substantial private development within the financial sector.” 110
Further, the project was supposed to “strongly complement” banking sector reforms
supported under the PRSCs, which aimed to create a private, liberalised finance sector.
Subsumed under the conditions on the contents of a policy manual for both the first and
second rural finance loans, was a requirement for commercially sustainable interest
rates acceptable to IDA. 111 Indeed, there was a high level of conditionality on both the
Rural Finance Projects — 29 conditions on the first loan and 45 on the second. These
are the second and third highest numbers of conditions in the two case study periods in
Vietnam; the average number of conditions was 20.9 and the median was 19. 112
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Weber argued that microfinance should be seen as a key policy response to crises that
follow from structural adjustment programs —it is “…a neo-liberal safety net for
neoliberal political restructuring.” 113 In Vietnam, microfinance loans were among the
first organised by the World Bank. This was at a time when, following a period of
restructuring broadly along neoliberal lines, the rate of reduction in poverty had
declined and the social welfare system, which had been neglected since the mid-1980s,
was in a state of disrepair. Even in education and health, where Vietnam had achieved
above average outcomes, user-fees and neglect resulted in declining performance. This
produced increasing levels of unrest, especially in the countryside. Given the Bank’s
commitment to neoliberalism, microfinance loans in Vietnam should be seen, as
Weber’s analysis suggests, as part of the neoliberal policy response to problems arising
from economic adjustment.

The model of microfinance used in the Bank loans also sheds light on the PWC. It was
what is called a minimalist approach to microfinance and involved credit provision only
for those accessing ‘sub-projects.’ 114 That is to say, there was no training or skills
development involved for the poor. There were, however, significant programs of
institutional strengthening for the wholesale bank and the participating financial
institutions. There was a substantial administrative burden on participating financial
institutions and little flexibility for them to modify operations to suit local conditions
and needs. The paradox of this approach was that microfinance operations were initially
established precisely because traditional banks and financial institutions were not
flexible enough to serve the poor. The Bank’s model required participating financial
institutions to follow the management and institutional arrangements of mainstream
financial organisations. 115
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There can be little doubt that what has kindly been called the “mission drift” towards
commercial operation will significantly impact on microfinance operations. 116 This
appears to be the case in Vietnam — a review of rural lending in Vietnam by Pham Bao
Duong and Yoichi Izumida found that the Vietnam Bank for Agriculture and Rural
Development (VBARD), which accounts for 84 per cent of formal lending for rural
households, lends primarily to the non-poor. 117 VBARD lending is primarily determined
by a household’s reputation in the village (a measure of both economic position and
prestige), a low number of dependents and by the amount of credit applied for. In other
words, VBARD follows traditional commercial banking practices that make it difficult
for the poor to access formal credit. 118 Further, differential in access to credit is,
according to A. Haroon Akram-Lodi, contributing to a stratification of peasant
landholdings in rural Vietnam, which in turn is contributing to the creation of landless
wage labourers. 119 The percentage of landless rural households jumped from 8.2 in
1993, to 9.2 in 1998 and 18.9 in 2002. 120 It may well be that World Bank microfinance
(and other) activities are contributing to the development of a landless proletariat in
Vietnam.

There was little information in the loan documents on the way the microfinance
activities were operated, however a couple of references suggest a relatively standard
microfinance model. This involves the formation of small savings groups of
approximately five people; after a few weeks of demonstrating their savings capacity a
limited number, generally two, members of the group are eligible for loans. If these
loans are re-paid in line with the rules, other members of the group become eligible for
loans. The key feature is the collective or group responsibility for loan repayment; this
collective responsibility also serves as ‘collateral’ for the loan. 121 Jude Fernando, in a
review of microfinance in Bangladesh, found that, the group system results in range of
pressure tactics to ensure repayment including control and regulation of household
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consumption. Difficulties meeting repayments can increase the conflict within a
household too. 122

Other research has shown that microfinance loans are often not used for the purpose for
which they were made, instead they are used for consumption (e.g. medical costs,
school books, etc). As Weber pointed out, donors responded to this finding by changing
the objectives of microfinance to include consumption ‘smoothing.’ 123 Where loans are
used for income generation activities, the requirement for immediate weekly repayment
means income generation activities need to provide returns from day one. Often new
loans are taken to repay existing ones, which can result in debt dependency. 124

The Second Rural Finance Project referred to results from a socio-economic study of
the first project reporting that there was a high repayment rate of loans (98 per cent) and
that the bulk of funds went to projects in cultivation and animal husbandry (74 per cent
of loans). 125 There was no detail on the impact on poverty, despite the project being
classified as a Poverty Targeted Initiative. On gender issues, the assessment was limited
to noting that only 30 per cent of borrowers were women. 126 The study does not indicate
the level of access of ethnic minorities (who suffer the highest levels of poverty in the
country) to the program, but it claimed that there was no negative impact on them. 127

The Second Rural Finance Project posited that: “[f]inancing viable initiatives of the
rural poor and providing them with better access to financial services would increase
their chances of getting out of the poverty trap.” 128 Despite the growing literature on
microfinance, there is little solid and uncontested evidence to support this argument.
The Bank’s claim is an example of the belief that microfinance has “intrinsic value” and
122
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the “general expectation” that it will assist the poor. 129 More to the point, though, the
argument re-frames social vulnerability as economic potential and thus can be seen as
“…a form of social disciplining aimed at commanding compliance” with Washington
Consensus restructuring. 130 The Bank’s continuing reliance on microfinance in the
PWC, demonstrates the PWC’s neoliberal core. Further, this individualistic, self-help
approach to economic growth is increasingly being marketed to the poor themselves and
to the developed world as the appropriate way of achieving development. 131

The final two loans examined here are the Payment System and Banking System
Modernization Project from 1995 and the 2003 Public Financial Management Reform
Project. The Payment System Project aimed to establish a national inter-bank payment
settlement system, a commercial intra-bank payment system and provide institutional
strengthening for commercial banks. It was designed to undertake precursor actions for
the commercialisation and equitisation of the domestic financial sector and as a “…step
toward the gateway for global markets.” 132

The Public Financial Management Reform Project provided hardware, software and
training for a management information system for Treasury. It also piloted the use of
Medium Term Fiscal Frameworks and Medium Term Expenditure Frameworks
(MTEFs). Because these were to be linked to achieving the goals of the CPRGS, the
Bank claimed that “…the poor should benefit disproportionately” from the project. 133
This may be the case but accounting and planning methods were the reason that
Vietnam has not been able come to terms with the IMF since 2001. As Porter and Craig
pointed out such standards, and MTEFs in particular, are an effective way to deepen
PWC fiscal discipline and global transparency. They found that:
MTEFs provide one, comprehensive device through which global
agreements, national inter-sectoral budgeting and highly localized
investments are bound together in ways that were never possible
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through the instruments of national development planning [and] of
national accounting that were popular in newly independent nations.
In practice, MTEFs now sit in a larger basket of World Bank/IMF risk
management procedures as part of wide-ranging fiduciary and due
diligence assessments of a country’s public financial accountability
arrangements. 134
This may be a project sold in poverty terms but it was nevertheless fully consistent with
the Washington Consensus.

In addressing the central question of whether and how the PWC differs from the
Washington Consensus, this section demonstrated that finance and public
administration sectors remain dominated by Washington Consensus thinking.

Agriculture, Fishing and Forestry
Two things are surprising about loans in the agriculture, fishing and forestry sector, first
the lack of change in the language and content of projects over the two case study
periods and second, the number of projects that can best be described as area
development or integrated area rural development projects. These developed during the
McNamara presidency as poverty lending but became unfashionable in the Bank in the
early 1980s. However, the focus on specific geographical areas high in poverty fulfilled
the Bank ’s need for specific projects and its need to be seen doing something about
Table 6.7 Word Bank Agriculture, Fishing and Forestry Sector Lending to Vietnam:
1993-1997 and 2000-2004
Project Name

Year
Approved

Approved
Amount
(USD millions)

Loans 1993-1997
Agricultural Rehabilitation Project*

1994

$96.0

Irrigation Rehabilitation Project

1995

$100

Forest Protection and Rural Development Project

1997

$21.5

Northern Mountains Poverty Reduction Project

2001

$110

Water Resources Assistance Project

2004

$157.8

Loans 2000-2004
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Forest Sector Development Project

2004

185

$39.5

Avian Influenza Emergency Recovery Project
2004
$5.0
* World Bank sector classification is finance 51 per cent, non-finance components included in this
section.

rural poverty. 135 In terms of language and content, participation of local communities
was incorporated by 1997 — in the Forest Protection and Rural Development Project —
and maintained a strong presence thereafter. Decentralisation was discussed more
explicitly in the second case study period loans, not enough though to suggest
significant change. This may be because given their nature, all projects adopted
decentralised management and implementation systems (with the exception of the avian
influenza loan).

In the Northern Mountains Poverty Reduction project, the Bank claimed that its key
‘value-added’ to the project was its direct support for “…true and full participation
during design, implementation, operation and maintenance, and monitoring and
evaluation.” 136 However, a brief analysis of the project design reveals that most project
implementation responsibility lay with districts rather than communes and that
participation essentially involved representation from existing GoV structures and
connected organisations (e.g. Women’s Union, Youth Union, Farmers’ Association).
Participation in this form is likely to reinforce existing power relations. This design
indicates why the Bank’s own Operations Evaluation Department concluded that in
general “…the language of NGO/CBO involvement in Bank-supported projects
outstripped the reality.” 137

Both forest sector loans claimed to be focused on biodiversity protection, however, they
can be better understood as rural area development projects — in the Forest Protection
and Rural Development Project (1997) $10.46m of the $21.5m loan was directed to
rural infrastructure projects in the two project areas, a further $1.77m was for
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agriculture support services and $1.62m was for land allocation. 138 In the Forest Sector
Development Project (2004) $38.02m of the $39.5m loan was for development of
smallholder plantation forests in four sites (this includes the microfinance component
discussed previously). 139

The Northern Mountains Poverty Project was also an area development project — it
targeted 368 poor and remote communes across six provinces and funded a range of
community-selected rural infrastructure projects and some associated ‘software.’ 140
Informal feedback indicated that this and other community development projects in
Vietnam did not performing particularly well. The Project Appraisal Document
acknowledged some of the problems that the Bank has encountered with both
community development and area development projects in the past, noting they have
“…not been entirely successful in terms of impact or sustainability.” 141 Specifically it
highlighted project complexity as a problem and acknowledged this project has “above
average complexity” and will place significant demands on local institutional capacity.
This concern with administrative and procurement complexity is one that could be
applied to all the area development projects as well as the two irrigation projects.

Both forest sector projects supported provision of land-use certification as a way of
increasing stability, access to credit and sustainable land-use. There was little sign here
of the impact of NIE which would caution that:
…partially complete ‘real’ markets are capable of being ‘regulated’ by
dominant economic agents that can take advantage of asymmetrical
information and bounded rationality to shape the operation of markets
to their own advantage. 142
Akram-Lodhi found that partial land markets are a central cause of “differentiation in
access to land” contributing to the stratification of rural households. Land-use
certification is more than a reflection of core Washington Consensus concerns, land
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markets as a way to create and reproduce private property are a central hegemonic
principle of the liberal capitalist project exemplified by the Bank.

The water resources/irrigation projects were designed to rehabilitate, improve and
expand existing large irrigation schemes. Neither made substantial claims regarding
poverty impact, rather the Water Resources Assistance Project, for example, supported
“transition to a more market-based economy by promoting changes in infrastructure and
management that will encourage and underpin further agricultural diversification.” 143
Wealthier farmers tend to already and increasingly have access to irrigated land (poor
households in contrast are more likely to have a high portion of forested land).
According to Akram-Lodhi, the Bank was correct in pointing to the growth potential of
diversified (i.e. non-rice) agriculture, however, the resulting accumulation process
“…may be inequalizing.” 144 Support for rehabilitation of existing irrigation schemes
was likely to contribute to the stratification of rural landholders that is (as the Bank
itself acknowledges) already occurring and thence to increasing landlessness (as was the
case with microfinance).

Overall, loans in the agriculture, fishing and forestry sector provided linkages to the
pre-Washington Consensus Bank expressed largely though PWC rhetoric. These
commitments combined with core Washington Consensus principles of private land
ownership and economic growth regardless of its distributive impacts seem to form the
basis of the PWC version of poverty reduction.

Education and Health
Table 6.8 Word Bank Education and Health Sector Lending to Vietnam: 1993-1997 and
2000-2004
Project Name

Year
Approved

Approved
Amount
(USD millions)

Loans 1993-1997
Primary Education Project

143

1993

$70.0

World Bank, "Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Credit to the Socialist Republic of Vietnam
for the Vietnam Water Resources Assistance Project" (Report No. 27395-VN, March 3 2004), p. 2.
144
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Population and Family Health Project

1996

$50.0

National Health Support Project

1996

$101.2

Primary Teacher Development Project

2001

$19.84

Regional Blood Transfusion Centres Project

2002

$47.5

Primary Education for Disadvantaged Children Project

2003

$138.76

Loans 2000-2004

There were only three projects in each of the health and education sectors; to facilitate
comparison between the two case study periods, the sectors were combined. Education
and health care were also the two sectors with least World Bank lending activity, which
is, in itself indicative of the relative priority these sectors have been given in the Bank’s
program for Vietnam. Loan volumes to the two sectors dropped only slightly from
$221.2 million in 1993-1997 to $206.1 million in 2000-2004, however, the weighting
shifted significantly towards education projects, despite the ongoing problems in
Vietnam’s health sector.

In terms of the structure of the projects, there was a notable tightening of focus and
goals in the 2000-2004 loans — they shifted from generic projects covering a range of
issues and many geographical regions to more tightly focused and geographically
limited projects. This may have been a response to the Bank’s own evaluations of the
earlier projects, which indicated that they were too complicated and imposed too many
administrative and management burdens on ministries not used to working with
donors. 145 Ministries were required to establish specific structures, entities and
accounting and reporting systems for Bank projects, whereas this was not a requirement
for the integrated rural development projects. In education, projects had a strong focus
on construction of infrastructure — in the Primary Education project, rehabilitation and
construction of primary school infrastructure accounted for 58.6 per cent of the loan at
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completion; in the Primary Education for Disadvantaged Children, 91.8 per cent of the
Bank commitment was for infrastructure.

There was relatively little change in justification or analysis for projects between the
two case study periods, apart from increasing concern with the regressive effects of user
fees on the poor (only) in education but not in health care. This change may reflect the
impact of the NGO lobby and poorer Vietnamese regarding growing inequality. In
education, the Bank proclaimed it had undergone a “fundamental shift” in its
understanding of equity from one focused on inputs to one aimed at achieving “equity
in outcomes.” 146 This focus on outputs is another way of making the ‘non-poor’
responsible for education themselves and equally limiting government social
expenditures on education by targeting them to the poorest — thus this approach
effectively increases the burden on the so-called non-poor in meeting the costs of
education. 147 Such outcomes from Bank activity support Porter and Craig’s finding that
the PWC may aim to get people above one dollar a day but it does not aim for much
more than that. Thus the PWC is “…fundamentally not redistributive in any substantive
sense.” 148

In health care, the early Bank loans focused on support for the communal health system,
which was undermined by the end of the cooperative system. The communal health care
system is the centre of preventative health care in Vietnam and World Bank health
policy has, since at least the early 1990s focused on allocating government health
resource on so-called low-cost, high return activities that target the poor, that is
preventative public health interventions.149 However, the parallel to the focus on
preventative care has been a program to reduce government expenditure on curative
health care services and to promote market forces, initially in curative services. As Asa
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Laurell and Oliva Arellano state, this is a neoliberal agenda proscribing health as a
private activity and concerned with limiting state intervention and expenditure; but one
tempered in the early 1990s by political backlash engendered by the socio-economic
impact of the agenda. 150

The unbundling of the curative and preventative health sectors has the added advantage
that the curative sector can then be subject to market forces and the extraction of
profit. 151 There is an interesting parallel here in the separation of profitable and nonprofitable components of utilities. For Laurell and Arellano the problematic
consequence of the overall Bank health policy is that it “…recreates a modern version
of 19th century charity: the state intervenes in response to popular demands but the
benefits provided are regarded as concessions rather than rights.” Indeed the Bank
“…also covertly seek[s] to destroy the very concept or idea of social rights, a critical
condition for the privatization and commodification of health financing and
provision.” 152

In curative health, Bank policy in Vietnam followed this model as part of encouraging
the transition to a market economy. Its reasoning was quite seductive, the Bank argued
that curative services were disproportionately accessed by non-poor households and that
relatively too much GoV expenditure was devoted to them particularly though hospital
care. However, making curative services subject to market forces only makes such
services even less accessible given that, as a study in Vietnam demonstrated, the poor
already tend to “…forgo inpatient treatment because of the expense.” 153 The Bank’s
argument about access was premised on a simplistic, non-specific distinction between
the ‘poor’ and ‘non-poor.’ It assumes that when households are not longer poor they
have the capacity to pay for curative services. This focus on making the ‘non-poor’ pay
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for health services also supports Porter and Craig’s argument that the PWC only aims to
get people above one dollar a day and no more.

There are alternatives — a study of health services in Vietnam recommended, in the
first instance, exempting the poor from user-fees in both primary and hospital care. 154 It
found that in general such exemptions are administratively complex and generally do
not effectively target the poor, which indeed the Bank acknowledged in relation to
education exemptions. Thus, in the longer-term, the study recommended that
exemptions be replaced with more comprehensive support. Ensuring good public health
outcomes would require, in the first instance, maintaining the strong public health
system built under central planning. This is in contrast to the Bank’s approach of
pushing the sector towards market mechanisms.

Overall, it is difficult to determine if the Bank’s approach to health care has shifted
under PWC (or other) influences, as there was only one loan in the later period. The
lack of projects in itself indicates that the Washington Consensus approach of
‘marketising’ health care, which is apparent during the first case study period and is
linked to poorer health outcomes in Vietnam, remains dominant. In education, while
there was support for private providers, there was a greater concern for equity.

Conclusion: A Weak Post-Washington Consensus

This analysis of the Bank’s program in Vietnam demonstrated that the impact of the
PWC on country programs and lending has been more limited than it appears from
Bank policy documents and research output. In terms of country ownership — perhaps
the feature that is meant to distinguish the PWC most from the Washington Consensus
— we saw that Vietnam’s CPRGS did involve country ownership but that the process
was significantly Bank-driven and controlled and has been at best a second-track policy
forum. The Bank’s CAS liberally reinterpreted the CPRGS, to focus on neoliberal
priorities.
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In terms of loans, there were few changes in administration and procurement
requirements that ceded greater control or authority to the GoV. Project personnel,
implementation manuals and accounts all must be “acceptable to the Association.”
Project accounting and procurement must be done according to Bank guidelines and, if
anything, the attention to Vietnam’s procurement arrangements increases in the second
case study period. 155

In terms of sectoral priorities, as suggested in the 2002 Vietnam CAS, Bank lending has
prioritised regional development projects but these address welfare only indirectly at
best through provision of infrastructure, especially roads. There remains limited support
for health, education or more direct forms of social welfare. 156 The dominant form of
‘social safety net’ the Bank supported was microfinance — an avowedly neoliberal
approach, cannot be described as a safety net, even if prefaced by the term neoliberal. A
number of Bank interventions may be increasing landlessness in a context where, by all
accounts, the equitable distribution of land provided the basis for rapid and relatively
equal growth out of poverty. The Bank’s rural development activities seem remarkably
similar to those that dominated the second phase of the McNamara presidency. And
these projects, as Caufield argued, may have highlighted the Bank’s activities with the
poor but in reality they were based on the “…conviction that the best way to create new
wealth is to invest in the wealthy, not the poor.” 157

The increased focus on law, justice and public administration, through structural
adjustment lending, seemed to be the product of the PWC priority on good governance
and reducing corruption. Structural adjustment loans showed an expansion of the
development agenda, some of which are poverty-focused but equally the revitalised
PWC agenda on governance was visible with the focus on land titling and government
administration. The analysis demonstrated that the approach to health and education
remained focused on increasing the space for markets and on maintaining fiscal restraint
on the state. Public administration reforms equally were focused on state expenditure,
indeed in a more invasive and expansive way than during the Washington Consensus
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period. Further, when PWC ideas conflicted with those of the Washington Consensus,
the later inevitably prevailed. All of this demonstrates a weak version of the postWashington Consensus at work.

The Bank’s lending and technical advice during the Washington Consensus can be seen
as a Gramscian ‘war of position’ designed to impose at least the key features of a
capitalist system — private property and markets, connected to an unequal distribution
of wealth and the expansion of a class of landless proletariat. The PWC was a passive
revolution whose aim was to continue the Washington Consensus project through
compromise regarding the social costs of adjustment. What this analysis demonstrated
is that the PWC’s added focus on poverty reduction is a minimalist one, concerned to
get people out of absolute poverty but not much more.

This Gramscian analysis of the Vietnamese historic bloc and its relations with the
World Bank highlighted both the acceptance of, and resistance to, the imposition of
Washington Consensus policies. The case study showed that the state has notable
capacity to resist outside pressure for reform. Thus, in the case of SOE equitisation, to
date Bank funds have essentially been coopted to further the process as far as acceptable
to the mix of interests in the historic bloc. What is not yet clear is whether the Bank has
successfully helped change the underlying terrain on which debates about equitisation
occur in favour of market interests. The Ninth Party Plenum gave some indication; it
committed to expanding the scope of equitisation to include the large general
corporations but not all SOEs. It also committed to: ensuring enterprises were properly
evaluated before sale including land-use rights; and transparency in the equitisation
process. 158

In areas that do not appear to have been subjected to such a level of public scrutiny, in
particular, the energy, water supply and transportation sectors, the Bank seems to have
had a greater measure of success in introducing market ‘reforms.’ The Ninth Party
Plenum committed to expanding the scope of SOE equitisation to include electricity. 159
Although, it is important to note that the Vietnamese have generally conducted such
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processes at their pace rather than the Bank’s and the GoV’s involvement in these
projects helps them to (re-)assert central state and party control in what is a quite
decentralised c. 160 Thus the new Electricity Law, the drafting of which was funded by
Bank technical assistance grants, took over nine years to pass the National Assembly.
The Bank envisaged a two or three year timetable and was not fully happy with the final
content.

Looking at Vietnam’s record on poverty reduction, economic growth and social stability
they seem to be doing something right — Vietnam was one of the countries in Asia
least affected by the Financial Crisis in 1997 and quickly returned to high growth rates.
Growth in 2003 was 7.2 per cent and was slightly higher in 2004. The incidence of
poverty has declined from 58 per cent of the population to 20 per cent in 2004. There
are still huge challenges in poverty, education, health and infrastructure to name a few
but the largely cautious program and the reinvestment in the social sectors, for the most
part contrary to Bank advice, has been more successful than most other former
communist countries undergoing transition (with the notable exception of China).
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Chapter Seven
Indonesia: An Overview
In parallel with the case study on Vietnam, this chapter outlines the structure of the
Indonesian government and its principal socio-economic policies from 1966 to the end
of 2004. The chapter briefly explores the history of ODA in Indonesia including the
World Bank program, which approved over $30 billion in loans between 1968 and
2004. The macro analysis of the Bank’s involvement in Indonesia continues with an
analysis of shifts in sectoral lending and size of loans. Chapter Eight is a detailed
exploration of all Bank loans to Indonesia in the two case study periods. As we shall
see, this second case study provides not only a different context but also a distinct
pattern of lending through which to understand World Bank lending under the postWashington Consensus.

The political and socio-economic background starts with the New Order government of
Suharto, which came to power via a bloody coup in 1966. But, given the focus of the
thesis, the concentration is on the period from 1993 to the end of 2004. As background,
it summarises key structures and developments, and provides an indication of the
framework within which the World Bank operated in Indonesia and under which its
lending program was conducted.

The Political and Administrative Structure in Indonesia from 1966

Indonesia continues to be governed by the 1945 Constitution, which, as its name
suggests, was instituted at the beginning of the independence Revolution as a temporary
measure. It was replaced in 1949 when sovereignty from the Dutch was ceded. In 1959,
it was reinstated as part of Sukarno’s ‘Guided Democracy’ again as an interim measure.
The 1945 Constitution is short, open to varied interpretation and concentrated power in
the president. Thus when Suharto overthrew Sukarno, he was able to utilise it “…as a
suitable vehicle for a strong presidential rule” in what was essentially an authoritarian
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and patronage-based regime (or historic bloc). 1 During the Suharto era, the formal
political process was largely subsumed to a project of nation-building or development. 2
However, later in the New Order, the focus shifted to shoring up Suharto’s economic
and political control. 3

The Political Structure Under Suharto: 1966 - 1998
According to the constitution, sovereignty is vested in the people, who exercise their
will through the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR). Full executive authority is
vested in the President, who until 2003 was elected by, and responsible to, the MPR.
Legislative power is predominately in the hands of the House of People's
Representatives (DPR). 4 The MPR is formally the highest constitutional body though it
had little power or responsibility before constitutional reform commenced in 1998. Its
responsibilities were to elect the President and Vice President and to approve the Broad
Outline of State Policy — a planning document establishing policy guidelines for the
next five years. Under Suharto, the President was selected by consensus while senior
government officials developed the Broad Outline in a largely “executive-controlled
exercise.” 5 The MPR was only required to meet every five years, in the year following
DPR elections. From 1985, the MPR consisted of 1,000 seats, 500 of which were held
by members of the DPR. A further 100 seats were reserved for representatives of
professional groups, including the armed forces, who are appointed by the President.
After reforms in 1992, provincial-level legislative assemblies elected 147 seats. The
balance of seats (353) was assigned on a proportional basis to representatives of the
political parties, depending on their respective membership in the DPR. Given that
Suharto controlled the DPR, the “…MPR was, in effect, beholden to the president.” 6
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The DPR had primary responsibility for legislation, though the executive was also able
to initiate legislation and indeed under Suharto virtually all legislation came from the
executive. The DPR was only required to meet once a year. Four hundred of its 500
seats were subject to election and the remaining 100 seats were allocated to military
representatives. 7 Both the MPR and DPR served largely as rubber stamps for the
Suharto regime.

Elections were tightly controlled and only government-sanctioned political parties were
allowed to contest them. 8 By 1973, the New Order had created two main parties from
the previous multiparty organisations: the United Development Party or Partai
Persatuan Pembangunan made up of the former Islamic parties; and the Indonesian
Democratic Party or Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (PDI) made up of the former Christian
and nationalist parties. These artificially formed parties incorporated different and even
contradictory social forces, which limited their scope of political effectiveness. Further,
party leaders were vetted by the state, the parties were not allowed to campaign outside
election periods and were denied organisational representation in villages and smaller
towns, making them impotent. 9

The bureaucracy, civil society groups and political parties were linked through the Joint
Secretariat of Functional Groups (Golkar), which became in effect the key political
force and a central organising body for the state. 10 Golkar was not a formal political
party until 1999 but still won between 62 and 73 per cent of the votes in the (rigged)
elections between 1971 and 1993. 11 All government officials (and governmentconnected organisations) had to be members of Golkar (via the Civil Service Corps,
KORPRI). From 1992, officials had to get permission to vote for parties other than
Golkar. Golkar was used to organise and control civil society — it incorporated official
groups organising labour, peasants, fisherman, youth and women. 12 This corporatist
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structure was expanded over time to encompass a range of other occupations and groups
with strategic value via separate representative organisations that could be controlled
and monitored by the dominant historic bloc. As Andrew Macintyre notes, the de facto
role of these groups under the authoritarian corporatist structure “…was to absorb and
contain the demands of extra-state groups… They were, in short, a means of social and
political control.” 13

Cabinet’s role in the New Order, like parliament’s, was restricted. It met in full only
once a year to report on the annual budget. There were restricted sub-gatherings of
Ministers organised around economic, political and social issues that met more often
but they tended to avoid policy debate. Detailed policy debate usually took place
through working groups at the ministerial level. The President’s view on controversial
issues was sought through private meetings. 14 Individual cabinet members could, and
often did, wield significant power.

The entire parliamentary structure was framed by the state ideology of Pancasilia — its
five principles are: belief in one God; a just and civilized humanity; the unity of
Indonesia; democracy guided by the wisdom of deliberation and representation; and
social justice for all the people of Indonesia. Pancasilia is important, as Richard
Robison points out, because, beyond its “bland generalisations,” it “…legitimates
authoritarianism as a mechanism that achieves the common will of society through
consensus under the tutelage of a state.” 15 Moreover, it defines “…liberalism, laissezfaire capitalism, communism or any exclusive claim to represent a religious, ethnic or
class interest” as illegitimate in the Indonesian state. 16 These were hegemonic principles
of the New Order historic bloc. Pancasilia was applied to political and social
organisations through a 1985 law that required such organisations to accept it as their
guiding principle. It is notable that Pancasilia remains a defining feature of the
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constitution in post-Suharto Indonesia, though it’s formal role in guiding political
parties and other organisations ended in 1998. 17

Until 2001, despite the existence of provincial and local level government, Indonesia
was largely centrally controlled and run. Through most of the Suharto era there were 27
provincial-level units: 24 provinces (called propinsi), two special regions (Aceh and
Yogyakarta) and the special capital city region (Jakarta). Provinces had elected regional
people’s representative councils (DPRD) that could recommend appointments for
governors from a shortlist prepared by the Minister of Home Affairs, but the President
had the final choice. Beneath provinces are districts; during the New Order there were
241 districts (kabupaten) and 40 municipalities/city governments (kota). The
Department of Home Affairs appointed district heads. Districts are divided into
subdistricts (kecamatan) and further into villages.

Provincial and local government implemented Jakarta-determined policies and
programs. Jakarta also controlled budgets and personnel appointments and there was
little capacity for feedback to the centre. 18 The overarching goal of this centralised
structure was to ensure national integrity and integration, which was projected as
requiring significant redistribution of wealth from resource-rich outer provinces to the
more population-dense areas (in particular Java and Bali). This had the added benefit of
giving the central government control of national wealth. Jakarta controlled around 90
per cent of the resources available to the provinces and districts — 80 per cent through
the various ministries and a further ten per cent through Presidential Instructions. The
remaining ten per cent of provincial and district income was locally generated.

No discussion of Indonesian politics is complete without reference to the military, in
particular, the army and police (until 1 April 1999, the police were a branch of the
armed services). From independence, the armed forces were given a dual function of
defending and administering the state, which developed into a formal doctrine called
dwifungsi. The Indonesian army operates with a territorial structure, under which its
units “…paralleled and participated in government administration from the provincial
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level to the village level.” 19 Under Suharto, the army had a key role in political society
— officials could be appointed to all levels of administration down to the village level.
The army frequently employed terror tactics on those perceived to threaten the state’s
stability. In effect, it played a coercive role similar to that in most authoritarian states.

Military influence has fluctuated over time and there is disagreement amongst
commentators regarding its current significance and the real extent of its recent apparent
decline. On the one hand, commentators point to its declining economic significance
both in budgetary and non-budgetary terms, its reduced operational capacity and its lack
of political unity in post-New Order elections. 20 On the other hand, the territorial
structure has remained intact in the post-Suharto period; military support has been
important to the presidencies of Megawati Sukarnoputri and Susilo Bambang
Yudhoyono; and the events of September 11 2001, and the bombings in Bali and
Jakarta assisted the police, and to a lesser extent the military, in regaining international
standing. 21

The late 1980s saw a brief period of political ‘openness’ in Indonesia but this ended in
1993-4. 22 The New Order was in decline by the mid-1990s. However, it took the
economic upheaval of the Asian Financial Crisis to finish the Suharto regime. The story
of his downfall has been extensively covered elsewhere and is not repeated here; rather
the chapter turns to an overview of political reform process in the post-Suharto era. 23

Constitutional and Political Reform: 1999-2004
Doctor Jusuf Habibe became President of Indonesia in May 1998. As Suharto’s chosen
successor and a New Order insider, he surprised many by his political reformism. His
earliest reforms were the vote on independence in East Timor, removal of controls on
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press and release of political prisoners. In terms of Indonesia’s political society, Habibe
removed laws restricting the number of political parties, however, limits were retained
on the number of small parties — parties require representation in nine provinces and
within the nine provinces in half of the districts. Elections became open and a series of
reforms changed the constitution, introduced checks and balances on presidential power
and increased the influence of the legislature. The MPR now comprises the 500 seat
DPR and a 200 seat Regional Representative’s Council (DPD) both of which are fully
elected. Since 2004, the President and Vice-President have been popularly elected and
limited to two five-year terms. 24 The role of the MPR is limited to swearing-in the
President and Vice-president, removing them for specified constitutional violations and
amending the constitution.

The DPR remains the key legislative body, it has strengthened legislative
responsibilities, including the right to submit legislation. The President is still in charge
of promulgating government regulations in the implementation of law. The DPR has
increased power to review the executive, military and bureaucracy, however, it has
shown limited interest in using its review or legislative powers. 25 Radical
decentralisation accompanied the reforms and resulted in national political and
executive authority being limited to “international policies, defence and security,
judicature, monetary and fiscal policy, religion” and other fields requiring national
planning and policy-making. 26

The DPD manages relations between the regions and the central government. It
participates in debate, and can submit bills to the DPR, on regional issues, for example,
finances and relations between Jakarta and the regions. It considers DPR bills on the
budget, taxation, education, and religion and is empowered to supervise the
implementation of such laws. Members of the DPD are elected by Regional People’s
Representative Assemblies (DPRD), whose members are, in turn, directly elected.
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The creation of the DPD was the logical outcome of the radical decentralisation of
formal political power and government administrative responsibilities that commenced
in 1999, as were amendments recognising the role of provinces, kabupaten and kota in
regulating and managing their own governmental matters. Reform led to fully elected
DPRDs and elected local leaders (governors, bupati and mayors). 27 The constitution
now states that regional administrations “…exercise the broadest possible autonomy.”
Though, of course, the reality is more complex. Decentralisation was the product of two
laws, no. 22/1999 on regional governance and no. 25/1999 on fiscal balance between
the central and regional governments. Law no. 22/1999 aimed to democratise local
government and devolve central government responsibilities to the provinces,
kabupaten and kota. Kabupaten/kota are given equal status with provinces and, along
with the provinces, are given explicit responsibility for “public works, health, education
and culture, agriculture, communication, industry and trade, capital investment,
environment, land, cooperative and manpower affairs” as well as for managing natural
resources. 28 But even within these areas, national government retains some
responsibilities, particularly for coordination activities. The division of responsibilities
both between the centre and provinces and between the provinces and kabupaten/kota
continues to lack clarity. This has given international donors and various elements of
the historic bloc room to influence outcomes in directions they see fit.

Law no. 25/1999 specifies a General Allocation Grant as the key mechanism for
financing decentralisation. The grant must be at least 25 per cent of domestic revenue,
90 per cent of which is allocated to kabupaten/kota and ten per cent to provinces. 29 The
law provides for revenue sharing between Jakarta and the regions in the areas of land
and building tax, land acquisition, forestry, fisheries, mining and oil and gas. However,
the mechanisms for sharing are not specified, nor are local capacities for revenue
generation clearly delineated. The two laws were drafted very quickly, largely by
bureaucrats from separate ministries and there was little input from political or civil
society. There is a “…clear mismatch between the two laws… one assigned authorities
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without any concept of costing, and the other assigned funding without any concept of
need.” 30

Why the very rapid process of decentralisation? The main reason was undoubtedly that
President Habibe saw it as a way to craft a new historic bloc in the context of
widespread demands for democratisation that were sweeping Indonesia. It responded to
domestic and international calls for reform whilst maintaining the unity of the
Indonesian state and the privileges of the elite. 31 From the international side, donors —
in particular the World Bank — had been pushing for decentralisation since at least the
early 1990s. Despite donors’ support for the New Order (or indeed perhaps because of
it), when it fell they demanded rapid reform and in particular decentralisation. 32 Wihana
Kirana Jaya and Howard Dick argued that, domestically, the real intent of
decentralisation was to bypass the provinces around which independence movements
had been organised. By redistributing power to kabupaten/kota the centre could retain
substantial influence. 33 This may overstate the case somewhat, but as Mark Turner and
Owen Podger point out, Law no. 22/1999 does contain regular references to the unity of
the state. 34 The sheer administrative and political difficulties of dealing with 357
kabupatens and kotas have resulted in recent regulations increasing power to the
provinces. 35

Decentralisation is a key issue for this and the following chapter, because the World
Bank claimed it was “…catalytic in getting the Government to focus on” it. Further,
decentralisation was a major area of financing during both case study periods. 36 The
core issue here, though, is the impact of decentralisation on post-New Order power
structures. Vedi Hadiz argued that decentralisation has not challenged existing
30
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networks, they quickly reconstituted themselves under the decentralised system,
creating “…newly decentralized, predatory networks of patronage” that “…are
relatively autonomous of central state authority.” 37 For this reason, decentralization has
done little for the most disadvantaged in Indonesia. 38 This equally applies to the reform
process overall. Thus, Richard Robison and Hadiz noted that, apart from
decentralisation, the Suharto-appointed DPR controlled the reform process. The voting
system they agreed upon for the DPR — candidates are elected by proportional
representation organised around provinces but allocated by party performance at the
district level — allowed incumbent politicians to fully utilise their existing party
structures thus giving them an advantage over newly formed parties. 39 Andrew
Macintyre makes a similar point stating that incumbent politicians, “…all had their eyes
clearly focused on the new game of competitive elections, understanding full well that
the design of the institutional framework would favor some interests over others.” 40 Nor
has corruption disappeared from the political process. All this suggests that the
transition from the New Order was, in Gramscian terms a passive revolution. That is, it
is a way already dominant groups confronted with changing social relations, manage
this change using the instruments of the state to ensure that their dominance is
maintained or indeed extended. In Indonesia, the elite continued their domination of the
political process and furthered their own private interests. As Robison and Hadiz state,
the Indonesian political contest is:
…not primarily about agendas or even ideologies, but about [the
elites] furthering dominance over the institutions of the state, and their
resources and coercive power, and about developing networks of
patronage and protection. 41
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Socio-economic Developments in Indonesia since 1966

Socio-economic Developments under Suharto
As noted above, under Suharto there was a strong commitment to nation-building and
an explicit development project. Growth was strong through the 1970s, slowed in the
early 1980s but returned to respectable levels after 1987. In the early 1990s, many
commentators including the World Bank, labelled Indonesia as a new Asian ‘tiger.’ But
after the Asian Financial Crisis it was more commonly seen as the epitome of ‘crony
capitalism.’ With hindsight, it is possible to dismiss some of the economic growth under
Suharto as a proverbial ‘house of cards.’ However, such an approach, neglects the
substantial changes that did take place.

There is a key debate about the extent to which the Indonesian economy is marketbased. In the early years of the regime — with the background of the Cold War and
Western hostility to the previous Sukarno regime — Indonesia was largely presented as
a market-based economy. This was possible because, in contrast to Sukarno’s closed
and increasingly socialist-oriented policies, Suharto pursued relatively mainstream
policies. With the assistance of a group of US trained economists labelled the ‘Berkeley
mafia’ or technocrats, he controlled inflation and pursued conservative monetary and
fiscal policy (including a 1000 per cent devaluation of the Rupiah); 42 restructured and
reduced debt (with the assistance of the West via the Inter-Governmental Group on
Indonesia); and liberalised the foreign investment regime. Western aid is discussed in
more detail later in the chapter but it is worthwhile to note the haste with which bilateral
donors became involved with Indonesia after Suharto’s brutal take over, and they were
followed quickly by the IMF and World Bank.

Underneath the liberal surface though, the regime was committed to a high-level of state
involvement in the economy. The level of intervention shifted with the changing
configurations of the New Order historic bloc. During the early years, a relatively open
economic stance was adopted reflecting the New Order’s need to distinguish itself from
the previous regime in order to attract Western investment and debt restructuring. At the
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same time, the regime itself was relatively weak and the Berkeley mafia had significant
influence over fiscal and monetary policy and indeed over economic and social
planning more broadly through its influence in a range of other ministries. A key
exception was Indonesia’s oil industry, where through Ibnu Soetowo, director of the
state-owned Pertamina, Suharto had access to high levels of off-budget funding.

The economy responded to the stability and relative openness to capital and these
combined with development expenditures, available largely due oil wealth produced
GDP growth of 10.9 per cent in 1968. 43 From 1971 through to 1981, economic growth
continued at a high average of 7.7 per cent despite growing political and economic
turbulence. In 1972, poor rice harvests led to price hikes and unrest. In 1973, the
international oil shock and growing discontent amongst domestic Islamic businesses
contributed to the Malari riots in 1974. 44 However, the New Order was, by this point,
hegemonic and it responded to the instability with both coercion — repression of
dissenting forces — and consent — populist policies in the form of a resurgent
nationalist economic agenda. Thus, from 1973-4 a range of controls over foreign
investment, trade and other economic policy were introduced.

In the 1980s, economic growth slowed to around four per cent. An increasing
proportion of oil production was being consumed domestically and this combined with
decreased prices for oil exports to erode valuable export earnings. 45 Debt was also
accumulating at a fast pace. This contributed to increased unemployment and some
social unrest and prompted policy reforms from the early 1980s, particularly to reduce
government expenditure and reform the banking system. However, it took the
international recession of 1986-1987 and leverage from the IMF and World Bank to
initiate more substantial ‘adjustment.’ Even then liberalisation was not systematic
because:
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…the attempt to liberalise the economy was made before the complex
coalitions of state and social power that had underpinned the existing
regimes had been dismantled or at least fractured, and no coherent
political alliances had formed to drive the reform agenda. 46

But the reform, linked to a period of increasing political openness, was enough to kickstart the economy and economic growth averaged 6.7 per cent between 1987 and 1992.
Economic growth and increasing corruption made the regime complacent so by the
early 1990s the reform program slowed substantially, followed in 1994 by an end to the
period of political openness. Nevertheless, economic growth remained strong at 7.8 per
cent between 1991 and 1995. In the years leading up to the Asian Financial Crisis, there
were no significant fluctuations across a wide range of macro and microeconomic
indictors. 47 The debt to GDP ratio was stable at around 54 per cent and it comprised
more private than public sector debt — a situation financial markets typically applaud.
Yet, an increasing portion of debt was short-term. More broadly, the influence of the
technocrats in the regime was again on the wane and corruption intensified. 48 Social and
political turbulence increased from 1996 with Suharto’s ousting of Megawati from the
PDI leadership and it led to widespread ethnic violence in early 1997.

The extent of change in the Indonesian economy is indicated by the change in the
structure of its GDP. In 1966, agricultural output accounted for over 50 per cent of
GDP, by 1992 it was 36 per cent. Industry grew from a few per cent of GDP in 1966 to
around 40 per cent, though oil was the major source of growth until 1987. Shares of
employment by sector have not changed as much as GDP, but agriculture dropped from
73 per cent of employment in 1961 to around 50 per cent in 1990. Industry increased
from 8.1 per cent to 17 per cent and services grew from 18.9 per cent to 32.9 per cent.
Though, as Hal Hill points out, these averages hide strong variations between Java and
the rest of Indonesia. 49
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New Order economic policy needs to be situated within the complex network of
business, political, bureaucratic and military relationships that formed the Indonesian
historic bloc. Ethnic Chinese predominate in the business community 50 — ethnicity and
their small numbers exclude them from political power but they were key beneficiaries
of New Order patronage and in return were the main source of extra-budgetary funds
for Suharto. This close relationship caused significant resentment amongst the
indigenous Indonesian business community. Business and political interests
increasingly merged as the Suharto family expanded its business interests in the 1980s
and 1990s. They were also fused with the New Order controlled bureaucracy. 51 The
military played a role in business too. Initially they directly operated businesses and
controlled concessions and licences but, as many of these enterprises failed, an indirect
network formed working though yayasan (charitable foundations) and interconnected
business interests. These complex social forces created a delicate balance between
economic growth, social objectives and entrenching the (economic and political)
interests and power of the politico-business families that controlled the economy. 52
Fundamentally though, the Suharto regime’s legitimacy was underpinned by economic
performance, in particular improving living standards for ordinary Indonesians. For
most of the New Order, the regime succeeded in improving living standards and social
indicators. When it could no longer do this, the regime fell.

Between 1970 and 1996 the proportion of Indonesians living below the poverty line
dropped from 60 to 11 per cent, this equalled a drop from 70 to 22.2 million people. 53
However, the poverty line used in these measurements is lower than used by the poorest
countries in the world. If the World Bank’s measurement for near poor (US$2 per day)
is used, in 1996, some 50 per cent of the population were still living in poverty. 54 This
measurement makes the large number of people who fell into formal poverty as a result
of the Asian Financial Crisis more explicable.
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Surprisingly, growth was achieved without large increases in relative inequality as
measured by income inequality, though initial inequality was higher than in other
countries in the region. Moreover, there are no reliable figures available for wealth or
asset inequality, which may well be high. 55 There were significant disparities in growth
between urban and rural areas and between Java (and some other resource rich regions)
and outlying regions, in particular, West and East Nusa Tengarra. 56
Chart 7.1 GDP Growth and Gini Ratio in Indonesia, 1971-2002 57
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Universal primary education was achieved in the early 1980s and here gains were also
impressive in rural areas. 58 Health care improved —as an example, the infant mortality
rate dropped from 118 per 1,000 lives births in 1970 to 47 in 1997, however, this is still
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significantly higher than regional averages and the per cent of population with access to
safe drinking water was also much lower than regional neighbours. In general, as Thee
Kian Wie concludes, social development was less impressive than economic growth and
compares “…unfavourably with the gains made in Malaysia, Thailand and the Asian
‘Tigers.’” 59

The Asian Financial Crisis and Beyond: Economic and Social Impacts
The focus here is on the consequences of the Asian Financial Crisis more than its
causes, however, it is necessary to engage briefly in the debate about causation.
According to Thee, there have been two main economic explanations of the Crisis. 60
The first or ‘fundamentalist’ explanation saw that the Crisis was caused by deep-seated
economic weaknesses in affected countries. It pointed to domestic factors as the
primary cause and argues that the affected countries’ good economic indicators in some
areas “…masked serious structural problems and policy shortcomings that rendered
these countries vulnerable to the crisis.” 61 ‘Fundamentalists’ focused on the large shortterm external debt, large and volatile private capital flows, problems of the quasi-fixed
exchange rate system, weak and poorly regulated banks and of course “…widespread
corruption and poor governance.” 62 This was the position of the international financial
institutions, in particular the IMF.

The second explanation focused on the panic and “…self-fulfilling pessimism of
international lenders.” 63 Under this analysis, economic fundamentals were not as
important as the lack of market maturity and the structure and denomination of foreign
and domestic debt. The two explanations are not mutually exclusive but as a rule it is
political scientists who have tended to give more weight to political and social factors or
to the role of international institutions, in particular the IMF’s (mis-?)handling of at
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least the early response to the crisis. This last aspect, though, is generally regarded as
more an explanation of the length and depth of the crisis rather than its origins. 64

The bulk of commentators on the crisis do seem to agree that, in the case of Indonesia
(as well as Malaysia and the Philippines), the trigger was (at least in part) ‘contagion.’
Equally though most of the factors that Thee’s ‘fundamentalists’ point to were present
in Indonesia. While macroeconomic indicators were stable (low budget deficit,
moderate inflation and broadly accepted exchange rates) there was a growing level of
short-term unhedged debt — unhedged in part because of the security provided by the
quasi-fixed exchange rate system. Equally, banks were poorly regulated and there had
been a significant build up of corporate debt and some asset price inflation, although
none of this had received much attention from economists. 65 Poor governance and
corruption were obviously issues, though Hill questions whether their levels actually
increased in the 1990s — while the wealth of the Suharto family had undoubtedly
increased, the relative size of the SOE sector had fallen and the trade regime was more
open. 66 There were few indications that the market’s perceptions of levels of corruption
altered notably in the period leading to the crisis. 67 Nor were there signs of a change in
confidence in the regime’s economic credentials. Domestic governance was, however, a
factor in the severity and length of the Crisis: the government handed down an
unrealistic budget shortly after the onset of the Crisis, it signed an overly ambitious
program with the IMF and mishandled bank closures. 68 In addition, Suharto was seen to
be protecting the interests of his family and its cronies. This contributed to the way the
crisis intensified.

The program of liberalisation in the 1980s left the Indonesian government with limited
levers with which to respond to the Crisis. For more radical critics of the neoliberal
development agenda, liberalisation was the key factor behind the Crisis as it facilitated
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uncontrolled build up of short-term debt. 69 For those influenced by New Institutional
Economics, it was the sequencing of reform that was the key failure — financial
liberalisation should not have taken place prior to freeing up exchange rates, appropriate
prudential supervision of banking, etc. 70

The impact of the Crisis on Indonesia was severe and long lasting. The Crisis came on
top of a severe El Nino drought that had reduced rice production by four per cent and
there was ethnic violence in a number of provinces. Economic growth in 1998 was
minus 13.6 per cent. 71 The Crisis had its severest sectoral impact on construction,
finance and services. Agriculture was least effected and manufacturing declined by
around the Crisis average. 72 Inflation soared from 6.5 per cent in 1996 to 65 per cent in
1998 and took time to be brought under control. The current account actually went into
surplus because imports collapsed but exports declined too, despite the huge
devaluation in the Rupiah after it was floated in August 1997 (in 1998, it was 28 per of
its US dollar denominated value from pre-crisis). Devaluation contributed substantially
to the exploding debt. Private capital switched from a net inflow in 1996/97 of $13.5
billion to a net outflow of $11.8 billion in 1997/98, the capital account returned to
positive in 1998/99 only due to the high level of official flows. 73

Official unemployment increased only slightly, to around six per cent, because formal
unemployment is essentially not an option in Indonesia — workers were absorbed into
less productive sectors, in particular agriculture. As a result, underemployment, which
was always high, increased. There was also a substantial decline in real wages.
According to the World Bank’s conservative estimates, the incidence of absolute
poverty more than doubled to 27 per cent in 1999, but declined again to 15-16 per cent
by 2000 due primarily to a decrease in the price of food, especially rice. 74 However, the
overall vulnerability to poverty has increased significantly since the Crisis. 75
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Growth only returned in 2000 and between 2000 and 2004 averaged 4.6 per cent, still
two percentage points below even the poorer phases of the Suharto era. 76 Inflation
seems to be back under control; in 2004, it was just over six per cent, despite a spike in
2001-02. Foreign direct investment remains very weak, the major outflows continued
into 2000-01 but levelled off in 2002-03 before some modest growth in 2004 (just over
$1 billion). Formal unemployment jumped to 9.9 per cent and poverty remains higher
than in 1996.

Official Development Assistance to Indonesia After 1966

According to James Soemijantoro Wilson, Cold War aid practices were central to
perpetuating a post-colonial political economy in Indonesia built around “…a wealthy
indigenous class that reaped its primary economic rewards from neither feudal nor
market structures, but from transfer payments from a foreign government.” 77 These
practices, he suggests, continued throughout the Suharto regime and only with its fall,
did the façade collapse revealing facts that donors had never properly taken into
consideration. 78 The Cold War context was central to the US and Western support for
the New Order’s murderous take-over of Indonesia. Once it had taken legal control and
aligned itself publicly with the West it received “unprecedented” Paris Club debt
rescheduling and a very large aid package — $300 million in credits was provided in
1966 and $200 million in 1967. 79 Aid was coordinated through the Inter-Governmental
Group on Indonesia (IGGI) — which later became the Coordinating Group on
Indonesia (CGI). From 1967, when Indonesia rejoined the IMF and World Bank, the
Bretton Woods twins became key avenues of support. The Bank’s first loans were
approved in September 1968 — a quick turnaround for the Bank. The support for
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Suharto was clearly politically motivated, reflected in the initial form of aid from the
IGGI — over 80 per cent of aid was program (or adjustment) not project aid — a quick
disbursing, direct and relatively untraceable form of support for a pro-US and Western
regime. 80

By 1974, aid was predominately in project form and shortly thereafter, program aid
accounted for only a tiny portion of aid flows. 81 As oil revenue increased, aid flows
declined in importance to Indonesia, measured both as a percentage of GDP and as a
percentage of government revenue. The need to conform to the agenda of donors and to
attract foreign capital declined and, as outlined earlier, a range of more nationalist
economic policies were introduced. 82 From 1977, aid flows slowly became more
important peaking in 1986-89 with the decline in oil and gas revenues impacting
government receipts and an economic downturn. Aid accounted for only 1.5 per cent of
GDP in 1977 and for almost 6.5 per cent in 1988. 83 So from the early 1980s, the
technocrats and international donors again had more influence on New Order policy.
This influence was visible in significant trade liberalisation, devaluations in the Rupiah,
relaxations in the foreign investment regime and some liberalisation of the finance
sector — all Washington Consensus prescriptions.

After 1989 the proportion of aid to GDP declined slowly, averaging two per cent in
1995-97. However, as a percentage of government revenue, ODA remained significant
—it comprised between 15 and 30 per cent of (official) revenues between 1982 and
1997. 84 During the Asian Financial Crisis, aid flows peaked at over four per cent of
GDP in 1998-99. 85 What was different after this crisis was how quickly aid declined —
by 2000 aid was back down to two per cent of GDP. During both 1986-89 and 1997-99
the proportion of program/adjustment to project aid increased significantly and declined
quickly as each crisis subsided.
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Historically, Indonesia has received aid from a range of agencies and countries. The
most important sources have been the World Bank, the ADB and Japan’s JBIC; other
notable but less important sources are the US (USAID), Germany, France and the
Netherlands. Since the 1990s, Japan has been the largest bilateral donor, the World
Bank and ADB remain the major multilateral donors. 86 According to Anis Chowdhury
and Iman Sugema, in the first half of the 1990s the largest sectors of aid were: mining
and energy, transportation, agriculture, education and national defence. 87 Since the
Asian Financial Crisis,
[t]he aid share of the mining and energy sector declined from around
20 per cent to less than 10 per cent. But the share of education, health
and social welfare sector increased significantly and that helped
cushion the poor to some extent from the adverse impacts of the crisis.
The share of regional development, too, increased markedly. This
shows the importance the donors are giving to the decentralization
process that Indonesia undertook in 2001 following the crisis. There
have also been significant increases in aid allocated to national
defence since 2003. 88
Interestingly the law, justice and public administration sector received only a minor
increase in funding under the sectoral categorisation used by Chowdhury and Sugema.
However, as we shall see later, the World Bank boosted funds in this area significantly.
The discrepancy may partly be due to categorisation — Chowdhury and Sugema used
Indonesian Ministry of Finance data that includes a regional development and
transmigration category, which the World Bank does not. Nevertheless, it seems that
other donors have not had the focus on this area that the Bank has. Debt relief has also
been a major component of bilateral donors’ contributions to Indonesia. 89
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Indonesia’s relationship with the IMF was historically based more on technical
assistance and advice than on a large lending program. From 1970 to the end of 2004,
Indonesia accessed IMF loans on only six occasions — 1972, 1983, 1987, 1997, 1998
and 2000; notably three of the six occasions were during the Asian Financial Crisis. 90
The first Crisis loan was under the IMF’s stand-by arrangement (SBA) and involved a
fairly standard set of conditions including reductions in government social expenditures
and cuts to food and fuel subsidies despite the fact that the budget was broadly in
balance. It also specified closure of 16 banks, which led to a run on other banks, and a
rise in interest rates that did little to attract international investors whilst squeezing
domestic creditors. Subsequent loans were under the IMF’s Extended Fund Facility
(EFF), indicating its determination to pursue a program of structural adjustment for a
now full-blown Crisis. 91 However, as Chowdhury and Sugema pointed out, Indonesia
did not require the full SBA package. Despite paying interest and charges on the loan,
Bank Indonesia only drew down 44 per cent of it. Indonesia’s reserves were at a healthy
level when the assistance was requested; its purpose was psychological — part of the
attempt to restore market confidence. 92 Of course, it did no such thing. Rather the IMF
was seen as pushing for accelerating political as well as economic change in Indonesia
— a position visible to all in the photo of Michel Camdessus standing over Suharto as
he signed the second loan deal. 93

As the IMF assumed a larger role in Indonesia, relations with the World Bank were not
always smooth. Mallaby contended that it was not disagreement regarding the
appropriate policy response behind the poor relations. Rather, it was Wolfensohn’s
anger at the Bank’s failure to respond quickly to the crisis, which resulted in it being
seen in a poor light against its Bretton Woods twin. 94 The Bank has acknowledged the
tensions stating in one report that it “…eventually developed a productive working
relationship, playing a key role in the government’s Extended Arrangement with the
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IMF.” 95 It took until around January 2000 for the Bank, IMF and ADB to agree on a
division of responsibilities for Indonesia’s recovery period. This gave the IMF the lead
in macroeconomic policy; the Bank the lead on structural and social policies, including
corporate restructuring; and the ADB responsibility for privatisation and SOE reform.
In addition, all three agencies agreed to support bank restructuring and financial sector
reform. 96 The Indonesian Government eventually terminated its arrangements with the
IMF and it has returned to its more traditional role of advice and monitoring.

The World Bank in Indonesia

Indonesia rejoined the Bank in 1967 and they quickly formed a close relationship. After
Suharto took control, high-level World Bank visits culminated in a visit from President
McNamara in mid-June 1968. McNamara had set out to expand the Bank and his visit:
…may have been the most consequential that a Bank president has
paid to a borrowing country. It galvanized the president into making
Indonesia, from the Bank’s side, an instant special case. 97
The unique operations in Indonesia involved the establishment of the Bank’s first
resident mission —its largest and most significant for many years with very broad terms
of reference and initially direct responsibility to the President of the World Bank. 98 This
direct relationship may have been more to do with the Cold War than anything
regarding Indonesia per se. It resulted in fundamental agreement on macroeconomic
policy bound by “…intimate, ongoing” dialogue with Indonesia’s technocrats. 99 The
Resident Mission worked most closely with BAPPENAS, the Indonesian National
Development Planning Agency but also with other core central government agencies.
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Kapur, Lewis and Webb’s official Bank history argued that Indonesia’s honeymoon
with the Bank was coming to a close by 1972 due to tensions between the Bank’s
Washington and Jakarta offices regarding the close personal relationships between the
Jakarta office and the Suharto administration. 100 By this time, they suggested, the Bank
was also concerned about corruption and the large-scale, public sector development
program being funded by oil revenues parallel to the government budget. Bank staff
aligned with Indonesia’s technocrats to oppose the expenditure but they had lost
political influence as oil revenues and the economy grew. As the technocrats’ influence
declined so too did that of the Bank.
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Yet as Kapur, Lewis and Webb also

acknowledge, the Bank’s public response to the Pertamina scandal was to express
confidence in Indonesia. 102 They did not speak out publicly on corruption until late in
McNamara’s term, which may only have been due to a 1977 The Wall Street Journal
report stating that corruption increased the cost of Bank projects in Indonesia by ten to
15 per cent. 103 In 1980, a World Bank mission produced a 600-page report critical of the
bureaucracy and corruption. However, Indonesian officials “…refused to accept it” and
the World Bank:
…blinked first — perhaps realizing that the country’s oil revenues
greatly diminished the bank’s structural leverage and fearing that a
decade and a half of good relations with Indonesia might be
jeopardized if it pushed too hard in such circumstances. Said the
World Bank’s top official in Jakarta, ‘They didn’t need our money
and they didn’t listen to what we said.’ 104
The report was rewritten extensively but it was submitted to the 1980 IGGI (and the
story leaked to the Far Eastern Economic Review) along with a recommendation of no
increase in ODA — the first since 1967. 105 There was an ongoing problem with slow
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disbursement of loans that indicates some curtailment of the relationship. 106 However,
the Bank quickly returned to its softly-softly approach and, overall, Kapur, Lewis and
Webb appear to overstate the change in the relationship with Indonesia in the light of
the large ongoing lending program and the ‘miracle’ economy tag. Indeed, it seems
more accurate to conclude that Bank staff in Indonesia closely identified with the New
Order regime and were largely ‘captured’ by it. 107

Loans to Indonesia increased through the 1980s when it was one of the World Bank’s
biggest borrowers. From 1981 new loans were only IBRD funded as Indonesia
graduated from IDA funding, although after the Crisis in 1998 it again became eligible
for IDA funding. The oil slump in 1982 increased the technocrats and Bank’s influence
and they were behind much of the structural adjustment that took place from 1986,
outlined earlier. 108 Lending peaked in 1988-1991 with $6.2 billion in new loan
approvals. Thereafter lending declined “…partly because the Bank was reaching its
exposure limits and the Bank shifted its approach to smaller, diversified projects.” 109
However, lending still averaged $1.3 billion per annum between 1990 and 1997. 110

During Wolfensohn’s tenure it seems that the Bank’s resident mission became divided
between two factions: one trusting the Suharto regime and another that Mallaby labelled
“corruption fighters.” 111 During a visit by Wolfensohn in mid-1996, he privately
expressed concern over corruption but the corruption fighters were losing the internal
debate as the “…Bank’s old Indonesia hands refused to alienate their star client.” 112 This
was partly due to the fact that, at the time, the only notable mechanism for responding
to corruption was cutting lending. Given Bank lending to Indonesia had already been
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reduced, this option was unpalatable both to many individual loans officers, whose jobs
depended on lending, and to their managers who are focused on the Bank’s
perpetuation, which requires ongoing increases in lending.

The World Bank plays a key role in coordinating donor programs in Indonesia – across
the case study period, it chaired the CGI and it was represented in the Partnership for
Governance Reform. 113 The Bank leads many projects that receive grant financing
and/or co-lending from other donors. It has a close partnership with the United
Kingdom and the Netherlands. 114 The Bank itself notes:
[e]ven where it is not in the lead, Government and donors rely on it
for strong analytical and advisory support (decentralization, SMEs,
corporate governance, privatization). The Bank plays a key role in
Government’s Extended Arrangements with the IMF… And its
relationship with key policymakers continues to be good—although
where it differs on policy it tends to do so more openly than in the
past. 115

As chart 7.2 shows (see over), in terms of sectors of lending the Bank’s historical focus
has been on energy (electricity), agriculture fishing and forestry and transport. Though
as we will see, there was a dramatic shift in Bank lending in the PWC period.
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Chart 7.2 World Bank Approvals to Indonesia 1968-2004, by Sector
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The World Bank’s Key Planning Documents: the Country Assistance
Strategy and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
The first publicly available CAS is 2001, but references in other Bank literature indicate
that the 1994 CAS had the following objectives:
(a) maintaining economic growth with macroeconomic stability;
(b) reducing poverty and enhancing human resource development;
(c) enhancing private sector development and competitiveness;
(d)

improving

public

sector

management;

and

(e) improving environmental management. 117
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The framing of the objectives around economic growth and macroeconomic stability
indicates the predominance of the Washington Consensus. In terms of lending
directions, there was a major shift from agricultural lending towards infrastructure,
education and health and water supply and sanitation during the 1990s that was not
envisaged in the 1994 and other CASs. Actual allocations for agriculture were
“consistently far below the amount in the CAS.” 118 Nevertheless, the Bank lending
program fits within the themes outlined by the Bank; given the breadth of the themes
this is hardly surprising.

The Bank’s Board approved the 1997 CAS eight days after the Thai Baht was floated
and it presented an essentially optimistic assessment of Indonesia’s economic prospects.
The:
…objectives of the Bank’s 1997 country assistance strategy remained
broadly unchanged from those of the previous 1995 strategy, focusing
on macroeconomic stability; increasing efficiency and productivity in
the public and private sectors; reducing poverty; and sustainable
management of natural resources. 119
The July 1997 CAS had only a meagre discussion of the PWC theme of governance and
it relegated poverty to third on the agenda behind the efficiency and productivity of the
public and private sectors. This is unsurprising given that poverty had not received
adequate attention in general in Indonesia since 1990. 120 This may have been because of
absolute poverty had substantially declined, nevertheless, prior to the Crisis over 20
million people were living in absolute poverty and around 50 per cent of the population
lived on less than $2 a day. The CAS did note the fragility of the Indonesian banking
system but did not consider a crisis likely. Even in mid-August after the Rupiah
depreciated 20 per cent “…the Bank did not revise its strategy or develop a contingency
plan for addressing the deteriorating situation.” Rather, they reported to the Bank Board
that the Crisis was under control. 121 The Bank’s first solid response to the Crisis was a
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technical assistance loan in the finance sector (Banking Reform Assistance Project, $20
million); it was not approved until December 1997. This is the only direct Crisis
response loan that comes under the first case study period. It took a further seven
months for the Bank’s large SALs to be approved. 122

The Bank is now relatively frank regarding the failures of the July 1997 CAS and the
failure to develop contingency plans after the Crisis started. Surprisingly though a 1999
Operations Evaluation Department Country Assistance Note classified Bank
performance in Indonesia over the 1990s as “marginally satisfactory.” 123 Mixed
messages are apparent in relation to corruption — on the one hand, the Bank has
acknowledged that a significant portion (30 per cent is the commonly cited figure) of
Bank funds were misappropriated by the Suharto regime. On the other hand, the 1999
report referred only on page 10 to “…past allegations of improprieties in Indonesia.” Its
review of sectoral achievements utilises old project evaluations without questioning
their integrity. 124 The report translates the ‘special relationship’ with Indonesia into an
argument that Bank operations there were fully client-driven and that this was the
reason for it not pursuing ‘unwelcome’ policies. 125 This reticence and lack of leverage
may have predominated in some sectors (in particular finance) but the idea that the
Bank did not pursue an agenda or possess any leverage is equally absurd. 126

The 2001 CAS contained a more substantial analysis of social, political and economic
forces than the earlier CASs, or indeed the 2002 CAS for Vietnam. 127 It focused
strongly on the PWC themes of participation, decentralisation, poverty and governance.
The Bank claimed that the CAS is informed by consultation with ‘civil society
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organisations,’ 128 but it actually revealed a Bank vision of civil society as something
requiring structuring into organisations that can be trained, evaluated and finally
legitimated by the very process of their incorporation into Bank consultation.
Bernadette Whitelum’s study of World Bank/NGO relations in Indonesia found that this
was precisely what the Bank was doing with the NGO sector, which it regards as
lacking capacity, maturity and an appropriate view of the Bank and of Indonesian
development. 129 Whitelum demonstrates that the Bank “…has assigned itself a role in
shaping Indonesian NGOs in order to further its vision of Indonesia.” 130 Perhaps
because of this view, it struggled to find NGOs willing to engage with it on its own
terms.

On decentralisation, the Bank believed it “…makes good economic sense” but was
concerned about implementation of such radical change. 131 Decentralisation also offered
the opportunity for selective support for provinces implementing appropriate reforms,
that is, for introducing competition amongst provinces. 132 However, as Tania Li pointed
out, there is a tension between the project to “…institute competitive practices at
various levels” and the Bank’s supposed mission of poverty reduction. 133 Thus where
provinces have been performing poorly the Bank leaves open the option to support
“bottom-up” reform via community development projects.134

On levels of lending during the CAS period, the Bank forecasted a base-case “muddlethough” scenario with core lending at around $400 million per annum. 135 This was what
transpired and as a result, net Bank disbursements have been negative since 2002. The
CAS also notes the “…significant possibility of a crisis scenario.” 136 If this were the
case, the Bank’s planned response was to cease all lending. This is a surprising position
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because it would not have suited the needs of international capital or the poor; 137 but the
group that would have been most effected was Indonesia’s political society. The
Government’s resources were substantially reduced by the Crisis and a stop to Bank
lending would likely have produced a drying up of private capital flowing to the state. It
may even have prompted further capital outflows. The impact on the relatively weak
presidency of Abdurrahman Wahid (which lasted just six months after the CAS’s
release) would have been major. This then is quite a formidable example of the Bank’s
coercive power undoubtedly designed to ensure that the Wahid Administration
undertook Bank-supported ‘reform.’

The Washington Consensus themes visible in the 1995 and 1997 CASs dominated the
2001 CAS as well — its first theme of “sustaining economic recovery and promoting
broad-based growth” was little more than a reformulation of the 1994 CAS’s economic
growth and macroeconomic stability theme. The second priority was “national
institutions for accountable government,” again a new expression for an old theme of
efficiency and productivity in the public sector. However, the theme was given new
legitimacy by the international financial institution’s reading of the Asian Financial
Crisis that focused on Indonesia’s institutional weakness and corruption. This justified a
more interventionist role for the Bank. The third theme, “delivering better services to
the poor,” also rehashed the public and private sector efficiency theme but for the newly
decentralised service delivery environment. It was the component that covered the
Bank’s series of Kecamatan Development Projects and Urban Poverty Projects, which
actually operate outside of local government administration. Yet the justification in the
CAS for this theme was support for the government “…to maintain service delivery
through the transition” to decentralisation. 138

The 2003 CAS was thematically similar to 2001. Theme one was re-focused in PWC
terms, where the state has a role in creating an enabling environment for business; it
became: “improving the climate for high quality investment.” Services for the poor
were relegated to second on the list. The national institutions theme from the 2001 CAS
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became in 2003: “the core issue of governance.” 139 The forecast for lending remained at
the base case, though evidence “…of decisive momentum in implementing the reform
package could lead to an ‘enhanced’ base case, in which the Bank would offer an
adjustment loan in late 2004.” 140 The Bank did offer the adjustment loan — the First
Development Policy Loan, which is analysed in the following chapter.

Regarding adjustment lending, the 2001 CAS gave a sense of a new Bank view, which
was comprehensively stated in the 2003 CAS. In this view, adjustment lending does not
offer good leverage in countries that have widespread governance issues and lack ‘deep’
commitment to governance reform. 141 This is now precisely how the Bank views
Indonesia, thus it proposed restrictions on the use of adjustment lending, making it a
reward for ‘good’ past behaviour.

Indonesia is not a Highly Indebted Poor Country and thus was not required to prepare a
PRSP to gain IDA access. However, developing a PRSP was part of the 2001 CAS’s
conditions for moving to a higher lending scenario. An interim-PRSP was completed in
early 2003 and submitted to the World Bank Board in March of that year. As in
Vietnam, the interim document was produced fairly quickly with limited public
participation. 142 The full PRSP process was due for completion in mid-2004 but was
only finalised and released in October 2005. There is remarkably little information
available on the PRSP or the process for its completion, the PRSP itself is not on the
World Bank website, indeed there is barely a mention of it. According to Rudsi
Tagaroa, the PRSP proposes a strong rights-based approach to development, derived
from a participatory process. The Government of Indonesia has committed to
integrating the PRSP action plan into its medium-term expenditure framework,
however, there is little commitment from most portfolios, and indeed they have refused
to implement it. 143
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Conclusion

Indonesia is an important case study because for most of the first period examined here,
1993-1997, it was relatively stable, showed generally steady economic growth and
progress and it was a Bank ‘favourite.’ Early in 1998 things changed, the often brutal
and certainly authoritarian reign of Suharto and the New Order finally collapsed and
were replaced by a series of relatively weak governments. The Bank seemed to support
the first of these led by Habibe, who was a New Order crony turned reformist. Its
support waned during the governments of Wahid and Megawati. The presidency of
Yudhoyono from October 2004 seemed to herald a return to relative stability, even
though it has not challenged entrenched interest in Indonesian society more than other
post-New Order presidencies. Nevertheless, his presidency has seen some rebuilding in
Bank support.

The next chapter explores the Bank’s lending practices in Indonesia in detail, which will
give more insight into how the Bank’s underlying development philosophy has
progressed and the tactics it utilised to achieve its goals.
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Chapter Eight
World Bank Lending in Indonesia
In 1993, the start of the first case study period, the Bank and Indonesia were in a
‘business as usual’ phase of their relationship. Indonesia was one of the Bank’s bigger
lenders but the Bank’s influence on the New Order was not particularly strong. This
relationship is clear in the sectoral analysis of Bank lending that leads this chapter.
What also becomes clear is the profound impact that the Asian Financial Crisis had on
the Bank’s program with Indonesia. It resulted in both a large decline in the size of the
Bank’s program and in major shifts in its sectoral support. The underlying rationale of
these changes and how strongly they are connected to the post-Washington Consensus
versus other factors, are opened up as the chapter analyses Bank adjustment and
investment lending in Indonesia.

A Sectoral Analysis of World Bank Lending in Indonesia

This section examines the evolution of Bank lending in terms of sectoral focus, types of
loans and the size of loans in the two periods, 1993-1997 and 2000-2004 and provides a
brief overview of lending during the Asian Financial Crisis. Like the case study on
Vietnam, the analysis broadly utilises the Bank’s sector classification system of new
loans approved during the case study periods. However, more so than in Vietnam, there
were a significant number of multi-sectoral projects and projects with anomalous Bank
sector classifications. For example, Kecamatan Development Project (KDP) I was
classified transport, its extension was classified as health and other social services and
KDP II was classified as law, justice and public administration. Therefore, the loan
analysis does not strictly follow the Bank’s sectoral classification as was the case for
Vietnam, rather it groups similar projects. These anomalies also make the sectoral
analysis somewhat problematic — it least affects sectoral classifications in energy and
mining, education, transport and health (with KDP I as an exception) and is most
prominent in agriculture, fishing and forestry, water sanitation and flood protection and
law, justice and public administration.
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Table 8.1 World Bank New Loan Approvals to Indonesia by Sector, as a per cent of
total lending: 1993-97 and 2000-04
Sector

1993-1997
(%)

2000-2004
(%)

Energy

24

6

Water, sanitation and flood protection

20

4

Transportation

15

18

Education

13

5

Agriculture, fishing and forestry

10

6

Law, justice and public administration

7

47

Information and Communications

6

<1

Health and other social services

4

14

Industry and Trade

1

0

Finance

<1
0
Data source: World Bank Website, Projects & Operations, Projects Database

Between 1993 and 1997 a total of $5.35 billion in new loans were approved — a little
over one billion per annum. There was no structural adjustment lending. As per Table
8.1, the key sectors of lending were: energy and mining — comprised totally of power
projects — and water, sanitation and flood protection — predominately urban development projects. Transportation projects were mainly road projects while education
lending covered the junior secondary school level and above. Agriculture, fishing and
forestry lending was focused on irrigation and water management projects, two area
development projects and the first Village Infrastructure Project.

Between the case study periods, 1988-1999, Bank new loan approvals were over $1.67
billion per annum of which just over 70 per cent was structural adjustment lending.
Indonesia has only ever received ten SALs: five between 1987 and 1990, four in 19981999 and one in 2004 (note the parallel to IMF loans). The overall average of 13.8 per
cent of loans being SALs is largely due to the large-scale loans of 1998/99. Net World
Bank disbursements 1997-2002 were only $322 million, due to repayments of older
loans and delays or cancellation of tranches from active loans that were tarnished by
New Order corruption (and World Bank complicity). 1

1

The total amount cancelled between 1998 and 2000 was over $1.6 billion, World Bank, "Indonesia CAS
2001-2003," p. 14.
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Bank lending dropped dramatically in 2000-2004 to $2.18 billion. With only one large
structural adjustment loan, adjustment lending was 13.8 per cent of the value of loans,
In contrast to the limited changes in the scale, type and sectors of lending in Vietnam, in
Indonesia there were major shifts not just in volume but also in the sectoral focus. Most
prominently, lending in the law, justice and public administration sector shifts from
seven per cent of lending to 47 per cent, of which KDP projects account for just over 56
per cent. IDA loans comprise 27.6 per cent of the value of all new loan approvals. In the
2001 Indonesia CAS, the Bank estimated that Indonesia’s eligibility for IDA lending
would phase out in four to six years. 2

On the average and median size of loans — an indicator of the Bank’s trade off between
project quantity and quality — in 1993-1997 there were 54 loans with an average and
median size of $99 million. In 2000-2004, the average loan approval remained around
the Bank’s standard at $108 million but the median declined to $77 million. However, if
the two small (less than $5 million) learning and innovation loans are discounted, the
median was $100-103 million. The average number of conditions jumped dramatically
from 15.5 (median 13) in the first case study period to 25.5 (median 24) in the second.

Structural Adjustment Lending in Indonesia

As noted earlier, structural adjustment lending in Indonesia is, as with Vietnam, well
below the Bank’s overall average of 33 per cent. Nevertheless, SALs are often good
indicators of Bank priorities. Take for example, the two trade adjustment loans in 1987
and 1988 (each for $300m) and the two private sector development adjustment loans
(1989 - $350 and 1990 - $250), these had no conditionality at a time when the Bank was
in the midst of its Washington Consensus linked-conditionality period. 3 This indicates
the extent to which Indonesia remained a special case for the Bank through the 1980s,
despite the increasing levels of corruption and cronyism. Even the large-scale Policy
Reform Support Loans (PRSL) I and II (in 1998 and 1999 for respectively $1,000m and
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Ibid, p. 40.
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company, Vickers, History of Modern Indonesia, p. 188. The fifth adjustment loan in this period was the
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$500m) were not highly conditional for their size, containing respectively 12 and 18
conditions. 4

The conditions on the PRSLs though were core Washington Consensus ones — macroeconomic stability, banking reform, tariff reductions, eliminating trade restrictions,
privatisation, liberalising markets and increasing competition (especially in crony
conglomerates such as cloves, palm oil and forestry). In PRSL I, the only PWC theme
was governance, in the second loan corruption and decentralisation appeared. The lack
of strong conditionality was the subject of criticism in the Operations Evaluation
Department’s review of these loans — it argued that this was a missed chance to
“…move the reform program forward.” 5 Given that the loans conditions were
predominately Washington Consensus concerns, there is little doubt about the type of
reform being referred to here.

The $600m Social Safety Net Adjustment Loan (1999) ostensibly provided one-off
assistance to those negatively impacted by the crisis but its underlying objective was to
drive reform of government social expenditures. It sought to make social programs
more targeted and thus constrain expenditure in the medium-term. The Bank largely
designed the loan and saw it as a vehicle for ‘reform,’ which resulted in a high level of
conditionality. This contradicts other elements of the PWC rhetoric, in particular
country ownership. 6 The loan contained 57 complex conditions covering everything
from expenditure levels in specific safety net areas to public involvement in monitoring
and evaluation and “[s]pecific corrective actions taken against an identified list of
problems in implementation of safety net programs.” 7 The Bank used the loan
conditionality extensively, even in an unrelated (but core Washington Consensus) area
— it held off disbursement of the first tranche as leverage for banking sector reform. 8
The program suffered from design and corruption problems and eventually, the second
4

See World Bank, "Project Performance Assessment Report Indonesia 2003."
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menuPK:115635~pagePK:64020917~piPK:64021009~theSitePK:40941,00.html, accessed: February
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World Bank, "Report and Recommendations of the President of the IBRD on a Proposed Social Safety
Net Adjustment Loan to the Republic of Indonesia" (Report No. P7307-IND, April 27 1999), Annex II.
The loan was co-financed by the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) for $600m.
8
Whitelum, "Rhetoric and Reality in the World Bank's Relations with NGOs," p. 303.
5

WORLD BANK LENDING IN INDONESIA

232

tranche of the loan ($300m) was cancelled. The Bank stated the cancellation was
“…because of lack of progress on governance issues” 9 — and indeed, many conditions
were not met even after extension in timeframes. Undoubtedly the extensive
conditionality was administratively difficult for the Government of Indonesia (GoI)
particularly in the midst of decentralisation and other reform. The conditionality also
made the loan a political liability for the Wahid Government. 10

The Water Resources Sector Adjustment Loan (WATSAL) (1999, $300m, $150m
disbursed) was the most controversial of the Bank’s package of Crisis adjustment
operations due to its introduction of the concept of tradeable water rights and its
facilitation of further privatisation of water resources management and operations. 11
WATSAL was proposed by the Bank to progress reform in line with sectoral work
carried out by itself and the ADB in 1997. 12 Legislation, produced as part of the loan,
was the subject of a challenge by NGOs and individuals to Indonesia’s Constitutional
Court in 2005. Its most interesting aspects were its conditionality and the level of
country ownership in relation to the legislation. The legislation was drafted with little
public consultation 13 and, because of the controversy surrounding it, was the subject of
intense debate and amendments by the DPR. These amendments, and some changes in
interpretations by the responsible Ministries, led to the Bank delaying the second and
third loan tranches and eventually cancelling the third loan tranche.

Nevertheless the Bank’s report on the completed loan regarded it as quite successful in
driving reform. The discussion of lessons learned includes a detailed discussion on the
“…necessary and sufficient conditions for ambitious, major sector reforms.” 14
Conditions identified include: …“an overriding trigger, such as a national or sector
‘crisis,’” a local leader to champion reform, a clear strategy and a conducive political-

9
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Implementation Completion Report on the Social Safety Net Adjustment Loan, however, interestingly
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economic environment. 15 Next, the report considered the most effective form of
adjustment assistance to drive “reform operations” in various circumstances. 16 In other
words, how to ensure the most leverage from loans in various circumstances. Finally, it
explored ways of implementing reform that minimise political opposition and ensure
full compliance. Issues discussed range from minimising legislation amendments to
having broad participation in reform and regulation design. On technical assistance, it
argued that “…reform ‘ownership’ is crucial” thus “preparation of reform deliverables
by expatriate consultants should be decidedly avoided.” 17 This is more than a classic
piece of Bank-speak, the inverted commas around ‘ownership’ indicates precisely how
the Bank seeks to manage reform processes in such a way that they seem to be locally
owned, whilst in reality establishing and managing the agenda itself.

With the new view that adjustment lending does not provide enough leverage where a
regime does not follow the (Bank-determined) ‘right’ agenda, there was no adjustment
lending to the governments of Wahid or Megawati. Whereas Habibe, who lacked a
strong domestic power base and was thus particularly reliant on the support of
international agencies, received three large, quick disbursing program loans within the
six months prior to the election.

Two months after Yudhoyono was sworn in, he was rewarded for his strong talk on
increasing economic growth, creating the right investment environment and fighting
corruption with the First Development Policy Loan ($300m) in December 2004. This
loan was less conditional than those made in 1999. It contained ten ‘prior actions’ (i.e.
conditions) before release and twelve indicative conditions for a second loan. The
conditions covered three areas, the first two of which are consistent with Washington
Consensus concerns: reducing government debt and improving the investment climate.
The third core area was a PWC one: governance and anti-corruption (expressed in a
focus on accounting standards, accounting operations, corruption investigations). 18 The
loan was relatively tightly focused but, as in the Vietnam case study, it clearly
demonstrates the PWC’s role to extend and deepen financial discipline and
15
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transparency. Under the governance heading, one of the prior actions was development
of a timetable for adoption of a Treasury single account. 19 The completion report for the
First Development Policy Loan claimed there was country ownership of the reform
program but it provided little evidence in support of the claim and it is difficult to gauge
its accuracy. 20

Overall, in adjustment lending to Indonesia the Social Safety Net Adjustment Loan
stood as indicative of the influence of a strong version of the PWC. Yet, the high level
of conditionality and cancellation of the second tranche indicated the level of unease
with the loan. The 2005 Implementation Completion Report on WATSAL signified the
Bank preference for driving reform regardless of country ownership. Starting with the
proposition that crisis provides the opportunity for ‘reform,’ it suggested use of the form
of lending that provides the most leverage in the circumstances. Implementation, it
argued, need to be done incrementally to minimise backlash. This is a clear indication
of the Bank’s hegemonic predisposition using coercion combined with little more, in
this case, than a veil of consent.

Investment Lending in Indonesia

The analysis of investment lending in Indonesia commences with an analysis of the law,
justice and public administration sector, which was by far the major sector of lending in
the second case study period. This sector is divided into three sub-sectors: general law,
justice and public administration project; rural area development projects; and urban
area development projects — this includes the series of Urban Development Projects
which were classified by the Bank predominately as water, sanitation and flood
protection but were multi-sectoral and the forerunners to the Urban Poverty Projects.

Given that the law, justice and public administration sector incorporates a large number
of projects originally classified as water, sanitation and flood protection, this leaves
only a small number of projects in this sector, which is the second sector analysed.
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Transportation is the third sector examined, as it is a substantial sector during both
periods, followed by energy and mining, health, agriculture and fishing and forestry
and, lastly, education. There was one loan in both the finance and industry and trade
sectors. The finance loan is included with law, justice and public administration and the
industry and trade loan is included with education sector loans, as it was a human
resource development project. The information and communications sector is not
analysed as there was only one loan in each period and the loan in the second case study
period was a learning and innovation loan for $2.66m, thus it would be impossible to
undertake a meaningful analysis. The loans could also not usefully be included in
another sector.

Law, Justice and Public Administration
General Law, Justice and Public Administration Projects
Table 8.2 Word Bank General Law, Justice and Public Administration Sector Lending
to Indonesia: 1993-1997 and 2000-2004
Project Name

Year
Approved

Approved
Amount
(USD millions)

Loans 1993-1997
Flores Earthquake Reconstruction Project

1993

$42.1

Integrated Swamps Development Project

1994

$65.0

Land Administration Project

1994

$80.0

Second Accountancy Development Project

1994

$25.0

Industrial Technology Development Project

1995

$47

Second Technical Assistance Project for the Public and
Private Provision of Infrastructure

1995

$28.0

Human Resources Capacity Building Project

1996

$20.0

BEPEKA Audit Modernization Project

1997

$16.4

Information Infrastructure Development Project

1997

$34.5

Banking Reform Assistance Project*

1997

$20.0

Private Provision of Infrastructure Technical Assistance Loan

2003

$17.1

Land Management and Policy Development Project

2003

$65.6

Government Financial Management and Revenue
Administration Project

2004

$60.0

Loans 2000-2004**

* This loan’s classification is finance, it is the only loan in the sector and thus included here.
** The First Development Policy Loan was approved in this period — it was analysed above.
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This is quite a hodgepodge of loans, however, there are three reoccurring themes: land
titling, private sector participation and public financial management. Land titling is a
theme in three projects — Integrated Swamps Development, Land Administration and
the Land Management and Policy Development Project. This Bank’s interest in land
titling derives partly from its lack of ease with the Indonesian Constitution’s vesting of
ultimate control of land, water and airspace with the state due to its social function. 21
Combined with the Pancasilia commitment to social justice, land in Indonesia is not a
mere commercial commodity as in the West. 22 This is a problem for the Bank because
they see that private ownership facilitates land markets that underpin “modern economic
development.” 23 As noted in the Vietnam case study, land markets as a way to create
and reproduce private property are more than a core Washington Consensus, they are
central to the broader liberal capitalist project that the Bank exemplifies.

The Integrated Swamps Development Project was a so-called second-stage
transmigration project, that is, one focused on rehabilitating original transmigration
sites. 24 Rehabilitation was a necessity because transmigration loans were not only an
environmental disaster, they often did little to improve the living standards of
transmigrants, let alone those of local indigenous populations. 25 The project aimed to
reduce poverty in 20 swamp transmigration locations in Sumatera and West
Kalimantan. It included components on water control, rural infrastructure, and food and
tree crop production as well as land titling. The land-titling component focused on
providing titles to original inhabitants — most of whom did not receive titles, whereas
transmigrants did! 26 By the mid-1990s when this scheme was approved, it was well-

21
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23
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known that transmigration projects had systematically violated the customary land
rights of indigenous groups. Yet the Staff Appraisal Report claimed that “…swamp
lands are usually uninhabited before drainage, and therefore relatively free of land
claims which often hinder large scale development elsewhere.” 27 The project exhibited a
surprising faith in the capacity to farm swamp lands and in transmigrant labour as the
key to developing, in this case, a large-scale tree cash-cropping industry. 28 It focused on
private sector participation in infrastructure development, but had virtually no
discussion of community participation in design and implementation and equally no
discussion of gender issues including regarding land titling.

Limited community participation and gender analysis were also features of the Land
Administration Project, which had the rather lofty goals of not just fostering
“…efficient and equitable land markets” but also alleviating “…social conflicts over
land.” 29 Apart from the rather tricky notion of what ‘equitable’ land markets are, the
idea that titling will resolve social conflict in the context of large-scale dispossession of
indigenous peoples is rather problematic. 30 The Land Management and Policy
Development Project (2003) in the second case study period, exhibited more awareness
of such issues and as a result it focused on the policy and regulatory framework rather
than titling. It explicitly excluded areas with traditional land rights issues from pilot
titling activities. The project also had a much more participatory approach — a lesson
learned from the Land Administration Project. 31

The Land Management Project’s gender analysis was only slightly more developed than
that of the Land Administration Project. The latter project argued that women’s rights
would be strengthened by titling of land because, under Indonesia law, land that either
partner own prior to marriage remains their property; titling would ensure that women

27
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retain their rights in cases of marriage dissolution. 32 There was no mention, though, of
the proportion of land owned by women prior to marriage, which is small. Further, it
claimed that property acquired during marriage is under marriage law joint property and
thus joint titling was not essential. Yet the Land Management Project acknowledged
that titling in the husband’s name only weakened the position of women. 33 To remedy
this, the project merely aimed to ensure that 90 per cent of participant women were
informed of the right to have joint property titles. 34 There was no discussion in either
loan of women’s rights in the case of property acquired jointly by unmarried couples —
this is not an insignificant issue in Indonesia as marriage can be expensive (bride price
and the costs of registering marriages) and thus out of reach of some of the poor.

Private sector participation was a key theme in four loans: the Industrial Technology
Development Project, the Information Infrastructure Development Project, the Second
Technical Assistance Project for Public and Private Provision of Infrastructure and the
Private Provision of Infrastructure Technical Assistance Loan. The Industrial
Technology Project (1995) aimed to improve the competitiveness of Indonesian
industry, especially small to medium enterprises (SMEs) via improvements in research
and development (R&D), industrial measurement, standards, testing and quality and
improvements in industrial technology policy. The Bank’s evaluation of the loan,
completed in 2005, noted three major issues with the loan, which they cannot, or do not
wish to explain, yet which can be contextualised by anyone with a rudimentary
knowledge of Indonesian politics.

First, the evaluation stated that it is “not clear” why the project was approved given the
context of significant budgetary restrictions on R&D institutions. 35 One explanation is
that Habibe was then Minister for Science and Technology and was an up and coming
favourite in the administration. Second, the evaluation pointed to the inconsistency of
having SMEs as the target of R&D and quality programs that are normally the domain
of big business. The unmentioned context here is the sensitivities of New Order support

32

World Bank, "Staff Appraisal Report: Indonesia Land Administration," pp. 30-31.
World Bank, "Project Appraisal: Indonesia Land Management and Policy Development," p. 21.
34
Ibid.
35
In the lessons learned, this problem is reduced to a sequencing issue, World Bank, "Project
Performance Assessment Report Indonesia Industrial Technology Development Project (Loan No. 3972)"
(Report No. 32733, July 5 2005), p. 5.
33

WORLD BANK LENDING IN INDONESIA

239

for Chinese big business versus indigenous business concentrated in the SME sector —
when the indigenous SME sector felt too excluded, political and social disturbances
often resulted. This project then, might be explained by the New Order’s need to be
seen supporting indigenous SMEs. Third, the evaluation pointed out design defects in
the technology transfer grant scheme also targeted at SMEs. It was demand-driven and
operated on a first-come-first-served basis, which did not guarantee the best projects
were supported. Indeed, it may have facilitated corruption, or at least nepotism, in
scheme administration; this later issue is not discussed. 36 Yet, nepotism was central to
the New Order’s distribution of wealth. Thus this design ‘fault’ may have been
deliberate. For a project evaluated in the PWC period the lack of analysis of politics or
corruption is quite striking.

The 1997 Information Infrastructure Development Project aimed to enhance private
sector participation in providing information technology, post and tourism services. It
had a strong focus on legal and regulatory ‘reform’ and in particular the protection of
intellectual property rights — a core Washington Consensus concern. The project also
subsidised a science and technology network, a tourism information service and a
program to expand private sector access to technology. These are justified on the basis
of the “strong positive externalities” they generate. 37 This is an interesting departure
from the Bank’s standard (Washington Consensus) position on the necessity for cost
recovery in other infrastructure sectors (e.g. power or water supply).

These two projects — Public and Private Provision of Infrastructure and Information
Technology —were clearly more the product of the New Order’s agenda than the Bank
one. Given too the Bank acknowledgement that the New Order creamed substantial
amounts from its loans, this indicates, albeit in a rather negative form, a fairly high level
of regime ‘ownership’ of the Bank program.
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The 1995 Second Technical Assistance Project for Public and Private Provision of
Infrastructure acknowledged, implicitly more than explicitly, corruption but its solution
was purely technical — development of effective regulatory frameworks. This solution
reflected the background analysis which presented Indonesia as engaged in linear
development from: “…a primarily natural resource-based economy to a more human
capital productivity-based economy;… from a largely rural economy to a more urban
society…”, complimented by (liberal democratic) “…political transition featuring a
more open debate of public policy issues and a rethinking of the role of Government,
private sector and community organisations.” 38 The project covered public as well as
private sector provision of infrastructure because, it argued that the GoI was “still at an
early stage” in the supposedly cost-effectiveness driven transition of government from a
supplier to a facilitator of services.39 Given the technical, problem-solving approach of
the project, there was no discussion of political or community commitment to the new
regulatory frameworks or of private interest in participating in infrastructure provision. 40

Regulatory frameworks were also the focus of the Private Provision of Infrastructure
Technical Assistance Loan from 2003. This loan more explicitly acknowledged
corruption (a PWC theme) but private provision of infrastructure moved from being an
option to an “imperative” about which no debate is required (core Washington
Consensus). 41 Mistrust of public debate is quite evident in the loan documents, which
claimed for example, that the public debate on the failings of private investments in
infrastructure under the New Order regime was “poorly-informed” and “…open to
exploitation by those with vested interests in maintaining the status quo.” 42 And while
“civil society” was to be involved in project oversight it seems that public perceptions
needed to be shaped to support private sector provision of infrastructure and
privatisation. 43 The project demonstrated that private infrastructure provision has
become a Washington Consensus hegemonic principle. PWC influences were visible in
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the allowance that tariff increases be accompanied by well-targeted subsidies and
through the strong emphasis on transparency.

Public financial management was a theme in four loans — the Second Accountancy
Development Project, the BEPEKA Audit Modernization Project, the Banking Reform
Assistance Project and the Government Financial Management and Revenue
Administration Project. The Second Accountancy Project (1994) aimed not just to
modernise the GoI accountancy system but to improve overall public and private sector
accountancy standards via implementation of exams for public accountants and
development and enforcement of internationally-based accounting standards. The
BEPEKA (state audit agency) Project (1997) aimed to improve audit capacity. The
focus here on GoI accountancy systems and auditing fits with the Washington
Consensus focus on government failures but interestingly they can be seen as early
examples of the PWC focus on governance ‘reforms’ that expand financial discipline
over the state. Both projects implicitly acknowledged corruption though largely in the
Washington Consensus sense as a problem of government. On local ownership, the
Second Accountancy Project appraisal stated only that while “…the Government is
committed to improved enterprise reporting and disclosure, resistance to the changes
which are introduced could come from some stakeholders.” 44 The BEPEKA Project
appraisal listed a range of commitments by GoI to the project, yet the Bank’s
Implementation Completion Report stated that the required political will for project
implementation was lacking. 45

The Banking Reform Assistance Project (1997) was, as noted earlier, the Bank’s first
lending response to the Asian Financial Crisis. It is included under the public financial
management theme because it had a strong focus on reforming government regulation
and supervision of banking. It also assisted with the restructuring of private banks and
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preparation of state-owned banks for full or partial privatisation. 46 The project clearly
promoted core Bank Washington Consensus concerns, it was also spectacularly
unsuccessful even in the Bank’s own terms. There was clearly little GoI support for it as
they failed to appoint counterparts or undertake other supposedly agreed actions. 47

In the second case study period, the Government Financial Management and Revenue
Administration Project (2004) seemed to be underpinned by a Washington Consensus
view of government failure but its detail was shaped by the PWC governance agenda.
Its overall objective was to facilitate “…poverty-reduction goals through higher
resource mobilization and more effective public resource management.” 48 The link to
poverty reduction was a very indirect link at best as there was no requirement that any
savings generated through efficiencies or reduction in corruption be targeted to poverty
reduction expenditures. Rather, the project relied on the generic PWC claim that better
institutions and good governance assist in poverty reduction. 49 The project sought to
reduce possibilities for corruption and misuse of funds and had a strong focus on: GoI
ownership; sequencing of further reforms; safeguards in procurement; and risk analysis
and minimisation. It is a further example of a PWC project to extend the fiscal
discipline on the state through financial management systems.

Two projects do not fit any of the themes explored: the Flores Earthquake
Reconstruction Project and the Human Resources Capacity Building Project. The Flores
Project (1993) had no documentation just a web entry. It seems to have focused on
infrastructure reconstruction but was classified as law, justice and public administration
perhaps due to a focus on government planning and response to natural disasters. 50 The
Human Resources Project (1996) promoted human resource development in the health
and education sectors via funding technical assistance for sectoral and feasibility
studies, planning frameworks and training. It had a strong focus on decentralisation as,
indeed, did four other loans in the first case study period (Integrated Swamps, Land
46

World Bank, "Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Loan to the Republic of Indonesia for a
Banking Reform Assistance Project" (Report No. 17165-IND, November 20 1997), p. 4.
47
World Bank, "Project Performance Assessment Report Indonesia 2003," pp. 12-14.
48
World Bank, "Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Loan to the Republic of Indonesia for a
Government Financial Management and Revenue Administration Project in Support of the First Phase of
the GFMRAP Program" (Report No. 29910-IND, November 22, 2004), p. ii.
49
Ibid.
50
See the World Bank Website, Projects & Operations, available from: http://www.worldbank.org/
external/projects, access date: March 2006.

WORLD BANK LENDING IN INDONESIA

243

Administration, Public and Private Provision of Infrastructure and the BEPEKA
Project). This is because decentralised project administration was a Suharto-initiated
reform from around 1992, albeit one with limited impacts. The Bank, however,
systematically pursued the issue in its lending program during the first case study
period. In the second case study period, decentralisation was a reality and a problem for
implementation not an agenda to be pursued by the Bank.

Projects in this general law, justice and public administration sector demonstrated an
increase in participatory rhetoric from the first to the second case study periods. The
form of involvement was predominately NGOs undertaking monitoring and evaluation
of projects. This form does not challenge the “…political insulation of technocrats”
presiding over project design and implementation. 51 The limited loans in the second
case study period make it difficult to analyse ownership in this period, certainly all three
loans are on issues that have been on the public agenda in Indonesia, however, the Bank
approach clearly drives the reform agenda in particular directions.

Rural Area Development Projects

Table 8.3 Word Bank Rural Development Lending to Indonesia: 1993-1997 and 20002004
Project Name

Year
Approved

Approved
Amount
(USD millions)

Loans 1993-1997
Village Infrastructure Project

1995

$72.5

Second Village Infrastructure Project

1996

$140.1

Kecamatan Development Project (supplement)

2000

$48.2

Second Kecamatan Development Project

2001

$320.2

Third Kecamatan Development Project

2003

$249.8

Loans 2000-2004

The Village Infrastructure Projects (VIPs) provided block grants to targeted poor
villages in Java and Sumatera to construct small-scale infrastructure. Villages who
formed local community groups could select an infrastructure project to undertake from
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a project ‘menu.’ The community managed construction using contractors or local paid
labour. The project built on two existing GoI programs providing funds to villages —
the Program for Villages Left Behind (IDT), a grant program that utilised governmentpaid community facilitators to assist community groups to decide and implement local
projects; and the Presidential Instruction village grant program. This program funded
inputs for infrastructure projects, with labour provided by the village as an in-kind
contribution. 52 Community facilitators from the IDT project were available to assist
villages participating in VIP plus they received Bank-funded engineering assistance.

VIP pioneered a range of innovative approaches for the World Bank in Indonesia:
[t]he project is innovative for the Bank in the extent of its
decentralization/grassroot approach: the villages selected are to decide
the works they want and that comply with a simple economic criteria;
technical assistance is to be provided directly to village groups;
financing will be provided directly through subdistrict bank units and
be delinked from late budget releases. The focus is also on employment: villagers doing the work are to be paid cash in proportion to
work progress and works are to be organized seasonally or as
convenient for labour availability. 53
So, VIP was innovative in three ways: first, it operationalised a scaled-up community
development approach in a Bank-funded project; second, it adopted and promoted
decentralised administration; and third, it departed from the Bank’s standard project
approach of only funding goods and services that are competitively procured by funding
community labour at a subsistence pay rate as well as procuring goods and specialised
labour competitively. Though, on this last point, Kecamatan Development Project
(KDP) literature suggests that, in fact, contractors, rather than directly engaged labour,
undertook most of the work on VIPs. 54
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The first KDP (for $225m) was approved in June 1998 and was the second project of
any size or significance funded by the Bank after the onset of the Crisis.55 This was just
four months after a trip by Wolfensohn to Jakarta. After being briefed on the Bank’s
current lending program, which was focused on macroeconomic stabilisation,
Wolfensohn reportedly responded: “I can’t tell the bloody press that these reforms are
being financed by our money! I’ve got to tell them we’re buying medicines, food for the
poor, that’s what I need to say!” 56 KDP showed the Bank supporting the rural poor to
earn a wage to purchase food.

KDP quickly became a flagship program for the Bank — its sheer scale relative to
lending in this period indicates its centrality to Bank strategy in Indonesia. KDP was the
face of the new Bank in Indonesia, it was ‘under the radar’ as Bank strategy required
and also populist. It funds lots of small projects in poor communities, not big
infrastructure or central government ‘reform.’ It was great for PR as it showed money
going to poor communities. 57 In Mallaby’s book, the program received a very positive
analysis. He presented it as innovative and even claimed that, in shifting the focus from
human capital to social capital, the program promoted “…revolutionary political and
social change.” 58

In reality KDP is quite similar to VIP in both its stated operations and objectives and
VIP, of course, built on existing GoI programs. The key differences between them are
that KDP operates a more extensive community planning and training component
(based on its social capital analysis). It directly trains and funds thousands of
community facilitators as well as engineers. The KDP community planning component
generally takes four to six months. Community participation is more self-selecting in
KDP than under VIP, although both projects are targeted at poor villages. 59 KDP’s
project menu is larger than VIPs; to infrastructure it added social expenditures (for
example, for school scholarships and materials) and economic activities (essentially

55

The first sizeable project — $103.5m — was the West Java Basic Education Project.
Quoted in Mallaby, The World's Banker, p. 196.
57
In 2000, Wolfensohn returned spending a night in one of the project villages, ibid, p. 205.
58
Ibid, p. 205 and 337.
59
KDP claims a better targeting system than VIP but it maintains the requirement to fund clusters of poor
villages to reduce costs for facilitation and support, see World Bank, "Project Appraisal Document
Indonesia KDP", pp. 4-6. On VIP targeting see World Bank, "Staff Appraisal Report: Republic of
Indonesia Second Village Infrastructure Project" (Report No. 15467-IND, September 13 1996), p. 3.
56

WORLD BANK LENDING IN INDONESIA

246

microfinance which are referred to as ‘revolving funds’). Until 2004, infrastructure was
by far the largest activity (70 per cent of kecamatan grant funds) followed by
microfinance (25 per cent), while social expenditures only accounted for around five per
cent of grants. KDP also has a strengthened focus on information sharing, transparency
and participatory monitoring and evaluation. It often engages local NGOs to undertake
these activities.

The KDP appraisal documents were strongly informed by, and imbued with, the
literature of social capital — yet, despite the prominence of social capital in PWC
rhetoric, the case studies in this thesis indicate that overall it has had limited influence
on lending. The exception here is not surprising because a number of members of the
social development team in Jakarta, which supervised KDP, researched and promoted
social capital from Bank headquarters in Washington before their shift to Indonesia. 60
Indeed, Indonesia was one of a small number of Bank sites selected for testing the
impact of social capital on development. KDP was designed, or rather justified by,
social capital studies, some of which were not completed until after the project was
designed. According to Li, the key finding of the studies was that Indonesian villages
“…already do — or could do, with appropriate facilitation and incentives — everything
good governance and village development require.”61 Further, they characterised the
state as largely a hindrance to village development despite many examples of its
positive impacts. It is difficult to know whether this hostility to the state was the result
of neoliberal opposition to it or due to specific concerns about the Suharto regime —
KDP’s designers were undoubtedly part of the corruption-fighter grouping in the Jakarta
office.

The identified sources of poverty in the KDP background analysis were lack of access
to the state and the state’s lack of responsiveness and inefficiency. There was no
discussion of the impact of capitalist accumulation or state economic and social policy
on poverty. This confirms Fine’s finding that PWC social capital does not extend to
social scientists engaging with ‘economic’ issues. The political-bureaucratic-business
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patronage system received only passing comment, via its impact on local level
governance, which was the proposed site for addressing poverty through “…improved
planning and control of projects and resources close to home.” 62 Here is the Keynesian
commitment to planning at the core of the establishment of the Bank itself, rewritten
and reformulated for a NIE-influenced neoliberal age.

The Bank claims that KDP is different from its normal project because its focus is on
process not outputs; it is the most developed expression of the Bank’s version of
participation in the case studies. Yet as Li pointed out, every aspect of the process is
delineated in a huge array of project manuals and other documents.63 Despite the Bank’s
rhetoric that the overarching design principle of the project is maximising end-user
choice, 64 there is no choice for communities in how participation is undertaken or how
projects are planned and approved, the only choice is which activity communities
undertake from the KDP menu. Once an activity is chosen, there are whole sets of
manuals and rules instructing how activities are to be planned, implemented,
administered and monitored. Even ‘independent’ local media monitoring of projects is
organised and funded.

The four design principles of KDP are:
i.

maximising ‘contestation,’ which in practice means competitive procurement of
goods and services;

ii.

direct negotiation, which means making kecamatan responsible for adjudicating
in a forced competition between the proposals of various villages;

iii.

active sharing of project information — a principle derived from NGO
community development projects and NIE theorising, which is rendered
technical by the Bank’s checklist approach; and

iv.

utilisation of existing village organisations — so long as they meet the Bank’s
checklist of what a participatory organisation looks like. This is another example
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of partial adoption of NGO community development principles rendered
technical by the Bank.

KDP claims a strong gender focus — there must be women on the village community
groups and the committee that competitively selects the projects to be supported across
each kecamatan. Where a village wishes to submit two proposals, one must be from a
local women’s group. 65 It does not require gender equity and it certainly does not
challenge women’s position in Indonesian society. KDP II contained additional
measures to ensure gender sensitivity. Nevertheless, KDP III found that gender (and
inclusion) has been problematic. It seems that women’s participation has not improved
over the course of the project and, in some cases, it has worsened. This was explained as
the result of decentralisation reviving traditional social institutions, not because of the
gendered impact of the Crisis. 66

Li demonstrated that KDP does not challenge traditional power structures (despite them
being mapped under the project). In one example, she deconstructed a project success
story about the transformation of village culture. It celebrated a village protest regarding
a delivery of lumber, which was less than specified in the contract. The village head and
council of elders utilised traditional symbols in an orderly protest at the district
parliament. The Bank saw the protest as one to celebrate because it was culturally
authentic, “…quiet and orderly… [and] directed at the appropriate authority… They
acted autonomously and responsibly within the limits experts prescribe.” 67 This example
also indicates that village groups under KDP have been dominated by the village elite
(represented in the story by the villages head and elders). Further, corruption in relation
to materials procurement has been a significant problem for the project and the Bank’s
own studies indicate that community participation is not effective in controlling it. 68
What Li’s deconstruction also demonstrated was that KDP promotes an instrumental
focus for people as project or contract managers in their community.
65
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KDP largely bypasses local and district governments other than as a conduit for funds.
Provincial bureaucracy plays a limited role in project management and supervision via a
coordinating committee. Line ministries, such as the Department of Transport, etc,
normally responsible for the provision and maintenance of infrastructure are bypassed.
Of course, managing and administering such a large project requires a whole range of
structures and a program of accountability that parallels the state. As Li states, “KDP is
unabashedly governmental.” 69 But this is neoliberal governmentalism — run by the
community and lacking permanence because of the separation from the state. The lack
of permanence also creates a dilemma for the Bank in terms of sustaining project
outcomes, a dilemma that is finally partially acknowledged in KDP III.

Bank staff recognise the frailty of the changes they promote but do not propose
activities to achieve more fundamental transformations. 70 Despite the undoubtedly
progressive aspirations of the Bank team working on KDP, the more pertinent question
is not how transformative KDP is, but how much it actually supports current statesociety relations and networks of power. To return to Li:
…the KDP process (backed by its rule books, monitors, and auditing
devices) is designed to shape desires and act on actions, setting the
conditions so that people will be disposed to behave as they should. 71
And, as we saw above, how people should behave is as “critical customers” and as
rational, competitive actors responsible for, and focused on their own development
within the market. 72 Equally, they are not required or supposed to focus on intangible
national or international political or economic issues supposedly beyond their control.
The “project telos” of KDP, indeed of all Bank community development projects, is
according to Li the need for training and facilitation to enable communities to
69
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“become.” Become what? — neoliberal communities that take “…responsibility for
their own improvement by engaging with markets” and learn “…how to conduct
themselves” in a competitive market. 73 Indeed, Porter and Craig note that this inclusion
of communities in “…wider governance and market relations in subordinated,
disaggregated ways… as regions coordinating their own service delivery” is one key
purpose of the PWC. 74 It is a project to embed neoliberal social, political and economic
relations. The poor are included — but in a peripheral way so that their “…poverty can
be ‘locally owned’, and services imputed to them as ‘social income’ while they work
their way back step-wise into the global economy.” 75

Urban Area Development Projects

Table 8.4 Word Bank Urban Development Lending to Indonesia: 1993-1997 and
2000-2004
Project Name

Year
Approved

Approved
Amount
(USD millions)

Loans 1993-1997
Surabaya Urban Development Project

1994

$175.0

Semarang Surakata Urban Development Project

1994

$174.0

Kalimantan Urban Development Project

1995

$136.0

Second East Java Urban Development Project

1996

$117.0

Second Sulawesi Urban Development Project

1996

$155.0

Bali Urban Infrastructure Project

1997

$110.0

2002

$100.0

Loans 2000-2004
Second Urban Poverty Project

The six Urban Development Projects (UDPs) were part of a series of Bank-funded
projects supporting the GoI’s Integrated Urban Development Program (originally the
Integrated Urban Infrastructure Development Program). All of the projects operated
with decentralised administration — central and provincial governments played key
coordinating roles but implementation was undertaken by local government. However,

73

Li, "Government through Community: The World Bank in Indonesia," p. 5. This is equally the case for
NGOs involved in such Bank projects, see Whitelum, "Rhetoric and Reality in the World Bank's
Relations with NGOs," pp. 198-204.
74
Porter and Craig, "The Third Way and the Third World," p. 393.
75
Ibid.

WORLD BANK LENDING IN INDONESIA

251

not all GoI agencies supported this approach and thus some of the projects took a long
time to prepare — six years in the case of the Kalimantan UDP. 76 The projects all had as
core objectives improved urban infrastructure provision and enhanced institutional
capacity amongst local governments. In addition, some included a specific focus on
urban poverty alleviation and others on environmental sustainability.

All projects involved competitive tendering of activities in urban transport, water
supply, solid waste management, sanitation and sewerage, drainage and technical
assistance and training. Two important elements of UDP were the Kampung
Improvement Program (KIP) and Market Improvement Program (MIP). The Kampung
Improvement Program was a government-assisted urban community self-help program
that has been operating in Indonesia since the 1960s. It was partly funded through a
number of Bank loans since the 1970s. 77 After the Asian Financial Crisis hit, KIP was
expanded in a number of the UDPs and most projects added a component to fund
labour-intensive civil works. The KIP/MIP components were the main avenue for
community participation in the UDPs but participation was a strong theme in the project
documentation.

Equally, all the projects had a strong focus on private sector participation, for most
components this involved tendering infrastructure construction or rehabilitation.
However, in at least four projects privatisation of services, particularly water supply and
solid waste management, was proposed. 78 The three available implementation
completion reports indicated that there was resistance from both the community and
local administrations to water supply privatisation. 79 In general this is attributed to
difficulties in raising water tariffs (a condition of all the UDP loans) in the wake of the
Asian Financial Crisis. However, the Bali project also acknowledged that:
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[p]roblems encountered in the Jakarta water concessions likely
contributed to the unwillingness of Bali local governments to
complete restructuring as a prelude to initiating PSP [private sector
participation] in water supply. 80

The three implementation completion reports provide three very different stories about
the outcomes of these projects from poor (Sulawesi), OK (Kalimantan) to good (Bali).
The Sulawesi project was expanded from 18 to 32 small and medium cities across
Sulawesi at the behest of the GoI, 81 thus the project was much more complex than in
Bali, which had a tight geographical focus or in Kalimantan, which only incorporated
five regional centres. Why the Bank, despite its misgivings, approved the expanded
geographical focus, was not addressed by the completion report. A likely reason is GoI
concern with “regionally balanced development,” a concern regarded as “legitimate” by
the Bank as indicated by the geographical spread of the urban and rural area
development projects. 82

The Kalimantan and Sulawesi reports, written respectively in 2003 and 2004, provided
some insight into the PWC view of corruption — or “misprocurement” as it was called
in a wonderful piece of ‘Bank-speak.’ In Sulawesi, “irregularities” were found in 56 out
of the 60 contracts reviewed by the Bank and there were “…weak fiduciary practices in
procurement, implementation and financial management systems.” 83 Here corruption is
addressed in precisely the way that the analysis of PWC rhetoric suggests — a technical
problem of market and government failure.

The Urban Poverty Projects (UPP) can be understood as an urban version of KDP and
the PWC version of UDP-type interventions. 84 The projects provide block grants to
community units, which are neighbourhoods (kelurahan) rather than subdistricts
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World Bank, "Implementation Completion Report on a Loan to the Republic of Indonesia for a Bali
Urban Infrastructure Project" (Report No. 31464-IND, June 28 2005), p. 11.
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World Bank, "Implementation Completion Report on a Loan to the Republic of Indonesia for a Second
Sulawesi Urban Development Project" (Report No. 25719, March 31 2004), p. 2.
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This was expressed in a number of the loan appraisal documents including, World Bank, "Staff
Appraisal Report: Indonesia Surabaya UDP," p. 10.
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World Bank, "Implementation Completion Report: Indonesia Second Sulawesi UDP," p. 9.
84
A third UPP was approved by the Bank in May 2005 and additional funding of $135.5 million for UPP
2 was approved in May 2007.
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(kecamatan) as is the case for KDP. 85 To be eligible for funding, neighbourhoods need
to be constituted as democratically elected community committees, whereas in KDP the
kecamatan group responsible for funding decisions is actually an informal group though
it includes the (government appointed) Council of Village Heads. UPP neighbourhood
committees competitively allocate grant funding between proposals from members and
resident groups. As in KDP, those submitting proposals need to undertake training. In
UPP I, over 90 per cent of grants were used for microfinance activities.86

The role of microfinance as a neoliberal replacement for social safety nets was
discussed extensively in the Vietnam case study. However, it is worth noting here that
KDP/UPP view microfinance through the Bank’s commercial/financial paradigm,
meaning it should operate profitably and not require donor support after establishment.
However, repayments rates for both KDP and UPP microfinance funds have been poor.
KDP III included a project component to address the poor performance of KDP-funded
microfinance projects and the broader legal and regulatory framework for
microfinance. 87

The Second Urban Poverty Project departed notably from the earlier project on the role
of the state. It posited that construction and management of urban infrastructure is often
too big or complicated for community groups and requires involvement of local
government. It also noted that bypassing local government may harm the relations
between it and community organisations in the short- and medium-term and thus harm
local development. 88 It therefore included a component for projects to be undertaken
through a partnership between local government and the local community. While this
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See Ke Fang, "Designing and Implementing a Community-Driven Development Programme in
Indonesia," Development in Practice, Vol. 16, No. 1 (2006), pp. 74-76 and World Bank, "Project
Appraisal Document on a Proposed Loan to the Republic of Indonesia for the Second Urban Poverty
Project (UPP 2)" (Report No. 23810-IND, May 15 2002).
86
World Bank, "Project Appraisal Document Indonesia UPP 2," p. 10. Ke Fang suggests the different
priorities of KDP and UPP groups may be due to democratically-elected UPP groups being more focused
on long-term sustainability than village leaders “…who have no direct stake in the funds.” Fang,
"Designing and Implementing a Community-Driven Development Programme in Indonesia," p. 78.
However, without primary research this seems a rather long bow to draw.
87
World Bank, "Project Appraisal Document Indonesia KDP III," p. 24. Surprisingly, KDP/UPP funded
establishment of new community-based funds, rather than building on Indonesia’s already extensive
network of microfinance providers. For an overview of the microfinance system in Indonesia see Kieran
Donaghue, "Microfinance in the Asia-Pacific," Asia Pacific Economic Literature, Vol. 181, (2004),
pp. 43-47.
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World Bank, "Project Appraisal Document Indonesia UPP 2," pp. 6-8 and 20.
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component is only around 17 per cent of Bank funds, it does indicate a shift in thinking
on the role of the state.

Urban and rural area development projects were a significant component of Bank
lending in both case study periods though their relative importance increased in 20002004 as Bank overall lending declined. KDP accounted for 28 per cent lending in the
2000-2004 case study period and 33 per cent with UPP, whereas VIP and UDP projects
only accounted for 20 per cent (but of a larger lending program) in 1993-1997.
Cumulatively, to the end of 2005, KDP lending was $1,003.2m. By 2005, the program
was expected to have reached 30,000 of Indonesia’s 65,000 rural villages. 89 Three UPPs
have now been approved with lending totalling $474.2 m. These are large-scale projects
in anybody’s terms and they direct urban and rural lower classes towards becoming
‘critical consumers’ focused on local administration. Are these projects, as critical
analysts of World Bank area development programs in the 1970s and 1980s argued,
about ensuring stability by “defusing discontent” amongst the urban and rural poor? 90
And do they also divert citizen’s attention away from questions about national and
international political economy?

These projects are also a modern version of McNamara’s urban and rural lending
activities that aimed to address poverty without trading-off growth. KPD goes further
aiming to make villagers efficient contributors and replicators of capitalism, via training
in the “…habits of transparency, accountability, efficiency, and the rule of law.” 91 Li
described KDP in Foucauldian terms as a powerful example of a ‘governance’ or a
‘conducting conduct’ project. 92 In Gramscian terms, governance is a method of
organising consent to create the ‘common sense’ of neoliberal hegemony.
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World Bank, "Project Appraisal Document Indonesia KDP III," p. 27.
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Water, Sanitation and Flood Protection
Table 8.5 Word Bank Water, Sanitation and Flood Protection Sector Lending to
Indonesia: 1993-1997 and 2000-2004
Project Name

Year
Approved

Approved
Amount
(USD millions)

Loans 1993-1997
Water Supply and Sanitation for Low Income Communities
Project

1993

$80.0

Second Water and Sanitation for Low Income Communities
Project

2000

$77.74

Western Java Environmental Management Project

2001

$17.45

Loans 2000-2004

The first Water Supply and Sanitation for Low Income Communities (WSSLIC) project
aimed to provide infrastructure and hygiene/health education for underserved poor
communities, whereas the second aimed to improving their “…health status,
productivity, and quality of life” — a PWC reformulation focused more on poverty. 93
Core Washington Consensus themes visible in both projects are private sector
participation and treating water, “…as an economic as well as social good.” 94

The WSSLIC projects evolved and operated in a similar way to VIP/KDP but funded
only water supply and sanitation construction and rehabilitation and related health
interventions. Project administration was the same as KDP’s with communities, after
undertaking a planning phase, managing the construction of their own facilities. The
projects cannot claim KDP’s menu of choices in the use of funding, instead much was
made of the choice between: “…a variety of appropriate technical options” in
infrastructure and the choice to: “…select and plan the construction of health
infrastructure that the benefiting families want and are willing to pay for.” 95
Participation was instrumentally focused — WSSLIC II claimed that the main reform
promoted by the project was: “…strengthening the participatory planning process in
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World Bank, "Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed IDA Credit to the Republic of Indonesia for
a Second Water & Sanitation for Low Income Communities Project" (Report No. 20132-IND, May 16
2000), p. 2.
94
Ibid, p. 4.
95
Ibid, p. 7, emphasis added.
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order to foster increased beneficiary demand responsiveness in project outcomes.” 96
These projects were essentially a variant on the area development projects analysed
above, which promoted the ‘common sense’ of commodified social relations in all areas
of human endeavour.

The West Java Environmental Management Project was a small loan focused on
improving solid waste management with a particular focus on increased cost recovery
and “privatisation of commercial services.” 97 It included a grant component to assist
with commercialisation of compost production, which was meant to assist reduce
greenhouse gas emissions. There was a strong focus on participation, a PWC theme, but
it was secondary to the focus on commercialisation and privatisation, Washington
Consensus themes.

Transport
Table 8.6 Word Bank Transport Sector Lending to Indonesia: 1993-1997 and
2000-2004
Project Name

Year
Approved

Approved
Amount
(USD millions)

Loans 1993-1997
Eastern Indonesia Kabupaten Roads Project

1993

$155.0

2 Highway Sector Investment Project

1994

$350.0

Fifth Kabupaten Roads Project

1994

$101.5

Strategic Urban Roads Infrastructure Project

1996

$86.9

Railway Efficiency Project

1996

$105.0

Eastern Indonesia Regional Transport Project

2001

$200.0

Second Eastern Indonesia Regional Transport Project

2004

$200.0

nd

Loans 2000-2004

With one exception (a rail project), lending in this sector was focused on road transport.
In the first case study period, loan objectives centred on reducing road transport costs,
expanding the road networks and/or dealing with transport bottlenecks and building
institutional strength in government agencies. The primary objective of the first project
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in the second case study period – the Eastern Indonesia Regional Transport Project
(EIRTP 1, 2001) — was in contrast formulated in PWC language. It aimed to:
“…support efforts to stimulate economic growth and improve social welfare” in Eastern
Indonesia. 98 But this PWC formulation for transport projects disappeared by EIRTP II
and the traditional focus on costs and institutional strengthening returned.

The appraisal document for the Fifth Kabupaten Roads Project (1994) claimed that
reductions in vehicle operating costs will result in a reduction in input costs (particularly
agricultural inputs) and thus to increase rural incomes. 99 EIRTP 1 (2001) is slightly
more cautious about the benefits of reduced costs claiming only an increase in the,
“…competitiveness of local products from the affected areas.” 100 Even this more
cautious formulation indicates the neoliberal belief in linear development but subject to
existence of the appropriate enabling environment and increased local engagement with
national or international markets. EIRTP 2 is also cautious but still claims that reduced
vehicle operating costs and increased access to markets, etc will assist in combating
rural poverty.

All of the Bank loans in the sector expressed concerns about the lack of cost recovery in
the transport sector. The road projects all had components to promote increases in
vehicle taxes (in particular heavy vehicles, which they suggest are relatively undertaxed in relation to their contribution to road damage) and/or to reduce, or end, fuel
subsidies. 101 In other words, all the road transport loans actually aspired to increase
overall vehicle operating costs but claimed their objective was reducing them. This is
really an extraordinary contradiction and one only exacerbated by the feeble claims in
the loans regarding access and poverty reduction. To be clear, the argument is not one in
favour of fuel subsidies — they can disproportionately benefit the non-poor and their
impact needs to be studied on a case-by-case basis — rather, the point is that claims
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World Bank, "Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Loan to the Republic of Indonesia for the
Eastern Indonesia Region Transport Project" (Report No. 22273-IND, November 12 2001), p. 2.
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World Bank, "Staff Appraisal Report: Indonesia Fifth Kabupaten Roads Project" (Report No. 12671IND, April 19 1994), p. i.
100
World Bank, "Project Appraisal Document Indonesia Eastern Indonesia Region Transport," p. 3.
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There is no detailed documentation on the Eastern Indonesia Kabupaten Roads Project but this is a
theme from 1994 through to 2004, see for example, World Bank, "Staff Appraisal Report: Indonesia
Second Highway Sector Investment Project" (Report No. 12161-IND, February 7 1994), p. 21 and World
Bank, "Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Loan to the Republic of Indonesia for the Second
Eastern Indonesia Region Transport Project" (Report No. 28071-IND, May 18 2004), p. 4.
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about the impact of transport projects on poverty require more substantial socioeconomic analysis and this argument indicates a purely rhetorical use of PWC
language. 102

The Bank was not successful in increasing road user charges, which made tariff
increases in railways impossible, particularly given the existing discrepancy in the
relative levels of costs recovery and thus prices for the two services. 103 This was a
problem for the Railway Efficiency Project, which aimed to establish preconditions for
the privatisation of railways, whilst also improving infrastructure. The project was not
fully successful in its objectives, however, it did belatedly achieve a change in the
structure of the railways corporation from a public corporation to a limited liability
company and formal separation of the rural and urban networks (unbundling). 104 The
Bank claimed the project substantially increased knowledge of key stakeholders
regarding reform and provided them with an understanding where resistance lay and
how those who resisted could be “socialized.” 105 For an evaluation written in the PWC
period, there is no indication here of a commitment to country ownership.

In the road projects, private sector participation was a strong theme in all the first case
study period loans. In the highway and urban roads projects, Bank documents indicated
existing extensive participation in both construction and maintenance of roads. With
regards to rural roads, the Fifth Kabupaten Roads Projects observed that the Bank had
achieved a high level of private sector involvement in road construction but not in
maintenance. Thus, increased private sector participation in rural road maintenance was
its goal. A key mechanism for this was packaging of contracts in ways that made them
attractive to medium and larger-sized contractors. 106

In EIRTP 1 and 2 the focus was on increasing the level of competition between private
providers and the transparency and efficiency of government procurement and contract
102

Fuel hikes finally happened in 2005, there were two fuel price hikes, the second of which in October
increased the price by of gasoline and diesel by almost 127 per cent. The government attempted to
cushion the impact on the poorest via a large-scale program of direct cash payments to the very poor.
103
World Bank, "Implementation Completion Report on a Loan to Indonesia for a Railway Efficiency
Project" (Report No. 31719, June 29 2005), p. 11.
104
Ibid, p. 2. The report also indicated that earlier Bank lending was central to the 1991 change in
structure of the railways from a dependent agency to commercially oriented public corporation.
105
Ibid, pp. 9-11.
106
World Bank, "Staff Appraisal Report: Indonesia Fifth Kabupaten Roads," pp. 14, 18-19.
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management in the new decentralised environment. In other words, the focus was on
reducing corruption — though in EIRTP 1 corruption was only explicitly referred to on
page 25 of the appraisal document in relation to decentralisation. The discussion
clarifies that decentralisation could either make corruption better or worse (!) and that
the overall “risk of error” is high. 107 EIRTP 2 was a little more explicit on the issue, and
included a project anti-corruption plan. In both projects, anti-corruption measures were
a matter of getting procurement and contracting arrangements, training, contract
supervision, complaints handling, information provision and sanctions right. 108 Thus
corruption remained a technical issue requiring no analysis of the political environment
in project areas.

One other interesting aspect of the road projects was their high level of conditionality.
This is not so much in terms of the number of conditions, though both the railway
project and EIRTP 2 have a high count with 22 and 27 conditions respectively, rather it
is the broad nature of conditions. 109 For example, the Second Highway Sector
Investment Project required that the Directorate General of Highways, “…formulate its
work program and budgets on the basis of criteria, principles and procedures
satisfactory to the Bank, and taking into account comments by the Bank.” 110 This
condition appears to refer to the Directorate’s whole program, not just Bank-funded
sub-projects! The EIRTP 2 project supported development of a pilot road fund — a
mechanism for expanding user charges in roads. A related condition was that a report on
the road fund’s implementation be furnished to the Bank for review and thereafter the
GoI had to, “…prepare and carry out an action plan for further expansion and
continuation of the road fund activities taking into account the comments of the Bank
on the report.” 111 The road fund was, in other words, only a pilot in the sense of getting
the functioning of the road fund right not to assess its applicability in the Indonesia
context.
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In the transport sector, the PWC appears to have had limited impact. This was also the
case in Vietnam, which is not surprising given that this is a traditional ‘technical’ area
of Bank lending and project staff still tend to be technical specialists. There was an
increased focus on corruption but, as anticipated in the analysis of the Bank’s approach
to it, corruption is a technical issue to be dealt with by the right type and amount of
procurement, supervision, etc. In the second case study period, there was increased
focus on ensuring that Bank social and environmental safeguards were actually adhered
to.

Energy and Mining
Table 8.7 Word Bank Energy and Mining Sector Lending to Indonesia: 1993-1997 and
2000-2004
Project Name

Year
Approved

Approved
Amount
(USD millions)

Loans 1993-1997
Cirata Hydroelectric Phase II Project

1993

$104.0

Sumatera and Kalimantan Power Project

1994

$260.5

Second Rural Electrification Project

1995

$398.0

Second Power Transmission and Distribution Project

1996

$373.0

Solar Home Systems Project

1997

$20.0

Renewable Energy Small Power Project

1997

$66.4

2003

$141.0

Loans 2000-2004
Java-Bali Power Sector Restructuring and Strengthening
Project

As was clear from chart 7.1 on Bank lending, the energy and mining sector has been a
major area of activity since lending began. The sector is dominated by power projects
— 21 of the 25 loans prior to 1993 were in power and all the loans in the case study
periods are power projects though the Java-Bali Power Restructuring and Strengthening
Project did include a small component to restructure the State gas company. The power
sector has been popular with other donors too, in particular the ADB, JBIC and USAID.

World Bank lending in the Indonesian power sector shifted around 1993, when the
Bank began pursuing privatisation of utilities. Its approach has been very similar to that
outlined in detail in the chapter on Vietnam. To briefly recap, the electricity
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privatisation model contains two core components: unbundling of profitable urban
components of electrical utilities from unprofitable rural ones, effectively removing any
capacity to cross-subsidise operations; and separation of electricity generation,
transmission and distribution functions. Privatisation can be promoted gradually starting
with the introduction of independent power producers (IPPs) in generation or more
radically, through rapid restructuring and privatisation in both generation and
distribution. 112 Transmission functions are often left in state hands.

As the Cirata Phase II project appraisal report stated, in the early 1990s the Bank
entered a new phase of its power program in Indonesia. This involved shifting focus,
“…towards the restructuring of the sector's regulatory framework and PLN's [the State
electricity utility] organization, and increased private sector participation.” 113 Some of
the groundwork for restructuring was undertaken earlier with Bank studies and reports
influencing the 1985 Electricity Act, which permitted private power production, and
Presidential Decree 37/1992. This Decree authorised private sector participation in
build-own-operate schemes in generation and permitted: “…cooperatives and other
legal entities to generate, transmit, and distribute power for public use.” 114

Cirata Phase II’s contribution was its requirement for an automatic adjustment
mechanism for electricity tariffs, this was duly introduced in 1994. Conditions in the
1992 Suralaya Thermal Power Project included compulsory reorganisation of PLN to
give regional units autonomy (i.e. geographical unbundling), as well as progressive
corporatisation and unbundling of the generation, transmission and distribution
functions in the Java-Bali system (the urban, profitable side that is distinguished from
the power system in the rest of Indonesia). 115

From the early 1990s, the GoI entered into contracts with a range of IPPs. Proposals
were unsolicited and the subsequent contracts, backed by government guarantees, were
at inflated prices. The process involved kickbacks to the Suharto regime and sweetheart
112
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deals for business cronies. 116 The Bank washed its hands of the arrangements, yet it was
clearly initially supportive of getting private participation in the sector. For example, the
Cirata Phase II appraisal stated that:
[t]he Bank is providing technical assistance to the ‘Private Power
Team’ of the Ministry of Mines & Energy to negotiate the first [IPP]
project at Paiton in East Java consisting of the construction of 2 x 600
MW coal-fired thermal units... Also, the Government is encouraging
private sector participation by facilitating the sale of power to the grid
from unsolicited power projects, as well as the wheeling of such
power supplies through the grid to third parties. In order to accelerate
these developments, the Bank is assisting in the reform of the
regulatory framework in the sector. 117

The 1994 Sumatera and Kalimantan Power Project required conversion of PLN from a
state utility to a limited liability corporation, which duly happened that year. 118 It
obliged the GoI to develop and implement regulations to frame private sector
participation in the sector. By the 1996 Second Power Transmission and Distribution
Project, conditionality was clearly endeavouring to constrain the growth of IPPs via
unsolicited proposals. All of the reports and evaluations written subsequent to the Crisis
— when the cost of IPP deals became public — emphasised that the Bank warned GoI
of the drawbacks of the unsolicited proposals and government guarantees (although in
2004 it happily provided a guarantee to get an IPP in Vietnam). 119 A 2003 report
claimed that the Bank’s capacity to influence the GoI had waned in the mid-1990s and it
was, “…unlikely that a loan suspension on this issue would have had any impact on
events either.” 120 While the Bank cannot be held responsible for GoI actions, its
complete washing of it hands is equally inappropriate given that it was actively involved
in establishing the conditions for IPPs and privatisation in a country known for its
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increasing levels of corruption and cronyism. Equally, while suspending loans may not
have ended corrupt practices, it is difficult to see how continuing them did not
demonstrate public confidence for the regime’s activities. The hand washing strategy is
not surprising though, as it is how the Bank has responded in other instances where the
utility privatisation model has failed in practice — it’s not anything wrong with the
model, it’s the imperfect world that needs to adapt. 121

The functional unbundling of PLN began with the creation of two generation
subsidiaries in Java-Bali in 1995. In the same year, the Bank funded its second Rural
Electrification (RE II) Project. This built on an earlier project promoting greater private
sector involvement in rural electrification through cooperatives and community
organisations. The RE II project aimed to further expand private sector participation.
The appraisal report claimed that the major factor inhibiting PLN’s RE operations was
its mixing of them with its urban-industrial (i.e. the Java-Bali system). 122 It (not
surprisingly) recommended separating, “…the RE and non-RE missions, with
appropriate transfer prices set for any inter-unit transactions.” 123 This was to prevent
cross-subsidisation of operations. Planning for and implementing unbundling were
conditions of the loan.

The Solar Homes Systems Project and the Renewable Energy Small Power Project,
both from 1997, focused on renewable energy but were squarely designed to advance
RE privatisation. In the Solar Homes Project, it was expansion of private sector
participation in rural areas through subsidising the acquisition of solar systems from
private dealers. The dealers were made managers of a combination of grants (made
from a related Bank Global Environment Fund grant) and hire-purchase loans. To fund
the hire-purchase, dealers were provided access to Indonesian bank loans, which were
guaranteed by on-lent funds from the World Bank. 124 The Renewable Energy Project
operated along similar lines with a Global Environment Fund-funded grant component
and access to credit from banks on-lent World Bank funds. But, in this project, the
target was the creation of private sector led renewable power generation. The grant
121
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component was to assist with feasibility studies and the credit to support construction. 125
Due to the Crisis, the Renewable Energy Project never became active and the Solar
Homes Project only disbursed just over $80,000.

The 1996 Second Power Transmission Project sought “functional decentralization
(unbundling)” of PLN generation, transmission and distribution operations in Java-Bali.
The Bank’s completion report noted that the plan to develop a regulatory framework to
achieve unbundling and a competitive electricity market was inconsistent with, “…the
prevailing electricity law, No. 15/1985, [which] was intended for a vertically integrated
monopoly.” The absence of a new law was a problem for regulation implementation
because: “…regulations are normally [sic] derived from laws.” 126 In other words, the
project attempted to bypass legal process in order to drive its agenda — which was also
the case in Vietnam due to the Bank’s haste to have IPPs operating in the country.

Ultimately though, the report regarded the project as a success because the restructuring
agenda outlined in it, and in loans since 1993, was largely completed albeit at a much
slower pace than envisaged. 127 In 1998, the Habibe government, with much assistance
from the Bank and the ADB, hastily finalised a Power Sector Restructuring Policy,
which provided the blueprint for a radical geographical unbundling as well as functional
unbundling and privatisation of the Java-Bali system. The plan had privatisation
initially focused on generation but within a short period it was meant to apply to
distribution too. Separate independent regulatory bodies were to govern the Java-Bali
and rural systems. The new Electricity Law designed to frame this process was not
passed until 2002, not late 1999 as originally envisaged because, low and behold, the
new, more democratic parliament wanted to debate and amend the legislation. Sectoral
‘reform’ was also supported by large loans from the ADB and JBIC, 128 whilst the Bank
was relegated to supporting PLN’s restructuring, which it did though grants for
technical assistance until a new loan was agreed in 2003.
125
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The 2003 Java-Bali Power Sector loan provided support to PLN for investments in the
transmission system, development of a resource planning system and development and
implementation of an action plan to restructure PLN’s Java-Bali operations into four or
more generation companies, five distribution companies and one transmission company.
Generation companies were to be spun-off first. The loan did not provide any assistance
with new generation activities despite acknowledging that generation shortfalls in the
near future are the: “…most critical issue facing PLN.”

129

This loan continued the

Washington Consensus Bank model for utility privatisation and PWC rhetoric regarding
local ownership and participation had little discernible impact. It also demonstrates little
interest in NIE-influenced ideas regarding market failure and sequencing.

One final issue is the extent to which there was local ownership of the ‘reform’
program. During the first case study period, World Bank loan reports claimed a “shared
vision” between itself, GoI and PLN for the sector. 130 In one, at times, frank assessment
report from 2003 it was acknowledged that the Bank’s vision may not have been that of
GoI. 131 Actions during this time suggest that the Suharto regime was certainly interested
in IPPs but not for the reasons the Bank supported them! Beyond that, the Suharto
regime’s position on radical privatisation is not clear.

In the post-Suharto period, the Habibe government took on unbundling and privatisation
with gusto but the program may have been motivated by the need for donor approval
(not just the Bank but also ADB, JBIC and USAID) and to secure funds. Privatisation
may have been seen as a way of separating the government from the sector in
community perceptions. Governments since have been increasingly lukewarm about the
process, they took time with the reform program and the final version of the Electricity
Act contained quite a number of provisions about what constitutes a competitive market
which must be met before the full competitive provision of the legislation come into
force. Since the Act was passed, the GoI has been slow in establishing the required
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regulatory agency to oversee the process. Thus, on country ownership of the electricity
privatisation program, it is reasonable to conclude that the evidence is shaky.

Health
Table 8.8 Word Bank Health Sector Lending to Indonesia: 1993-1997 and 2000-2004
Project Name

Year
Approved

Approved
Amount
(USD millions)

Loans 1993-1997
Fourth Health Project: Improving Equity and Quality of Care

1995

$88.0

HIV/AIDS and STD Prevention and Management Project

1996

$24.8

Iodine Deficiency Control Project

1996

$28.5

Safe Motherhood Project

1997

$42.5

Provincial Health Project I

2000

$38.0

Provincial Health Project II

2001

$103.2

Health Workforce and Services Project

2003

$105.6

Loans 2000-2004

The World Bank only began funding health projects in the 1980s, prior to that it would
only fund population projects — in Indonesia it approved five of these between 1972
and 1991. The first actual health project was in 1980 and, while the sector remained
relatively small, there has been a steady flow of projects since. During the first case
study period, World Bank-funded health projects conform to the Bank’s two-pronged
model outlined in the case study on Vietnam. This entails, “…the introduction of
market forces into the health care sector, and the allocation of public resources
according to criteria of technical and instrumental efficiency.” 132

In the Fourth Health Project (1995) the re-direction and restriction of health services
largely to preventative services for the poor was the main project objective. The Bank
clearly stated that these services must: “…conform to affordable, cost-effective
standards of care.” 133 On the introduction of market forces, the project promoted
increased fees for: “…nonessential health service provided by public facilities” and
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“…expanding health insurance for the better-off.” 134 Which health services are nonessential was not defined in this report. Other Bank reports do define non-essential
services though indirectly via the specification of essential services. 135 The pertinent
point for this thesis is that the Bank considered it their role to define who shall get
access to which health services on the basis of cost, rather than this being a role for the
citizens involving complex questions of ethics. This approach continued throughout the
second case study period. The project report did not define who the “better-off” or
indeed the targeted “poor” are. In the second case study period, Provincial Health II
referred to the lowest quintiles and the Health Workforce and Services project to the
fact that only 30 per cent of GoI subsidies reach the poorest 40 per cent of the
population. 136 Nevertheless, this is a crude analysis on which to justify major changes in
spending and service provision.

The three subsequent projects in the first case study period were condition specific
interventions that all form part of the Bank’s list of justifiable health interventions:
HIV/AIDS prevention fits the Bank’s narrow definition of a public health good. Both
iodine deficiency control and safe motherhood are considered as justifiable
interventions as they significantly reduce the “global burden of disease” measured in
“disability-adjusted life years” at relatively low cost. 137 The Safe Motherhood Project
also focused on increasing market mechanisms in the health sector through
performance-based contracts for community midwives and improved targeting of health
care was pursued through vouchers for the poor. While both these mechanisms were
dropped after the project, the Bank lauded the fact that their use, “…gained momentum
and acceptability.” 138

The three Provincial Health Projects (the Health Workforce and Service Project was just
a renamed provincial project) in the second case study period all pursued a clear Bank
model for the health sector in Indonesia’s newly decentralised system. The model
maintains the focus on government health services only supplying a Bank-delineated
134
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package of predominately primary health care interventions. But the introduction of
market forces was even more prominent in the second case study period than the first;
these projects aimed to blur the:
…distinction between public and private health care delivery which
are to operate under the same regulatory framework and thus be
subject to the same criteria and standards in competing for service
contracts on a level playing field. 139

Each project had a component to assist the central Ministry of Health in areas that are
part of the Bank’s model of essential public health roles. In Provincial Health I, it was
the generic responsibility in, “…health advocacy, information gathering and analysis,
standard setting and some regulatory functions.” 140 In Provincial Health II, it was
communicable disease control and in the third project, its health workforce regulation.

Overall then it seems that the Bank’s Washington Consensus model for health remains
dominant in the PWC period in Indonesia. Even the PWC theme of participation had
little penetration here. Equally, NIE analysis of market failures appears not to have an
effect.

Agriculture, Fishing and Forestry
Water was the dominant issue in five of the eleven loans in the agriculture, fishing and
forestry sector. From the first case study period, the World Bank’s focus in water was
not just supporting investments in infrastructure, rather these were a platform for
promoting sector ‘reform.’ That is, shifting the government’s role from managing water
and irrigation activities to regulating them and transferring responsibility for irrigation
management to water user’s groups. 141 The water user’s groups were designed to be
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Table 8.9 Word Bank Agriculture, Fishing and Forestry Sector Lending to Indonesia:
1993-1997 and 2000-2004
Project Name

Year
Approved

Approved
Amount
(USD millions)

Loans 1993-1997
Integrated Pest Management Training Project

1993

$32.0

Groundwater Development Project

1993

$54.0

National Watershed Management and Conservation Project

1993

$56.5

Dam Safety Project

1994

$55.0

Java Irrigation Improvement and Water Resources
Management Project

1994

$165.7

Second Agricultural Research Management Project

1995

$63.0

Kerinci-Seblat Integrated Conservation and Development
Project*

1996

$19.1

Nusa Tenggara Agricultural Area Development Project

1996

$27.0

Sulawesi Agricultural Area Development Project

1996

$26.8

Water Resources and Irrigation Sector Management Project

2003

$70.0

Coral Reef Rehabilitation and Management Program II

2004

$56.2

Loans 2000-2004

* World Bank classification was health and other social services but the project undertakes agricultural
area development activities.

independent entities with responsibility for implementing user-fees to recover the costs
of their activities. This is Washington Consensus ‘reform’ intended to reduce
government expenditure and responsibility and promote privatisation. Even the Dam
Safety Project (1994) promoted the model through changing the government’s role to
monitoring and regulation (with the goal of establishing an independent regulatory
agency) and separating these activities from those connected to undertaking remedial
works. Remedial work to improve dam safety was funded only as an interim step before
full responsibility for dam maintenance was handed to dam managers. 142

The 1994 Java Irrigation Improvement and Water Resources Management Project
pushed radical privatisation through decentralisation of river basin water resource
management and dramatic expansion of a program to transfer small irrigation schemes
in four Javanese provinces to water user’s groups. 143 The project ran into significant
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government opposition until Suharto’s fall. Decentralisation, and Habibe’s support for
World Bank inspired water sector ‘reform,’ changed the picture. After WATSAL was
approved in May 1999 (see structural adjustment lending above), the project
predominately assisted preparation of WATSAL reforms. It piloted collection of water
users’ fees and privatisation of small and large irrigation schemes. 144

The Water Resources and Irrigation Sector Management Program (2003), in the second
case study period, continued support for implementation of WATSAL reforms. It was
the first of a three tranche eleven year adaptable program loan designed to provide the
long-term “hand-holding” needed to implement reforms amongst local governments and
water users who are, “…ill prepared to assume their new responsibilities.” 145 It
continues a Washington Consensus-inspired Bank vision for the water sector in
Indonesia. There is no sign here of PWC concerns with sequencing. The PWC was
apparent though in decentralised project implementation (already a reality) and
participation. But participation was limited to project implementation; it was not visible
in planning for the water sector, which was undertaken with minimal participation under
WATSAL.

Of the other projects, there were three agriculture area development projects (KerinciSeblat, Nusa Tenggara and Sulawesi) all of which operated under the traditional ‘topdown’ approach of providing selected farmers with agricultural inputs to improve
productivity plus some funding for roads to improve access to markets. The Bank
regarded all three projects as unsuccessful and the Nusa Tenggara and Sulawesi projects
were restructured after the Crisis to focus predominately on microfinance for villages
run along the Bank’s standard model. With Kerinci-Seblat much of the loan was
cancelled after the onset of the crisis.

p. 2. The Java project was very complex with multiple components, each with a number of subcomponents. It operated in multiple provinces and kabupatens. It did not heed the Bank’s own warnings
about the problems of complex loans, for example in, World Bank, "Implementation Completion Report
on a Loan to the Republic of Indonesia for the Nusa Tenggara Agriculture Area Development Project"
(Report No. 28036, March 31 2004), p. 18. The multiple components seem to be the product of the
Bank’s needs for scale in lending. Use of an adaptable program loan provided eleven years for
implementation. Most projects in the second case study period again had standard Bank four or five year
project cycles, nevertheless they maintained complex, multi-component program designs.
144
World Bank, "Implementation Completion Report: Indonesia Java Irrigation Improvement and Water
Resources Management," pp. 5-8.
145
This is the Bank’s language in World Bank, "Project Appraisal Document: Indonesia Water Resources
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The only other project in the second case study period was the Coral Reef
Rehabilitation and Management Project, which, as is clear from the title, aimed to
improve local coral reef management. The project had a strong participatory focus and
also included a large ($10 million) village microfinance component. 146 There were only
two projects in the second case and thus once again it is difficult to draw firm
conclusions about World Bank directions in the sector, but relatively little appears to
have changed and Washington Consensus themes still dominate lending.

Education
It is not possible to analyse shifts in World Bank policy on education in Indonesia given
the dearth of projects in the second case study period. Nevertheless, the Bank’s
approach to education visible in the first case study period can be usefully outlined. The
loans in this period can be grouped by their focus: vocational and skills, formal tertiary
education and secondary, in particular, junior secondary education. All of the projects
were underpinned by a particular understanding of Indonesia’s stage of economic
development, namely the idea that Indonesia was, to use Rostow’s language, in the
‘take-off’ stage, moving from early industrialisation to complexly transformed
manufacturing. Indonesia had, as was appropriate, focused on universal primary
education resulting in, “…high payoffs with regards to economic and social development.” 147 Thus, Bank logic runs, in order to compete at higher levels, Indonesia needed
to focus on middle and higher-level skills. The Asian Financial Crisis demonstrated the
frailty of even the achievements in primary education. It resulted in the re-direction of
significant amount of funds from the World Bank and other donors to scholarships for
poor children and block grants for poor schools to sustain achievements.
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Table 8.10 Word Bank Education Sector Lending to Indonesia: 1993-1997 and 20002004
Approved
Amount

Project Name

(USD millions)

Loans 1993-1997
Professional Human Resources Development Project II*

1994

$69.0

Skills Development Project

1994

$27.7

University Research for Graduate Education Project

1994

$58.9

Book and Reading Development Project

1995

$132.5

Secondary School Teacher Development Project

1996

$60.4

East Java and East Nusa Tenggara Junior Secondary
Education Project

1996

$99.0

Higher Education Support Project

1996

$65.0

Central Indonesia Junior Secondary Education Project

1996

$104.0

Sumatera Junior Secondary Education Project

1996

$98.0

Quality of Undergraduate Education

1997

$71.2

2001

$4.15

Loans 2000-2004
Library Development Project

* The World Bank classifies this project as industry and trade— it is the only project in this sector and is
similar to the Skills Development project classified as education, thus it is included here.

Three inter-linked themes were visible in all the loans: decentralisation of educational
decision-making, 148 support for increasing the role of market forces in education and
limiting government resources to those areas seen to have a significant economic
payoff. 149 In university sector projects, the focus on increasing the role of market forces
was explicit in the 1994 Higher Education Project’s support for increasing the role of
private universities and the use of incentive payments for staff in order to promote
research. While the concern to limit central government expenditures remains
prominent, the project justified GoI activity on the basis that it would improve quality in
“priority areas” for research and reform policy. The new policies supported were to
allow, “…greater emphasis on private providers” and thus create a more efficient
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In vocational and skills projects, decentralisation is presented as both an outcome and a modus
operandi for project management. Further, greater skills training will, according to the Second
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sector. 150 By the time of the Higher Education Support project in 1996, the Bank
extolled the GoI’s “New Paradigm” for higher education, which defined the state’s role
as shaping regulations and directing resources to high priority areas. 151 This role
effectively limits government expenditures and facilitates private participation in the
industry.

In the Junior Secondary Education Project, the focus was originally decentralisation to
the provincial level, however, after the decentralisation laws of 1999, implementation
responsibility was shifted to kabupatens/kotas. The project included a demonstration
component that had school communities contract managing school construction, which
succeeded in having this approach promoted nationally as a cost-effective development
activity. 152 The logical extension of this approach, which the Bank promoted, is to give
control of schools to community boards. In the Bank’s approach, community boards
should, in most cases, be private entities. 153 Given that encouraging private education
was one of these project’s original objectives, this was undoubtedly a back-door method
of achieving that aim. The project also trialled the use of contracted teaching staff,
which is also part of the Bank’s focus on increasing market forces in education. 154

The implementation completion reports available on a number of the loans from the first
case study period, which were produced during the PWC, provide no indications of a
change in the World Bank’s Washington Consensus policy for education. The policy
involves limiting state expenditures via a focus on primary education; strategic
investments in areas deemed to have notable economic payoffs; and increasing the
market forces in the education sector. Indeed, as with the Vietnam case study the
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limited Bank resources devoted to the sector in the PWC are perhaps the most powerful
indicator of the Bank’s overall view.

Conclusion: World Bank Lending in Indonesia: More Change But…

This case study shows that World Bank lending in Indonesia shifted more notably than
was the case in Vietnam. The shifts were driven as much by the Bank’s public disgrace
over its relationship with the Suharto regime as its political judgements about the
capacity of post-Suharto leaders. On the post-Suharto or rather post-Habibe governments, the Bank considered they were not pursuing what the Bank (and IMF) saw as
necessary economic reforms in Indonesia. When President Yudhoyono took office,
there were some indications of renewed faith in the Indonesian government. To a lesser
extent, change was driven by its mandate as a conservative lending institution — the
concern about Indonesia’s lack of creditworthiness overrode the Bank’s disbursement
imperative. The reduction in lending also served to lower the Bank’s profile in
Indonesia, useful for a disgraced organisation. This disgrace drove most of the shift
from formal, large-scale projects in the electricity and water supply and sanitation
sectors and towards community development projects. Even with the electricity sector,
the disgrace shaped what the Bank funded. So while the Bank acknowledged that new
generation capacity is the, “…most critical issue facing PLN” they will not fund a largescale utility sector that has been a domain for corruption. 155

In the second case study period, the sectoral priority became broadly defined
‘governance’ projects. Along with the Bank’s deeply interventionist program to shape
the public sector, many governance activities focused on embedding civil society in
market-based relations. It is really in the KDP and UPP projects that the impact and
nature of the PWC is most transparent. Social capital analysis was at the forefront of the
project justification; participation and community control and ownership are relatively
strong themes and the Bank even steps away for a moment from its standard methods of
procurement. But as the analysis here demonstrates, KDP and UPP aim to restructure
social relations and create neoliberal communities — communities that take,
155
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“…responsibility for their own improvement by engaging with markets” and “conduct
themselves” appropriately in competitive markets. 156 The change in Bank procurement
methods under the projects is possibly their most radical departure from the Washington
Consensus. This change allows communities to pay community members to undertake
components of small-scale infrastructure projects, though with the proviso that wages
are below market rates for day labourers, which is below the cost of subsistence.

KDP and UPP also show a strong focus on poverty and there is a visible shift on Bank
thinking on this issue between the two case study periods. In the first case study period,
the Bank was of the view that Indonesia was in a second phase of industrialisation
shifting from an initial ‘take-off’ based on low technology, labour-intensive
manufactures towards higher technology manufacturing and less reliance on agriculture,
forestry and fisheries. The Asian Financial Crisis showed that this analysis was
premature at the very least and that poverty needed to be taken more seriously. This is
not to say that during the New Order the Bank was not aware that rural and urban
poverty represented a potential threat to stability — earlier funding for the Village
Improvement Projects and Urban Development Projects, which were essentially a way
of “defusing discontent” demonstrated this. 157 Rather, the Crisis discredited the idea that
poverty was a peripheral issue that would be dealt with by economic growth. It would
require specific measures. The Bank-supported measures start out as a strong version of
the PWC with direct support for social expenditures under the Social Safety Net
Adjustment Loan in 1999. However, after Habibe’s presidency ended, the Bank
reverted to a much weaker version of the PWC providing only indirect support via day
wage employment under KDP and to a lesser extent UPP. Its main focus became
promoting fiscal restraint by the state.

The PWC theme of decentralisation is systematically pursued throughout Bank loans in
the first case study period. This was a formal policy of the GoI but more at the level of
rhetoric than action. The Bank’s insistence on decentralisation created implementation
difficulties for projects approved early in the first case study period — the lack of
country ownership led to slow disbursement and bureaucratic resistance. For those
projects approved later in the period, however, it meant they could be more easily
156
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adapted to the reality of decentralisation from 1999. In the second case study period,
decentralisation is a reality and the Bank was concerned to make it work as they,
“…have invested a lot of resources into decentralization programmes around the world.
Thus they have an ever-increasing institutional stake in their success.”158 Hadiz
continues:
[i]n ensuring the ‘success’ of these decentralization programmes, the
Bank no doubt has to work with an array of entrenched elites, both
national and local. This in itself restricts any serious consideration of
factors of power, interest and conflict in the theoretical approach. The
result is a theory of decentralization that tacitly endorses the nondisturbance of the existing social order to the greatest extent possible,
while encouraging institutional tinkering in a supposed political
vacuum. 159
This approach is clear in Bank lending in the second case study period in Indonesia. For
example, the Provincial Health Projects do not analyse local power structures or indeed,
in any detail local institutional arrangements and politics. They simply aimed to
implement the same Bank-delineated package of interventions and increase the role of
market forces in each location. It is a continuation of the one-size-fits all model of Bank
lending that the PWC was meant to address.

During the first case study period corruption (unsurprisingly) rarely rated a mention. In
the second case study period, corruption was reduced to ‘misprocurement’ and
addressed by technical activities — an expanded program of procurement and financial
monitoring. Surprisingly, a large number of Bank implementation completion reports on
projects approved in the first case study period either did not mention corruption or
claimed that there were only a couple of small instances affecting the particular project.
It seems the Bank’s earlier acknowledgement of the level of problems has itself been
‘revised.’

In Indonesia, as in Vietnam, the Bank is engaged in a long-term ‘war of position.’ In the
first case study period, it seems that the Bank understood itself as engaged with a
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fundamentally market-oriented society that just needed the occasional push in the right
direction. This was reinforced by its view of the New Order state as relatively strong
and controlling. This view tempered its use of coercive techniques, indeed consensusbased action was the norm. The Bank wanted to stay engaged and continue lending to
Indonesia, thus it funded projects that nominally pursued the Washington Consensus
agenda but were, in fact, strongly manipulated by the New Order to enrich its cronies.
In the PWC period, the Bank has in fact been more dogged in its pursuit of Washington
Consensus hegemonic principles. It has had some formal, legislative ‘wins,’ in
particular in water supply and electricity. However, it has not confronted New Order
interests, which have reorganised themselves at the provincial and local level.
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Chapter Nine
Conclusion
The first section of this thesis (re)interpreted the history of the World Bank utilising the
Gramscian framework developed in Chapter One. The framework centred on the key
Gramscian concept of hegemony as a way of understanding how the US historic bloc
organises consent both in the West and internationally. Following the work of Cox, the
current hegemonic historic bloc was labelled pax americana. Chapter Two opened with
an overview of the changes in international power relations that accompanied pax
americana. In keeping with the Gramscian framework, it explored not just changes in
economic power but also issues of leadership, alliances, networks and ideology. This
latter issue was central to the establishment of the Bank because it was the ideas
unleashed by the Keynesian revolution in economic thought that provided the
underlying rationale for international organisations in the economic, financial and
subsequently trade spheres. While the ‘Keynesian, modernisation, welfare model’
provided the intellectual underpinnings of the Bretton Woods twins, US hegemony
profoundly shaped the institutions too. The consequences for the IBRD include the
weighted voting structure, conservative capitalisation and reliance on private capital
markets, project lending, the Washington location and strong US executive influence.

Chapter Three traced the trajectory of the Bank from a relatively small organisation
designed to assist with the postwar reconstruction needs of Europe to the most
significant international development agency. This transition began with the 1947
Marshall Plan, which largely undermined the Bank’s role in postwar reconstruction and
led to the search for a new focus. The Bank found this in developing countries, though it
initially only lent to ‘creditworthy’ developing countries and it continued to lend to high
income countries until 1979. Throughout the 1950s and for most of the 1960s, the Bank
lent predominately for infrastructure projects. Decision-making was based on the
Bank’s assessment of a project’s viability and its assessment of a country's overall
creditworthiness. These assessments involved ‘fly-in, fly-out’ consultants armed with
newly available economic data and new tools of econometric analysis. Projects were
scrutinised in-depth, judged on their estimated economic rate of return, subject to a
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range of conditions and then their implementation was closely monitored. The lending
program was underpinned by a neoclassical view of development, which held that
developing countries would ‘catch up’ with the West given the right technical and
financial assistance. The Bank grew slowly in the 1950s. The establishment of the IDA
in 1961 provided a big boost to its profile, size and lending sectors, allowing it to
expand slowly into what were previously regarded as ‘soft’ sectors such as agriculture,
water supply, health and education. The IDA made the Bank a development agency.

The 1970s saw dramatic expansion and transformation of the Bank into the leading
development institution — one no longer only reflecting pax americana but also able to
assist in its creation and reproduction. This transformation took place during the
presidency of Robert McNamara but should be understood in terms of the needs of the
dominant US domestic and international markets. In particular, the Bank’s expansion
was connected to the US strategy to centralise the role of its dollar in the world
economy, which required increasing the flow of US private capital to the rest of the
world — the Bank acted both as a conduit for this flow and as a ratings agency for other
lenders. Throughout the Cold War, the Bank supported US geopolitical allies and from
the 1970s significant Bank resources were directed at ‘defusing discontent’ amongst the
rural and urban poor in developing countries who might be exploited by communist
ideas. Expanding resources for the Bank was also a political strategy to counter the calls
for a new development agency more directly under UN control. Thus the Bank was an
agent of politico-economic change.

As McNamara’s presidency came to a close, neoliberalism swept the globe. His
introduction of structural adjustment lending in 1980 reflected this new politicoeconomic climate. Neoliberalism’s rise in the Bank was as dramatic as it was across the
West. The new President, A.W. Clausen —a particularly hardline advocate of supply
side economics who removed a number of dissidents — assisted its advance, but
neoliberalism’s rapid capture of the Bank equally indicates that the Bank was always a
neoclassically-dominated, mainstream institution. Neoliberalism translated into a set of
hegemonic economic prescriptions shared between the Bank, the IMF and the US
Treasury: this was the Washington Consensus. It prescribed a two-phased re-writing of
countries’ economic policy starting with large-scale changes to macroeconomic policy
settings, which was largely the domain of the IMF, though the Bank became
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increasingly involved as the organisations’ missions meshed. Phase two was
predominately the domain of the Bank, it covered microeconomic reform in everything
from trade and tax to banking and governance.

The Washington Consensus was quite successful in facilitating the penetration of
Western capital into all corners of the developing world. It also promoted more marketbased forms of governance in many countries, which increased the access and security
of Western capital. Yet there were many instances where ‘agreed’ reforms were never
implemented or policy was reversed after a short period because it did not fit the needs
of local elites and interest groups (i.e. national historic blocs). The Washington
Consensus lacked an engagement with, and an understanding of differing national
politics. Further, its social costs were simply too high and the backlash it provoked was
too politically costly, even for the Reagan administration. Thus in 1986 the more
politically astute Barber Conable replaced Clausen and some of the harsher Washington
Consensus policies were moderated. Nevertheless, the US continued its turbulent (yet
symbiotic) relationship with the Bank by cutting an IDA replenishment and
implementing an administrative overhaul that further reshaped the intellectual terrain of
the Bank in neoliberal directions. The worsening debt crisis did provide some relief for
the Bank, as the US government’s response gave it a central role in managing debt
rescheduling and relief.

The Washington Consensus agenda did little to improve the quality of the Bank’s
project portfolio. Lewis Preston, appointed Bank President in 1991 by the
administration of George Bush Snr, commissioned a staff member to compile a report
on the outcomes of Bank lending. The resultant Wapenhans Report concluded that 37.5
per cent of Bank projects did not produce satisfactory outcomes according to the Bank’s
own standards. Despite concerns regarding the social costs of adjustment and some
pressure from the Japanese government to acknowledge the role of the state in
development, in 1993 the Bank was still fundamentally following the Washington
Consensus agenda and declaring structural adjustment a success. A few issues were
added to the Bank’s agenda but its move beyond the Washington Consensus did not
really occur until the Clinton administration appointee, James Wolfensohn, replaced
Preston in 1995.
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The gradual shift to the post-Washington Consensus, outlined in Chapter Four, did not
substantially challenge most of the hegemonic principles of the Washington Consensus.
Rather, it generally involved adding new issues to the policy ‘reform’ agenda for
example, poverty reduction, local participation in development programs and a concern
with the sequencing of reform. At a fundamental level then, this was an intellectual,
political and social project to shore up Bank operations so that developing countries
would continue to be able and willing to support pax americana: it was a passive
revolution. Chapter Four identified ten core issues that Bank literature claims drive its
current developmental approach, these are defining features of its PWC. It also
discussed the impact of the Bank’s project model on lending practices.

The second part of the thesis examined the impact of both the Washington Consensus
and PWC on the lending practices of the World Bank via case studies of its lending
practices in Vietnam and Indonesia. These detailed studies provide a framework on
which to base some empirical conclusions about the extent to which the shift in rhetoric
associated with the post-Washington Consensus has been incorporated into lending
practices and thus providing insights into neoliberal development discourse more
generally. As a way of concluding this study, I return to ten features of the PWC as well
as the issue of Bank as project manager, to see what light the analysis and case studies
sheds on each.

Approach to Monetary and Fiscal Policy

As suggested by the analysis of the PWC, the Bank still focuses on economic growth as
the key determinant of development and poverty reduction and its view of growth is
centred on a neoliberal approach to monetary and fiscal policy. The PWC has seen
changes at the margins of this approach, in particular, capital market liberalisation has
been questioned both in the theoretical literature and by the international financial
institutions. 1 The focus on money supply as the key economic policy tool has also been
discredited but ‘getting the prices right’ is still a hegemonic principle. Equally, an open
current account remains ‘law’ as does the preference for consumption taxes over

1
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income taxes and the belief in full cost recovery for many government provided
services, especially utilities. The project to limit government expenditure has not been
affected by the (rather limited) debate about the role of the state.

World Bank recommendations on monetary and fiscal policy in Vietnam and Indonesia
did not display significant changes between 1993 and 2004. In Vietnam, across both
case study periods, the Bank focused on price liberalisation to control the budget deficit
and inflation and to ‘get the prices right’, currency devaluation and financial sector
reforms and openness to foreign direct investment. 2 There was an expansion of the
Bank’s structural adjustment program between 2001 and 2003 — health, education,
environmental sustainability, government planning and legal reform were added but
they were framed in ways that supported the Bank’s conservative fiscal policy agenda.
For example, the Bank encouraged the GoV to limit education spending essentially to
basic education and it encouraged the expansion of private education. Equally, health
care in the PWC period was still regarded as primarily an individual responsibility; the
Bank promoted spending only on a limited package of primary health care interventions
for the (generally ill-defined) poor.

In the first half of the 2000s, the Bank’s view was that Vietnam needed to progress
more quickly towards a floating exchange regime but it seemed to accept a role for
controls on short-term capital flows. However, they promoted faster liberalisation in the
foreign investment regime and interest rates policy following traditional Washington
Consensus prescriptions. 3 A moderated view on regulation of short-term capital flows
appears to be the most significant impact of the PWC agenda on monetary and fiscal
policy analysis by the Bank in Vietnam.

In Indonesia, the Bank increased its concern with tightening the fiscal restraint on the
state in the post-Suharto period. It demonstrated increased concern with the level of
government debt, which did indeed jump after the Asian Financial Crisis mostly due to
the large devaluation of the Rupiah. The key outcome of the Bank’s concern was a
decrease in the scale of its own lending program and an increase in the use of
conditionality to remove price subsidies, in particular fuel subsidies. The Asian
2
3

See World Bank, "Viet Nam - Structural Adjustment Credit I".
World Bank, "Vietnam CAS 2003-2006," Annex D1, pp.4-7
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Financial Crisis resulted in the end of the quasi-fixed exchange rate system on which
the Bank laid a part of the ‘blame’ for the Crisis (in combination with the liberalised
current account and corruption). During the PWC case study period, the Bank was
committed to floating exchange rates, a liberal current account and market interest rates
— indeed, these Washington Consensus prescriptions were core criteria in determining
the level of its 2002-04 lending program. 4 Surprisingly, in Indonesia, neither the PWC
nor the Crisis seems to have altered Bank hostility to capital controls even on short-term
capital flows.

Macroeconomic fundamentals were still treated as essentially a ‘given’ in the PWC
agenda. They do not require public debate as was clear from a 2002 study, which found
that the PRSP process did not provide an, “…opportunity to debate the macroeconomic
framework” in any of the fifty countries studied. 5 This was also the case in Vietnam and
Indonesia. Further, a 2006 review of fifty PRSPs found that only 14 per cent did not
include a commitment to strict monetary policy and only four per cent did not include
strict fiscal policy. 6 It seems reasonable to conclude that conservative monetary and
fiscal policy are hegemonic principles of the PWC and that they effectively frame and
constrain all other policy approaches.

Country Specificity

The PWC claims to have left behind the ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach to development so
negatively associated with the Washington Consensus. If this were the case, one would
expect to see increased attention to and analysis of each country’s specific social,
political and economic realities and an increased diversity of projects and approaches.
At the level of the Bank’s CAS, the PWC approach could present itself in the form of
better developed socio-economic analysis of local conditions as well as consideration of
global and regional impacts.

4

World Bank, "Indonesia CAS 2001-2003," pp. 11-12.
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The social, economic and political analysis in the Vietnam CAS of 2002 was
superficial. The economic analysis was brief and mainstream; it focused on the need for
faster policy reform in order to build a market economy and achieve economic growth.
The external environment was not analysed. The CAS claimed to promote the GoV’s
own agenda and be based on their planning documents, yet it simply did not accept the
GoV objective of a “socialist-orientated market economy” which translated in Bank
documents to a neoliberal vision of “[h]igh growth through a transition to a market
economy.” 7 Despite the constraints apparent in the CAS, the Bank is regarded the by
GoV and others as having a quite open attitude in Vietnam and it has supported research
and activities in a number of non-traditional areas.

In Indonesia, the 2001 CAS contained a more substantial social, political and economic
background analysis than the earlier CASs, or indeed the 2002 CAS for Vietnam. 8
Indeed, the CAS noted a need for its country assessments to more fully evaluate
“…political, institutional and social dimensions.” 9 It had a strong focus on the PWC
themes of participation, decentralisation, poverty and governance. Yet at the end of the
day, the level of the Bank’s lending program was determined chiefly by Washington
Consensus concerns: “…prudent monetary, fiscal and debt management,” bank
restructuring privatisation, rice-trade liberalisation and reform of GoI procurement and
financial management. 10

The PWC lending program in Indonesia was strongly influenced by country specificity
in the form of the large-scale KDP and UPP projects. In utilities though, country
specificity was not as visible — the Bank’s Washington Consensus model for utilities
privatisation prevailed and country specificity was wanting. Indeed, the political
instability after the fall of the Suharto regime offered the Bank the chance to pursue a
radical approach to water and electricity privatisation, which they did. In an interesting

7

Socialist Republic of Vietnam, "Comprehensive Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy," p. 6,
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the number of times such broad Bank claims regarding the impact of protectionism on prices have not be
empirically the case, this is a good demonstration of how neoliberalism has become ‘common sense’ in
the Bank.
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statement on the Bank’s commitment to country specificity, a 2003 loan in the
electricity sector acknowledged that generation shortfalls in the near future were the,
“…most critical issue facing” the country. 11 However, the Bank would not fund new
generation capacity and gave no explanation as to why. Instead, it funded a project
providing investments in the transmission system and implementation of an action plan
to unbundle the Indonesian electricity company’s urban operations.

In Vietnam, the Bank was constrained by the GoV to pursuit of a gradual approach to
privatisation. In water supply, the Bank’s major push has been to expand corporatisation
and private participation to districts. In electricity, the Bank followed the model of
introducing IPPs and separating urban and rural operations. It funded the separation of
over one thousand rural electricity distributors from the national electricity corporation,
yet the appraisal reports had virtually no analysis of the viability of these small
operations, indicating a lack of country specific analysis. Equally on tariffs in both
water supply and electricity, the Bank’s only policy view across both periods studied in
both Indonesia and Vietnam was that they must be increased. This position was pursued
in the wake of the Asian Financial Crisis and there was no analysis of the economic,
social or political impacts of immediate increases: the formula dominated.

The average size of loans can also be considered an indicator of the Bank’s trade-off
between project quantity, country specificity and quality. This is because the Bank tends
to aim for scale in its operations to meet its need to disburse loans but also because of
the needs for cost-effective project development and management. 12 In both Vietnam
and Indonesia the average and median loan size remained, in both case study periods,
close to the Bank’s historically standard size of around $100 million.

Recipient Government Ownership

The Comprehensive Development Framework emphasised that recipient governments
should own and control their development program and projects. For the most part, the

11

World Bank, "Project Appraisal Document Indonesia Java-Bali Power Sector Restructuring and
Strengthening," p. 9.
12
Ranis, "The World Bank near the Turn of the Century," p. 86.

CONCLUSION

286

Bank proposes to achieve this ownership by countries developing PRSPs in line with
the Bank’s sourcebook. For HIPC countries, a PRSP is a Bank condition for continued
access to lending, but neither Vietnam nor Indonesia are in this category. PRSP are
meant to be a pre-condition for access to structural adjustment lending. Of course, the
irony that countries are meant to ‘own’ their development program through undertaking
a Bank specified and delineated process has been noted by a number of critics. While
the requirement for the Bank and IMF to approve PRSPs was dropped in 2005, they still
do not necessarily form the basis of the Bank’s lending program, rather, this remains the
role of the Country Assistance Strategy. But given these provisos, the extent to which
Vietnam and Indonesia took on board or ‘owned’ the process varied significantly.

In 1999, Vietnam requested involvement as a pilot CDF/PRSP country. An interimPRSP was produced quickly in order to maintain access to structural adjustment lending
and involved little public participation or country ownership. 13 Yet, the GoV had a
relatively strong degree of ownership of the full PRSP, renaming it the CPRGS. The
World Bank, “…mobilised an immense effort to facilitate the process,” following it at
every step to ensure that research was transformed into policy. 14 This intervention,
while positively focused, nevertheless expanded the Bank’s involvement. As Woods
pointed out, there is a likelihood that:
…at a more political level, the greater presence on the ground by the
Bank and the Fund and more intensive and widespread relations may
well be further smothering local officials, reducing ‘ownership’ rather
than fostering nationally owned initiatives. 15
An evaluation of the process concluded that, despite the high level of ownership, the
CPRGS had limited impact on GoV policy-making and provincial and communal level
governments are unaware of it. 16 This obscurity is largely because the CPRGS process
was kept separate from the Government’s existing planning processes, which involves
debate in party cells and mass organisations across the country and approval by the
National Assembly. The Bank originally wanted the CPRGS to become Vietnam’s key
planning document but (reluctantly) agreed to have the CPRGS incorporated into the
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existing process. The irony regarding country ownership is obvious — the GoV had to
persuade the Bank to allow the process to be country-owned. But country ownership is
high in Vietnam and the Bank’s PWC agenda has at least allowed it to flourish.

Looking at the content of PRSPs, the analysis of fifty PRSPs showed that out of nine
standard Washington Consensus policy prescriptions considered each averaged six and
there were, “…very few instances of unorthodox policies being mentioned.” 17
Furthermore, it found that 72 per cent of PRSPs included policies on trade
liberalisation; 90 per cent included policies on privatisation; 64 per cent included
liberalising investment regimes; and 96 per cent had commitments to limiting state
budgets. 18 Notably, Vietnam was the one exception in policy on this last area, indeed
overall its PRSP only shows three out of the nine Washington Consensus policies — the
second lowest count of the fifty countries studied.

Indonesia voluntarily prepared an interim-PRSP in 2003 and a full PRSP in 2005.
However, the process seems to be more obscure than in Vietnam and it appears to have
little impact on GoI policy. 19 Indeed, country ownership of Bank projects has declined
in Indonesia since the fall of Suharto. Moreover, the Bank took advantage of the Crisis
situation to drive through major legislative and other changes (for example, in the water
sector), although it did so with the support of the Habibe Government who sought donor
support in effect as a substitute for popular support. Despite a high degree of initial
success in implementing its program, some Bank plans have been delayed in the
parliament, subject to legal challenges and protested against by large sections of ‘civil
society.’ It is also apparent that many of the Bank’s projects in Indonesia were
predominately prepared by Bank staff not government officials. In Vietnam, the GoV
appeared to have more control over the sectors and contents of projects than GoI
bureaucrats do for the Bank’s Indonesia program. It still remains the case though, that
documents submitted to the Bank’s Board are fully prepared by Bank staff; whereas it
seems obvious that country ownership would mean that recipient countries’ themselves
prepare the projects — perhaps with an appended appraisal by World Bank staff.
17
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A reduction in conditionality could be considered an indication of the Bank handing
over control to recipient governments. In Vietnam the median/average number of
conditions did not change between the two case study periods (19/20.9) and in
Indonesia there was a dramatic increase in the number of conditions from an average of
15.5 (median 13) in the first case study period to 25.5 (median 24) in the second. The
Bank claims that the average number of conditions on loans across its whole portfolio
declined from over 35 in the early 1990s to 12 in 2005. 20 Yet the number of
‘benchmarks,’ which supposedly do not determine Bank funding in the way that
conditions do, increased from 15 in the early 1990s to 23-34 in 2004-05. 21 The jump in
conditions for Indonesia parallels Penny Griffin’s finding that while the Bank’s overall
average number of conditions decreased, in countries the Bank regards as higher risks,
the number of conditions and benchmarks significantly increased. 22

Analysed by sectors, the only area that saw a substantial increase in the number of
conditions was public sector governance. 23 According to Griffin, not only has there been
an increase in the number of conditions on governance issues but the form of these
conditions has also become more abstract and invasive. 24 She labelled this ‘postconditionality’ and concluded that it increases the Bank’s, “…encroachment into the
day-to-day governance of developing countries” including more systematic involvement
with political and civil society. 25 The case studies demonstrated a significant increase in
projects in the law, justice and public administration sector — in Vietnam, projects went
from nine per cent of the value of new commitments in 1993-97 to 18 per cent in 200004; in Indonesia they skyrocketed from seven to 47 per cent. Further, while every
condition did not become more invasive, as Griffin found, conditionality certainly
remained very broad. For example, the Bank often required recipient governments to
discuss with them their plans for a whole sector and for sector studies, plans or
legislative reviews to be undertaken in line with terms of reference it approved. The
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Poverty Reduction Support Credit (PRSC) III in Vietnam — the only operation studied
that employed the post-conditionality tool of triggers — demonstrated the postconditionality breadth of Bank involvement in Vietnam’s governance. Conditionality
clearly does not always result in the Bank getting its way, nevertheless the case studies
provided limited indications that the Bank was prepared to reduce its influence in the
name of country ownership. Equally, conditionality aimed to mould countries’
structures in particular ways, in particular it increasingly effects not just the economic
but also political and civil society.

The Role of the State

The PWC theoretically allows space for an expanded view of the role of state in contrast
to the Washington Consensus hostility to it. The state can compliment, rather than
compete with markets. In a weak form, the PWC only offers a state that provides a good
policy environment for business, in other words an active, pro-capitalist state. 26 A
further step provides more space for state institutions to engage with market
imperfections (information and transaction costs). In a strong version, the PWC
genuinely engages with the state as an actor; it promotes critical analysis of actors and
interests in society and the distribution of power and resources between them. 27 The
case studies indicated that the Bank utilised a weak version of the PWC role of the state
that is framed by the Washington Consensus project of limiting the size of the state. The
project to privatise utilities, contract out activities and limit expenditures in health,
education and social safety nets prevailed. The PWC state is a technocratic and
managerial one, where the, “…policy aims are implicit and not part of an open political
negotiation.” 28 None of this is surprising given it is the role of the state that best fits
post-1970s pax americana, wherein globalisation is, “…being consolidated via the
nation-state system.” 29

The tensions and contradictions produced by the Washington Consensus hostility to the
state competing with the PWC acknowledgement of its necessity are visible in Bank
26
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lending. For example, in Vietnam, the 2004 PRSC III included as a condition the
number of enterprises registered each month. The Bank justified this on the basis that
“[e]ssentially private sector development is the combined outcome of policy actions in
many areas, from financial sector reform to better governance and public
administration” 30 — a PWC view of the state as a facilitator of business. In the same
series of loans there were provisions for a redundancy package for workers from
equitised SOEs. The package offered a single lump-sum payment and a retraining
voucher for Vietnam’s non-functional vocational education system. It was both a
passive approach to the labour market and a way to limit social safety nets expenditure
to one-off payments — this is adjustment welfare. Equally, the Bank put much faith and
money in microfinance (as a substitute for social safety nets). The point being that the
Bank’s approach to redundancy and microfinance as tools for poverty reduction assisted
in minimising the expenditure and role of the state in both welfare and finance, whilst at
the same time, Bank logic made the state responsible for business development.

In Indonesia, World Bank lending in the PWC focused on two areas — community
development projects and decentralised governance projects. The largest community
development activities were the series of KDP loans. KDP has largely bypassed local
and district governments whilst creating governance structures that effectively parallel
the state but lack its permanence. This is another example of the PWC tension around
the state resolved in this case through a form of neoliberal governmentalism. 31 In the
Bank’s decentralised governance projects (sector specific projects in health, transport
and water supply) the tension was resolved by directing provincial and district
governments toward neoliberal forms. That is, configuring them as far as possible as
technocratic contract managers, and where they do provide services, limiting the scope
of those services.

Market Failure and the Pace and Sequencing of Reforms
PWC rhetoric gives attention to market failure in addition to the Washington Consensus
focus on government failure. It sees the sequencing of reform programs as critical to
outcomes. In the study, examples were sought of analysis of market failure, increased
30
31
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attention to the development of regulatory frameworks relevant to local conditions prior
to liberalisation and analysis of local conditions prior to privatisation. There were
virtually no examples to be found but there were a number of prominent examples
where projects simply ignored issues of market failure and sequencing in order to
implement Washington Consensus hegemonic principles.

Perhaps the key difference between the Bank and the GoV since at least 1998 is the
pace of reform — the Bank has consistently urged faster and more dramatic reform
whilst the GoV preferred a more cautious approach. The issue that most concerned the
Bank was the pace and extent of equitisation of SOEs; it was pursued through
conditions attached to the Bank’s three PRSCs. Equitisation is a sensitive process in
Vietnam as it impacts on multiple interests and involves many actors. 32 Obtaining
genuine commitment to reform would require time and political engagement but this did
not concern the Bank. Privatisation is also administratively and managerially complex
and has stretched the regulatory capacity of the government. Valuation of land and
assets has been particularly difficult, yet the Bank pushed to have audit requirements
prior to privatisation dropped because it was slowing the equitisation process. This has
facilitated corrupt practices such as the undervaluation of assets. The Bank’s continuing
silence on this issue indicates PWC ‘lessons’ about market failure and pace and
sequencing of reform are second to the Washington Consensus push for privatisation.

In the power sector, in 2004 the World Bank backed the introduction of an IPP in
Vietnam two years prior to the introduction of a new National Electricity Law that made
IPPs legal; concern with sequencing was not visible here. The IPP was built with the
support of a Bank guarantee, ABD and JBIC funds and a 20 year, US dollar
denominated, set price power purchase agreement with the state owned electricity
company. At the end of the day, the GoV assumed virtually all the risk. 33 This is a
strong indication that the Bank still regards government failure as more problematic
than market failure.

In Indonesia, the Bank claimed after 1998 to have consistently warned against
guaranteed (inflated) price IPP arrangements. However, public documents do not fully
32
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support their claim, rather they indicate that the Bank was more concerned with
increasing private sector involvement than with market or government failure. The
studies of Vietnam and Indonesia indicate that PWC theorising on market failure and
the pace and sequencing of reform has had little practical impact on Bank lending.

A Focus on Poverty Reduction and the Social Costs of Adjustment

In Vietnam the Bank assisted the GoV focus on poverty at a statistical and analytical
level and it has devoted significant resources to assisting the GoV to both map and
understand poverty. The Bank has played a role in sharpening the focus on, and
understanding of, poverty in GoV policy-making. Loans in the PWC period utilised
poverty more frequently in their project justification. For the most part, however, these
justifications were highly generalised and often problematic, for example correlations
were claimed between poverty reduction and all weather roads or between rural
microfinance and direct, “…poverty alleviation and equitable growth.” 34 Microfinance
was a key area of Bank project activity to directly address poverty and the social costs
of adjustments. Indeed, microfinance loans were among the first organised by the World
Bank when it re-engaged with Vietnam. This was at a time when, following a period of
restructuring broadly along neoliberal lines, poverty was declining, however the social
welfare system, which had been neglected since the mid-1980s was in a state of
disrepair. This resulted in increasing levels of unrest, especially in the countryside. The
Bank’s support for microfinance in Vietnam should thus be seen as part of a neoliberal
policy response to problems arising from structural adjustment, as Weber so clearly puts
it, microfinance is, “…a neo-liberal safety net for neoliberal political restructuring.” 35
Moreover, the Bank publicly supports it as an approach to poverty reduction — but it is
an approach that eschews the need for social safety nets as “a welfare-based approach to
poverty alleviation that disenfranchises the poor and establishes new dependency
relations.” 36
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As a consequence of the Asian Financial Crisis, the Bank increased analytical work on
poverty in Indonesia; it remained, however, significantly underdeveloped. The Bank did
fund a Social Safety Net Adjustment Loan (in 1999 for $600m) that aimed to provide
one-off assistance to those negatively impacted by the Asian Financial Crisis. It also
sought to make social expenditures more targeted, which had the added benefit of
assisting the constraint of social expenditure in the medium-term. The Bank largely
designed the loan and saw it as a vehicle for reform resulting in a high level of
conditionality. But its uncomfortableness with the loan resulted in only part of the loan
being disbursed. This loan is perhaps the strongest indication of the PWC social agenda
in the lending studied, yet the neoliberal hegemonic principle of constraining state
expenditure dominated.

The Bank’s PWC approach to poverty reduction in practice involved support for basic
education; health care expenditure on preventative measures and a limited number of
curative services that it considers have a large impact on peoples’ disability-adjusted
life years; some adjustment welfare — that is, one off assistance after redundancy or an
economic shock; and some funding for projects that employ day labour at below the
minimum wage. Looking at this package, Porter and Craig’s argument that the Bank
approach to poverty reduction is to get the poor above one dollar a day but little more
than that, seems to have substance. 37

Social Capital and Civil Society Participation

The PWC regarded civil society as a distinct realm for analysis and intervention. In the
second half of the 1990s, the Bank tended to employ social capital analysis to
understand civil society. Its social capital theory sees civil society as the glue that holds
society together and a missing link in development. From this engagement, the PWC
claimed a genuine appreciation for local knowledge and practices tempered by concerns
about coherence and coordination. 38 It also focused on expanded local participation in
the planning, design and implementation of activities.
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The case studies demonstrated how the PWC dichotomises between civil society and
the state/market and between civil society and NGOs or civil society organisations.
Civil society was constructed as a positive and natural arena in which individuals
spontaneously collaborate. However, the Bank’s social capital approach considers that
this ‘civil’ component of society needs assistance or facilitation to achieve its full
potential as neoliberal communities responsible for their own development and engaged
with markets. 39 NGOs, in contrast, do not always share the Bank’s vision of
development and are often regarded by the Bank with suspicion. 40

Social capital was not utilised as an analytical tool in Vietnam although it may
indirectly have influenced Bank directions and engagements. Bank engagement with
civil society was, surprisingly, at one level both more extensive and more cooperative in
Vietnam than in Indonesia, which has a much more developed and active NGO sector
despite New Order repression. In Vietnam, the Bank reasonably successfully promoted
itself as a ‘white knight’ supporting the rights of civil society organisations that are, in
the Bank’s story, suppressed by the communist regime. The Bank even claimed a shared
development ‘vision’ with Vietnamese NGOs. Of course, the NGO community is quite
small in Vietnam and, outside the party-based mass organisations, it is strongly linked
to western developmental NGOs. Further, the Bank’s reputation for participative
practice was largely based on the operation of poverty studies and surveys rather than
the operation of projects, where its practices were, in fact, less developed in the PWC
case study period than in Indonesia. This was, in part, because the Bank operates with
and through the GoV, which has largely been uninterested in accepting funds for
community development type activities from the Bank. However, it was also because
the Bank’s practice of participation in project activities was narrow and instrumental.
For example, in rural electrification projects, communities were consulted to determine
the potential economic rates of return from electrification and their willingness to pay
for it. Even the Bank’s Operations Evaluation Department have questioned the real
extent of participation and concluded that in general, “…the language of NGO/CBO
involvement in Bank-supported projects outstripped the reality.” 41
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In Indonesia, the Bank only seriously started to engage with NGOs after the fall of
Suharto and as a result of this and its closeness to the previous regime, many NGOs
remained suspicious of the Bank. Bank officials, it seemed, did not understand this
suspicion and remained tied to a sub-set of NGOs that have been willing to engage with
them and that share, “…its development vision for Indonesia and values the Bank’s
development agenda as a way forward.” 42 As is to be expected, they essentially do not
engage with more radical, transformative NGOs. 43

The Washington office of the Bank selected Indonesia as a trial country for social
capital studies and projects. It use was limited to the project under which it was trialled
namely, KDP. It was not visible in other social sector projects and certainly not in
economic or infrastructure analysis. In terms of the process and type of participation
promoted under projects, KDP is the Bank’s most sophisticated version of community
development type activities. Yet, every aspect of its operations are specified in Bank
approved manuals — everything from how the participatory process is undertaken to
how the projects are planned, implemented, administered and monitored. 44 KDP
demonstrates that the Bank’s version of participation is instrumental not transformative
and aimed at producing critical consumers — rational, competitive actors responsible
for and focused on their own development, not critical citizens who may question
domestic and international power structures or demand rights. 45

While KDP is still running, social capital was already going out of fashion in the Bank
by 2004. But participation remains a key tool and it has impacted on the way the Bank
does business. Yet it seems increasingly necessary to look critically at its purpose, form
and outcomes. Kapoor’s convincing deconstruction of participatory development
concluded that its role is to, “…protect and advance institutional authority.” 46 Indeed, he
noted how:
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…in one fell swoop: participation becomes a disciplinary mechanism
for the World Bank/IMF to hold the poorest Third World states ‘to
account’… and, in turn for these states to keep civil society
organisations

in

check;

and

participations

helps

advance

neoliberalism, promoting ‘partnerships’ to co-opt Third World states
and (elite) NGOs into the structural adjustment program. 47
In Gramscian terms, participation has become a tool to pursue the PWC passive
revolution — it is a moral, intellectual and educative engagement to construct civil
society in the neoliberal image.

Decentralisation

Decentralisation is directly connected to participation because the Bank assumes that
decentralisation means local participation in decision-making. As Hadiz notes,
decentralisation has been an attractive policy for international development agencies
because it appears to respond to the criticism of their past technocratic and one-size-fits
all policies. 48 However, this claim is shallow because the PWC approach to
decentralisation, derived from NIE, is strongly technocratic — it was a technical issue
of choosing the form and amount of decentralisation in various policy areas. Further, it
tended to place responsibility for policy-making on sectoral issues in the hands of (now
locally situated) technocrats rather than political society.

In Vietnam, the Bank’s support for decentralisation was political as well as technical.
The Bank was not comfortable with Vietnam’s consensus-based system combining
mass organisations, the Communist Party and a formally elected government. It
promoted the creation of legislative frameworks for formal liberal democratic
institutions such as (Western-style) NGOs and trade unions. 49 This was central to the
Bank’s PWC project of transforming not just the economy but also the state. However,
in terms of Bank projects, decentralisation was largely a technical issue, it manifested
itself in issues like whether planning for rural roads should have been done by
47
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bureaucrats at the district or commune level or which institutional framework was best
for communities to manage electricity distribution.

In Indonesia, decentralisation was pursued throughout Bank loans in the first case study
period, when it was a formal policy of the GoI but not actively pursued by it. The
Bank’s activity may have been because, despite its closeness to the Suharto regime, it
felt a need to transform political and social relations to promote more liberal democratic
forms of governance or to prevent instability. After Indonesia’s radical decentralisation
program in 1999, Bank projects focused on ensuring decentralisation worked. Indeed,
the Bank has invested a lot of resources into decentralisation programs around the world
and it has been the biggest donor to decentralisation projects in Indonesia. 50 It has, as
Hadiz pointed out, “…an ever-increasing institutional stake” in decentralisation’s
success. 51 This is a particularly difficult task in Indonesia because there is a clear
tension between any project to reorder society through democratic decentralisation and
the reality that projects have bound it to, “…entrenched elites, both national and local...
[which] in itself restricts any serious consideration of factors of power, interest and
conflict...” 52

The Indonesian Provincial Health Projects are a good example of the technocratic form
of Bank projects. They did not analyse local power structures or indeed, local
institutional arrangements and politics in any detail. Rather, they funded
implementation of the same Bank-delineated package of health interventions and
activities to increase the role of market forces in each location. In other words, there
was little genuine local political or civil society input to the form and structure of local
health services. The projects’ directed provincial governments along a neoliberal model,
where the state funded only limited interventions for the poorest and the role of the
market was central.
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Health and Education

The PWC appears to have only marginally broadened the Bank’s approach to health and
education. Overall, focus remained on increasing the role of market forces but the PWC
approach was visible in the encouragement for governments to direct resources to areas
seen as having significant economic payoffs. In education, this meant basic education
and in health it was a package of primary health care interventions plus limited curative
treatments. Indeed, the most striking thing about the Bank’s role in health and education
in Vietnam and Indonesia was that while Bank resources devoted to research and policy
development in health and education seem to have increased, project lending remained
negligible. In Vietnam, education accounted for only six per cent of Bank approvals in
2000-2004 and health and other social services for one per cent. In Indonesia, education
declined from 13 per cent of new loan approvals in 1993-97 to five per cent in 2000-04.
Health expenditure did increase from four to 14 per cent thanks to the series of
Provincial Health projects.

Corruption

The PWC continues the Washington Consensus concern with corruption but supposedly
on the basis of quite different assumptions — the Washington Consensus focus on
corruption derives from the New Political Economy’s cynical and almost malevolent
view of states in the Third World, 53 whereas NIE understands corruption as the result of
government and market failures. Equally, the focus on property rights and institutions is
rejuvenated as these are essential to minimising transaction and information costs and
thus to economic growth, they are a prerequisite to ‘getting the prices right.’ 54 The PWC
approach promotes the incorporation of conventions and norms in institutions and
suggests that transferring Western systems to the developing world is unlikely, on its
own, to improve performance. But the case studies provided no examples of Bank
concern about corruption caused by market failure. Further, the project to apply
Western legal, political and financial solutions to developing countries appears to be
fundamentally intact.
53
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The Bank as a Project Manager

By 2003-05, adjustment lending had declined again to 30 per cent of new approvals.
This means that investment lending was again the dominant mode of Bank activity. The
PWC had limited impact on the project model for investment projects and their
procurement requirements. Yet, it may well be that these two structures are those that
most profoundly shape the outcomes of Bank projects and they seem to have received
less critical attention in the past decade than previously.

Investment lending generally operates with a three to five year project cycle and given
the Bank’s need to disburse and this short-term lending cycle, its main focus is always
on negotiating the next project. Bank staff prepare most projects and the Bank funds
pre-appraisal work through trust funds and grants or existing bank loans. Even in this
latter case, where recipient governments control funds, the Bank’s view on the
appropriate consultants and contractors for jobs tends to predominate. The Bank also
prepares the appraisal of each project that is submitted to its Board.

A raft of Bank requirements directs the operation of a project once approved. Bank
investment loans can only be utilised for work that is tendered out. Tendering methods
and types are specified for every dollar of a project. Project accounting must be done to
Bank standards, generally with separate accounts, software and Bank approved staff.
Project manuals, yearly work programs, project staff, sector restructuring plans and a
whole range of other items must be undertaken “to the satisfaction of the Bank.” As
even Mason and Asher note in their generally very moderate 1973 history of the Bank:
[i]nternational competitive bidding, reluctance to accord preference to
local suppliers, emphasis on financing foreign exchange costs,
insistence on a predominant use of foreign consultants, attitudes
towards public sector industries, assertion of the right to approve
project managers — all proclaim the Bank to be a Western capitalist
institution. 55
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Procurement procedures for non-consultancy work must be undertaken in line with one
of the Bank’s three standards: ICB, NCB and local shopping. According to Caufield, in
1995 the amount of Bank procurement specified for ICB was 56 per cent. 56 For 2004,
for non-consultant contracts subject to prior review, over 74 per cent were subject to
ICB. 57 The overall figure for Bank investment loans may be lower as contracts subject
to prior review would tend to be larger value loans that are mostly subject to ICB.
Nevertheless, this figure is surprisingly high as Indonesia and Vietnam showed some
move towards an increased use of NCB procedures in the second case study period,
particularly in regional and rural infrastructure projects. But even here, the suggestion
of change was generally superficial. The procurement procedures simply reflected the
reality that international firms were very unlikely to bid for these projects. Even local
contractors were difficult to find as much of the work had previously been done by the
state (e.g. road construction). So, loans were accompanied by training for the private
sector in bidding for projects. The use of NCB may well indicate a new level of
penetration in the Bank’s project to create markets.

The only project that deviated from standard Bank procurement arrangements was
KDP. Here communities were able to pay workers for day labour at below minimum
wages as well as using competitive procurement for goods and civil works. However,
under the presidency of Paul Wolfowitz community development activities were not
favoured, and Robert Zoellick’s reputation as a hard-line free trader does not bode well
for their future in the Bank.

Use of Bank consultants also influences recipient governments. In 2004, there were
3,581 consultant contracts worth $1.33 billion under Bank investment loans subject to
prior review. 58 Add to this consultants under investment loans not subject to prior
review, those hired from the Bank’s operating budget and those hired from trust funds
56

Caufield, Masters of Illusion, p. 242. Further, “[y]ear after year the Bank’s most powerful members are
awarded contracts roughly in proportion to their shareholdings in the Bank. The Bank’s five top
shareholders… receive half the money the Bank spends on foreign procurement.” Ibid, p. 243.
57
World
Bank
Group
Website,
Projects
and
Operations,
available
from:
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/PROCUREMENT/0,,contentMDK:202516
13~pagePK:84269~piPK:84286~theSitePK:84266,00.html, access date: May 2007. Consultant contracts
are not included as they are subject to different procurement guidelines. The total value of procurement
subject to prior review was $8.3 billion.
58
Ibid.

CONCLUSION

301

or the associated operating budgets and the Bank’s budget for consultants is likely to be
over $2 billion. Of the $1.3 billion in prior review consultant contracts, just over 44 per
cent were awarded to organisations or individuals from OECD countries. But this figure
is deceptive because it hides the number of contracts now won by local subsidiaries of
Western companies (for example, local operations of Price Waterhouse Coopers and
Ernst and Young came up in the Bank’s list quite a few times).

Actually there have been few academic studies of the impact of consultants (foreign or
otherwise) but one recent effort by Natasha Hamilton Hart is illuminating. 59 She argued
that the common impact of the use of consultants derives from the “commercially
mediated” nature of the relationship. 60 Consultants produce and reproduce international
standards that are then used to measure the performance of governments. Further, and
perhaps more importantly, “…consultant use configures government organisations in
ways that ensure their structural openness.” 61 This openness has a physical dimension in
the presence of consultants in government agencies and an ideological dimension in that
this presence has been: “…strongly associated with government receptivity” to
managerial ‘reforms.’ Using donor-funded consultants trains and “…configures
government organisations as contract managers.” And it demands increasing compliance
with the financial transparency schemes of the PWC era. Hamilton-Hart concludes that
donor funds for consultancies spreads, “…a particular model of government, one that is
not generically western or modern but specifically American.” 62

Conclusion
The case studies showed only a few indications that the Bank has moved beyond its
traditional concern with economic growth within a market capitalist framework. Indeed,
it was clear that the concern with social issues rested, to a large extent, on their impact
on social stability as well as on, “…economic development or the functioning of
markets.” 63 The changes that did occur were influenced by the East Asian
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‘developmental state’ model, New Institutional Economics, NGOs and the (now
reversed) American political climate. So, the post-Washington Consensus in a
hyphenated form is appropriate as it indicates the fundamental link to the hegemonic
principles of the Washington Consensus. It also gives a sense that the PWC is not a new
and stable form of hegemony, rather, while it has confronted some of the tensions and
instability of the Washington Consensus both theoretically and as a modus operandi for
the Bank, it has created new ones.

A number of critical IPE scholars have come to a similar view about the PWC, though
from different perspectives and using different terminology. The PWC has been seen as
a project to reinvent liberalism, 64 embed liberalism 65 or to legitimate and thus secure it. 66
Porter, whose focus was on the way recent shifts aimed at “…embedding, legitimating
and securing liberal reform,” 67 analysed the shift using the Polyanian notion of a double
movement:
[t]he first movement, economic liberalization and integration, involves
the breaking up or disembedding of traditional and local social
regulation by market relations, enabling increased, unfettered
penetration of market forces... This is followed by the second,
embedding movement, where acting almost intuitively a range of what
Polyani called ‘enlightened reactionaries’ rally to mitigate the social
disruptions of market-led liberalization. 68
Li’s study on the KDP draws on the Foucauldian idea of government as a means to
“conduct conduct,” which is quite similar to Gramsci’s idea about the role of political
society in governing through, and organising, consent. 69 My study finds the Gramscian
notion of passive revolution most illuminating in describing the nature of the shift to the
PWC. In these terms, the PWC has essentially been a project of pax americana to
manage change in order to ensure its dominant position is maintained and the possibility
of progressive change is contained. It has been a global project and its implementation
required (amongst other things) a global organisation that can appear to have broader
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interests and that can at the same time adapt to local social forces. Up until the
appointment of Paul Wolfowitz at least, the World Bank was very successful in its
ideological campaign, selling its focus on poverty reduction and country specific and
owned development strategies, but this detailed examination of its lending exposed
some example where this was little more than rhetoric, whilst other components such as
decentralisation or participation served the expansion of capitalism more than would
appear from a surface examination.

The conclusions above focused on the World Bank and policy outcomes, yet it would be
remiss (and indeed, inadequate in terms of the Gramscian framework) to conclude
without making a few comments about how Vietnam and Indonesia have moderated the
impact of Bank policies, that is to say without acknowledging the undoubted ongoing
relevance and capacity of states themselves. And, while this thesis did not aim to
provide a comprehensive analysis of the autonomy or capacity of the Vietnamese or
Indonesian states, it has provided some insights into both the shape of their historic
blocs and the way in which these blocs have interacted with the Bank.

In Vietnam, the state has been committed to receiving public support from the Bank,
though for a period in the late 1990s this was less the case. Despite the disinclination to
publicly disagree with the Bank, Vietnam’s policy implementation displayed a strong
degree of autonomy. In some instances, the GoV utilised Bank assistance to follow
quite a different path than that suggested by the Bank. More often though it used the
assistance develop its own policy-making capacity, to improve the centre’s financial
relationship with the provinces or to undertake reform in a way that re-asserted the
influence of the party and state. 70 The Bank has been part of the changing ideological
terrain in Vietnam regarding the role of states and markets but neither the level of
change nor the influence of the World Bank or other donors should be exaggerated.
In Indonesia, the Bank had a strong degree of influence on policy-making during the
Suharto regime yet at the same time it suffered from quite a degree of ‘capture.’
Indonesia seems to have convinced the Bank that it was a developing Asian ‘tiger’ and
that the authoritarian Suharto provided the required structure and stability. Yet the
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Asian Financial Crisis and the Bank’s embarrassment regarding its support for the
corrupt regime led the Bank to re-write its view of Indonesia’s economic status and to
attempt to utilise the political crisis to pursue dramatic economic and political ‘reform.’
At the same time, the Bank program was not simply imposed as President Habibe
utilised support from the international financial institutions as part of his political
strategy. The PWC inherited a limited engagement with politics and in the end the
Bank’s decentralisation push, in the context of Indonesia’s “rigid state-corporatist”
system, only resulted in a re-constitution of entrenched elites under a new system. 71
When Habibe departed, Indonesia’s relations with the Bank shifted again as subsequent
administrations did not need its public support to the same extent. In this context, the
Bank significantly cut the size of its lending program and focused on governance at
both a central government and civil society level. Despite this reduction in influence,
the post-Habibe governments do not appear to have had the same capacity as was
visible in Vietnam to direct the Bank’s activities.

I used a Gramscian framework to emphasise that the World Bank has been a major
agent in organising consent in an international environmental where it should not be
forgotten that US military power dominates. Equally, the Gramscian approach stressed
that capitalism has required over the past few decades structured markets that are still
largely imposed, controlled and protected by the state. This thesis has demonstrated that
the World Bank has effectively taken on the role of organising a passive revolution to
reorder the state-economy relationship: it has been a significant element in creating an
emerging global (neoliberal) ‘state.’
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